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2020, Vol., No.28

  • 1.

    An Examination of Temporality in Mindfulness Meditation

    Yao-ming Tsai | 2020, (28) | pp.9~31 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    Mindfulness meditation is a way to steady the mind from the ground up and maintain awareness of the actual activities of one’s body, feelings, mind, and related factors. Nowadays, more and more people emphasize present-moment awareness as a key feature of mindfulness exercises and consequently regard mindfulness as the art of being in the present moment. However, from a temporal perspective, the present is constantly fluctuating. To what extent is mindfulness about present moment awareness and what role do the past and future play in that awareness? This paper seeks to address this issue by exploring the Satipaṭṭhānasutta (The Discourse on the Ways of Attending to Mindfulness) and other Buddhist texts on meditative practices. If mindfulness is to be developed to its maximum capacity, including meditative absorption (Pāli, jhāna), meditative concentration (Pāli, samādhi) and nibbāna, then just focusing on the present momentz and non-judgmentally observing our experiences will not be enough, both theoretically and practically, to achieve many of the stated goals of the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta. This paper proposes that, theoretically, a philosophy of time and temporality is required to answer the difficult question of how mindfulness and meditative absorption are possible while the present is non-abiding, and practically, a more comprehensive strategy to deal with the past, future and present is also essential in overcoming the overall suffering of existence.
  • 2.

    Features of Woncheuk’s View on the Apoha Semantics of Bhāviveka

    JANG, GYU EON | 2020, (28) | pp.33~65 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    This paper is an exposition on features of Woncheuk’s (圓測 613-696, Ch. Yuance) view on the apoha semantics of Bhā(va)viveka. It is based on the assumption that he might have considered the continuity or similarities in apoha theory between Dignāga(ca. 480-540)-Dhamapāla(ca. 530-561) and Bhā(va)viveka (ca. 500-570). In order to do this, I first investigated the outline of Woncheuk’s view on the relationship between language and the object of reference. Second, I illuminated the core idea of Dignāga’s apoha theory by forcusing on the paragraph in his Nyāyamukha cited by Woncheuk. Third, I scrutinized Bhā(va)viveka’s view on apoha by exposing the context of the paragraphs in his Zhang-Zhen Lun (掌珍論) cited by Woncheuk, and tried to identify the common ground held between him and Dignāga with regard to apoha theory. Finally, I depicted the framework of Woncheuk’s own view on the apoha semantics of Bhā(va)viveka, by exposing the meaning of the paragraph in his Guang-Bai Lun (廣百論) cited by Woncheuk, and connecting it with that of Dharmapāla on the theme, as well as Woncheuk’s own view on the place of Bhā(va)viveka in the Nonbeing vs Being Controversy between these two Indian Buddhist thinkers. In conclusion, Woncheuk’s view is featured in the following points. First, by emphasizing the function of vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta, viz. “negation of the fictional substance”(止濫), he tried to find in them common ground for continuity or similarities in apoha theory held between Dignāga- Dharmapāla and Bhā(va)viveka according to the framework of Xuanzang (玄奘 600 or 602-664). Second, he regards both Bhā(va)viveka and Dharmapāla as members of the same school because they both appreciate the existence of an absolute abyss between ultimate reality and language, and the significance of negational function of the latter for expressing the former. Third, Bhā(va)viveka and Dharmapāla do however differ from each other in that the former emphasizes the function of “negation of the fictional substance”, whereas the latter emphasizes both the negational and affirmational aspects of language expressing the ultimate reality. Fourth, by depending on the authority of Dharmapāla, he indirectly ciriticizes Bhā(va) viveka’s overemphasis of transcendence of the ultimate truth over language because it might place us in danger of nihilism, which negates the existence of the phenomenal world, based on language. In sum, this multifacted view of Woncheuk on the apoha semantics of Bhā(va)viveka corresponds to the way in which he understands the role of Bhā(va)viveka in the Non-being vs Being Controversy. In his view, Bhā(va) viveka is both a positive thinker, which destroys the bhāva-grāha of some Yogācāra thinkers, and a negative one who is criticized for having the śūnya-grāha by his Yogācāra opponent, Dharmapāla. Nevertheless, he is held in higher regard and recognized as a representative of Mādhyamika thinkers by Woncheuk, as his usual appellation “the School of Bhā(va) viveka” shows.
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