KJC Korea
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Jajang was the famous monk who established the system of Silla Buddhism in the early age of Silla. Jajang went to Chinese Tang and studied Buddhism for 5 years from AD 638 to 643. Among Jajang’s acts in Jangan of Tang, what we can first see is that he was respected by Tang’s royal family. It means that Jajang was not just a monk to learn the Buddhism but a diplomat to represent Silla Dynasty. Furthermore, Jajang showed a miracle as the Yul(vinaya) master in Jangan right after entering Tang. It was even before he met Doseon(道宣) at Jongnamsan(終南山). With these, we can see that Jajang’s position as the Yul master was not acquired in Tang but in Silla already. And, from Beobsang(法 常)’s respect toward Jajang, it is possible to infer the influence of Seobnonhag(攝論學) and Hwaeom Idea(華嚴思想). Next, in his acts at Jongnamsan, Jajang stayed for 3 years at a grass cabin located in the east of Wunjesa(雲際寺) and made a miracle as Yul master. As he had a high position and firm dignity as the Yul master, it may be said that he associated with Doseon on the equal footing. In other words, Doseon’s influence on Jajang might be the horizontal communion rather than the vertical teaching. Jajang’s acts in Tang had deep relation with his works as Daegugtong(大國統) for national Buddhism after returning to Silla. In this respect, the review of Jajang’s acts in Tang can have a sufficient significance in relation with Jajang’s life and Silla Buddhism.

The Later Baekje Kingdom’s exchanges with China were investigated centered on its relations with the Wuyue Kingdom in the Zhejiang region and the Later Tang Dynasty of the Five Dynasties. The diplomatic ties between the Later Baekje Kingdom and the Wuyue Kingdom began as late as in the mid 890s and lasted until the fall of the Kingdom. Their ties had the practical purpose of keeping Goryeo in check. Such purpose was confirmed by the Wuyue Kingdom’s support for the Later Baekje Kingdom’s killing of a Goryeo hostage. The Later Baekje Kingdom tried to expand its global reach by establishing diplomatic ties with the Later Tang Dynasty in 925, which had been newly founded, and with the Khitans in 927 with an eye on keeping Gorye in check. However, its relationship with the Khitans had negative impact on its relationship with the Later Tang Dynasty. Because for the Later Tang Dynasty, the alliance between the Later Baekje Kingdom and the Khitans could pose a threat to them so they understandably expressed opposition to the Later Baekje Kingdom’s relationship with the Khitans and started keeping a distance from the Kingdom by supporting Goryeo. Since then, what changed the Later Baekje Kingdom’s foreign relations was the usurpation of the throne by Gyeon Singeom in 933. Because a crack in the Later Baekje Kingdom’s relationship with the Wuyue Kingdom appeared when Gyeon Hwon who had maintained friendly relations with the Wuyue Kingdom fell from the power. Singeom tried to bring about a change to the Later Baekje Kingdom’s diplomatic platform by using the Qingtai era of the Later Tang Dynasty. However, the change did not have big effect on improving the relations with the Later Tang Dynasty as the Later Baekje Kingdom was ultimately destroyed.

Procedures of national mourning ritual in Goryeo Dynasty had been made based on classical rituals of Chinese Dynasties and precedent cases of Goryeo Dynasty. As there was no strict procedures for national mourning ritual, it had adapted to political situation and chief mourner's opinion. The normative procedures of national mourning ritual in Goryeo Dynasty was made as follows. Taejo(太祖) had quoted Han(漢) Wendi(文帝)’s testament, and he had ordered his mourning ritual the way it was ordered in Han Dynasty. But there was no record in detail. In the testament of Kyoungjong(景宗), he had clearly enforced the short-term ritual. It called Dansangje(短喪制) which was required for the mourning rituals, changing the period from 27 months to 27 days. Sungjong(成宗) had built the national shrine as one of the policies to deliver the Confucian system. From this time mortuary tablet had enshrine in the national shrine. Eventually, the procedures of national mourning ritual from death to enshrinement was finally set up. The mourning ritual of Hyeonjong(顯宗) was normative procedures. Dukjong(德宗) who followed king had worn mourning clothes for 27 days. One year later, he served as a Buddhist and Confucian rites around first deathday. On 27 months after death, he had enshrined father's mortuary tablet in the national shrine. While 27 months he had followed the procedure by third-year memorial service. Even though royal family and officers took off mourning clothes, mourning attitude had been maintained and served as mourning rites according to the procedure of third-year memorial service. It was called Simsang(心喪). Since then until the late Goryeo Dynasty the royal family including king had worn mourning cloths in the short term based on Dansangje, and followed procedure of national mourning ritual for 27 months based on Simsang. In the late Goryeo Dynasty, due to the relation with Yuan(元, Mongol), it had been changes in enforcement. Bungsang(奔喪) means that the chief mourner is returning to Goryeo in order to organize the mourning ritual. As crown prince of Goryeo had to stay in Yuan, he ran down to Goryeo as soon as he heard about the king’s death. Bansang(返喪) refers to the activity of transferring body from Yuan to Goryeo, which stayed in Yuan or passed away due to the banishment. However, most of the national mourning ritual in the late Goryeo Dynasty was executed in response to existing procedure.

Imunso was one of the three major departments of Jeongdonghangseong. Given the records on activities of Imunso officials, Kim Buyun and Jeong Ingyeong, it is estimated that Imunso was established sometime between the ninth and the fifteenth year of King Chungryeol’s reign. Imunso of a hangseong had several officials. However, records from the Goryeo Dynasty mostly contain only the title of imun, suggesting that the office was not managed according to respective positions of officials. Sometimes, an imun official was transferred to Jwawoosa as nangjung, and in some cases, went on to become an imunnangjung, which combined the titles of Jwawoosa and Imunso. Imun means to “investigate” or “interrogate”, and the main job of an imun official involved administration of criminal cases and trial of murder cases. Thus, knowledge of types of criminal punishment was key criteria in selecting imun officials. The name, imunso, first appeared during a Kwon Hangong case in the eighth year of King Chungsuk’s reign (1321), and became widely known through an imprisonment of Shin Cheong during the reign of King Chunghye and a lawsuit regarding Jeongchidogam during the reign of King Chungmok. Since the main duty of imunso was trial of a murder case, when a murder took place, the criminal was sent to imunso for interrogation. ‘Harimun(下理問)’ or ‘Surimun(囚理問)’ indicated being detained at imunso for interrogation to resolve a murder case. A person was said to be ‘imprisoned’ in hangseongok (jail at hangseong), but ‘imprisonment’ was not used to indicate a detention at imunso. Thus, there is no need to make a distinction between being sent to imunso and being sent to hangseongok.

This paper examined the gender politics operating on Shin, Saimdang discourses through searching for variability of representation on her. The Image of Saimdang had undergone the transformation three times for about forty years from 1905 to 1945. Firstly, She was called the ‘educated woman’ who well trained her children at home as Lee, Yulgok’s mother in order to argue the necessity of education of women. Secondly, Saimdang encountered the discourses on ‘a wise mother and good wife’ and was invented as a traditional and ideal woman, that is a wise mother and good wife in 1930s. There were historical contexts regarding the critiques of western modernity, nostalgic moods of past, and disgust of so-called ‘new woman’. Lastly, She was spent as the symbol of ‘militaristic mother’ and ‘woman in the rear ground’(銃後婦人). It was naturally colonialistic appropriation which stems from national demanding of women. These discoursive representations of Shin, Saimdang were connected with political context at that time and Those were the politics reinforcing gender roles. In short, the images of Shin, Saimdang were reconstructed according to national or colonialist demanding. Futhermore, Shin, Saimdang dicourses together with ‘new women’ discourses have reinforced gender identities in colonial Korea. In particular, the discourses on ‘new women’ continued to ‘après-girl’ or ‘Madame Freedom’ dicourses in 1950s and ‘Doenjang girls’[soy bean paste girls] dicourses in contemporary days.

Taxation training at taxation office of Japanese Government General of Korea took place in the following areas: moral education, tax administration training, and abacus arithmetics. Moral education was composed of Japanization training, patriotic service by tax payments and Japanese taxation ideology training, viewpoint on social situation and virtue training. According to the Japanese taxation ideology made official in Korea by Japan whom set ahead the patriotic service by tax payments, taxation is a ‘sacrifice to god’ that the subject ‘offered as a bribe’ ‘to pay back for the nation’s hidden virtue.’ Taxation administration education was conducted in 2 sessions: 1) taxation lecture of Japanese Government General of Korea for junior managers, 2) taxation lecture tax intendant office for future officials. The latter was followed by tax management training school in 1940. Training subjects were composed of subjects for taxation administration and tax assessment & collection, such as administrative law, commerce law, book-keeping, accounting, great cause of commerce law, mathematics, finance, economic, commercialization. Abacus training was conducted for improving arithmetic technique to increase the work efficiency of taxation administration, and the intendant office and taxation office staff members participated in the contest where the winners were rewarded. Japanese Empire greatly improved the arithmetic ability of taxation staff members which led to the improvement of work efficacy as well. Taxation staff training content is thought to have included the modern taxation knowledge needed for taxation administration. However, it also had the negative perspective for the taxation knowledge being based on deep coloniality. Additional taxes were forcibly collected without the consent of the taxpayer, which was distant from the modern democratic base taxation administration.

This paper analyzed details and impact of the fertilizer supply and demand policy during the first Five-Year Plan(1962～1966) of Park Chung-hee administration in South Korea. Although the secondary sector of the economy had got bigger, the primary sector of the economy had been still the biggest in 1960s. Park Chung-hee administration, therefore, was facing challenges in developing agriculture industry as well as mining and manufacturing industries at the same time. The two of major Basic Objectives in the first Five-Year Plan were to increase agricultural productivity and to raise agricultural income. Fertilizer should have been supplied to farmers at low a price and in due season to achieve the objectives. The cost for fertilizer had over thirty percent on operating cost of farming. If the cost of fertilizer rose, farmers would have felt burden for expense of fertilizer. However, South Korea had imported most of fertilizer that farmers used until mid-1960s and South Korean won-US dollar exchange rate had been rising. Secondly, traders cornered imported fertilizers from foreign countries. As the results of them, farmers were considerably damaged and Park Chung-hee administration was called to make new policies for solving the problem. The fertilizer supply and demand policy of Park Chung-hee administration didn’t contribute to the effect. It’s because the administration had problems with distribution and price policy about fertilizer. They were not able to import and transport fertilizer at the right time. In addition, various policies that set selling price of fertilizer ceased and the price of fertilizer steadily increased. They were related with conflict between Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and Economic Planning Board, besides the US government requested that South Korean set economic stabilization policy on market. Also the failure of fertilizer supply and demand policy of Park Chung-hee administration appeared on indices. In fact, Grains Price Index wasn’t as high as Fertilizers Price Index and agricultural income from selling their crops didn’t increase. Although Park Chung-hee administration claimed their policies got successful results on market, farmers didn’t have a benefit from the policies when they made a purchase fertilizer.