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The author examined Silla commodities traded in Jiangnandao and Lingnandao area in T'ang in the middle of the 9th century based on Cathay and the Way Thither, Zhufanzhi. Up to now, many researchers have mainly concentrated on studying the origin of Silla commodities shown in Cathay and the Way Thither. Therefore, this study aims to examine their characteristics and distribution. Also, it focuses on introducing new Silla trade goods unnoticed listed in Zhufanzhi and, further on, comparing with Silla commodities in Cathay and the Way Thither. It was found that Silla trade goods were highly various ranging from a Silla sword, to perfumery, medicinal stuff, silk, pottery, porcelain and a writing brush with weasel's hair. Aloeswood and cassia bark were introduced as Silla goods in Cathay and the Way Thither but it is because those goods were distributed by Silla merchants as like written in Baisiragimojjeuge in the middle of the 8th century in Japan. It reflects the brisk commercial activities of Silla merchants in T'ang region competing with West of the T'ang Boundary merchants in Jiangnandao and Lingnandao area of T'ang region in the middle of the 9th century. Ibn Kuhrdadhibah (A.D. 820∼912) described indigenous products of Silla as well as silk which was preference of Islamic merchants, pottery, sailcloth essential goods for sailing and so forth. Zhao rŭ kuo wrote Zhufanzhi with interest about local products in Song and its neighbouring countries. This book was written based on his experiences and source materials of T'ang and informs of a lot of Silla's local products. According to this book, it was examined that Silla merchants was briskly active in Jiangnandao and Lingnandao area in T'ang in the middle and late of the 9th century and it can be said that the basis of West of the T'ang Boundary and Song merchants' come-and-goes to Gaekyoung was established by Silla merchants residing in T'ang region in the first half of Koryo dynasty.

This study is to examine the process of house possession, house lot distribution policy, and house demolition of people in Hanseongbu and the social characteristics especially in the early Joseon Period when the city reorganization was conducted by the nation. As a direct measure of housing control, the government implemented the grading policy to decide the scale of house lot and house according to the grade of each official. Besides, it operated the policy to confirm the user of lands based on the planning procedure to get approval of using the land. Indirect measures included taxations such as tax on house and house lot property, and Jingoje to bring a charge against illegal use of lands among people in Hanseongbu. As to house demolition policy as well, to protect the symbolic representation of the sovereign power was the main goal of spending the expenses, rather than to improve the efficiency of arranging landscape architecture and lots in a way of beautifying the city. On the other hand of the housing policy, reflected were the ideological frame and social conception that affected the settling areas in the Joseon Period. In addition, the right to use houses was admitted, rather than the property, under the authority of the central government, and the house properties was recognized, rather than as private belongings, as public materials to secure housing of the nation, which were supposed to be publicly managed. Since the 15th century, an increase in the population of Hanseongbu caused a polarization between luxury housing and illegal unauthorized housing, and even incurred a large fire. During this period, housing restructuring by the government was conducted in terms of two aspects, the improvement of houses and the removal of illegal houses. Because of the large fire that had occurred during the King Sejong period, the government attempted to renovate houses into tile-roofed houses, and also performed the removal of housing that featured a pre-modern duality, namely, the rationality of urban restructuring, fungsui, and royal power. The pattern of the removal of private housing, which appeared during the restructuring of urban housing, created another housing problem including the mass-production of unauthorized householders and a jump in housing prices. All the more, the lack of housing space, which worsened during the 15th∼16th centuries, created an expansion of housing outside the castle town, and a new housing pattern of rental housing, such as loaning and renting.

The purpose of this essay is to make the character and meaning of the Korean policy regarding Japan clear by analyze the diplomatic activities of Korean ministers to Japan in the Korea Empire(1900∼1905). After the Boxer Uprising in China(1900), Korean ministers demanded the neutralization of Korea like Switzerland or Belgium, Japan refused this request based on the Korean-Japanese [military] alliance. Also, Korean ministers did his best in depor the political exiles. So, Japan tried to conclude the Korean-Japanese alliance using this problem while couldn't take an administrative measure for exile because of the International law. But, negotiation about the exile was discontinued since Japan ignored the declare of the neutralization of Korea and concluded the Protectorate Treaty(1905) by force. Korean ministers protested against Japanese government about the interference and abuse of authority of Japanese ministers or advisers to Korea together. Although Korean ministers appeal the poverty of students studying in Japan, they couldn't receive any support from the government. So, they allot the money to study and to meet student's living expense by asking for a loan. Even though the government decided to send the students back, Korean ministers did his best to help the students finish the curriculum. Korean ministers mediated the buying the modern materials and machine or obtaining the technologies smoothly. And Korean ministers tried to aid the destitute and illegal entrant by spending operational expenses of legation or asking for a loan. Like this, Korea ministers to Japan tried to solve the a question pending between the two countries considering the actual circumstance in the field. However they failed to achieve any result because the diplomacy between Korea and Japan were determined unilaterally by Japanese policies toward Korea, not on the mutual basis. But we shouldn't overlook the aspect that in the situation which there were frequent changes of Korea ministers to Japan, long vacant seat, lack of operational expenses, Korean ministers to Japan could not systematically collect comprehensive informations concerning Japanese domestic situation. Neither did they fully negotiate with Japanese government over the questions pending between two states.

According to a document written in 1710, people in Kyungsang province knew how to cultivate ginseng. We can find out records on Red ginseng written in 1707. Though they knew how to cultivate ginseng and make Red ginseng, they were not able to manufacture Red ginseng for one century because they did not have enough capital to manufacture Red ginseng in the 18th century. In the early 19th century, however, Kaesong merchants started to manufacture Red ginsneg in large scale and export them to China. Kaesong merchants had successfully transformed their commerce capitals into ginseng capitals. In other words, Kaesong merchants made a big advance in cultivating ginseng and making red ginseng in the mid-19th century. This thesis examines the methods of cultivating ginseng and making red ginseng including ginseng capitals in the late 19th century. To run ginseng-fields, ginseng-field owners invested big capitals and employed many workers. According to the documents of the late 19th century, ginseng industry was operated by a mixture of capital and labor. In the 19th century, the export quantity of red ginseng was laid down by Choson dynasty. And as only interpreter-officials were legally allowed to export red ginseng to China, Kaesong merchants participated in manufacturing red ginseng and exporting them to China via black market. Although until 1900 Kaesung merchants had rights to only own ginseng-fields, they actually manufactured and exported red ginseng to China. Most of the ginseng-field owners rented other people's lands to use as ginseng-fields, because the lands that had been used for ginseng-fields could not be used for ginseng cultivation for more than 10 years. Since ginseng was a very highly priced farm product, the custom of the leased land differed from the normal leased land. The rent costs for ginseng-field were three times higher than normal farms and were paid in advance. Also, the term of a contract was finished when ginseng-field owners cropped ginseng. Though ginseng-field owners were leaseholders, they had big power over the landowners. The leaseholders could cancel the contract of the leased land if the leased land turned out to have some trouble for cultivating ginseng. But landowners could not cancel the contract even in cases they were not paid the rent. In spite that ginseng-fields were leased lands, ginseng-fields were authorized as a real right. So ginseng-fields were traded freely and very frequently.

This paper examines the evolution and characteristic of the municipalization movement of the Gyeongseong Electric Co. (hereafter GEC) during the early 1930's. The GEC supplied electricity, gas, streetcar operations and other services as a monopoly, pursuing an “excessive” profit-seeking strategy. The excessive nature of their strategy was apparent in the defective equipment, frequent malfunctions, and rudeness of workers that was suffered by their customers. A call for municipalization [gongyeonghwa] of the GEC appeared between industrial capitalists, and municipalization plan passed the Gyeongseong City Council [Gyeongseongbuhoe]. From the viewpoint of the GEC, municipalization became a matter of whether the firm would continue to exist or not. The GEC prepared various countermeasures to defeat the municipalization plan. The GEC turned management of its general affairs over to the Gyeongseong City Council and put pro-GEC politicians on the council. It also mobilized friendly media outlets to mobilize public opinion that was skeptical about the proposed municipalization while the Joseon Electric Association [Joseonjeongihyeophoe] expressed opposition to the municipalization. The GEC also used the establishment of the electric power control policy of the colonial government to obstruct the municipalization movement. As a result of all these efforts, the GEC succeeded in preventing municipalization. Behind the powerful lobbying power of the GEC were the Minister of State for Political Affairs Imaida [今井田淸德], Governor of Gyeonggi Province Matsumoto [松本誠], and the Mayor of Kyeongseong Inoue [井上淸]. The failure of the municipalization of the GEC was not a result of the establishment of the electric power control policy, but a result of the persistent lobbying power of the GEC, an exemplar of monopoly capital. This case study shows the depth and breadth of the political and social power of monopoly capital during the Japanese colonial period.