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The capacity of North Korean history academia in the 1950s and 1960s can be estimated through the first and revised editions of the Joseon Tongsa (A General History of Korea): Volume 1, published in 1956 and 1962 respectively. Despite the short time differences between the two editions, they differ greatly from the basic principles of narrative to the details. The first edition was filled with neutral explanations and expressions without a clear era classification due to the reasons such as lack of accumulated research. However, the revised edition was evaluated to have achieved the results of the “struggle to accomplish the party's science policy”. Meanwhile, North Korean history academia, which was conducting research under the banner of “learn from the Soviet Union” after liberation, had to gradually change its relationship with the Soviet academia since the 1960s. In particular, when the Soviet academia criticized the North Korean academia for the inability to escape from “dogmatism” in translating and publishing the first edition of the Joseon Tongsa: Volume 1 (1956 edition), they strongly oppose this and became more devoted to establishing “Juche Ideology”.

This article aims at explaining the research and education of Korean history at Joseon History courses of Kim Il Sung University. Particularly, An Overview of Joseon History(hereinafter called Overview) published in 1957 is noticeable. It was written by the faculty members of Joseon History Course at Kim Il Sung University. In the Overview, the Three Kingdoms period of Korea was described as an early feudal society. The faculty members were from history department of Keijo Imperial University-Seoul National University, and they were related to mainstream of Marxists from the 1930s to the liberation period. Early feudal social theory was raised through their interactions. It emphasized criticism of historical records and demonstrations, and Asian specificity. This aims at rapid growth through accepting the system of the Soviet Union in anti-feudal circumstance. This perception and prospect of Korean history was the overall atmosphere of Kim Il Sung University and the academic aim shared by the Joseon History courses, which was another ground for adopting early feudal social theory in the Overview.

This article reviewed the theory of Bunguk(分國, a kind of colony) of Samhan and the three kingdoms of Korea that Kim Seokhyeong of North Korea first raised in 1963. The main points are as follows: the reason of conceiving the theory, the academic background of his conception of the theory, the academic methodology used to conceive the theory, and the effect of his theory on the Korean academia. The above can be summarized as follows. The theory of Bunguk was the result of the collective discussion of North Korean academia, not the result produced by Kim Seokhyeong alone. In addition, it is confirmed through Kim Seokhyeong’s writings that Kim Il-sung's teaching influenced the conception of the theory. He tried to grasp the historical facts based on the “universal regularity(一般的 合法則性, allgemeine Gesetzmäßigkeit)”, and tried to apply it to the research on the history of Korea-Japan relations using archaeological data. It was a general trend in North Korean academia. However, it is possible to criticize the expediency of the application of “universal regularity”. It can be the circumstantial evidence that the case of North Korean academia’s criticism of the diffusionism of Gojoseon cultural system. In Korea, the theory of Bunguk was positively accepted in terms of overcoming colonial history. It was even described in the textbook. However, the theory is not significantly handled at present, because it lost the academic vitality due to the empirical problem. However, pseudo-history academia is actively using this theory as an important basis for the decrial of the history academia. This causes concern for researchers who are examining the current meaning of this theory.

This study investigates the process of establishing Kim Il-Sung’s anti-Japanese armed struggle as so-called Monolithic Revolutionary Tradition (Yuil hyŏngmyŏngjŏnt’ong) inside the early North Korean history academia. In particular, this study pays close attention to multiple modes of understanding of national liberation movement history, which were excluded or abandoned in the aforementioned process, rather than to the mythification of Kim Il-Sung’s anti-Japanese movement. In early historical narratives that were shared inside the history academia, led by Choi Chang-ik and Lee Cheong-won, multiple versions of “revolutionary tradition” were recognized such as the Korean Communist Party and the Korean Independence League (Chosŏn dongniptongmaeng), in addition to Kim Il-Sung’s anti-Japanese armed struggle. Be that as it may, historical perception of these multiple traditions were by no means liberal from contemporary realpolitik as they granted legitimacy to Kim Il-Sung’s struggle. This point becomes more evident in comparison to the description of exiles such as Lee Sang-jo and Kim Seung-hwa, who fled to the Soviet Union. Once sided with Choi Chang-ik in the anti-Kim Il-Sung movement in 1956, both Lee Sang-jo and Kim Seung-hwa not only criticized harshly the errors and limitations of Kim Il-Sung’s armed struggle but also degraded it as one of multiple national liberation movements in their articles published after defecting to the Soviet Union. In sum, this study suggests that the disparity in perceiving national liberation movement history among the North Korean history academia before the establishment of MRT was much more fundamental than previously estimated.

It is only possible for Gojoseon to have international relations with China after the concept of “China” or “Chinese” emerged in history. In China, the concept of the whole world(天下) was established after the Warring States, and only after the unification of the Qin(秦) and Han(漢) empires, a systematic theory was completed. It is possible to clarify the diplomatic relationship between Gojoseon and Han since the Qin and Han periods, when East Asia enters the international order centered on China. The previous phase can only be talked about economic trade. Literature records authored in the Warring States do not mention international relations with Gojoseon, making it difficult to say the diplomatic relations between Gojoseon and China before the 4th century B.C.. We can only talk about economic trade or cultural exchange. The Gojoseon of the Warring States was located on the outskirts of Liaodong County(遼東郡), and it grew up by sending envoys to Yan(燕) and establishing relations with Liaodong County. At the era of the Qin(秦), Gojoseon was incorporated into the system of indirect and collective control in Qin. Territories were not directly incorporated into the County of Qin(秦), but maintained a unique control order of Gojoseon. Since the emergence of Wiman in the early 2nd century B.C., Gojoseon has established relations with China as an feudal lords[外臣] for Han. The form of diplomacy was appointed by the emperor Han and ruled the country as an imperial power. At that time, Gojoseon made an economic relationship in which he offered tributes to the Han royal family and received gifts for them.

Choe Gukryang (崔國亮), a middle-ranking military official during the reign of Sukjong, co-authored Dangucheomnok (壇究捷錄) with Yi On (李蘊). While Yi On thoughtfully arranged a summary of the Chinese military text Deungdanpilgu (登壇必究), Choe Gukryang attempted to strengthen national security and resolve pending military issues regarding Joseon’s current military and geographical situation. Choe Gukryang’s concerns for national defense were concentrated on reorganizing and reinforcing the defense system of the Pyeongan province, which had been destroyed during the Manchu invasions of 1636. He thought that if a full-scale war against the Qing dynasty were to occur due to changing situations in China, the border defense of the Pyeongan province was a matter of utmost urgency. The emphasis on Pyeongan province as a strategic foothold for national defense was a deviation from discussions set out by the central government placing priority on capital defense. Also, Choe Gukryang personally examined both the geographical features of the Pyeongan province and the movements of the Qing dynasty, and he obtained reliable information reflecting the actual circumstances from residents and magistrates of the area. In this sense, his argument was distinctive from other assertions relying on books and maps. However, the central court dismissed his suggestion focusing on the defense of Pyeongan province, and Choe Gukryang’s ideas were eventually forgotten in the course of history. The reason behind its dismissal, as well as its position and implications among contemporary military discourse and its effect on future defense theories, are topics that await further examination by uncovering new historical materials.

In this study, one side of state administrative operation in the former half of 19c was intended to be observed focused on ‘larceny of government property’ and ‘assault/battery against petty officials class’ among crimes challenging state power. Such crimes that destroyed dignity of king, royal family and government office were occurred resolutely and prevalently during the former half of 19c. By observing what kind of punishment standard the government as a principal agent of administrative operation for such crime based on such crimes, what actually applied penal code and its subsequent punishment aspect were, detailed administrative operation practice could be figured out. First, ‘larceny of government property’ was divided into theft of royal tomb furnishings and shrine supplies and that of palace property and through its each case, crime reality was observed. As its result, it could be realized that goods were stolen at one place repeatedly and easy theft was possible as thieves were familiar with theft place and most of stolen goods such as brass basin, metal ring, firelock, metal arrowhead provided liquidity in case of its disposal. And against this crime, the government applied a crime of stealing big ancestral rite supplies by thieves (Dodae Sashin Eomool/盜大祀神御物), a crime of stealing warehouse materials by its keeper(Gamsooja Dochanggo Jeonryang/監守自盜倉庫錢糧), as defined in Daemyeongryul(大明律). At this time, If more than one person obtained one property as a criminal entity, byeongjang(竝贓) was applied. The clause has the nature of aggravated punishment for theft in an accomplice form, which I think the Joseon government also took advantage of it. In addition, confession was an important criterion and even if he did not confess, he executed if the crime was clear. More than anything else, the government emphasized importance of government property and dignity of government officials by comprehensively punishing not only stolen goods buyer but also government officials who neglected proper supervision or overlooked such crime. Next, in case of ‘assault/battery of petty officials’, range of such officials was limited to minor officials including Kyeongajeon and their assault, violence case was observed. However, such crime was not improved as king held its punishment priority and Gwansa somehow protected such officials. Eventually, the government announced relevant Soogyo by concluding that petty official class are not scared of strict laws (Bulwoi BubryeongJieom/不畏法令至嚴). Administrative operation for controlling those was strengthened through local exile after hard punishment, merciless flogging of criminals while dragging them around town, exile to remote island as a soldier, exile to remote island or region as a soldier without forgiveness. On the other hand, the government punished a person who assaulted government officials performing public duty for protecting public power or performed unauthorized private execution of punishment (Samoon Yonghyeong/私門用刑). This is a case of petty officials as assault victim and such crime was observed in a perspective of both ‘control and protection’ under the category of protecting state discipline.

The headquarters and the ‘Seonso’ of ‘Chungcheong Suyeong’ were located in Soseong-ri, Ocheon-myeon, Boryeong-si. Though there have been several researches made on the ‘gwangbang(關防)’ and ‘gonghae(公廨)’ of the headquarters, there have been few studies on the cases of operation and the organization of naval forces of Joseon Dynasty. ‘Gagosuyeong’ was often called “collection of cases for Chungcheong Suyeong”. It is a historical document which gets a lot of attention as it records the cases of 11 items including those for headquarters and the works of independent department. Focusing on this document, this study is made on the case of operating ‘Chungcheong Suyeong’ in early 19th century and the organization of the naval forces of Joseon Dynasty. ‘Gagosuyoeng’ has disclosed a lot of facts and clues which had not been known up to now. Especially, the information such as ‘mubuil’ (days in a month, when the warship does not get floated), distribution of ‘gyeokgun’ (‘rower soldiers’) by region, the supply of pine trees supplied for the building and renovation of warship and cases of warehouse called ‘Yukmulgo’ was the precious data for this study. In addition, although “Tongyeonggunji(統營郡誌, 1934)” was published in Japanese imperialism period, the interpretation of the application of the ‘gonghae(公廨)’ and warehouses contained in it was good references for this study and the study was conducted as follows. ① The previous interpretations of the works of each authority under Chungcheong Suyeong and the works of each professional department would be reviewed based on the operation cases written in Gagosuyeong. ② The type of soldiers for the ‘geupdaegun’ (‘salaried forces’) belonging to the headquarters and the total number of ‘jusagun’ (‘warship crewmen’) would be checked. And the number of mobilized ‘gyeokgun’ (rower soldiers) and the distribution of their residence would be understood. ③ The number of soldiers working at the commanding section, navigational section and combat section would be analyzed by type of solider for each warship and it would be drawn into chart for easy understanding in consideration of the number of warships, crewmen and ‘nogun’. ④ The situation at the time would be checked on the expenses of new building and renovation of warship and the supply of pine trees as the materials of warships. ⑤ The additional facilities such as the office of Seonso and warehouse of the naval force would be checked in various ways and the area for Seonso was reorganized. The findings of the study helped to make people understand many facts on the naval force in Chungcheong area in early 19th century and broaden the horizon of understanding. They also helped to correct the erroneous and unreasonable assumptions and interpretation of the warehouse and facilities made in the previous documents related to Chungcheong Suyeong by the authorities under Chungcheong Suyeong. The cases of headquarters in the Gagosuyeong was analyzed to find out the title of salaried soldiers under the headquarters and the list of salary by each type of solider while the accounts for one year or two years were analyzed to find out the income and expenditure for the salaried soldiers. The number of soldiers by field for the navigations crewmen on each warship under the headquarters was studied and listed for easy understanding. The record showed that the short pine trees such as ‘asong(兒松)’ and ‘chisong(稚松)’, which did not reach the middle-tall pine tree, were supplied as the raw materials for the new building or renovation of the warship at that time and that, showed that the supply of raw materials at that time was in trouble. The hard situation at that time was summarized here. The inland facilities like the additional facilities such as the office and warehouse which were essential for the Seonso under the headquarters were also reorganized to show the area of Seonso in Chungcheong Suyeong.

The Hanseong Shinbo played a role as an organ of Japanese Foreign Ministry, hence when it was published in Seoul, they supported Japanese government’s policies and reported on Joseon society with their pro-Japanese government stance. Through implementation of the Danbalryeong, Joseon society began to change. the Hanseong Shinbo’s awareness and response of the change were based on the role of newspaper forming basis of invasion on Joseon society. While the Danbalryeong was in progress, two specific roles of the Hanseong Shinbo were promoting commercial transactions of Japanese traders and providing information to Japanese merchants and residents in Joseon. Japan already had established absolute dominance in Joseon through Chunsaengmoon incident(春生門事件, 1895.11.28.). Thus, proclaiming the Danbalryeong was the result that Japan tried to show off their strong position in Joseon. When the Danbalryeong was enforced initially under Japanese coercion, the Hanseong Shinbo commented it was necessary for Joseon’s civilization, but didn’t mention about the background of the enforcement. The fact that proclamation of the Danbalryeong was forced by Japan spreaded widely, and objection to the Danbalryeong became objection to Japan. Therefore, the anti-Japanese uprising broke out, but the Hanseong Shinbo claimed that the reason of the uprising wasn’t came from Japan, but the Danbalryeong itself. However, on February 11th, 1896, when Korea royal refuge at the Russian legation[Agwanpacheon, 俄館播遷] occurred, the Hanseong Shinbo changed their tone. They claimed the reason of the uprising was caused by the anti-Japanese policy of Joseon government. The Hanseong Shinbo said, groundswell of uprising is the fault of Joseon government, because the government had admitted ‘a mob of rioters[暴徒]’ as ‘righteous army[義兵]’, and couldn’t suppressed the uprising successfully. The Hanseong Shinbo also asserted, the uprising continued because of the Joseon government and the people, who tried to banish Japanese from Joseon. The Hanseong Shinbo identified what interrupts Japanese merchants trading with Joseon. There were two obstacles. The first was an intensified anti-Japanese sentiment in Joseon caused by the Danbalryeong and Korea royal refuge at the Russian legation. And the second was advent of Qing merchants in Joseon. The Hanseong Shinbo kept finding a way to revitalize stagnated commercial transaction. In consequence, they could catch the possibility of new trade market between Joseon and Japan. It was the goods which were used to change hairstyle and costume form. The Hanseong Shinbo suggested increasing demands of new trade goods due to the Danbalryeong and change of costume form, and also predicted market extension of Japanese merchants in Joseon. Joseon officials’ awareness and response of the social change were different from the Hanseong Shinbo’s. When the Danbalryeong was carried out, the officials refused the policy and were busy to quit their offices. They claimed the sudden change of custom could make people’s mind confused and cause uprising. Joseon government was in accelerating social dislocation after the proclamation of the Danbalryeong, therefore they didn’t pay attention to assessing social change and proposing policies against Japan’s economic invasion.

This study set out to examine the characteristics and strategies of Jang Ji-rak’s self-description based on Arirang published on the basis of his oral statements as an independent activist in Yan’an, China in the summer of 1937. This Arirang mentions Jang’s experiences as he joined the Guangzhou Uprising and Hailufeng Soviet activities during his stay in Guangzhou, China in 1925∼1927. Compared with other records, it offers descriptions about the situation of the Korean community in Guangzhou in the middle 1920s and Jang’s unique “Guangzhou memories” of Guangzhou Uprising. Arirang offers some information about the Korean community of Guangzhou in the middle 1920s, recording that 800 Koreans gathered in Guangzhou to participate in the Chinese Revolution until 1927, that these Koreans had something to do mainly with communism, and that a group called K.K. was formed around Korean communists. Other records, however, estimate that 300∼400 Koreans, which were half the estimation of Arirang, gathered in Guangzhou to enroll in Huangpu Military Academy, thus having differences from Arirang. While Arirang mainly mentions Jang's experiences with Guangzhou Uprising, its descriptions do not cover the Koreans at the Saha battle and the sacrifice of 150 Koreans under Teukmuyeong at Huangpu Military Academy led by Choi Yong-geon during the withdrawal of the uprising combatants, as well as the roles of Kim Seong-suk during Guangzhou Uprising. Unlike other records, Arirang offers Jang’s unique “Guangzhou memories” because of his “self-description strategy” of some sort reproduced in the oral statement process. Jang, however, made it sure that Arirang contains even his mistakes and limitations in Guangzhou, which suggests that he wrote Arirang as a “lesson” from his experiences after he decided to move to Manchuria during the oral statement rather than a means of simply “showing off” his achievements or “restoring his place at the party register.” Despite its essential nature as a “collection of Jang’s unique memories,” Arirang established itself as part of the “mainstream” memories of Korean people’s Independence Movement in Guangzhou in the 1920s in the Korean society after its liberation. It was not an outcome of Jang’s strategy, but an “unexpected result” of “silence” among other participants that experienced Guangzhou in the prevalent anti-communist atmosphere of Korean society after its liberation.

This study explores the agricultural technocratic organizations of Korea during the U.S. Military rule and the Korean technocrats’ initial conflict and subsequent compliance with the U.S. Military rule. The US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) adopted Joseon Government General’s Agricultural Experiment Stations system as it was but lowered the Stations’ technocrats staff level by more than three ranks, which causedthe technocrats’ opposition and resistance. The USAMGIK established Agricultural Improvement Service in Dec.1947 to deviate from top-down agricultural technocracy of the colonial period. Agricultural Improvement Service was separated from the Agricultural Department to initiate research and educational projects to increase agricultural productivity and encourage democratic practices in agricultural businesses. However, systematic limitations and volatile political landscape hampered their progress. Korea Agricultural Association, a government-sponsored agricultural organization, attempted to transform into a democratic agricultural organization but failed as its bureaucratic nature became stronger. The Head of Agricultural Department during the US Military rule was Lee Hoon- Koo. The first Chief of Bureau of Agicultural Production was Hyun Kun, who studied abroad in the United States. Lee Hoon-Koo and Hyun Kun together supported the establishment of anti-Communism, capitalistic nation promoted by the United States, while deviating from authoritarian bureaucracy and implementing ‘democratic’ agricultural administration. But such plan did not realize. The first Chief of Agricultural Experiment Stations Keh Ung-Sang proposed that the training system to develop practical administrative skills and confidence as Korean administrators. But due to the lack of communication and conflict with the USAMGIK, Keh was laid off in six months. The successor Kim Ho-Jik conformed to and cooperated with the USAMGIK but Agricultural Experiment Stations staggered.