KJC Korea
Journal Central

This study surveys the discrimination of literary officers and military officers in the light of inferiority complex that Goryeo people used to have. Since King Seongjong, the ruling system was arranged on the basis of Confucius Political Ideology, enforcing the civil administration system. Thus, the literary officers led the political situation, establishing the powerful literary families. Each literary family formed a particular consciousness different from other ruling groups and displayed it in the human and social relations. It was mainly expressed with pride and arrogance, and the direct victim of such discrimination was mainly soldiers. Hurt by rudeness of literary officers, soldiers came to have victim mentality or inferiority complex. Without the literary ability, soldiers used to be excluded from the literary-ruling society. Literary and military officers got socially separated more and more and the psychological barrier became higher and higher. When the discrimination between literary and military officers became incurable, the inferiority complex of soldiers went to extremes. In this situation, when the literary officers showed contemptible behaviors to soldiers directly in Eujongdae, their inferiority complex along with frustration and rage could not be controlled. Finally, it caused a political upheaval by soldiers, who inflicted severe and harsh revenge to literary officers. After the political upheaval, the soldiers came to have a superior position to literary officers. But, never changed the climate that the literacy was valued higher than militarism. People continued to think that, while literary persons knew the right way through the literal exercise and tried to practice it, the soldiers ignored the way and thus could not do self-restraint. Therefore, the inferiority complex of soldiers toward literary officers could not be overcome. Meanwhile, in this process, literary officers came to have self-reflection and reduced their contemptible attitude toward soldiers. During the ruling by soldiers, they came to know the power and existence of soldiers and recognize it. And, thanks to the development of Confucianism and the introduction of Chu Hhi's idea, new moral rule and scholarly model were suggested. The tue scholar was thought to be the person who knew the rightness through the study and practiced the loyalty and filial piety. So, if even a soldier studied the way and practiced the loyalty and filial piety, he could be reckoned as a scholar. As the soldiers could become scholars through their endeavor, it provided the basis to relieve the discrimination against soldiers and to overcome the inferiority complex of soldiers.

The folk lore in the middle ages was deemed as distracted or unfocused and identified to be a being that was unable to prescribe itself as a being that remained outside universal ideology. The folk lore generally meant lifestyle, folkways, etc of the people as well as locality and circumambiency. In this study, the purpose of this article was to examine the way that they saw the folk lore, not the folk lore itself. The way that they saw the folk lore boiled down to that of universal ideology in the middle ages, which was Neo-Confucianism in the Joseon Dynasty. To look into issues related to folk lore in which Neo-Confucianism held, I have paid attention to viewpoint of custom held by Seoin-Noron in the latter half of Joseon Dynasty in this study. It was difficult that the field of 'folk lore' that was not included in the category of the dualism of Neo-Confucianism, that is, Sinicentrism and Babarianism, noble man and common man, and elegant and vulgar, could be created in the Neo-Confucianism. That's way they couldn't but hold positions favorably against their own folk lore. In particular, it was closely related to exercise of their political power that they held as ruling class. The ruling class could successfully oppress opposition parties represented by contemporary folk lore through exercising their political ideology based upon Neo-Confucianism. It was their essential position that they should only discuss whether the folk lore has any moral value or not, but they wouldn't need to discuss whether folk lore is similar or not, which showed clear point of their political philosophy. This kind of their position held a unique stance when looking further into the map of whole East-Asia.

In colonial Korea, husband killing had been made into a crime "unique" to the colonial Korean society. Those women who killed their husbands were depicted as a victim of the evil marriage custom and Sobu(tender girl wives) on the one hand, and Dokbu, erotic femme fatal, on the other hand. These seemingly contradicting image were not separate and distinct. They rather constituted the two sides of the same coin. Discourses such as “a young wife who committed atrocious crimes”, and “atrocious crimes done by tender girl wives” magnified to the full point "barbarity" and "tragic nature" stemmed from the Korean unique practice of early marriage. This development is closely related to the way in which the modern understanding of marriage and family was produced and consumed by the enlightened intellectuals of Korea. In this regard, the efforts to enlighten the Korean practice of marriage represented an attempt to construct “modernity" in colonial Korea. The tendency to make “early marriage” into a devil practice was a case in point to demonstrate the mechanism in which the “modernity” was put into action. That also reflects the process in which the discourse and reality of the colonial modernity transformed customs and practices not suitable for western civilization as "evil practices." With such efforts, colonies were made into an object of "barbarity". After all, it wasn't that the early marriage in the colonial Korea caused the cruel crime of husband killing. But that the crime of husband murder made the early marriage into an evil practice. The husband killing was a symbol of the discourse /which made the early marriage evil. The early marriage was not much of the cause of the spouse killing as its effect. It is also a good case to show how the gaze of modernity disciplined every day life of the people in colonial Korea.

이 논문의 목적은 1940년대 동아시아 지역에서 조선이 차지하는 지역주의적 위치를 배상문제를 중심으로 고찰하는 것이었다. 1940년대에 미국에 의해 형성된 대일 배상 정책은 지역주의적인 문맥에서 일본의 비군사화와 민주화 문제를 다룬 것이었다. 즉, 일본이 동아시아에서 정치ㆍ경제ㆍ군사적인 우위를 차지하지 못하게 하기 위해 일본의 군국주의적인 경제시설을 징발ㆍ해체하여 이를 일본에 의해 피해를 입은 동아시아 지역에 배분함으로써 동아시아 지역경제의 수평적 구조를 이루어 동아시아의 경제적 안정을 달성하고자 하는 것이었다. 즉, 역외 패권국으로서 미국이 통제한다는 전제로 일본이라는 역내 패권적 중심을 제거한 상태로 전전의 경제구조를 재가동하여 동아시아 지역 구조를 안정시킨다는 것이었다. 이러한 구상을 구체적으로 계획하기 위해 폴리 배상사절단이 2차에 걸쳐 동아시아 지역으로 파견되었던 것이었다. 폴리 배상사절단의 배상안은 전시기에 형성된 배상정책과 일관성을 유지하면서 작성되었는데, 각국의 경제부흥이 동아시아 지역 전체의 경제계획에 바탕을 두고 실행될 것이라는 점을 명확히 언급하였다. 폴리 배상안에서의 조선의 지역주의적인 위치는 다음과 같이 정리할 수 있다. 먼저 일본으로부터 배상을 받을 주체로서 통일조선을 상정하였다는 점이다. 미소 공동 위원회의 합의에 의해 임시정부 수립과 신탁통치 개시를 전제로 했으므로 배상은 분단된 양 지역에서 각각 수취할 성질의 것은 아니었던 것이다. 또한 미소 공동 위원회에서의 교섭이 난관에 부딪히자 교섭 타결을 압박하는 수단으로서 배상의 수취 주체는 통일된 조선이어야 한다는 주장을 했던 것이다. 그러나 냉전의 진척과 함께 배상안 자체도 이데올로기적인 접근이 강화되어 가고 있었다. 다음으로 배상의 범위로는 조선 소재 ‘재외 재산’과 일본의 철거시설이 그 대상으로 고려되었으나 점차 조선 소재 ‘재외 재산’ 만이 배상의 범위로 한정되어 가는 경향을 보였다. 또한 배상은 ‘재외 재산’ 이외의 배상청구에 대해서는 조선은 전승국의 일원이 아니었으므로 일본에 직접 청구할 수는 없을 것이라고 인식되었으며, 미국이 자국 청구분 일부를 조선에 할당하는 방식을 고려하고 있었다는 점을 알 수 있다. 이러한 배상 시설의 이전 원칙으로서는 조선ㆍ중국 등 동아시아 지역의 경제적 균등발전이라는 산업연관이 중시되었다. 배상시설에 있어서 점차 인프라 중심의 공장에서 향후 일본으로부터의 수입 가능성이 높은 기계류로 점차 배상 시설의 내용이 변화되어 가고 있었다. 마지막으로 조선에 주둔한 미군이 주둔비도 미국의 배상 청구분에서 탕감될 것이라는 인식을 보였다. 그러나 동아시아 냉전의 등장으로 초기 대일배상 구상을 실행에 옮기는 주요 대상 지역이었던 ‘만주’와 ‘북조선’ 지역이 미국의 통제 영역으로부터 벗어나게 되어, 동아시아 지역의 통합이라는 미국의 정책 의도는 심각한 재조정에 들어가지 않을 수 없게 되었던 것이다. 폴리 배상사절단의 배상안에 대한 조선은 일본의 ‘재외 재산’ 즉 적산이 배상으로서 국외로 징발될지도 모른다는 우려가 있었고, 이에 대해 미국 측은 조선 내의 ‘재외 재산’은 조선이 확보할 배상의 대상이 될 것임을 재확인하는 반응을 보였다. 이는 조선의 상황이 연합국의 일원이 아니라 패전국 일본의 일부였다는 사실에 대한 자각이 있었다는 점과 함께 조선에 남아있는 ‘재외 재산’ 시설이 실질적으로는 미국이 일본에 요구하고 시행 중이었던 ‘비군사화 및 민주화’라는 정책 시행의 대상이 되는 군사 시설 및 군국주의를 지원하는 공업 시설에 해당될 수 있었다는 점을 명확히 인식하고 있었다는 것이다.

The purpose of this writing is to identify the logic and policies of Korea, Japan, Russia, and North Korea concerning the return of Koreans in Sakhalin immediately after Liberation from Japan until the mid 1790s. Koreans in Sakhalin were forced to move by the Japanese imperial policies during the colonial era. Starting from 1920s immigration to Sakhalin was enacted by force under the purpose of the development of Sakhalin, a policy of Japanese Imperialism. Or they were drafted by force to work as laborers to support the Japanese military at war. However they were abandoned in Sakhalin. The Russians who won Sakhalin after the war implemented policies for the Koreans in Sakhalin to be returned to North Korea at first. But because of the lack of labor force North Korea changed the policies for Koreans in Sakhalin to force them to reside there giving them citizenship and nationality. North Korea also had to take precautions against returning Koreans in Sakhalin regarding the political consideration to Russia. North Korea enforced the policy to encourage Koreans in Sakhalin to settle there by giving them North Korean nationality or to send the new labor force to Sakhalin. Both Russia and North Korea accepted the Koreans in Sakhalin as ‘citizens’ in order to share the labor force as well as to take the initiative at the ideological war against America, Japan, and South Korea. After WWII and the defeat of Japan the Japanese government reorganized its national identity and boundary. Enacting the policy of returning Japanese people in Sakhalin, the Koreans in Sakhalin were excluded because they were not ‘Japanese people’ though certain Koreans who were married to Japanese woman were accepted with the name of ‘companion’. However this act, which was composed to accept the Japanese women who had married Koreans as ‘Japanese people’, was definitely based on ‘Japan nationalism’. In case of South Korea, President Lee Seong-man’s government did not take the issue of the Koreans in Sakhalin as one of the matters coming from the Japanese colonial rules. Only in the throes of political competitive system with North Korea, South Korea requested the return of Koreans in Sakhalin, blaming North Korea’s ‘repatriation of Korean residents in Japan’. However this attitude gave Japan an excuse to abandon its compensational responsibilities after the war keeping its indifference and insincerity in the issue of Koreans in Sakhalin so that the Koreans in Sakhalin were consequently abandoned. It was 1966, immediately after the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea when the issue of returning Koreans in Sakhalin was dealt with earnestly. This was the Korean government’s countenance to the civil movement on the issue rather than a serious response to questions about Japan’s post-war responsibilities. This was also a way of reacting to the issue of Japan’s ‘repatriation of Korean residents in Japan’ to North Korea. Also it was used as a way to justify the government’s authority which had decreased due to the struggle against the Treaty. The Korean government tried to stay in power characterizing the issue as a problem between Russia and Japan and encouraging the public to have feelings of anti-communism as well as anti-Japanese sentiment. With this attitude the Korean government neglected the historicity of the Koreans in Sakhalin, which resulted in downsizing the number of Koreans to be returned to the compulsory mobilized (immigrated) Koreans just under the Japanese general mobilization order. The Korean government did not unanimously accept the Koreans in Sakhalin as its people. The Korean government regarded the Koreans in Sakhalin as being somewhere on the margin of ‘Korean’ identity, continuously checking and controlling their ideology, and recognizing them as ‘the other’ for securing its legitimacy and political system.