KJC Korea
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The great financial crisis of 2007-08 is a global showcase of how profoundly erroneous modern neoliberal capitalism can be. Given that at the core of this crisis lies the abusive economy of debt, which includes not only household debt but also corporate financial debt, this paper thematizes specifically the abuse of debt from a moral-political perspective. More specifically, by critically engaging in comparative discourse between Karl Marx and Jürgen Habermas, I develop an argument that the abusive economy of debt should be deconstructed through the reconstructive political economy of debt. To be more specific, I present two fundamental ethical principles in reconstructing the political economy of debt: the “principle of nonviolence” and the “principle of remuneration.” The “principle of nonviolation” stipulates that it becomes an unethical appropriation of the economy of debt when debt plays the abusive role of violating the fundamental human rights of the debtor by the creditor. While the “principle of nonviolation” primarily addresses the abuse of debt occurring on an interpersonal level, the “principle of remuneration” mainly focuses on the abuse of the economy of debt on an international horizon such as Southern debt crises. The second ethical principle, the “principle remuneration” stipulates that it is imperative for the North to forgive the external debt (particularly odious debts) of the South, because Southern debt crises largely originate in the political economy of the North. Through political economy of debt, we not only protect debt from its abusers but also promote the mutual good between debtors and creditors in society. Ultimately, this paper presents a moral-political solution to liberate debt from the abusive and reductive economy of debt.

YouTube, the most successful video platform to date, is an important source for identifying public opinions, fantasies, and feelings about transhumanism. Looking at YouTube can show us how its many users think about human enhancement and possible posthuman futures; and that may help us to better understand the democratic viability or even legitimacy of political decisions concerning enhancement technologies. Moreover, YouTube not only is an indicator of collective imaginations but has an important influence on them as well. Because it allows for uploading user-generated content and participating in recommendations, comments and discussions, it can be seen as a cultural forum of exchange or as a battlefield where different opinions collide and intermesh. This paper tries to give a first, provisional survey of YouTube’s discourses about transhumanism, human enhancement, and posthuman futures. The analysis proceeds in three steps: After some general considerations concerning transhumanism and representations of posthumans in popular culture, it turns to the specifics of YouTube as a new media form. On that basis, four kinds of discourses concerning transhumanism are distinguished and illustrated by brief examples of typical videos and comments: non-fictional discourses (1) about emerging technologies in human therapy and enhancement, as well as (2) about the transhumanist movement, (3) fictional discourses about posthuman futures, and (4) reflective, meta-fictional discourses about mass media representations of posthumanity. The analysis of those discourses shows highly divergent tendencies of evaluating human enhancement. Taken together, those evaluations suggest that a majority of YouTube users take a skeptical stance towards enhancement technologies in general, while they may be more ready to accept concrete technologies with demonstrable benefits. Moreover, the discourses show that collective imaginations of human nature and posthumanity are changing: the human species is more and more seen not as something fixed and stable but as something transformable and ephemeral.

The purpose of this paper is mainly diagnostic. It tries to answer the question why we love machines. I argue that our biological bodies are often perceived as deficient in various ways. They limit our freedom, are easily destructible, and condemn us to die. For this reason, we look for an alternative way to exist and find it in the machine and its way of existing. Machines are attractive as a model for (post)human existence because they seem to allow an escape from the messiness of the human body. The more machine-like the human body becomes, the more it can be controlled and the more we make it our own by aligning the working of our bodies with our purposes. If the human body could be turned into (or be replaced by) a machine, we would finally be free to shape our own destiny. The paper traces how we attempt to become more machine-like in four different stages, which I call illusionism, fortification, replacement, and displacement. Illusionism is the practice of changing one’s appearance in order to accord with a commonly accepted standard of beauty. Fortification is the attempt to make the human body less vulnerable and more capable. Replacement is the practice of replacing human body parts with artificial ones. Finally, displacement is the act of replacing the whole body by something more durable or altogether immaterial. I conclude my discussion with an encouragement to adopt a different point of view, which sees the human body not as disabling and hence in need of improvement or displacement, but rather as enabling and a gift that is worth preserving, even in its imperfect state.

The main theme of this study is focused on the spontaneity of therapeutic improvisation from Zhuangzi’s perspective. Based on the free spirit of life, Zhuangzi’s musicology emphasizes ‘one-self [自]’ and ‘joy [快]’ from nature’s point of view. It means that we should be able to pursue ‘joy in oneself’ by ourselves. This is also why musicians, who complain about performance anxiety, need music therapy, such as therapeutic improvisation. In fact, young Korean musicians can feel joy by communicating with the audience through their emotions in music and by exchanging them with many people. However, what is waiting for them, even before empathizing with the audience, is severe competition and evaluation. Why do young Korean musicians need spontaneity? Which implications and ideas for the spontaneity of therapeutic improvisation and Zhuangzi’s philosophy can be given to those musicians complaining about performance anxiety based on eastern culture? On Zhuangzi’s perspective, when young musicians can get free from external stuff WàiWù [外物] like ranking, they can overcome performance anxiety and be absorbed in their own music. This is why Zhuangzi talked about ‘Do not depend on external stuff WàiWù’ and emphasized ‘one-self’ and ‘joy.’ The goal of this project is to find answers to (1) how individual musicians can maintain spontaneity, (2) how musicians can solve the performance anxiety that they have had, and (3) finally how they can maximize their competence and ability as professional musicians from Zhuangzi’s view of spontaneity. Ultimately, this study reviews a music therapy article on young Korean musicians and applies the concept of spontaneity as the free spirit of life in Zhuangzi’s philosophy to the empirical case and interprets the case’s results to answer those questions above. There is one condition: If young musicians want to be able to enjoy music, they have to set themselves free from others’ eyes. They can feel joyfulness accompanied with a kind of catharsis, which can be only possible when they express their own feelings and get absorbed in their performance. This is the meaning of spontaneity as the free spirit of life, which is namely shēngzhīdé [生之德] in Zhuangzi’s philosophy.

Human dignity supports the equal value of all humans and their ethical treatment. While human rights conventions use the term frequently, it is rarely defined. The term dignity is used differently, and two dimensions are described in detail. Inherent dignity is an intrinsic dimension held by all humans and is the basis of equal rights for all humans. Circumstantial dignity is another dimension, but is variable and changeable. This is in mind when circumstances are said to enhance or diminish someone’s dignity. The recent critique of dignity arises in part because of conflation of these two dimensions. Others reject dignity because of its religious connections. Such criticisms will be responded to in defense of dignity. Posthuman and transhuman enhancement also raise questions about the value of dignity because of its roots in humanism. Nick Bostrom defends posthuman dignity while critiquing Leon Kass’s bioconservative position. Bostrom’s argument will be critiqued because of his failure to distinguish between inherent and circumstantial dignity, and his misunderstanding of Kass’s claims. In contrast to the transhumanist enhancement project, inherent dignity points to the givenness and limitations of human nature. This indicates the importance of developing gratitude for human nature and avoiding an endless pursuit of perfection. Such an approach is not antagonistic to medicine and science. Instead, it places priority on improving the circumstantial dignity of all human beings, especially those who live without their basic needs being met. Their inherent dignity places a moral obligation on those with resources to help them. Medicine and science should focus on relieving their needs, not enhancing those who already have most needs met. Justice for all humans based on their inherent dignity is proposed as a significant argument against the ethics of transhuman enhancement.

This article drafts an overview of transhumanist and posthumanist ontologies, as well as provides grounds for their historical distinction based on their relationship to enlightenment humanism. By exploring their relationship and challenge to the dualistic metaphysics of enlightenment humanism, the essay makes clear that these two movements have distinctly different philosophical foundations. Transhumanism is critiqued for its reliance and intensification of dualistic attributes as virtues for its conceived ends, while posthumanism is shown to argue for a redeployment of ontological frameworks but without a complete or convincing response to the problematic dualisms that have been a part of the philosophical tradition since antiquity. Importantly, focus is placed on the role of technology in the makeup of both transhumanism and posthumanism. Technology holds a central place in each movement, but for very different reasons. Thus, the article pays attention to detailing technology’s relationship to the manner in which both movements construct notions of the human being as an ontological entity. By focusing on the notion of the human as a concept and by placing these movements in context, while revealing their philosophical groundwork, the article outlines the challenges facing each movement and the paradoxical byproducts that each generate. Through a philosophical lens, these movements are assessed along with their contemporary attempts to provide new, and simultaneously reinforce old, ontological paradigms.

The question concerning the moral status of living beings is a central one within current bioethical debates, and many life and death issues are connected to it. The field of discourse is divided up between Catholic thinkers like Spaemann who argues for the validity of human dignity which starts with the fertilization of the egg cell and naturalist philosophers like Singer who puts forward reasons for associating the moral status with personhood, as only persons possess morally relevant qualities, i.e. self-consciousness and sentience. I argue for a concept of human dignity which considers Singer’s criticism concerning speciesism and moves beyond a rigid anthropocentric position as it was proposed by Spaemann. Thereby, I progress as follows: In part one, I present some methodological reflections which support the following argument of parts two and three. In part two, I present selected aspects of the debate concerning the moral status of living entities and also explain scientific insights concerning various types of organisms. In part three, I suggest a concept of dignity and personhood which I regard as plausible and appropriate for our times.

In this essay I aim to offer a close reading of Andrew Marvell’s The First Anniversary of the Government under His Highness the Lord Protector (Hereafter The First Anniversary) as a work that addresses the poet’s moral dilemma arising out of his conscience in crisis. To this end, I begin by placing The First Anniversary within the internal progress of Marvell’s Interregnum poetry, thus tracing the poet’s development as a protestant casuist compelled to tackle a crisis of conscience in times of great transition. I then move onto an analysis of the language of The First Anniversary, while situating the text within an historical setting. In doing so, I specifically look at how Marvell’s private conscience reconciles with Cromwell’s public authority. My central claim is that Marvell develops his arguments along two different yet intricately related lines: first, the language of reformed religion or providential theology helps the poet grasp the divine purpose at work behind the statesman’s hold on power; a chiliastic sense of the present moment serves to endorse Cromwell’s reign as he is granted with a providential mandate. Second, the language of civic republicanism helps the poet reassess an ethical aspect of the statesman’s allegedly coercive rule; Cromwell thus stands out as one who superbly fulfills via media between license and tyranny—one who represents in person the most desirable type of authority. To sum up, Marvell’s Cromwell in The First Anniversary is depicted as a self-effacing ruler who is specifically called to draft a new constitution for a godly commonwealth yet to come.