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This paper surveys Seungjeogwon(承政院) Seungjijik(承旨職)’s actual personnel management in Hyojong(孝宗) reign(1649~1659) by focusing on the lists of the order of the court officers of the Journals of the secretary office , Seungjeongwonilkijwamok(『承政院日記』 座目). The lists of the order of the court officers of the Journals of the secretary office Seungjeongwonilkijwamok(『承政院日記』 座目) are chronological documents of the court officers the holding office. In Hyojong(孝宗) reign(1649~1659) Six Seungjis(六承旨) headed by the prime minister(院相) in charge held office. The prime minister acted for the king while the king was in mourning of the late king Injo(仁祖). The king had the power to designate the secretary, Seungji(承旨) by choosing one from threefold candidates were nominated by the officers. The secretary, Seungji took the assignment by being assigned to the certain office room. By king’s special order or by the certain private cause of the secretary, the assigning of the secretary would be changed. The management of the secretary office, Seungjeogwon was organized with the chief secretary, Doseungji(都承旨) as a leader in the hierarchy. The secretaries had the everyday office meeting, Chungjwa(廳座). In this meeting, they made the decisions that they report the documents to or not. Sometimes secretaries sent back the documents to the officers who made those documents in the case of the officer didn’t follow the customs of the court. In certain case, the secretaries expressed their opinions by changing the texts of the documents. Sometimes the secretaries were impeached these misdemeanor. The secretary office, Seungjeogwon sent back the king’s order when he didn’t follow the custom. By this procedure of sending back, Bongwhan(封還) the secretary office expressed its own opinion. On the special case, the secretary office showed its opionion by t he secretary office report, Wonuigesa(院議啓辭). By the lists of the order of the court officers of the Journal of The lists of the order of the court officers of the Journals of the secretary office Seungjeongwonilkijwamok(『承政院日記』 座目), it was found that the secretaries starts their jobs from the deputy secretary, Dongbuseugji(同副承旨) and they got the promotion. As the rank got higher and higher from the deputy secretary, Dongbuseugj to chief secretary, Doseungji, in the hierarchical ladder, the seats of officers became fewer. The average holding office days of the chief secretary, Doseungji(都承旨) is 43.1 days which is longer than other secretaries. It means that the chief secretary, Doseungji is main figure of The secretary office, Seungjeogwon. The average holding office days of the secretaries is very short. Either the secretaries were changed by short term change management way of the secretary office or they were impeached occasionally. And the reason that the seat of secretary, Seungjijik(承旨職) was important position of the court was the other factor of short holding office time. By Surbeying of former office job of the 70s persons of the secretaries in Hyojong times, it was found that 50% of the secretaries served as military officers, and the candiadates of the higher court rankers, Dangsanggwan who were in the major grade of third court rank, Jungsampum, and the a staffs in charge of the six ministry office, Yukjo(六曹) were moved to secretary office. 10% of the ex-secretaries became the higher ministers, 60% of them got the rank of the the minor grade of the second ranker of the court, Jongipum(從二品) or higher rank in Hyojong times. By this survey it is found that the secretary office, Seungjeogwon is important office of Joseon dynasty.

This study considered its characteristics by paying attention to Article of The Royal Lecture of Seungjeongwon ilgi, which is the national treasure and was registered even as the UNESCO Memory of the World. Its significance was clarified with a method of mutually comparing with Article of The Royal Lecture, which is recorded in Joseon wangjo sillok(朝鮮王朝實錄:Annals of the Dynasty of Joseon), which is same as the specific date of Seungjeongwon ilgi and or has the similar date, or in the collection of works in members of the Royal Lectures(經筵官). As a result, Article of The Royal Lecture of Seungjeongwon ilgi was clarified to be contained several kinds of information certainly necessary for a study on The Royal Lecture. It was simultaneously included The Royal Lecture time, The Royal Lecture place, The Royal Lecture kinds and lecture materials, list of names in the whole members of the Royal Lectures who had initiated lecture, scope of lecture, the image of being progressed members of the Royal Lectures in reality, and the discussion of the national administration that had been executed essentially along with lecture, which are very useful in intactly restoring the original form. Article of The Royal Lecture, which was arranged the lecture contents on the Confucian scriptures and history books, is what shows a change in classical studies(經學) in another form, thereby becoming data as well. Thus, it also became the foundation of a research on the Learning for the Ruler(帝王學). Accordingly, Seungjeongwon ilgi is evaluated as the core data of a research on The Royal Lecture, which had been the essence of Confucian political culture.

In this paper, I reviewed the general features of weather records and portent records of The Seungjeongwon Ilgi, The Daily Records of Royal Secretariat of Joseon Dynasty, with the question whether these records reflect the 'nature itself' or the climate situations of their times or not. For this purpose, I examined and analyzed 56,880 records of daily weather and 19,438 records of portent from 1623 to 1782 with statistical method and with trailing to their sources. Through this analysis, I founded that the daily weather records of The Seungjeongwon Ilgi just reflect the climate situations of small region of palace where kings stayed, and the portent records did not cover the whole portent reports produced in the Gwansanggam at that times. The daily weather records and portent records were not produced with the terms of objective and quantitative. The meteorological observations were not performed with objective and quantitative approach, rather influenced by the locality and subjectivity of observers. The statistical analysis show that the frequency of portent records decreased gradually with the time era, but some kinds of portent records increased rapidly. These results of analysis and examination reveal that the production of portent records was influenced by the political situations and institutional changes. Therefore, it will not be able to understand the long-term changes in climate patterns of Joseon period only with the statistical analysis on the weather records and portent records contained in The Seungjeongwon Ilgi. The weather records and portent records of The Seungjeongwon Ilgi cannot be treated as ‘objective data’ reflecting 'nature itself' of their times.

in 『Daily Records of the Royal Secretariat』, we can find out that Crown Prince So-Hyeon has been ill during 8 years hostage in sim-yang(瀋陽). in fact, Crown Prince So-Hyeon became ill in February 1637 in which Crown Prince So-Hyeon had to head sim-yang(瀋陽) from seoul. Crown Prince So-Hyeon used to live in on-dol(溫突). but in February 1637, Crown Prince So-Hyeon had to spend many days in army barracks. that was why Crown Prince So-Hyeon became ill in February 1637. the illness symptoms of Crown Prince So-Hyeon was cold flu. in April 1637, Crown Prince So-Hyeon arrived in sim-yang(瀋陽). from that time every year, Crown Prince So-Hyeon had experienced Illness and had been recovered. but sometimes the illness Symptoms of Crown Prince So-Hyeon was so critical that attendant doctor had to send the message to choson in order to take good medicine and good doctors also. at that time, attendant doctor of Crown Prince So-Hyeon diagnosed illness Symptoms as the symptoms of san(疝症). generally, choson doctors thought that the symptoms of san(疝症) were caused by contact of coldness while having hwa illness((火病). Crown Prince So-Hyeon could return home permanently in 1644. but he took critical illness at that time. after returning home in February 1645, Crown Prince So-Hyeon experienced again critical illness. but one month later, Crown Prince So-Hyeon recovered from his Illness. and next month, Crown Prince So-Hyeon experienced again critical illness. choson doctors diagnosed illness Symptoms as the symptoms of hakjil(瘧疾). during the symptoms of hakjil(瘧疾) treatment, Crown Prince So-Hyeon was dead. so by the 『Daily Records of the Royal Secretariat』, we can conclude that Crown Prince So-Hyeon was dead through misdiagnosis or other Illness.

The purpose of paper is to examine how Political activity and situation of poongsan hong' family had changed From political sudden change inside during the period of king youngjo and king jungjo. poongsan hong' family makes the numerous political man -hyekunggung, hongbonghan, sanghan, naksung-, and in addition as scholar the person which wins a fame -yangho, kungmo, sukjoo-. but The various person(inhan, kukyoung, nakim etc) encountered a hardship. The reason is event because of 'imowhabyun' where occurs at 1762, about 'the Royal descendants' bonghan' responsibility, and Coronation disruption damage. To the political activity which calls frequently with 'attack hong's family', there was a political dissident group(kim guijoo' namdang influence). The duration when these people have become the target from the political world with king jungjo' coronation beginning and king sunjo' coronation latter half. In the process, they face the division showed that, rename, or were directly involved in 'gonghong(攻洪: attack hong's family)' activities. At that time, Politics during the 'gonghong' - 'buhong(扶洪: support hong's family)' disputes Furthermore, from fertilization 'si-faction(时派)-puk-faction(僻派)' developed in conflict, 'gonghong‘ the term refers to a political party rather than the concept is the term for political activity. Meanwhile, under the leadership of the king jungjo's, poongsan hong' family have tried rebuilding the house. The king jungjo for a fusion of their families and paying tribute to my grandfather, junhan, yonghan, chuyoung were nominated for the office. anniversary of the king's mother's birthday in 1795, poongsan hong' family 82 people were was invited to. In addition, the king himself had volunteered to be the head of poongsan hong' family. He established the rules of social gatherings(whaso-gathering: 花樹會), and co-spearheaded the work of land management. but the king jeong-jo death did not succeed in rebuilding the family.

This article examines Im Hwa’s view on language and his response towards the Japanese colonial assimilation policies, to show how the socialist Im Hwa came to recognize the nation and the changes with which he came to see the national. From the mid to the end of 1930s, Im Hwa saw language as well as those related to the nation merely as the expressive formalities of the content or as the mode of expressing thoughts and emotions. As socialist, he acquired such view through Stalin’s theory on national policies and the theory of linguistic function that criticised national languages. By uniting these two, Im Hwa thought he could ‘comprehend’ the nation without having to become nationalist. In the 1930s, Im Hwa responded to nationalism by conceptualizing nation as formality and language as function. However, after 1939, the problems that arose were not about differences with nationalism, but one of direct confrontation with imperialism that saw the formal and the functional particulars itself as the purpose. It could be said that it was only then that Im Hwa became directly involved with the problems of the nation. The Korean particulars or the apology of the Korean language as the accurate mode of expression was articulated through the national front. During this process, Im Hwa seems to have revised his view of the nation as formality and the language as function. His expression of ‘the awareness of nation as spirit and the return of terminology to mother tongue as the renaissance,’ uttered after the liberation, is one of the representative examples of the changes taken place as result. The territorialization of the general theories on nation and the national was accomplished through self – problematization. In the post-liberation period, the foremost plan for Im Hwa was the theory of national literature. For him, at this time, the nation possessed duality as the concept of historical community and as the particularity newly discovered through resistance towards the Japanese assimilation policies. For this reason, it would be more accurate to see Im Hwa’s theory of the national literature, not as the literary version of the theory of bourgeois democratic revolution of the Korean communist party, but as the culmination of the literary experiences forged under the Japanese colonization. To Im Hwa, the national was not logical, but newly found through anti –imperialistic experiences. Whether this awareness remained situational, and if not, how the problems of class, or of the people, were then solved within this structure would become an important question.

The Yosun Revolt is still a controversial subject in the modern historiography of Korea. The official version mainly emphasizes the atrocities committed by communist rebels and makes little attempt to clarify the cause of the revolt, identify leading elements within the revolt, state whether the event was the result of a spontaneous reaction or a conspiracy, or reveal the truth about civilian participation and casualties. Although 60 years have passed, the official version is still accepted as the truth. It was only in the late 1990's that the local residents began to reveal their versions of the event. Despite the initial limited scope of the undertaking, the oral sources collected by concerned local organizations contributed much in correcting errors and bringing hitherto unknown facts to light. The oral sources contain new facts. The official version and the oral sources provide different views on how and why the atrocities were committed and by whom. It’s important to point out that differences that have arisen since the re-examination of the brutalities committed against civilians offer a clue in understanding the true nature of the Yosun Revolt. The most glaring difference between the official version and the oral sources lies in the identity of those who brutalized civilians. Most witnesses recalled that it had been the government forces which treated civilians inhumanely. It’s essential to make an effort to understand the legacy of the Yosun Revolt and its relation to what is currently happening in our country. In South Korea society, the word ‘Ppalgaengi’(reds) embodies extreme hostility and disdain harbored by the speaker against his target. Ppalgaengi is not only used to denote a person who believes in communism, but also ‘a morally wretched non-human who doesn’t hesitate to do harm to his own country and people.’ When a communist is called by such name, it usually implies that the person is someone who should be put to death for his inhumanity. In the world annals of ideological confrontations, it would be impossible to find a word which exudes more hatred and venom than Ppalgaengi. It had been essential for Syngman Rhee’s government to conjure up a common enemy of the state and a despicable group of people because the regime lacked popular support. Through such political machination, the image of communists as murderers was firmly entrenched in the minds of the Korean people. The hostility and antagonism toward communists was part of an identity building process for the Korean people as a nation. It can be said that Koreans were born out of a hatred against the reds. The Yosun Revolt has been mainly used as a pretext for anti-communist propaganda, Therefore, a reexamination of the revolt is not limited to revisiting a specific moment in history, but would require a rewriting of the entire historiography of post-war Korea. Now, we’re standing at a crossroads at which we can choose whether we’ll continue to use the event merely as a pretext for anti-communist propaganda or to use it as a medium to build a society where the others’ lives and human rights are respected and protected.

This article examines the leprosy control carried out in Korea during the American Occupation. Following the end of Japanese colonization, the American Occupation was a critical period of decolonization and post – colonial nation – building for South Korea and yet, this period remains understudied in diverse areas of subjects. In the studies of public health and sanitation, the above statement remains true as there has yet been significant literature that explored the public health and sanitation works carried out by the American Occupation Government. Leprosy, in particular, was one such public health project that the American Occupation paid particular attention. As disease that possessed politically symbolic values, ‘controlling’ leprosy was means for the Occupation Government to showcase the successful decolonization and establishment of modern nation – state in Korea. The argument of this paper is that self – government (chach’ihoe /chach’ije) carried out at the Sorok Leprosarium during the American Occupation served as symbol of ‘democracy’ underway in the newly liberated South Korea. Through ‘democratizing’ leprosy, the incoming Occupation government sought to epitomize the transplantion of American democracy onto a nation that had previously only known colonialism. However, as this article shows, this ‘self–government’ that the American Occupation lauded as an example of democracy and arrival of modern nationhood was neither ‘new’ nor ‘decolonizational’ in its practices. Through writings on American leprosy control in the Philippines, this essay will demonstrate that ‘self – government’ and ‘democracy’ have been one of the hallmark features of Culion Leprosarium, the world’s largest leprosarium built by the American colonial government in the Philippines in 1906. By replicating these American ‘colonial’ practices in the Philippines onto Sorok and by implication, the newly liberated South Korea, this essay concludes with questions on what decolonization and citizenship meant when the Korean leper body came to possess the symbolic values of democracy and modern nationhood.

The purpose of this article is to provide an introductory overview of the broad contours of civilian migration during the war. Because the Korean War was part and parcel of the colonial past, the division of the peninsula, and the establishment of separate regimes, I define forced migration, or movement resulting from civil conflict, as a development that began in 1945 and ended in the mid 1950s. I examine the experiences of civilian migrants in the various stages of the conflict in hopes that surveying the structural differences encountered by the numerous groups of refugees will illuminate how war and disorder affected civilians during the war and after. First, I outline how anticipatory refugees were generated by liberation from Japanese colonization and the formation of the North and South Korean states. Second, I explore the conditions of those internally displaced from the outbreak of the war on June 25, 1950 to the recapturing of Seoul on September 28, 1950. Third, I elaborate on the circumstances of the acute refugees and internally displaced of the January 4th retreat including refugees from North Korea who began fleeing in November 1950 and residents of South Korea who evacuated their residences from mid-December 1950 to the early months of 1951. Fourth, I analyze the evacuee relief system: its policies, practices, and limits. Finally, I evaluate the conditions of war sufferers and the scale and meaning of reconstruction, resettlement, and the general impoverishment brought on by the war. In exploring the broad history of non-combatant movements and experiences, I hope to challenge and offer an alternative to popular understandings of refugees that often generalize what the Korean War meant to the civilian population.

At the latter part of the Joseon Dynasty, how advocate faithful subjects who are loyal to their principle and uphold a cause according to Neo-Confucianism after both war. And the Joseon Dynasty keeps their cultural pride during King Yeongjo and King Jeongjo. I focus on these. A policy that advocate faithful subjects at the latter part of the Joseon Dynasty is equal to the process that The Joseon Neo-Confucianism(조선성리학) based on school of mind(心學) takes root in society. The policy of faithful subjects according to consensus of learning and virtue(學行一致)) takes root in the Joseon Dynasty from King Sukjong to King Yeongjo. And then give government posts to dead vassals(贈職) and build a ancestral shrine in King Injo, King Hyojong and King Hyeonjong's periods. Next, give a posthumous title to dead vassals(贈諡) in King Sukjong's period. At last, It works up to enshrine their ancestral tablet forever(不祧之典) in King Yeongjo's period.

This study is to examine how promotion of treatment for deceased patriots has been established and practiced after the restoration of independence and to contribute to establishing proper promotion policies and promotion activities as well. Rewards for men of merit for independence movement started in 1949 after the restoration of independence and 11,870 people have been rewarded until the end of 2009. Only 2 people were conferred in the 1950s due to Korean war and the damage of the war. Conferment of a man of merit was resumed in 1962, yet the number of conferment was very small during the 18 years of the third republic(Park Jeonghee administration) which was fully committed to economic development and growth. Such trend was visible in the fifth republic as well. Reward for men of merit for independence movement significantly increased in the 1990s, which was attributed to growing interest in the history of independence movement as the democracy in Korea developed and grew; research and study on independence movement after foundation of the Memorial Hall for Korean independence Fighter and Korean Independence Movement History Research Institute. In 2005, socialistic independence movement activists were also rewarded only under the condition in which 'communists' were considered 'activists who were committed to building a socialistic country'. March 1st Movement is the most common case for the reward when selecting people for the reward because the movement was carried out nationwide and related facts can be confirmed through materials and documents such as court records created during Japanese regime. Most activists overseas were populated in Manchuria because many activists carried out independence movement in Manchuria. The reward level became lower over the years. The reward level became relatively lower while the number of people for conferment increased since the 1990s. This shows that review for conferment became much tighter and enhanced. For more conferment and reward, comprehensive research, organization and publication of the related materials are needed. The most important thing, however, is support and interest in the activists and the history of independence movement. Only we can take care of our patriotic martyrs. Without our interest and support, they will be forgotten. If they are forgotten, the history of our independence movement will be forgotten, which can promise no future for our nation. The area for deceased patriots in the National Cemetery, many memorial halls for deceased patriots including the Independence Hall and over 700 facilities for promoting independence movement are still not enough but they can be actively utilized for promotion of deceased patriots. These facilities are located nationwide therefore we should seek a way to utilize these for educational purposes. Furthermore, we should promote related festivals and events in each region to increase the interest among the residents as we seek a way to promote to people in other regions through websites of the cities and districts or promotional pamphlets. Education and promotion should be utilized to encourage the idea that deceased patriots and the history of independence movement should be acknowledged by the whole Korean nation. Base for education promotion is academic research. Promotion and education for the public should be divided for students/youth and the general public. Proper education contents and methods for students/youth should be developed and practiced and promotion/eduction on independence movement as the root of Korean identity and the growth force to maintain the essence of Korean nation should be offered to the general public.

This thesis covers the administration of the Crown Prince system and his political stature in Three Kingdoms by analyzing the article on the Crown Prince Installation in Samguksagi. To sum up this as follows. In Goguryeo(高句麗), 16 kings out of 28 kings proclaimed their sons the Crown Prince. 2 kings out of 5 kings whose birth date is identified installed the Crown Prince at the age of 35. When installing, the period of king's reign was from 12 to 19 years and it was mostly held on Chunjeongwol(春正月). They were 9 times for the oldest son to be a the Crown Prince to the throne, 2 times for the second son, 1 time for the third son, and 4 times for only one son. Half of them were the oldest son, and they were in about early or middle teens. Considering the article on the Crown Prince installation and the appointment of high-ranking government posts, political stature of the Crown Prince is higher than Guksang(國相), which is the highest-ranking government posts. Considering the number of the installation of the Crown Prince, regulation of the date, and political stature of the Crown Prince, it represents that royal authority in Goguryeo was more stable than two other Kingdoms. In Baekje(百濟), the installation of the Crown Prince was confirmed 6 times by 6 kings out of 31 kings. When installing the Crown Prince, the period of king's reign is irregular. The installed Crown Prince included the 5 eldest sons and one third son. Comparing the installation of the Crown Prince with the number of the appointment of high-ranking government posts, political stature of the Crown Prince was less than Byeonggwanjwapyeong(兵官佐平) and Naesinjwapyeong(內臣佐平). Repeated wars and rebellions made Backje weaker and weaker, so Backje failed to proclaim the Crown Prince properly, which could guarantee stable succession to the throne. In Silla(新羅), the installation of the Crown Prince was confirmed 17 times by 14 kings out of 56 kings. Among the former 27 kings, when the system of installation of the Crown Prince had not established yet, 15 kings didn't proclaimed the Crown Prince because they had no sons. When installing the Crown Prince, present king's age, the period of his reign and the date of installation are various. But the kings who were acceded to the throne in change of a royal family almost carried out the installation of the Crown Prince within 5 years. Among 17 Princes who were installed to the throne were 11 Crown Prince the son by king's legal wife, 1 the eldest grandson, 2 the second son, 1 unknown son, and 1 king's younger brother, 1 the son of a concubine, so the portion of the son by king's legal wife is two-thirds. When installing the Crown Prince, the average age of them was under 15. Comparing the installation of the Crown Prince with the number of the appointment of high-ranking government posts, political stature of the Crown Prince was less than Sangdaedeong(上大等) and Sijung(侍中). It's because the Crown Prince was mostly installed when young and with a struggle for the throne people who have enough political power to usurp to the throne made the Crown Prince powerless. Such phase of the installation of the Crown Prince represents that royal authority in Silla was changable, depending on political situation.

Based on a new interpretation of Pohang Jungseongri Silla Stone Mounument discovered in 2009, I examined the development process and the structure of Silla 6 Bu and the Office rank of Capital and provinces. With this, it was found that Silla 6 Bu was reorganized as a territorial administrative district from a residence-centered district based on kinship and there were palaces as the clan basis of each Bu and messengers(sain; 使人) with private characteristic. In addition, it can be figured out that, going through triple systems, as it were, an office rank system of Yangbu(喙部)․Saryangbu(沙喙部), ‘Khanji(干支)-Ilbul(壹伐)’ structure of 4 Bu in capital and ‘Khanji(干支)-IlKumji(壹金知)’ structure in provinces(村; chon), the Office rank system of Silla, which developed from ‘Khanji(干支)-Ilbul(壹伐)’ structure at the beginning of creation of 6 Bu, was organized to the office rank system of capital and provinces when the law was promulgated in the reign of King Bupheung and then the system was completed as Gyeongwi 17 levels of office rank(京位: office rank held by residents of capital) and Woewi 11 levels of office rank(外位: office rank held by residents of provinces) at around 539～561 A.D. Moreover, the status hierarchy from True bone(Chingol) to the head rank four (4 dupum) as the core basis of Bone rank system(Golpum System) of Silla was already established in the period of Maripgan and it was enlarged to True bone and head rank system from six to one, then, reflected on the Statute enacted in the reign of King Bupheung.

This paper examines the aspects in which time record, i.e., the almanac, was used and the necessity for calendrical science, the process of improving the Astronomy Office, and calendrical science related to the contents of the Xuanming calendar from end of Silla to early Goryeo period. As a dynasty of the Middle Ages that was grounded on the idea of Mandate of Heaven, Goryeo contrived to understand time and control it. This is directly related to calendar system and dissemination of almanac as well as numbers used in calculating a calendar and time measured with a clepsydra, the contents of which were applied toward "recommending work according to appropriate farming seasons" for important agricultural policies as well as monthly ordinance system, diverse ritual times, and personnel administration. Goryeo searched for a sacred ruling system of the sovereign through its realization of the idea of Mandate of Heaven and as the axis of universal order. To do so, almanacs, numbers for calculating a calendar, and clepsydra were developed by focusing on the Xuanming calendar. It can be said that comprehension and application of the calendrical science in early Goryeo has contributed greatly toward the formation of Korea's medieval dynasty. And one cannot evaluate this period as simply adopting China's book on calendar or using information from this book by merely remeasuring longitude and latitude with Gaegyeong as the center. Ultimately, Goryeo dynasty was able to accurately provide established pattern of astronomy as well as grasp the farming seasons and calendrical days as a dynasty of the Middle Ages by compilation and dissemination of almanacs that used various calendrical sciences such as the Xuanming calendar. In statecraft, Goryeo was able to exert itself to inform its people the seasons, months, and days they should observe as well as to accurately reveal the seasons by correcting calculating the calendrical system so that it can plan regulations, rationalization, and unification of dynastic operations such as rituals, tributes, tax, and bureaucratic system. In international relations, Goryeo manifested its status as an independent kingdom by partially accepting China's calendrical methods and calendrical days while calculating and disseminating its own calendrical days.

In the early years of Joseon Dynasty, 'false ambassadors of the Jurchen tribes' started to appear when the direct diplomatic relation between Joseon and Holjaon Oljeokap(忽刺溫 兀狄哈) was made after the foundation of 4 Guns and 6 Jins. It seems that this occurrence affected other Jurchen people to follow it. The types of 'false ambassadors of the Jurchen tribes' so far clarified are as follows:First, borrowing stamps; second, using Mongol(元) stamps; third, false assumption of another person; fourth, false statement of a messenger of false ambassadors; fifth, forgery, borrowing, or trading of official statements; sixth, two or more of the violations above. The fact that such types were related to stamps, another persons' name, false assumption of false ambassadors indicate that there were already many forgery, borrowing, or trading of official statements. It is thought that assigning governmental offices to Jurchen tribes as well as royal assignment of offices became the consent of diplomatic relation with Joseon in the end. In other words, as Jurchen people who were given offices presented the official certificates from Joseon to chieftains in borderlands for passage. The problem is, though, such documented writs of appointment could be easily fabricated or forged. As a way of prevent such 'false ambassadors of the Jurchen tribes,' Joseon endeavored to collect information on Jurchen people, and started to limit the relationship with Jurchen tribes. In the mean time, Joseon would forgive and let them leave as a great country out of generosity to embrace people from far regions. However, the chieftains were ordered to investigate thoroughly the writs of appointment of Jurchen people before passage, and to take over such false documents, whether in Seoul or in side areas, when finding them forged, borrowed, or traded. In fact, seizing false writs of appointment resulted in disturbanc among Jurchen people, especially the tribes who surrendered(城底彼人) and submitted to Joseon since it already became old customs to borrow such certificates, deceive officials, receive stipends or become officials. To limit such acts, which became a custom and a way of diplomatic policy to them, was like a limitation to the diplomatic relationship. Therefore, this could resulted in a revolt of the major tribe over the basin of Duman River(城底彼人). In examination of the types of 'false ambassadors of the Jurchen tribes,' it is made clear that they tried to disguise the true identities for a financial purpose and attempted to get profits in trading with Joseon. They deceived the officials, forged, and assumed a false name of a messenger in many different ways by cunningly exploiting the established methods of exchange with Joseon. Thus, there is a need to change the approach to 'false ambassadors,' which is one of the hot issues among Korean and Japanese researchers on Korean-Japan history in the age of Joseon Dynasty, and to investigate the title, concept, and appreciation of 'false ambassadors' during the early years of Joseon comprehensively.

Lee Seock Hyung was a typical scholar raised by the government in the early Chosun dynasty. For about a half of his life as a bureaucrat he worked at Jiphyunjeon participating in the publication of such historical texts as Chipyungyoram, Yeokdaebyungyo, and Koreasa. However, Lee Seock Hyung was neither a meritorious retainer who might have played a significant role in the ruling of king Sejo; nor he preserved fidelity by opposing Sejo's seizure of the royal post. This political position instead made him intimate with both the meritorious retainers and the Sarim faction. Lee Seock Hyung had an intense idea of how to rule the state. He understood Chosun in his own perspective and was proud of its culture. Holding this pride he sought lessons of how to reign the state from history. The sum up of his political idea was the compilation of Daehakyeoneuijipryak. Political texts had long been compiled for the purpose of strengthening the royal power. It seems that upon the appearance of this privately compiled political text, Daehakyeoneui began to be appropriated for the power of bureaucrats. Lee Seock Hyung learned from history that the state and people can not be stable unless the strong hold themselves moderate and the weak live without difficulty. His main emphasis lay on the idea of 'In', through which the strong can hold themselves moderate. To Lee Seock Hyung, these ideas were the base of people-oriented ruling. We can catch this point from his 'Hoyaga', a famous poem for people in the early Chosun dynasty, which vividly reveals the miserable life of the people. During his bureaucratic career, Lee Seock Hyung was indeed a person who endeavored to disclose and punish the greed of the strong.

The activity of Po-Do-Ch'ŏng(PDC) was limited within about 4km radius around Seoul castle(城底十里). Because its location and activating area was set up its optimum sphere of security activity under the consideration of geographical condition of Seoul. PDC divided such 2 bureaus as the left bureau and the right bureau. Both bureaus kept aloof 1.3Km distance in the opposite direction from the street, Chongro(鐘路). In relation to the distance between each bureau, it seems to me that although during peace time the left or right bureau activated separately at the designated site, in case of emergency these bureaus coordinated beyond their own designated sphere and the boundary of jurisdiction. Also, it seems that the left and the right bureau played such role as guard and escort at all the road in Gwanghwamun(光化門) and Donhwamun(敦化門). Because these bureau's task in nature connected with the judicial and military business systematically, these bureaus had to maintain public affair contact with quickly Judicial or military organs. Therefore the distance between both bureaus and the judicial or military organs needed from the minimal 6-7 minute to the maximum 23 minute on foot. As Seoul's distribution economy was vitalized in the center of Han River basin during the lated Choson Dynasty, the outer population and residential districts out of Seoul castle was expanded in the scale and number. As the spacial size of Seoul grew up, PDC's parol activity was increased. On account of three river zone〔三江: Hangang(漢江), Sogang(西江), and Youngsangang (龍山江)〕's population growth, PDC's parol and its force were deployed these district intensively. Although PDC's parol area expanded within about 4km radius around Seoul castle in the Late Chosun Period, its main security field put emphasis on Seoul castle only. It not only looked upon Seoul castle as its main security field but also carried out its security activity positively.

Although Dokugawa Ieyasu established Dokugawa Bakuhu after ruining his sovereign in the name of providence, he was much concerned that others probably ruined his sovereignty in name of providence as he did. Therefore, it became a vital task for Dokugawa Bakuhu to settle down the agitation of “the tail wagging the dog” in the period of “Warning States” and to revert feudal orders. In addition, they should also reasonably explain the legitimacy of Edobakuhu. However, it’s pity that no one could explain this among Japanese scholars. There is no one with rich Neo-Confucianism thoughts among Japanese scholars. For this reason, the ruler of Edobakuhu is bursting to seek a new system of ideology and a scholar to explain the statue of Edobakuhu. At that time, no one had so much Confucianism wisdom except Hugiwara Seika, a Zen monk. During Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592, he encountered with Gang Hang, a famous Korean Confucian, who was forced to Japan by arrest. He didn’t know what Neo-Confucianism is until he met with Gang Hang and became his pupil influenced by Neo-Confucianism. From then on, he started out to study Confucianism. Dokugawa Bakuhu took Hujiwara Seika as their spiritual leader and accepted his suggestion to develop Korean Neo-Confucianism. They facilitated Japanese official education to absorb Korean Neo-Confucianism so as to re-organize their medieval social order back to modern age. The core of so-called Neo-Confucianism not only aimed at political stability, but also established their social system in Japan by making flexible use of their thoughts on society. As a result, Edobakuhu set up General-centered “Master-Slave Relationship” (that is, the model of patriarchal system) and hereditary identity system to solidify social order. Under such circumstances, the social order established in Dokugawa times and capital ethic awareness are formed into the basic spiritual elements of modern Japanese. By this, Japan realized modernization. Under this social background, “Japanese Civilization” called by Samuel Philips Huntington came into being.

This study aims to reveal through Russian documents the full account of the Ito assassination to see what impacts it had on Russia-Japanese relations. Russian data related to the October 26, 1909 assassination of Resident General Ito by Ahn, Jung-geun at Harbin, territory then leased from China by Russia, were found at the Imperial Russia Foreign Policy Archives, Russian History Archives, Russian National Military Documents Archives, and in media sources from Eastern Siberia. Of special interest are the telegraph messages and reports of Russian finance minister Kokovtsov (then on an official trip to Manchuria to meet with Japan which had set up an oppositional structure of East Asian interests), precious data from Russian sources with which to confirm the full story of the Ito assassination which has been understood primarily through Japanese data until now. As expressed in Kokovtsov's telegrams, the assassination of Ito- whose ambition was the annexation of Joseon to Japan- clarified the Korean people's opposition to Japan's intentions. The assassination of Ito by An also brought changes to Russia-Japanese relations. Following the Russia-Japanese War, preparations for the remapping of power in Manchuria were concluded in the Russia-Japanese Treaty of July, 1907. Furthermore, Ito was on his way to meet with Kokovtsov in Manchuria to clearly define the scope of power of the two countries in the region. Russia was recovering to some extent from the aftermath of their defeat in the war with Japan, they wished to solidify their domination in Manchuria as far as possible without displeasing Japan. Japan planned to go use this opportunity to use railways to expand and entrench their power in the region. But before the meeting, Ito was shot by Ito at Harbin, thereby delaying and changing the expectations of both sides. Regarding the assassination which took place in Russian-occupied Harbin, and before Kokovtsov's own eyes, Japan silently questioned the responsibility of Russia, and Russia felt a need to make a response. Russia had to eliminate any possibility of further hostilities with Japan. So in order to rapidly solve the problem of Manchuria, the 2nd Russia-Japanese Treaty of July 1910 was concluded in accordance with the advice of foreign affairs minister Izvolskii. Ultimately, insofar as it preceded the treaty between Russia and Japan, two major players in change to the East Asian international order, the Ito assassination functioned as a medium for building a new East Asian international order after 1910.

At the time of yearly National Humiliation Day, Korean Americans criticized Japanese occupation of Korea and proposed new policies for national independence. Thus the study of Korean Americans' understanding of National Humiliation Day will provide important clues for the study on the causes of the forced annexation of Korea by Japan and the analysis of the independence movement conducted by overseas Koreans including Korean Americans. This article analyzes the activities of Korean Americans and their cognition on the National Humiliation Day by referring to The New Korea, which was published by the Korean National Association during the period of Japanese forced occupation. After the annexation, Korean Americans declared spiritual independence and decided to arouse hostility toward Japan by observing the National Humiliation Day on August 29th until the expulsion of Japanese imperialism. And they urged the reflection of Korean nation beyond the condemnation of Japanese annexation of Korea. They pointed out the incompetence of upper ruling group as the fundamental cause for the national humiliation and urged that each of the Korean nation should play his proper role, increase ability and arouse patriotism. On the National Humiliation Day after the March First Movement of 1919, the main argument was pointed at the accomplishment of national independence by succeeding to the spirit of March First Movement or active support for the Korean Provisional Government. When the actual contents of the Taft-Katsura Agreement was known around the National Humiliation Day in 1924, they urged the increase of domestic capability without relying on foreign powers such as the United States. In 1925, reflecting the internal division in the Korean Provisional Government, there was a reflection on the failure to make a united revolutionary organization. There was also a new proposal for a struggle for national liberation with new awakening and scientific method by an unknown hero. When the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 occurred, the overseas Korean organizations made a commemorative announcement on national humiliation. They urged instant participation in the Chinese anti-Japanese war by taking the war as an opportunity for achieving national liberation with a united force. Thereafter, expecting the Japan's defeat, there appeared a view that urged support for Korean Provisional Government and Korean Restoration Army for achieving national liberation cooperatively. The Korean Americans were expected to support the independence struggle by providing the military expenditure as rear service area. When Japan's defeat was expected and the chance of national liberation was growing after the Korean Provisional Government declared war against Japan in the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the end of 1941, the United Korean Committee in America conducted flag-hoisting ceremonies in several cities in the United States for the purpose of urging the recognition of the Korean Provisional Government by allied forces. Especially in Los Angeles, Korean independence was recognized symbolically as the national flag was hoisted at the city hall with both the Koreans and Americans watching it. Thus the National Humiliation Day was not the day of humiliation any more. It was now recognized as the Hope Day. There was even a voice for celebrating the day as a national holiday and the Korean Americans' expectation of independence heightened. When Japan's defeat seemed to become a reality, there appeared even the view that suggested the means and forms for the restoration of national sovereignty in preparation for national independence on the National Humiliation Day. Especially what draws our attention is the view that pointed out the problems in political thought and provisional government. The view suggested that even though the world approve Korea's freedom and independence, national humiliation would come again if we fail to unite with our own political thought. It also raised questions on the role played by the Korean Provisional Government which would complete the independence movement as a supreme organization and government. Thus it argued that Korean Americans had to take united and allied actions to accomplish the great national project and to solve impending problems and it also urged the establishment of a central organization, which could provide the central causes and doctrines for various organizations. This view was very suggestive as the worries became reality after the liberation.

This manuscript is a thesis analyzing a Singan-hoi movement of the Gwangju region, Gyeonggi-do, where the national movement of a local society was relatively low since the 3.1 Movement. This can become a different form of analysis from that Singan-hoi case study until now progressed by focusing on a region where the national movement of a local society was mainly developed actively. As a result, the Gwangju region actively developed educational activities rather than a social movement such as a youth movement, etc., and the Singan-hoi movement was developed under the leadership of the old school force of the Cheondo religion(天道敎) and socialist force. And the Gwangju branch of Singan-hoi performed activities on affairs of a society, activities for solving local society and Joseon's current issues and life improvement activities, etc. In case of activities for solving local society and Joseon's current issues and life improvement activities, there are activities for protecting Koreans in Manchuria, correcting evil practices on local people of local authority and supporting Wonsan‘s general strike, etc. Especially, it could be known that activities for protecting Koreans in Manchuria aimed to execute organizational and continuous activities through formation of Gwangju alliance for protecting Koreans in Manchuria. And it seems that the Singan-hoi movement aimed to expand force of the Gwangju region through activities on affairs of a society and actively developed comments to the headquarters of Singan-hoi. Especially, it can be said that what it powerfully criticized against restriction of the headquarters of Singan-hoi shows that it had an independent standpoint. An especially notable point in the Singan-hoi movement of the Gwangju region was that it aimed to organize a Gwangheung branch setting Eonju-myeon, Daewang-myeon, Jungase-myeon as well as Shindong-myeon, Gwacheon-myeon and Seoi-myeon as a target district in the end of 1930. In short, it can be known that the Singan-hoi of the Gwangju region was organized as union between nationalists and socialists and lead a national movement of the Gwangju region from the middle and later half of 1920s to the early half of 1930s. However, a revolutionary agricultural union movement was developed in other regions as soon as the Singan-hoi was disorganized, whereas a Gwangju Communist Party's Council was organized and executed in the Gwangju region. It seems that in-depth discussion on reasons that local properties occurred like these will be necessary.

This study analyzed established processes of Joseon Steel Co. having been materialized from 1941. Through this analysis, the study tried to look into development status of the steel industry propelled by imperialist Japan during war basis period. Also, this study paid attention to conflicts of opinions and adjusting processes between Planning Board and the military, Government General of Joseon and economic authorities in Japanese government. While entering in 1940s, developing features of the steel industry from imperialist Japan has been changed. In case of latter half of 1930s, Government General of Joseon requested the necessity of steel industry’s development strongly to their mother country Japan focusing on constructions such as Cheongjin Steel or Seongjin Steel etc. as a part of colony industrialization. On the other hand, existing positive attitudes of the Government General were been withered, and they adhered to prudent stances in the constructing process of Joseon Steel Co. at 1940s. According to this, there appeared different aspects from inner national power of imperialist Japan differently from Cheongjin Steel construction at 1930s. The reason was that the Planning Board led constructions of steel mills after getting supports from the military, but a structure of requesting substantial reduction on the plans from Government General of Joseon has been established together with Department of Commerce and Ministry of Finance in Japanese government. In final, the construction of Joseon Steel Co. has been decided as reducing the plans same as demands of General Government of Joseon and economic authorities of Japanese government. Attitude changes of the Government General was originated from the structure that cannot but depend on resource’s sourcing power of their mother country ultimately. It was because weakness of sourcing powers from Japan having been started owing to establishing war basis caused delays and deadlocks of large- scale steel mill’s constructions that were begun at the latter half of 1930s, and thus its burdens have been transferred to Joseon economy. In contrast, central economic authorities in Japan kept economic policy’s stances of home centrism invariably even in entering into 1940 by giving priority to economical efficiency, and there were rather strengthened aspects owing to lack of resources. Consensus between central economic authorities of Japan and Government General of Joseon surrounding Joseon Steel was happened in these backgrounds. However, this prudent attitude based on realistic situations of Government General of Joseon was not able to be kept while the Pacific War was begun in earnest. The reason was derived from a fact that any restraining influences on the Joseon Steel’s transforming into uneconomical and more logistic factory such as producing small-furnace steel and bullet steel for logistics were not displayed. Constructive processes of Joseon Steel Co. during the Pacific War could be said as exposing limitations of Government General of Joseon more realistically as a colony authority related to the colony industrialization.

The aim of this study is to examine the Organized characteristics of the central structure of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Korean State, the process of and reasons for rupture of negotiations between left and right wing to expand the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Korean State, and the hegemony victory of the Reconstruction group of Joseon Communist Party that became clearer in the process of conversion from the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Korean State to the People's Republic of Korea, in order to reveal the internal structural limitations that led to the failure of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Korean State activities, and analyze the characteristics of the National United Front Line theory of the Reconstruction group of Joseon Communist Party and Park Hun-young as a background that inevitably had limitations, and ultimately explain the background for left and right wing conflicts in the process of national establishment for the first time immediately after liberation. The first central structure of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Korean State plainly reveals the weaknesses of the political forces that support the committee. Since the Japanese colonial period it was structured solely by a small portion of the national and social movement forces. The structure established a system by the second central structure, but the Reconstruction group of Joseon Communist Party was the biggest force, and the Joseon Alliance for National Government and Lyuh Woon-Hyung failed to take the majority position. because they have due to a fundamentally weak human resources structure. Nationalist forces like Ahn Jae-Hong and other members of the Kihopa did participate, but they were a very small portion of the entire nationalist force. Negotiations between left and right wing to include a wide range of nationalist forces in the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Korean State took place twice between Lyuh Woon-Hyung and Ahn Jae-Hong, and the nationalists. However, the negotiations foundered due to interference from the Reconstruction group of Joseon Communist Party. Forces connected to Reconstruction group of Joseon Communist Party already had leadership in the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Korean State. In the process leading up to the announcement of the People's Republic of Korea at the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Korean State, the leadership of Lyuh Woon-Hyung was limited to people around him, and did not influence communists. The Reconstruction group of Joseon Communist Party charged forward despite his intentions, and skillfully used him. The August Thesis that expanded to the political route of the Reconstruction group of Joseon Communist Party claimed cooperation of the national bourgeoisie and establishment of a national united front line. However, the focal point of interest was proletarian hegemony. In other words, the focus was on winning the public to establish a working class and leadership authority. The August Thesis defined Song Chin-Woo as a rebellious national bourgeoisie and the Korea Democratic Party as a holding and capitalist class counter-party, and made clear that the wide nationalist force focusing on the Korea Democratic Party and pars of he socialist right wing would be excluded from the national united front line. Such routes and actions of the Reconstruction group of Joseon Communist Party were important reasons that prevented the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Korean State from developing into a national united front line that included left and right wing, in the process of national establishment. Lyuh Woon-Hyung needed stronger political faith that he could walk the road alone, stronger abilities, and great will and political power to break through the situation, but he failed in the end, and the separation of left and right wing grew clearer.