KJC Korea
Journal Central

This paper examines various matters such as the location condition, distribution, structural characteristics, labor force and population scale of the construction, the size of population and the buried people of the 23 large table-type dolmens in the Northeast region of China and North Korea which are about 450 centimeters long and weigh more than 25 tons. Among the large table-type dolmens, the length of the cover stone of Eunyul Kwansan-ri No.1 is the longest(875cm) and the average length is 635cm. The weight of Anak Noam-ri No.1 is the heaviest at 84tons. Geographical distribution of the large table-type dolmens is more prevalent in the northwestern region of North Korea than in Liaonam(遼南), which is related to the center of Gojoseon in relation to the period of construction. The dolmens of North Korea are mainly distributed in wide fields or at the end of the ridge of mountain. The structural features of the large dolmens include the cemetery facilities, the eaves, the tilting stone which is slightly inward to keep general balance and the division of the stone chamber. The cover stones of Euncheon Unyong-dong No.19, Sangwon Jang-ri No.3 and Yonggang Seokcheonsan No.1 have a lot of grooming and look like a turtle. The large table-type dolmens would have been applied to the principles of the metrology and architectural mechanics of the society at that time. The dolmen of Yeontan Sonsin-dong No. 20 is a unique structure divided into three chambers. The tombs have individual functions and are likely to be a burial place based on family or relatives. The quarrying and transportation methods of the large stones used in the construction of dolmens are analyzed on the basis of ethnographic data and experimental archeology. As a result of rudimentary analysis of the labor force required for the construction, more than 1,000 people are mobilized: Anak Noamr-i No.1(1,344), Baecheon Yongdong-ri No.1(1,259), Yeontan Sonsin-dong No. 1(1,112). It seems that the group of people building such a large table-type dolmen is more than 5.000. At the stage of social development, it is highly likely that the society is a chiefdom society which is ruled by a leader who has a social dominance.

Sukui(宿衛) means the duties regarding the security service for the king in the royal palace, in other words palace guarding. In the Goryeo dynasty, the palace guards were named as Sukuigun(宿衛軍). The place guards prepared for emergencies on night duty in turn in the royal palace. Given the duty of place guarding, it can be argued that Sukuigun(宿衛軍) was related to the Geumgun(禁軍) as Gyeonryonggun(牽龍軍), a part of Geumgun(禁軍), was mentioned in the section of Sukui(宿衛) in <the History of Goryeo>. Besides, it is also notable that the term, Geumuisa(禁衛士) which is an abbreviation of Geumuigunsa(禁衛軍士) appeared in the section of Sukui(宿衛) in <the History of Goryeo>. As Geumui(禁衛) meant Geumgun(禁軍), Geumgun(禁軍) was Sukuigun(宿衛軍). Sukuigun(宿衛軍) was also called as Uisa(衛士). Uisa(衛士) was a collective term which referred to Geumuisa(禁衛士), Gunggwolsuuigunsa(宮闕守衛軍士) and Sukuijisa(宿衛之士). Soldiers of Uisa(衛士) were deployed in the innermost place of the royal palace and conducted missions to defense attacks from hostile forces, arrest and mop up them. Uisajang(衛士長) was the commander of the Uisa(衛士). Sukuigun(宿衛軍) served in the courtyard area and were assigned at the palace gates or administration buildings as guards. Gujeong(毬庭), the facility which divided the inner and outer courtyards functioned as a moat. The palace guard system had a multi-layer defense system. Igun(二軍) stationed in the royal fortress out of the royal palace, and Yukui(六衛) stationed in the capital fortress out of the royal fortress. In the middle of the Goryeo Dynasty, several new palace guard units were created such as Naesungeomgun(內巡檢軍), Uigukchomaengban(衛國抄猛班), Hubyeok(後壁), Holchi(忽赤), Sungun(巡軍), Chungyongui(忠勇衛) and Ikuigun(翊衛軍). The mission of these new palace guards was expanded from defense of the royal palace to the maintenance of public order of the capital city and the border defense. This phenomenon was related to weakening of the central forces of Igun(二軍) and Yukui(六衛). In particular, weakening of Igun(二軍) undermined the royal security service and caused slackening of the palace guard system. Consequently, new units for palace guarding were established and they were deployed to provinces to suppress uprisings or to border areas to defend the remote frontier.

In late Goryeo, there were various Buddhist faith and many Buddhist services were done. With Buddhist services which done in late Goryeo, quite many notes of prayers record was remained. I will analyze these notes to understand the tendency of Buddhist faith. Buddhist sculptures, paintings, sutras have their own role in faith. People made this Buddhistic objects and pray for complex faith. They did not pray one wish to one objects, generally pray two or three wishes. The diversity and complexation of faith was the characteristic of late Goryeo Buddhist faith. Among the Buddhist statues of late Goryeo, Amitabhas are most. The notes of prayers placed in the construction of Amitabha statues mainly wished for the rebirth in Pure Land, add to this they wish longevity and healthy life, rich harvest, peace of the nation. The notes of prayers placed in the construction of Avalokiteshvara are about prosperity in the secular world, and rebirth in Pure Land. The Majority of Buddhist painting Amitabha, the prayers wish to rebirth in the Pure Land and happiness and comfort in the secular world. This tendency is same as in publication of Buddhist sutras or transcribing sutras. The tendency to pray for the comfort of people in this life and rebirth in the Pure Land regardless of the types of Buddhist sutras. Like metal drum, incense burner and Buddhist bell, offering instruments are not fiwed to certain faith, so the notes of prayers are important. With the metal drums, people wish cease of the war and longevity. The majority of metal drums shows praying for the prosperity in the secular world. With the incense burners, people wish two or three wishes at same portion, prosperity in the secular world, rebirth in the Pure Land, attain enlightenment. With the Buddhist bells, people wish the prosperity in the secular world in half portion, and rebirth in the Pure Land portion is little. Various offering instruments, stone light and kundika, people mainly wish rebirth in the Pure Land. These various wishes of people depending on the object and subject but shares in common that they pursued happiness and comfort in the secular world. The tendency of Buddhist faith in late Goryeo, it was the complex trends which accompanied wishes for the benefits in the present world as well as the rebirth in Pure Land. Buddhist sculptures, paintings and sutras, the wish of the rebirth in Pure Land is remarkable, but the offering instruments like metal drums, incense burners and Buddhist bells, the wish shows similar cases of faith, and the benefits in the present world is frequent, in some case wish the attain of enlightenment.

Min Sapyung was a member of Yeoheung Min family, a prestigious jaesangjijong (a family that produced generations of high-ranking officials) from the late Goryeo dynasty, and was born to Min Jeok and the granddaughter of Kim Banggyeong. He was bereaved of his mother when young, raised by the grandfather Min Jongyu, and married the daughter of Kim Ryun when he was 20. Min Jongyu and Kim Ryun both strongly opposed to enthroning of King Shimyang; they came from prestigious families that shared a similar political view. The daughter of Min Sapyung lived with her parents throughout her life, and her daughter also grew up in the grandparents’ house. Solseohon (matrilocal residence) was widespread during the Goryeo dynasty whereby families forged a strong bond with relatives on mothers' side, as is shown in the case of Min Sapyung’s family as well. When he died, he was buried at a cemetery for his wife’s family, and this indicates that jokbun (family graveyard) was not centered around the paternal line in the late Goryeo dynasty. The non-paternal oriented characteristics of that period are also observed in that the terms that indicated Min Sapyung’s families on mother's or wife's side were not different from those that indicated his families on father’s side. After passing a state examination in the second year of King Chungsuk’s reign, Min Sapyung devoted himself to academic learning. Then he began his career as a government official when he was appointed as jwajeongeon (左正言) after King Chungsuk was released from the capital city of Yuan Dynasty and returned to Goryeo. During the reign of King Chungsuk and the reign of the reinstated King Chunghye, Min Sapyung was promoted and appointed at important posts termed cheongyojik (淸要職). He was acknowledged as a mentor to King Chungjeong, and he took positions of docheomeuichamri (都僉議叅理) and chanseongsa (贊成事). After King Gongmin was enthroned, Min Sapyung left the government as people close to King Chungjeong were excluded from key positions. His poems and proses describe daily life of noblemen in late Goryeo Dynasty in detail. Exchanges with dongnyun (同年) and jwaju (座主), close relationships with the wife's family are well observed. His writing also illustrates his relationship with various other people, characteristics of different regions and lives of people. Since passing the state examination, Min Sapyung had a successful political career between the reign of King Chungsuk and King Chungjeong without much frustration except for the period of King Gongmin. Primarily, he could lead a respected life in both personal realm and political career as government official due to his outstanding academic knowledge and capabilities, but his background as having come from a prestigious family and a consequent strong human network also played an important part.

The Dispute between Ju’hwa-ron and Cheok’hwa-ron is one of the key topics of Research related to Manchu Invasion of Joseon. This review article examines trends and issues of Research related to Ju’hwa-ron and Cheok’hwa-ron, and tried to present future research directions and challenges. To accomplish this, the major articles were classified into four groups and their performance and limitations were analyzed. Since the introduction of modern history, Japanese scholars have begun to analyze the research topics of Ju’hwa-ron and Cheok’hwa-ron from a perspective of interests versus the cause. Even after the liberation, the Korean researchers persisted strongly in this approach for solving the paramount problem of the time. This topic has also been reviewed in connection with theory of National Reconstruction or ‘Chaejochieun’. After the doctrine of Joseon’s sinocentrism grew, a new tendency to research has emerged in which this topic has been removed from the resultative or teleological viewpoint and reinterpreted in the contemporary context.

This paper investigates the social significance of the discourse on the corporeal punishment of elite women during the Joseon dynasty. The Great Ming Code (『大明律』) that served as Joseon’s criminal law stipulated that, for female criminals, fines be collected in place of sentences of penal servitude or exile (a practice called suseok (收贖)). Yet in reality, beatings with a heavy stick were administered to women. But in the case of elite women, the substitution of beatings with either the light or heavy stick for fines or other punishments remained customary. Eventually however, some began to argue that women who killed female servants out of jealousy should be punished corporeally, and in 1691 (Sukjong 17), one such woman was punished corporeally at the capital bell tower and exiled by royal proclamation. The case of a woman’s privately torturing and killing a female servant who had been involved in an extramarital affair with her husband was a matter of an owner killing a servant. As such, it tended to be punished lightly relative to other homicides—were an investigating official to apply relevant laws, the sentence would fall within the ‘60 strokes of beating with the heavy stick and 1 year of exile’ category. But once this matter came before the king, whether follow custom in substituting the sentence’s beatings for fines or other punishments, or whether to break with custom and proceed with the beatings became the subject of debate. The officials opposed to the beatings rooted their argument in the logic that both the privilege of the elite and the chastity of women needed to be protected. On the other hand, those officials favoring the application of beatings in the limited case of a woman’s jealousy-induced murder of a female servant countered that this act was one of derogating the husband and violating the constant bonds (綱常). The argument against proceeding with the beatings was one based upon status order and female chastity—elements considered critical to the maintenance of Joseon’s social order. In this light, it was because the argument for enforcing the beatings eschewed a focus on the cruelty of the torture and murder involved in the act in favor of advancing a vision of husband-wife relations rooted in Confucian ideology that it proved so persuasive. Ultimately, that the royal proclamation to punish corporeally the woman who had killed a female servant out of jealousy was handed down and became part of Joseon law reflects the process by which Joseon’s ruling elite used penal administration to treat as serious crimes actions that opposed the patriarchal family order they had constructed, and in so doing demanded—by force—women’s accommodation.

The clan villages in Daegu prefecture began to form purposefully in the late 18th to mid-19th century, and more than a few villages also emerged in the late 19th to 20th century. Among those villages were those that can be defined as commoners’ clan villages. A representative example is the Danyang Woo clan’s village in Gwang-ri, Haebukchon village. The Danyang Woo clan was not of the typical nobility (Yangban in Korean) in the late Joseon Dynasty. Moreover, it was difficult to find the nobility in Gwang-ri, which was village of the Danyang Woo clan. In fact, Gwang-ri was originally a typical commoners’ village, which was inhabited by ordinary people with different family names and clan seats, rather than those of the upper class. Since the 19th century, the Danyang Woo clan, who occupied the majority of middle-class occupations, rose to the position of the upper class before any of the other family names in the village. The intention of the Danyang Woo clan in raising the social status through the rise in position was consequently a factor of the formation of a clan village. The Danyang Woo clan of Gwang-ri shared one genealogy derived from a common ancestor. This conflicts with the existing understanding that the members of a commoners’ clan village had no blood relation to each other or that they originated from various genealogies. It seems that the Dangyang Woo clan of Gwang-ri lived for generations over a long period of time and maintained an exclusive blood relation. As can be seen from the case of the Danyang Woo clan of Gwang-ri, the entity of the formation of clan villages evolved into positions of the nobility and even the commoner since the 19th century. It seems that the formation of the commoners’ clan village was mainly attributed to ordinary people’s orientation toward the upper class which appeared in the overall kindred order of the late Joseon period.

This study aims to reexamine the thesis of ‘declination of Dong-gye’ & ‘vitalization of Chon-gye’ and to present a new framework for explaining changes and trends of Dong-gye since the 19th century. Dong-gye which had appeared as a local ruling organization during the middle of Joseon Dynasty, changed to the village self-governing organization in the 19th century. As a result, it spread widely regardless of Yangban village and commons village, and played a central role in forming a network of various gye organizations. Although the path of the transition to the village self-governing organization and the role and status of the Dong-gye in the autonomous operation of the village varied, the Dong-gye was an ‘institutionalized organization’ that oversees the community activities of the village and secured the autonomy and stability of the village community.

While July 1894 marked the beginning of tax payment in money, there were still concerns of coin crunch(錢荒) and grain crunch(穀荒). Yoo Gil Joon(兪吉濬) argued that commerce could prevent coin crunch and grain crunch and strengthen the nation, supporting the tax payment in money. Newspapers, the Japanese Minister to Korea(駐韓日本公使) as well as the Japanese merchants(日商) in the open port areas argued that the development of commerce would not cause issues with rice supply and demand. However, the actual occurrence of the famine saw different movements in the rice markets. Famine ensued around the Gyeonggi region in 1897, which saw rice responding very sensitively to price. The rise in rice prices in Japan saw large volumes of rice exports to Japan, despite worries of rice shortages in Korea. It was when the rice prices in Japan fell when rice began to flow into regions with rice shortages. When the rice prices at Incheon rose quickly, rice was imported from overseas. However, domestic and foreign merchants who hoarded rice carefully watched the rice markets, controlling sales to ensure higher prices. Then, with the Gyeongin region seeing rice shortage, Japanese merchants led a large-scale speculation in rice, expecting rice prices to rise even further. This saw a rise in the rice prices in Incheon, with the rice prices in surrounding regions such as Seoul also rising. Unlike the predictions, the rice market had turned into a market of speculation, causing large-scale confusion in prices. When concerns on rice supply spread with the famine of 1897, the government of the Korean Empire sought to enforce the Grain Export Prohibition(防穀令). However, these attempts was interrupted with strong dissent from the Japanese Minister to Korea, and simply led to removal of import taxes on rice. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance(度支部) sent down dispatched officiers(派員) to each region, attempting to supply rice to Seoul through the policy of transferring local tax to third parties(ex. merchants) for purchasing grains in large quantity(外劃貿米). These attempts were generally unsuccessful. There was another large-scale famine in 1901. Gyeongin region was again at the centre of the famine, with Jeonbuk also negatively impacted. However, during this time, the rice prices did not jump as they did in 1898, and rice tended to flow into Incheon rather than being exported to Japan. This was because 1901 was a good year for rice crops in Japan, lowering the rice prices, which then led to lower exports. Moreover, the Grain Export Prohibition led to rice remaining in Korea during August to October, period of high rice prices in Japan; as such, there were no rice shortages and rice price hikes prior to the 1902 harvest. After the third quarter of 1901, the large-scale imports of Annam rice also contributed to the stabilization of rice prices. However, as most of the domestic rice volumes were focused in Incheon, rice shortages occurred in Gunsan and neighboring areas; as such, rice prices shot up after May 1902 in these regions. These were the limitations of government policies and trade structures that focused on the Gyeongin regions. When famine hit in 1901, the government of the Korean Empire put the Grain Export Prohibition in place between August 25 to November 15. The Grain Export Prohibition ceased exports of rice to Japan. However, indications of the Grain Export Prohibition often spurred exports depending on region, and there were some regions where rice prices did not fall after the Grain Export Prohibition was in place. Particularly, the Grain Export Prohibition was more likely to shock the grain markets, rather than stabilizing them. Next, large-scale imports of Annam rice, spearheaded by Naejangwon, supplemented the shortages of domestic rice, which proved to be effective. However, these exports were made without accurately identifying demand and import volumes which then led to over-importing; the large outflow of yen used to pay for the imports led to drop in the value of baekdonghwa(白銅貨) (A nickel coin use in the Korean Empire). Moreover, fixed prices due to poverty aid(救恤) caused confusion in rice prices. Lastly, the policy of transferring local tax to third parties(ex. merchants) for purchasing grains in large quantity(外劃貿米) was utilized to secure rice. This was in response to the need for merchandise on spot, which was constantly emphasized since tax payments in money. However, these attempts were also criticized as being misleading for regional rice markets, and for exchanging the pains felt by citizens of Seoul with that felt by citizens in rural regions. After the Gabo Reform of 1894, the rice markets saw an uptick of price disturbances from speculation. This was a confusing phenomenon for not only the Korean government and its citizens, but as well as merchants. At the same time, Koreans began to realize the risks that could be brought by freedom in markets. However, in the capitalist world system of the time, it was impossible for the Korean government to temporarily restrict the free markets. As such, the government focused on temporary interventions to stabilize rice prices. These interventions resulted in a gradual building of a cycle of rice price disturbances and then temporary market interventions for stabilization.

After the establishment of the South Korean Government until 1987, the memorial ceremony of the Independence Movement Day(March 1) of the governments, the historical, political and social significance of its representations of the March 1 Independence Movement will be examined. In 1949, the Rhee Syng-man government declared that it was the first Independence Movement Day after the Republic of Korea was approved by the UN and became an independent nation. From the beginning, the government commanded the celebration of the March 1, and imposed the state monopoly of memory. The memorial ceremony of the Independence Movement Day at this time was reproduced almost exactly under the authoritarian state. The Rhee Syng-man government converted and monopolized the March 1 Spirit as representations of the ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘anti-communist unification’. However, since the Park Chung-hee's military government was established, the celebration of the Independence Movement Day tended to be reduced. The government celebration of the Independence Movement Day was hosted by the government of Seoul. The ceremony began to be held indoor and it was sharply simplified. The Park Chung-hee government adopted the policy of having a distance from the event of the Independence Movement Day. The Park Chung-hee regime rebuilt the March 1 Spirit as a representation of the ‘national unity’, and combined it with the representation of the ‘modernization of the fatherland’ which prioritizes economic growth. He tried to create self-legitimacy through by representing ‘(anti-communist) peaceful unification’ against North Korea. The Chun Doo-hwan's military regime upgraded the celebration of the national days hosted by the government again, and actively utilized the ceremony of the Independence Movement Day to maintain his regime. During the era, the representation of the ‘national fusion’ and ‘national unification’ of the March 1 Spirit emerged. As the Cold War system continued, the representation of the anti-communist ‘national spirit’ revived. The Chun Doo-hwan government’s perception of the March 1 Independence Movement has a thread of connection to the representation of the ‘national unity’ and ‘(anti-communist) peaceful unification’ during the Park Chung-hee government. The authoritarianism government, only emphasized the distorted nationalism, democracy, and unification to extend the dictatorial regime.

The military government under the banner of rapid economic development tried to introduce foreign capitals. Pursuant to the regulations on the international economic order at that time, private capitalists played a leading role in negotiating and introducing loans which made up a majority of foreign capital. Korean businesses preferred to introduce foreign capitals through negotiation with Japanese companies. However, under the military government, it was impossible under the laws to introduce foreign capitals from Japan because the diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan had not been normalized yet. Nevertheless, there was an influx of applications by private capitals for loans from Japan both to the Korean and the Japanese governments. Such a high demand for capital exchanges between Korean and Japan led to the enactment of laws to permit foreign capital transactions even before the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries, resulting in the political settlement of the diplomatic relations between the two countries earlier than expected. Meanwhile, the Korea Businessmen's Association (KBA) focused on the projects to establish its reputation such as a project to attract investments of Korean residents in Japan in export industries in the early stage of negotiation for the normalization of inter-governmental relations between Korea and Japan. However, as the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries continued to be delayed, it was in the vanguard of supporting the conclusion of the Korea-Japan treaty. The KBA emphasized the importance of growth strategy through the international division of labor with Japan as well as the international political environment where the Korea-Japan cooperation is inevitable, arguing that “the Korean people are opposed to the treaty because they do not understand the reality.” At the same time, as an organization which represents the private sector of the Korean economy, it took the lead in operating the exchange channel with the Japanese business circle and occupied the center place to obtain various types of information and rights and interests. After the normalization of the diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan, Japanese loans began to be introduced in earnest. However, the voices of concern for the large scale inflow of Japanese capitals grew bigger. The KBA proposed such measures as limiting the permitted ratio of investment by foreigners, preferential treatment for domestic enterprises. It also succeeded in having its proposals included in the newly enacted foreign capital introduction law. It changed its name to the Federation of Korean Industries in the late 1960’s. Afterward, when the government established the Masan Free Export Zone, it succeeded in persuading the government to adopt regulations on the types of businesses allowed in the free export zone and the restriction on the size of business which are favorable to domestic large capitals. Such an interrelationship with the government was the foundation on which Korea, unlike other underdeveloped countries, could adopt the growth strategy focusing on domestic large capitals rather than the direct inward investment of foreign capitals.