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2015, Vol., No.17

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    Remarks on an Instance of Intertextuality in the Eleventh Chapter of the Śikṣāsamuccaya and the Phrase Tṛṇagulmauṣadhivanaspati in Buddhist Sūtra Literature

    Charles William DiSimone | 2015, (17) | pp.9~37 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The Śikṣāsamuccaya of Śāntideva is an excellent resource for scholars interested in the relationship between Buddhist texts as a significant portion of this seventh century text is made up of quotations from other, often significantly earlier, texts and as such examples of intertextuality occur often within its pages. Taking an instance of intertextuality between a pair of passages from two texts quoted in the eleventh chapter of the Śikṣāsamuccaya, the Ugradattaparipṛcchā-sūtra and the Ratnarāśi–sūtra, as a starting point, this paper will explore the usage of a particular phrase shared in the passages quoted from both texts, tṛṇagulmauṣadhivanaspati (grass, shrubs, medicinal herbs, and forest trees), as it occurs in all available sources. By using resources available through the digitization of Buddhist literature that have only become available to modern scholars in recent years, the instances in which this particular phrase occurs in extant Sanskrit texts can be uncovered with a reasonable degree of accuracy, uncovering that it appears to be used almost exclusively within well-known Mahāyāna Buddhist texts considered to be either vaipulya sūtras or found as part of the Mahāratnakūṭa sūtra collection. This paper collects the instances where tṛṇagulmauṣadhivanaspati occurs as well as similar phrases used in Sanskrit and Pali texts with the goal of creating a preliminary study of the use of this phrase and its variations in Sanskrit and Pali sources that provides some insight into how the texts that employ the phrase tṛṇagulmauṣadhivanaspati may be related and how this may further our understanding of the connection of certain types of texts in Buddhist—and especially Mahāyāna—sūtra literature.
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    The factors to make theMiao-fa-lian-hua-jing Xuan-zan abridged in its Tibetan translation

    望月海慧 | 2015, (17) | pp.39~77 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    In the commentaries on the scriptures (mDo ’grel) in the Tibetan Tangyur, we can find two works that were translated from Chinese into Tibetan: the ’Phags pa dGongs pa zab mo nges par ’grel pa’i mdo rgya cher ’grel pa of Wen tshegs and the Dam pa’i chos puṇḍa rī ka’i ’grel pa of Sa’i rtsa lag. The former is a commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra of Woncheuk (圓測) (613-696), who came from Korea, and the latter is a commentary on the Lotus Sutra of Kuei-Chi (基) (632-682). Though both of them belong to the Chinese Fa-hsiang School (法相宗), their views on the teaching of mind-only are different, and the former is said to be criticized by successors of the latter. In this paper, I take up the latter to consider some problems in this Tibetan translation of a Chinese text. The Dam pa’i chos puṇḍa rī ka’i ’grel pa is said to be an abridged translation of the Miao-fa-lian-hua-jing Xuan-zan (妙法蓮華経玄賛) and comes to an abrupt end in the eleventh Chapter. Comparing this Tibetan translation with its Chinese text, we can find the reasons it became a shorter version of the Chinese original: (1) the differences in chapters between the Chinese translation of the Lotus Sutra and its Tibetan translation; for example, the lack of the chapter on Devadatta in the Tibetan translation or the position of the chapter on Transmission; (2) differences in the passages of the Tibetan translation of the Lotus Sutra from its Chinese translation; for example, numbers of verses or added verses in the Chinese translation; (3) Buddhist texts unknown in Tibet, namely the Ta-chih-tu-lun (大智度論), the Shih-erh-men-lun (十二 門論), the Shih-chu-p’i-p’o-sha-lun (十住毘婆沙論), etc.; (4) etymological explanations in the Chinese; for example, the title of the scripture; and (5) information known only in the Chinese tradition; for example, the differences between two Chinese translations, transmission of the scripture to China, or non-Buddhist works written in China. The Tibetan translator consulted the Tibetan translation of the Lotus Sutra by Surendrabodhi and Ye shes sde, not the Chinese translation by Kumālajīva that Kuei-Chi depends on, when he translated citations of the scripture. This obviously led to the above-mentioned factors. Therefore, he obviously acknowledged the differences between the two translations, and revised the citations from the scripture in consultation with its Tibetan translation. Thus, it seems that the abridgements occurred when he could not solve the problems stemming from these differences.
  • 3.

    ‘Non-Erroneous’ Debates in the Buddhist epistemology

    Bae, Gyeong-A | 2015, (17) | pp.79~108 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    Dharmakīrti defines direct perception (pratyakṣa) as the cognition that is non-erroneous (abhrānta) and free from conception. When Dignāga identified direct perception as cognition without conception, it was not necessary for him to add an extra element, ‘non-erroneous’. While Dignāga argues that wrong cognitions are caused by the mind, Dharmakīrti criticized the idea of attributing all illusions to the mind. According to Dharmakīrti, illusory cognition, such as cognition of double moon caused by eye-disease, should be considered as a sensory illusion that cannot be counted for a perception. Dharmakīrti seems to have thought that the cause or the object of non-erroneous, such as cognition of double moon, is not the result of inner cognition. This is incompatible with Dignāga’s theory of knowledge. Vinītadeva interprets that Dharmakīrti’s intension as being to exclude sensory illusion with the particular term ‘non-erroneous’ for two reasons. Firstly, he identifies the definition of the ‘non-erroneous’ perception as that of a ‘non-deceptive’ one because valid cognition is by definition non-deceptive. Secondly, he contends that the notion of ‘non-erroneous’ should not be considered as a real object of cognition (ālambanaviṣaya) because the Yogācāra school maintains that all cognitions are erroneous in terms of the object of cognition (as an external existent). Dharmottara criticized Vinītadeva in three regards. Firstly, ‘nonerroneous’ should be understood as presupposing ‘non-deceptive’. Therefore ‘non-erroneous’ as a synonym of ‘non-deceptive’ is simply redundant. The definition of perception as cognition that is both free from conception and ‘non-erroneous’ must be taken together and not separately. Therefore, both of these characteristics combined with each other determine the essence of perception. Secondly, ‘non-erroneous’ is intended to counter the opinions that the cognition with conception or an erroneous cognition can be also included in direct perception. Thirdly, he supposes that the cause and object of erroneous cognition embrace even external existents. According to Nyāyabindutīkātippanī, Dharmottara also believes that the cognition is ‘non-erroneous,’ on the basis of the Sautrāntika’s standpoints. The notion of abhrānti (nonerroneous), for Dharmottara, is on the one hand ‘non-erroneous’ object of cognition and at the same time not contradicted by the causal efficiency that the object of cognition possesses.
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