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The establishment and management of Paegangjin by Silla was deeply related with the political situation of the north-east Asia and pioneering the northern territory in the reign of King Seongdeok. Up to date, it has been assumed that Balhae was not enough to extend its power to the area of P’ae river and this area was a sort of military buffer zone at that time. However, some doubts has been raised about why Tang willingly offered the southern area of P’ae river, which was a strategic location in Silla-Tang War, to Silla as a benefit in return for the dispatch of Silla’s forces and why Silla had neglected it for 13 years since gaining the official approval of the occupation of this area from Tang. Through tracing the attack time and the route to Dengzhou by Balhae and the process after the attack, this study tried to make clear the request for a dispatch of Silla’s troops by Tang and the process of its dispatch. In addition, it focused on how the dispatch was related with the official approval of the southern area of P’ae river. At this, by analysing the diplomatic documents between Tang and Silla in the period of the time from asking for the dispatch of the troops by Tang to the establishment of Paegangjin by Silla, this study identified the fact that Balhae’s forces had blocked the sea route between Silla and Tang in West Sea after stepping back from Dengzhou and it was the issue of Silla and Tang to drive out them. On this result of the research, it is assumed that the military garrison(戍) established in the area of P’ae after driving out Balhae’s forces corresponded to 14 Gunhyeon shown in the record of Goguryeo(高句麗) Hansanju(漢山州) in Jiriji 4, Samguksagi (History of Three kingdoms) and indicated the jurisdiction of Paegangjin as well.

In previous research, the belief in Maitreya’s future descent into this world was a teaching disseminated by Jinpyo(眞表) in the later Silla(新羅) era, along with the Buddhist doctrine of the “Age of Degenerate Dharma.” This was the background for King Gung-ye’s(ruled in Later Goguryeo 後高 句麗from 901～918) claim to be the incarnation of Maitreya Buddha. (This was very confusing) In this paper, I have added more background. Firstly, the Maitreya faith of the later Silla’s royal family in the 9th century is another background I would like to add. In the reign of King Gyeongmun(景文王r.861～875), once a member of Silla’s Hwarang(花郞 Youthful Warriors), all Seon monks were revered as Maitreya Buddhas. The belief in the coming of Maitreya was propagated so that people would view the king as a “wheel-turning sage king(轉輪聖王Skt. cakravartin)”. Secondly, Seon monks of the later Silla period believed in the coming of Maitreya. Unlike the Seon(禪Ch. Chan) Buddhism of Tang(唐China), in Silla, Seon monks who believed in Maitreya also believed that Kāśyapa(迦 葉) was waiting for Maitreya to descend on Mt. Kukkuṭapāda(鷄足山in Magadhā 摩揭陀). There is also the possibility that Seon monks who anticipated the coming of Maitreya actively propagated the belief that King Gung-ye was the Maitreya Buddha. Thirdly, Zetian Wuhou(武則天624–705, a Tang 唐empress), who claimed to be a Cakravartin(wheel-turning sage king) and Maitreya Buddha, is more evidence of the East Asian belief that kings are Buddhas. Like Zetian Wuhou, who ascended to the throne citing spurious scriptures such as the Mahāmegha-sūtra(大雲經) and the Ratnamegha-sūtra(寶雨經), King Gung-ye himself wrote more than 20 volumes of such scriptures Through these cases, we can better understand King Gung-ye’s claim to be Maitreya Buddha as a manifestation of the East Asian belief in the “King is Buddha”, as well as the belief in the coming of Maitreya held by monks and the royal family in 9th century Silla. Even though King Gung-ye’s claim to be Maitreya lasted less than 10 years, it is an interesting case of the existence of the “King is Buddha” tradition on the Korean Peninsula.

In the Goryeo era, Jeonsigwa(田柴科) was provided to those who performed government service or were in charge of a certain Jikyeok(職役). Jeonsigwa concerned granting land and the right to obtain firewood, in other words, Siji(柴地). However, the land which was divided and distributed under Jeonsigwa was not to be directly given but only some amount of grains produced from the land were granted. The right to obtain some amount of grains is called Sujogwon(收租權, the right of collecting land tax). The land whose Sujogwon was commissioned to Yangban(兩班) bureaucrats under the system of Jeonsigwa was Yangbanjeon(兩班田). However, in the historical records at the time, Yangbanjeon was often expressed as Sajeon(私田). This is different from today's private land, but just in that Jo(租, land tax) belonged to individuals, not the government, it was called Sajeon. However, there are some cases where private land was called Sajeon and therefore special caution is needed when interpreting Sajeon of the Goryeo era. This paper reviewed Sajeon that appeared in relation to cultivation of Jinjeon(陳田, wildland) of Sikhwaji(食貨志) Geonje(田制) Jose(租稅) in Goryeosa(高麗史) and was able to find the followings. Sajeon that appears in panmun(判文, regulation) on Jinjeon cultivation was Sujoji(收租地) like Yangbanjeon. Therefore, unlike cultivation of private land, the government prescribed distribution of crops between Jeonju(田主) and Jeonho(佃戶). This is verified twice in the 24th year of King Gwangjong(光宗, 973) and the 6th year of King Yejong(睿宗, 1111). The regulation on cultivation during Gwangjong’s regime was a preliminary work for Jeonsigwa to be implemented three years later and reflected the result of transfer of political powers like purge of Hojok(豪 族). King Gwangjong purged Hojok and meritorious retainers and appointed new powers in order to assume them as the basis of his politics. As a result there was disorder in land ownership by taking land owned by old powers and giving it to new bureaucrats. Jinjeon resulted from such political chaos and restrictions by agricultural environment. Accordingly, in 973, three years before the establishment of Jeonsigwa, the regulation on Jinjeon cultivation in order to create a systematic land distribution system was needed. The regulation on Jinjeon cultivation during Yejong’s regime resulted from poor management of Sajeon. Jinjeon cultivation and preliminary operational methods determined in early Goryeo era were not observed over time. Accordingly, bureaucrats illegally took Jo(租) from Jeonho or negligently managed Guninjeon(軍人田), triggering problems like soldiers' bankruptcy. As a result, in the 6th year of King Yejong, new regulation on the distribution of crops was made in relation to Jeonho and Sajeon owners, thereby seeking stable management of Sajeon.

With the Manchu conquest of Ming China in the mid-1600s, Manchuria became a sparsely populated region: the majority of the Manchu population left their homeland and rushed to China. The Qing authority also concentrated all its energy on the military campaigns against Ming loyalists in the south. The Koreans on the peninsula also abandoned Manchuria, not only because they regarded it as a barbaric land but also because they never wanted to offend the Manchu. It was in this situation that new-comers began to infiltrate into northern Manchuria alongside the Amur (Heilung) River and the Sungari River. The Manchu-Korean joint expeditions to the Amur were planned and launched subsequently. In the early phase of the Manchu-Russian/Cossack conflicts, the Manchu suffered some successive defeats because they were surpassed in firepower and mobility. In the mid-1650s, for this reason, the Manchu authority demanded twice that Chosŏn send some troops armed with Korean-type muskets. Referring to Korean and Russian sources, this paper examines and provides the details of the expeditions and interprets the historical meaning of the expeditions in the context of the emergence of a new political topography in Northeast Asia in the mid-1600s.

This study focuses on the specific situation how the class with no surnames, who were known as numerous in number to the point of the late Joseon Dynasty, had existed and achieved the surname and origin from the process of having their own surnames. It is understood that the class with no surnames were classified in the lower class has rapidly changed to have their own surnames as experiencing the late Joseon Dynasty. For the cases that could confirm the routes of achieving surname and origin of the class with no surnames based on the family register, most of them were following the surname of the father or ancestors, which means the correlation between blood ties. It has been appeared that most of the people who had the surnames of the ancestors after a certain time as not having immediately were the children of concubines with the occupational classification of a servant. Furthermore, the fact, which the case of following master’s surnames was relatively few in number compare to the majority who had the correlation between blood ties, could be figured from the cases that could confirm the routes of achieving surname and origin. However, there were more cases that could not confirm the routes of achieving surname and origin than that could be confirmed. Most of the class with no surnames was servants. The records on servants are comparatively rough from the people with other occupational classifications, and especially, they were difficult to find the root of blood ties. They are identified to have their own previous surname, especially naming the representative surname of the region they live in, while having surname and origin. This tendency seems to have a close relationship with the formation of representative surname of Danseonghyeon.

This paper discusses the three-year period following King Cheoljong’s coming to the throne, when the nation was under a regency by Queen Sunwon. The aim is to examine the practice of appointing bureaucratic officials and to understand power relations of those times. The political power of the early part of King Cheoljong period was led by the maternal relatives of the king, who were the Kims of Andong and the Hongs of Namyang. Also, it was the Office of Border Defense that was in the center of the authority. In specific, the core government officials were Yusa-dangsang (a permanent member of the Office of Border Defense) from the Office of Border Defense and Dangsang who could participate in recommending government officials, where a number of the Kims of Andong and their relatives entered to obtain political power. In addition, many government officials were connected by marriage. Similar with this, there was considerable number of the Hongs of Namyang and their relatives, too. It was through the Office of Border Defense that the Kims of Andong could advance to significant political position. To sum up, the Office of Border Defense was provided as an institutional strategy. However, the political relationship of King Cheoljong and that of Heonjong was quite different: The political balance between the Kims of Andong and the Jos of Pungyang was achieved according to the King Sunjo’s will. The King Heonjong died; however, he was not able to have a son to carry on his throne. Therefore, the King Cheoljong came to the new throne by the Queen Sunwon instead. Thus, it was the maternal relatives’ political position that enabled them to seize power during the King Cheoljong’s ruling. Also, the Kims of Andong were able to begin gaining political ground during the period of regency by the Queen Sunwon. Also, Cheoljong’s queen consort was selected from the Kims of Andong as well, which allowed the Kims of Andong to retain their political status as the maternal relatives of a king.

Cheongjin, which was constructed newly at the time of Japanese occupation but became the fourth largest city in Chosun in 1944 in terms of population, could be regarded as a representative ‘colonial city’. It was after the Russo-Japanese War when Cheongjin became a logistical base for the war, attracting civilian dwellers as well. The name Cheongjin itself was named by a Japanese military unit. In Cheongjin, Japanese organizations maintained a close linkage with colonial elites, who encouraged them to establish an association of Japanese dwellers and the chamber of commerce. Japanese leaders in Cheongjin had continuously lobbied the Japanese government, the Japanese Diet and the Office of the Governor General in Chosun to settle various pending local issues in their favor. These efforts laid the groundwork for the development of Cheongjin. When a railroad system started to be constructed to transport war supplies, Japanese leaders in Cheongjin launched a strenuous campaign for railroad construction to expand their sphere of commerce into northeastern Manchuria. The steady campaign led to the opening of the Hamgyeong Line and the Gilhoe Line. Another important catalyst for the development of Cheongjin was the establishment of a sea route. Even when the Japanese government suffered from financial difficulties, the Japanese leaders in Cheongjin lobbied successfully for the designation of direct sea routes to its port. The expansion of harbor facilities and the improvement of water supply and drainage systems caused an explosive increase in the population of Cheongjin and spurred economic growth. As much as the city expanded, ‘Colonial City’ Cheongjin faced many cases of serious discrimination against Koreans as well. Like other colonial cities, almost all key developers and beneficiaries were Japanese. This situation became associated with discrimination in educational opportunities, which caused even the ‘pro-Japanese’ Chosun assemblymen of Cheongjin to tender resignations collectively.

On Oct. 12, 1933, as the police at Guangdong Japanese consulate arrested a naturalized Korean named Park Ui-il in Guangzhou Fuyincun, China, there was some diplomatic uproar between China, Japan, and France. Since then, for some 5 months, the three nations had done intense diplomatic severe battle with the issue of nationality of the Korean people and surrender. After Park Ui-il punished a Japanese spy in Shanghai, he was hidden in Gwangzhou due to chase of Japanese consulate police in Shanghai. Guangdong Japanese consulate advised from Japanese consulate in Shanghai arrested the Korean naturalized to China in the Chinese territory in illegal way without notice to Chinese authority. Korean people in Gwangzhou informed the fact to Guangdong government, censured Japanese activity to invade sovereignty of China, and requested immediate release of Park Ui-il. China also considered this accident as invasion of their sovereignty and posed hard attitude against Japan. Japan argued that they did not ‘arrest’ Park Ui-il but simply ‘voluntarily went with’ him, this had been practice. France denounced Japan that to arrest Korean naturalized to China in the Chinese territory is to neglect international practice. Since then, both nations of China and Japan could not decide nationality of Park Ui-il for some 5 months and repeated existing assertion. China insisted that as Park Ui-il naturalized to China legally, previous nationality of Japan naturally disappeared. On the contrary, Japan repeated that as Park Ui-il was not allowed for renunciation of his nationality, to naturalize to China is not effective so that he was still ‘Japanese people’. France gripped casting vote of the accident. Both countries of China and Japan could not decide nationality of Park Ui-il and France could not detain Park Ui-il arrested illegally continuously. What urged France to decide was that Park Ui-il went on a fast to find breakthrough for solving the accident. France driven into a corner released him in the form of banishment from French Concession 5 months later after he was arrested. Korean Park Ui-il with dual nationality - he was ‘Chinese people’ and at the same time was ‘Japanese people’ - could be completely free in the midst of conflict without compromise of China and Japan.