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2016, Vol., No.20

  • 1.

    Reframing Bhāviveka

    Jundo Nagashima | 2016, (20) | pp.13~48 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    According to Tibetan accounts, Madhyamaka bifurcated into the Svātantrika of Bhāviveka and the Prāsaṅgika of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. However, we can hardly find any trace concerning the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction in later Indian sources. This paper attempts to explain why this discrepancy occurred by analysing the works of Candrakīrti, Bhavya and Atiśa. Firstly, I examine what is svatantra anumāna in the Prasannapadā to elucidate the cause of the problem and the point of controversy between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. It is a widespread view that the dispute over the use of probative inference in the Prasannapadā resulted in this division of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. It is, however, possible to read it in a different way. Then, I focus on Atiśa’s works to show the widespread view was not shared by him, who endorses both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. In order to bolster my argument, I look into how Candrakīrti’s position regarding inference was transmitted to him, and point out that Bhavya’s Madhyamakaratnapradīpa played a crucial role in the formation of the later Indian Prāsaṅgika lineage. A close examination of these texts makes it clear that Candrakīrti succeeded in handing down his view by misleading the later Mādhyamikas.
  • 2.

    Madhyamaka Schools in Early Tibet

    Kevin Vose | 2016, (20) | pp.49~94 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This paper examines two senses of Madhyamaka “schools” in eleventh and twelfth-century Tibet. On the first, the present work roughly sketches the monastic institutions that were instrumental in teaching Madhyamaka during this time when Tibetan exegesis of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy took firm root. Our present state of knowledge only allows a sense of the central figures and the monasteries with which they were affiliated in Central Tibet. On the second sense of “Madhyamaka school,” this paper analyzes the categories that Tibetan authors utilized to classify various Madhyamaka teachings and to stake out their preferred interpretations. After noting that some authors retained the eighth-century distinction between Sautrāntika and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, this work explores many renditions of the “Illusionist” (sgyu ma lta bu / sgyu ma rigs grub pa) and “Non-Abiding” (rab tu mi gnas pa) schools of Madhyamaka. Through the many ways that Tibetan authors characterized these two camps, we see a range of evolving concerns that ultimately fed into the enduring Svātantrika – Prāsaṅgika divide. Arguing that Svātantrika – Prāsaṅgika does not, however, constitute a simple renaming of the “Illusionist” and “Non-Abiding” positions, this paper shows that the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika (sometimes referred to in this period as “Great Madhyamaka”) categories classify a host of issues that divided Tibetan Mādhyamikas on both conventional and ultimate truths.
  • 3.

    The Meaning of rigs shes in the Geluk Tradition

    Jongbok Yi | 2016, (20) | pp.95~138 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    A rational consciousness is a crucial concept that can explain Tsongkhapa’s and the Geluk Tradition’s path to enlightenment. There are two types of rational consciousness: a conceptual and a non-conceptual rational consciousnesses. A conceptual rational consciousness is regarded as a concordant ultimate because, while a conceptual rational consciousness itself is not an ultimate due to relying on signs to examine the ultimacy of true existence, this type of rational consciousness concords with an ultimate which is the result of the ultimate reasoning. On the other hand, a non-conceptual rational consciousness is an actual ultimate since it directly perceives the selflessness of persons and phenomena. The former is, according to Sonam Thakchöe’s formulation, ontologically deceptive but epistemologically correct; the latter is correct ontologically and epistemologically. This paper tries to find answers on the two questions. First, how can these two rational consciousnesses—a conceptual rational consciousness and a non-conceptual rational consciousness—be related to each other in meditation on emptiness? A conceptual rational consciousness and a non-conceptual rational consciousness are cause and effect, respectively. That is, by means of refuting both objects of negation in this way, throughout rigorous and constant meditative cultivation to the limit of one’s thought, at the last moment, a conceptual rational consciousness will become a non-conceptual rational consciousness, which is a yogic direct perception. Second, when these two types of rational consciousness have separate designations as a subtle inference analyzing ultimacy and a Superior’s pristine wisdom of meditative equipoise, why are they both still called “rational consciousness”? Although there are two types of rational consciousness, both are called rational consciousness because not only does a rational consciousness indicate the two separate functions which are in the relation of cause and effect, but also the term is an epitome describing the whole process of realizing emptiness. A rational consciousness is a description of the whole process from refuting other systems (the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence) to clearly understanding the Middle Way School tenets, confirming the nonexistence of true existence, and attaining and sustaining a yogic direct perception that directly perceives the mere absence of true existence.
  • 4.

    “If Apprehending Occurs, It is not the View” — Sakya Thinkers on the Madhyamaka View of Freedom from Proliferations

    Yaroslav Komarovski | 2016, (20) | pp.139~170 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    The Sakya thinkers whose views were addressed in this paper are consistently in agreement regarding what freedom from proliferations is, how it is utilized in contemplative practice, and how it is located within the broader universe of non-tantric and tantric Buddhism. Freedom from proliferations is not an object, and transcends all categories of existence, nonexistence, etc. Consequently, it cannot be approached and described in the same way we understand and describe colors, tastes, ideas, etc. Yet, it is also not a nonexistent thing similar to rabbit horns and other types of falsely imagined phenomena. It can be realized, but only in a negative, deconstructive way: by stripping away all conceptual constructs, and ‘seeing by way of not seeing’. Freedom from proliferations is just this very non-findability, non-apprehending of anything at all. To free mind from proliferations, to reach this state of non-apprehending, one has to resort to contemplative practice which incorporates Madhyamaka reasoning negating extremes, and/or realizations based on quintessential instructions, tantric empowerments, blessings, and practice of the two stages. This approach to freedom from proliferations suggests that to understand the Sakya take on the Madhyamaka view of reality, we have to pay close attention not only to how Sakya thinkers articulate the ‘object’ realized, but also—and even more importantly—to how they present the way the ‘subject’ realizes that ‘object’. In other words, rather than trying to find the most adequate definition of freedom from proliferations, we have to examine the process wherein mind frees itself from proliferations. And that, in turn, cannot be done without exploring how the Madhyamaka view is supposed to be incorporated into contemplative practice.
  • 5.

    Madhyamaka in Tibet: Thinking Through the Ultimate Truth

    Douglas Duckworth | 2016, (20) | pp.171~197 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    This paper is a philosophical reconstruction of dominant interpretative strands of Madhyamaka thought in Tibet. I distinguish features of Tibetan interpretations of Madhyamaka from what Mark Siderits has characterized as the view of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka, and in particular, his claim that for Nāgārjuna, an ultimate truth is an incoherent notion. In doing so, I make a case for an interpretation of Madhyamaka that is compatible with Yogācāra, with particular attention to an interpretation offered by Mipam (1846-1912). Mipam’s presentation bridges Madhyamaka and Yogācāra by articulating an inconceivable unity of the two truths. I will argue that an inconceivable ultimate is compatible with Yogācāra and Madhyamaka by drawing attention to Madhyamaka as a system of interpretation that acknowledges all truths as framework-dependent. That is, since all truths are relative to a particular framework in Madhyamaka, framework-dependent truths are always only conventional, or relative truths; there are no framework-independent truths. Yet the structure of the framework itself is “unframeable” (beyond the scope of thought and expression) because discrete truths are necessarily conceived within a particular framework. What transcends the boundaries of the framework (and cannot be completely enframed within it) is the ultimate truth. Whereas emptiness is the principal metaphor for ultimate truth in Madhyamaka, the inexpressible (unenframed) ultimate is expressed in different ways in Yogācāra: in terms such as the “dependent nature” (paratantra) and the “basic consciousness” (ālayavijñāna). An inconceivable ultimate is certainly consistent with Yogācāra, but need not conflict with a Madhayamaka interpretation. This is because, while the ground of things is empty, it is also dependently arisen (and dependence is dependent, too, just as emptiness is empty).
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