Korean | English

pISSN : 1975-2660

2020 KCI Impact Factor : 0.17
Home > Explore Content > All Issues > Article List

2017, Vol., No.22

  • 1.

    Tathāgatagarbhaḥ sarvasattvānāṃ — A Hypothetical Interpretation of a Declarative Formula in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra —

    Kazuo Kano | 2017, (22) | pp.9~61 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    In this paper, I shall propose a hypothetical interpretation of the phrase tathāgatagarbhaḥ sarvasattvānāṃ, which is a declarative formula of the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra (abbr. MPMS) and is preserved as original Sanskrit. This phrase confirms that the word tathāgatagarbha—if this is a bahuvrīhi compound—cannot grammatically go with the word sattvānāṃ unlike the case of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, in which tathāgatagarbha, being a bahuvrīhi, qualifies the noun sattva (sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ). Previous studies have mostly interpreted tathāgatagarbhaḥ of the MPMS, as a tatpuruṣa, whereas I shall keep this as a bahuvrīhi and take it to be an adjective which qualifies some undescribed noun—that is, stūpa, omitted in the phrase, based on the following reasons: (1) The word tathāgatagarbha in the formula is probably premising such expressions like tathāgatadhātugarbhān stūpān, dhātugarbhe caitye (which is paraphrased by the expression sadhātuke caitye “a caitya that contains relics”), etc., as found in other Mahāyāna scriptures, where tathāgatadhātugarbha, as a bahuvrīhi, qualifies the noun stūpa “a stūpa that contains tathāgata's relics”; (2) the omission of the noun stūpa in the formula might reflect the same omission found in expressions, such as dhātudhṛk or dhātudharaḥ (both omitting stūpaḥ), as found in Buddhist inscriptions; (3) The declarative formula of the MPMS should naturally be relevant to the main topic of the MPMS, which deals with tathāgata's nirvāṇa and his relics that were found in stūpas (which, in turn, are reinterpreted in the MPMS from the viewpoint of the dharmakāya and tathāgatagarbha); (4) The MPMS precisely declares that all beings are real stūpa/caitya, and this declaration fits well with the phrase tathāgatagarbhaḥ sarvasattvānāṃ “all beings have tathāgatagarbha (i.e. stūpa)”; (5) We find yet another expression (asmākam upari tathāgatagarbho 'sti “there is tathāgatagarbha above us”) in the Sanskrit fragment of the MPMS; however, the word tathāgatagarbha, in this expression, does not disturb the above- mentioned interpretation. Instead, this reminds us of the famous scene taught in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka—the stūpa arising in the sky above the audience: saptaratnamayaḥ stūpo ’bhyudgataḥ ... parṣanmaṇḍalasyopari vaihāyasaṃ tiṣṭhet. Accordingly, I shall tentatively propose to interpret the word tathāgatagarbhaḥ in the formula as a bahuvrīhi which qualifies the noun stūpa. I think, however, it is possible to apprehend tathāgatagarbha as a tatpuruṣa, to be the secondary meaning of the word because the MPMS most probably utilizes the word with double or triple meaning in order to preserve the semantic richness of the word garbha, which has already been pointed out by Masahiro Shimoda and Michael Radich.
  • 2.

    The Eighth Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554) on the Relation between Buddha Nature and its Adventitious Stains

    Klaus-Dieter Mathes | 2017, (22) | pp.63~104 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    Among the positions within the post-classical Tibetan tathāgatagarbha debates, the Eighth Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje’s pointedly stands out by reason of his categorical denial that the mind-stream of sentient beings contains a buddha nature, not even one in the sense of subtle seeds of buddha qualities. The entire repertoire of one’s psycho-physical aggregates consists of nothing but adventitious stains. What is covered up by them is an all-pervading but ontologically separate buddha. Consequently the ‘profane’ and ‘sacred’ also have different foundations, the ‘all-ground consciousness’ (kun gzhi rnam shes) and ‘all-ground wisdom’ (kun gzhi ye shes), two categories that are typical of the Jonangpas. In the introduction to his Madhyamakāvatāra, Mi bskyod rdo rje also criticizes the popular interpretation of the Mahāmudrā teaching that thoughts appear as the dharmakāya and excludes the possibility that the two are one in essence. In the present paper I will seek to further our understanding of Mi bskyod rdo rje’s position on buddha nature by looking at how he describes it in relation to adventitious stains in comparison to ‘Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392-1481) and Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292-1361). The main focus will be his commentaries on the Madhyamakāvatāra (introduction), the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (introduction), the sKu gsum ngo sprod rnam bshad, the Phyag rgya chen po’i sgros ‘bum and Mi bskyod rdo rje’s independent work on gzhan stong, the dBu ma gzhan stong smra ba’i srol legs par phye ba’i sgron me. Of particular interest will be also Mi bskyod rdo rje’s review of ’Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal’s Kālacakra commentary rGyud gsum gsang ba, on the basis of which Mi bskyod rdo rje’s denial of a buddha nature in the sense of an individual nature of mind that differs from a Buddha is most forcefully made.
  • 3.

    Buddha-nature, Critical Buddhism, and Early Chan

    Robert H. Sharf | 2017, (22) | pp.105~150 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This article begins with a reflection on why medieval Chinese Buddhist thought has not been more conspicuous in recent comparative work on Buddhism and Western philosophy. The Japanese proponents of “Critical Buddhism” (hihan bukkyō 批判仏教), Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗 and Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭, would see this neglect as merited since, in their view, East Asian Buddhism in general, and Chinese Chan in particular, is philosophically crippled owing to its embrace of tathāgatagarbha and buddha-nature thought. Indeed, Matsumoto singles out Shenhui 荷澤神會 (670-762), one of the architects of the Southern School of Chan, as an example of the early Chan advocacy of buddha-nature doctrine. This article is not concerned with whether buddha-nature and tathāgatagarbha thought is actually deleterious to critical philosophical work. Rather, the concern is to demonstrate that, far from embracing buddha-nature doctrine, the eighth-century founders of Southern Chan had serious concerns with it. Evidence for this is found in: (1) the writings of Shenhui, notably in his opposition to the doctrine of the “buddha-nature of insentient objects” (wuqing foxing 無情佛性); and (2) the Platform Scripture of the Sixth Patriarch (Liuzu tanjing 六祖壇經), particularly in the variant versions of Huineng’s famous “enlightenment verse.” Thus the Southern School may be viewed as a forerunner of the Critical Buddhist anti-dhātuvāda polemics. The article closes with comments on the ongoing problems Chinese Buddhist exegetes had in marrying the metaphysical monism of Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha teachings with the anti-foundationalist thrust of Madhyamaka and Prajñāpāramitā literature.
  • 4.

    The “Mahāyāna” in the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna: Its Meaning and Use, and the Confusion thereof

    Tao Jin (金濤) | 2017, (22) | pp.151~190 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This paper is focused on the reading of the word “mahāyāna” in the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna (or Qixinlun in its popular Chinese abbreviation), particularly in its synoptic chapter, namely, the Liyi fen (立義 分). To many modern scholars, it refers not to the “Mahāyāna” or “Great Vehicle” Buddhism (as opposed to the “Hīnayāna” or “Lesser Vehicle” Buddhism) as it is popularly understood, but to the so-called “One Mind” (yixin 一心), a mind that exists simultaneously as Suchness and Phenomena and constitutes in that sense a dual-natured Absolute in both its quiescence and dynamicity. It is for this presentation of the “One Mind”, labelled “Mahāyāna” by some, that the treatise claims itself to be the teaching of the “Mahāyāna” Buddhism. This paper proposes to dispute this “Absolute” reading of “mahāyāna”. It argues that the word “mahāyāna” in Qixinlun refers consistently and exclusively to (and in that sense means) the “Mahāyāna” Buddhism or its teaching; that the word is used in the synoptic chapter of the Liyi to respectively characterize and metaphorize the Absolute as “great” (i.e., “mahā”) and “vehicle” (i.e., “yāna”) and, in doing so, to praise and glorify “Mahāyāna” Buddhism as a “great vehicle” and thus a superior teaching; and that the confusion of the meaning and the use of the word results in the modern reading of “mahāyāna” as the Absolute.
  • 5.

    Investigation into the Period when yijibieji (義記別記) was Written

    Kim, Cheon-hag | 2017, (22) | pp.191~220 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    This paper aims to explore a new perspective on Fazang’s yijibieji (起信 別記), which has been analysed questioned since the Edo period. Yijibieji was first recorded in Fazangheshangzhuan (法藏和尙傳), which was written by Choichiweon (崔致遠) in 904, and was revised in Enochoroku (圓超錄), the first Japanese list, in 914. However, yijibieji was first quoted in the Seokhwaeomkyobungiweontongcho (釋華嚴敎分記圓通鈔) of kyunyo (均 如) who was active in the early Goryeo period. Zixuan (子璿), of China, does not use quotations, but it is almost certain that he refers to yijibieji. And Junko (順高), of the Japanese Kamakura period, wrote a commentary on Fazang’s yijibieji. Thus, it can be seen that yijibieji has been circulated and quoted in East Asia since the 10th century. In modern times, Mochizukishiko (望月信亨) published a study denying that yijibieji is a work of Fazang. However, later researchers tend to regard Fazang to be the author of yijibieji. In this paper, I investigate the authorship of yijibieji by attempting to solving these problems through analyzing the relationship between various sentences. Tanguang (曇曠), a Fashiang scholar from Dunhuang, wrote Chishinrunguangshu around 763. Zongmi, a Huayen scholar of the Tang period, wrote yuanjuejingtashu (圓覺經大疏) around 823. And Choichiweon wrote Fazangheshangzhuan in 904. I therefore presume that yijibieji was written during this same period.
  • 6.

    The Characteristics of Wonhyo’s Logic of Hwajaeng regarding the Interpretation of Catuṣkoṭi: Focusing on the Comparison with a Deleuzian New Dialectic

    Kim taesoo | 2017, (22) | pp.221~256 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    This research examines the characteristics of Wonhyo’s logic of hwajaeng, reflected in his interpretation of the catuṣkoṭi, while comparing it with Deleuze’s new dialectics, which criticizes the ‘Four shackles of representation.’ The main focus will be on the 4th koti, i.e., the view of ‘neither existence, nor non-existence’ in the catuṣkoṭi, which was used for interpreting the major tenets of Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, Doctrinal Essentials of the Perfection of Ultimate Wisdom and Preface to the Exposition of the Sūtra on the Adamantine Absorption. After categorizing the concept of ‘neither existence, nor non-existence’ according to two different approaches, namely (1) a negation of both while revealing the middle path, and (2) an ultimate truth, the research concluded that Wonhyo’s approach is closer to case (1) in its structure of thought. Further, when analyzing the Deleuze’s new dialectics, which criticizes the concept of identity in Hegelian dialectics, it also shows a similarity to case (1). Both Wonhyo and Deleuze’s systems reveal congruence with regard to the inter-penetrative accommodation of differences between reality and foundation, by raising the latter to the surface of the former, without positing Idea (Idée) as the final end in the vertical or sequential hierarchy. They both reveal a positive ontology of ‘becoming’ which depicts an answer to reality through a series of synthesis and differentiation, in an open space. Problems are posited as inter- penetrative multiplicities without implying any negation. By transcending the answer, the problem is presented as being no different from the solution, and as containing answers to all series of differences within itself. Likewise, one mind (一心) matches an Idea, while drawing its concrete determination (peras) as hwajaeng through differentiation and inter-penetration between True-suchness and the Phenomenal aspect of mind. The return of one mind shows the congruent synthesis of question and answer, based on the affirmation of catuṣkoṭi, while revealing Univocity (Univocité) as a true reality of all phenomena. The phrase, “it corresponds to all aspects since it is not one, and to one taste in all aspects because it is not different”, unravels the non-dual nature of the tenet, in the sense that the 4th koṭi equals the affirmation of the 3rd koṭi, when seen from different aspects. In turn, it reveals a process of recovering true nature through desexualization and univocity by breaking the representational bounds of catuṣkoṭi.
  • 7.

    The Great Treasures of East Asian Buddhism and Minobusan

    Chuichi Kimura | 2017, (22) | pp.259~280 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    On Mount Minobu is located Kuonji Temple, and from ancient times this area was known to believers as a sacred place, referred to as “The Mountain of the Founder of the Nichiren School.” The Minobu Archive is under the jurisdiction of Kuonji Temple, and in this collection are many Buddhist scriptures, apocrypha and other treasures of Buddhist literature. These are widely used not only by researchers of the Nichiren School of Buddhism, but also by many researchers of East Asian Buddhism in general. The works are introduced in the three-volume “Index of Writing in the Minobu Archive” and the “Index of Art and Writing in the Minobu Archive.” However, in the present situation researchers in far places can only find the tiny amount of information contained in these indexes that is open to the public, and must actually come to Mount Minobu if they wish to use the works in the Minobu Archive for their research. In this paper, entitled The Great Treasures of East Asian Buddhism and Minobusan, I will first simply discuss the life of Saint Nichiren, the founder of Nichiren Buddhism, as it is deeply related to the first period of the chronicles of the Minobu Archive. Next I will discuss the theory behind the collection of writing in the Minobu Archive, and the purpose and methods of collection. Afterwards I will divide the history of the Minobu Archive into 6 periods, discussing the state of the collection in each period. Following this I will discuss the modern investigations of the Minobu Archive that led to the creation of the“Index of Writing in the Minobu Archive,” and finally I will write about the works that are preserved separately from the Minobu Archive, discussing the state of preservation and the value of the other important writing. Through the consideration explained above, I sincerely hope that this paper can lead to the development of East Asian Buddhist research and can provide a chance for new discovery.
  • 8.