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‘Non-Erroneous’ Debates in the Buddhist epistemology
불교학리뷰
Abbr :
Critical Review for Buddhist Studies
2015, (17), pp.79-108
DOI : 10.29213/crbs..17.201506.79
Publisher : Geumgang Center for Buddhist Studies
Research Area : Buddhist Studies
2015, (17), pp.79-108
DOI : 10.29213/crbs..17.201506.79
Publisher : Geumgang Center for Buddhist Studies
Research Area : Buddhist Studies
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Dharmakīrti defines direct perception (pratyakṣa) as the cognition that is non-erroneous (abhrānta) and free from conception. When Dignāga identified direct perception as cognition without conception, it was not necessary for him to add an extra element, ‘non-erroneous’. While Dignāga argues that wrong cognitions are caused by the mind, Dharmakīrti criticized the idea of attributing all illusions to the mind. According to Dharmakīrti, illusory cognition, such as cognition of double moon caused by eye-disease, should be considered as a sensory illusion that cannot be counted for a perception. Dharmakīrti seems to have thought that the cause or the object of non-erroneous, such as cognition of double moon, is not the result of inner cognition. This is incompatible with Dignāga’s theory of knowledge. Vinītadeva interprets that Dharmakīrti’s intension as being to exclude sensory illusion with the particular term ‘non-erroneous’ for two reasons. Firstly, he identifies the definition of the ‘non-erroneous’ perception as that of a ‘non-deceptive’ one because valid cognition is by definition non-deceptive. Secondly, he contends that the notion of ‘non-erroneous’ should not be considered as a real object of cognition (ālambanaviṣaya) because the Yogācāra school maintains that all cognitions are erroneous in terms of the object of cognition (as an external existent). Dharmottara criticized Vinītadeva in three regards. Firstly, ‘nonerroneous’ should be understood as presupposing ‘non-deceptive’. Therefore ‘non-erroneous’ as a synonym of ‘non-deceptive’ is simply redundant. The definition of perception as cognition that is both free from conception and ‘non-erroneous’ must be taken together and not separately. Therefore, both of these characteristics combined with each other determine the essence of perception. Secondly, ‘non-erroneous’ is intended to counter the opinions that the cognition with conception or an erroneous cognition can be also included in direct perception. Thirdly, he supposes that the cause and object of erroneous cognition embrace even external existents. According to Nyāyabindutīkātippanī, Dharmottara also believes that the cognition is ‘non-erroneous,’ on the basis of the Sautrāntika’s standpoints. The notion of abhrānti (nonerroneous), for Dharmottara, is on the one hand ‘non-erroneous’ object of cognition and at the same time not contradicted by the causal efficiency that the object of cognition possesses.
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