KJC Korea
Journal Central

Even though spies are just spies, there are many types of spies in South Korea due to the reality of the peninsula split in half, and the existence of powerful anti-Communist sentiments. The most common type of spies we often talk and hear have been spies from North Korea infiltrating the South Korean society. On the other hand, spies of nature the other way around was only made known in the latter half of the 1990s. In the end, either North Korean spies or South, they were all real spies. At the same time, there have also been people who were not spies yet were accused to be, and were consequently deprived of their normal life and even their own lives. These were the so-called ‘Framed as spies.’ Dictatorial powers of South Korea, which considered themselves to be above the law, have created spies out of innocent people and at the same time tried to ‘convert’ real spies infiltrating South as well. Even after the dictatorship ended and a new era of Democracy kicked in following the Struggle of June in 1987, the intelligence bodies’ practice of framing people as spies did not go away and continued even during the Park Geun-hye administration. The power of the reference itself also firmly remained as a Scarlet letter. Right now, there are far-right activists calling no other than the President of South Korea to be a spy at the Gwang’hwa-mun Square. They also call out any person who differs in opinion from them and label them as NK-following Leftists as well as treacherous spies. We can see that a divided region like the Korean peninsula can have a lot of types of spies. Most regretfully, a powerful logic of hatred which sees anyone different as a spy still prevails amongst ultra rightists.

This study examined changes in North Korea’s strategy toward South Korea during the Cold War and training and activities of North Korean spies. After the Korean War, North Korea’s espionage against South Korea was mainly handled by the Liaison Department under the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party. The Liaison Department dispatched mostly South Korean-born spies, whose mission was largely “the Maneuvering of Connection Line” to recruit their relatives. The policy organization against the South was greatly strengthened through the 4ㆍ19 Revolution and reorganized after the 5ㆍ16 military coup. At this time, a new strategy focused on the construction of an underground party so-called the “Theory of South Korean Revolution” emerged. However, due to the deterioration of the political situation at home and abroad in the late 1960s, hard-liners from the military gained power in North Korea, and they also caused 1ㆍ21 Incident in 1968. After the 7ㆍ4 Joint Communique in the early 1970s, the North shifted to a defensive line, such as the Goryeo Federal System, as the South’s economic growth made it increasingly difficult for the North to be confident of its superiority over the regime. As a result, the focus of espionage against the South moved from a direct operation targeted on relatives to a bypass operation through Japan and other countries.

Since the establishment of the ROK in 1948, the South and the North have been under a hostile relationship that alternates between hot and cold wars amid the influence of the Cold War system in world history. A representative symbol of hostile system competition is a spy. However, the spy between the South and the North seems to be clear, but in fact, it is also ambiguous. The South and the North officially deny espionage. Therefore, spies are often unilateral claims by either side, and the spy discourse to make ambiguous spies a clear entity becomes important. Spy, in particular, served as a device to control South Koreans as a symbol of emphasizing North Korean threats. Under the Park Chung-hee regime’s strategy of public security in the 1960s and 1970s, espionage was a very important medium. The word “You’ll be a red if you talk too much,” which can be used to block critical discourse. In other words, while blocking critical discourse, the politics of discourse based on espionage was developed so that their words could have a truth effect. For example, he wanted to silence all criticism with a word of “spy-like sound.” The discourse on creating spies shows historical change. The image of an inhumane and cruel spy was created, and it needed to be watched carefully because they looks like ordinary people. In particular, the assertion that an extremely ordinary person could be a spy was also a device that could make all residents watch each other. As social differentiation progressed, the variety of spies increased. In other words, all classes existing in society have become potential spies. In particular, economic espionage also emerged as economic development began in earnest. Amid this trend, the reward system for residents who cooperated in reporting and arresting spies will also be newly reorganized, giving them huge amounts of money. In addition, as exchanges with the world expand, spies also expand to the world. Not only Korean-Japanese spies but also Korean students and residents in Europe used to become spies. Spies eventually become involved with the exclusion strategy of our society. The public security-ruling discourse on spies involves the socio-engineering view that a safe and sound society should be created, excluding disparate elements such as various non-nationals, anti-social beings and minorities. In short, we would like to look into how the ruling order of our society works through the discussion of spies.

The direction and conclusion of the study undertaken in this thesis are shown as follows. First, in order to find out the accurate time of the era name of Goguryeo as confirmed in a number of epigraph, the naming an era method of Goguryeo was reviewed first. As a result, it was confirmed that Goguryeo followed the method[踰年稱元法] that the naming an era was made in the year after the preceding king passed away. And, second, the periods of each era name of Goguryeo that was shown on the epigraph are finalized as follows: first year of Youn-su(延壽) = 451, 7th year of Youn-ga(延嘉) = 539, 7th year of Young-gang(永康) = 551, 4th year of Kyung▨(景▨) = 571, 5th year of Kun-heung(建興) = 596, and 3rd year of ▨hwa(▨和) = 606. As a result of reviewing the operation and change era name method for the era name of Goguryeo on the basis of the deployment trend of the aforementioned era name, following facts could be observed. First, the Era Name Young-lak of the reign of King Gwanggaeto was used throughout the entire period of its ruling without the change era name during the kings reign. However, from the rime of King Jangsu, as confirmed through the Era Name Youn-su, the change era name was attempted during the term of the king. Second, in the later period of Goguryeo, the new kings had the change era name in the third year of the reign after completing the 3-year mourning period of the preceding king, or if it follows the method [踰年稱元法] that the naming an era was made in the year after the preceding king passed away, the change era name was undertaken in the second year in the throne. Third, as in the case of the Era Name Young-su under the reign of King Yangwon, if the preceding king died under the emergency situation, such as a political upheaval, the change era name took place immediately following the method to take the throne right after the death of the preceding king [卽位年稱元法]. And, fourth, as in the Era Name during Kyung▨ under the reign of King Pyeongwon or the Era Name ▨hwa during the reign of King Yeongyang, the change era name following the enormous building campaign in the nation or change in the international political situation was undertaken.

Silla attacked Nangbi fortress of Goguryeo in August 629. The main force, led by commander Kim Yong-chun, attacked Nangbi fortress, believed to be Banwol fortress in Pocheon. A detached force, led by a general, moved northward through Biyeolhol and attacked the eastern frontier of Goguryeo. Silla’s strategy was Holding Attack. It has curbed the reinforce of Goguryeo troops in major battle area. Main effort of the Silla army won by concentrating on Nangbi fortress, the objective of operations. Kim Yu-shin's desperate fight was a factor in victory. The historical significance of this victory in Silla history are following. Military importance has been raised for Biyeolhol areas. Through diplomacy, Silla moved Tang to stop Goguryeo from attacking Silla and defeated Goguryeo. The strategic use of the tribute appointment relationship was the origin of the pragmatic diplomacy during unification of three kingdoms. However, there was a problem of strained relations between Tang.

This paper examined the relationship between Joseon and Ming dynasty during the late Goryeo and early Joseon periods in terms of the formation and application of the diplomatic ideology of “universal benevolence(一視同仁)” and “a vassal can not be diplomatic(人臣無外交)” which was newly introduced in the Ming Dynasty. The Ming Dynasty treated the vassal like servants of the Ming Dynasty according to diplomatic idea of “universal benevolence”. The vassal, a servant of the Ming Dynasty, was restricted in diplomacy by the diplomatic idea of “a vassal can not be diplomatic” that diplomacy could not be done without the permission of Cheonja. However, Goryeo and Joseon responded to the diplomatic idea of “universal benevolence” of the Ming Dynasty. The reason for this was that Goryeo regarded itself as a ijeok(夷狄) of courtesy during the period of Yuan’s intervention in Goryeo. Though, when its diplomacy was sanctioned by the Ming Dynasty, Goryeo and Joseon tried to resolve it in the diplomatic order of the Ming Dynasty. In particular, King Taejo of the Joseon attempted to Liaodong conquest to actively modify his country’s position in the diplomatic order of the Ming Dynasty.

This article is on finding out the factors of urbanization of Hamheung (咸興) in the 1930s from the external influence of Heungnam (興南), especially Bongung (本宮) area. It is the connection between the two cities of Hamheung and Heungnam that centered around the space of Bongung area at that time. To examine the connection between the two cities, this article first covered the Seongcheon River water-dimension project and the maintenance of the transportation network in the direction of Heungnam, which are a spatial background. Waterproofing construction of Horyuncheon (瑚璉川) for 3 years from 1923 (left side of Horyuncheon), the protective work of flooded area near Hamheung (咸興附近浸水地帶防水工事) from 1925 to 1929 (right side of Hoyeoncheon near Hamheung, left side of Seongcheon River) and Seongcheon River (城川江) from 1931 to March 1935 as the waterproofing construction (downstream of the Seongcheon River) progressed, the section from Hamheung to the estuary along the left bank of the Seongcheon River was also able to escape the threat of flooding. In the case of the maintenance of the transportation network, It progressed that Bongung station came to be a official station on the Hamgyeong Line railroad between Hamheung and Seohojin, that Heungnam Station and Heungnam Main Station were established, and that Heungnam Line of Shinheung Railway Co., Ltd. opened in 1934. In addition, the reconstruction of Bongung and Heungnam sections of Hamheung-Seohojin 2nd level Road was carried out. The article also dealt with the emergence of Bongung factory zone in the mid-1930s and the process of Hamhung transformed to a part of “twin cities” afterwards. Various chemical plants, including condiments, caustic soda, and carbide, formed colonies on the site of Bongung, which was secured after the completion of the Seongcheon River waterproofing construction in March 1935. Despite the discussion to unite Hamheung-Bungung-Heungnam- Seohojin, in 1937, Hamheung’s exclusive urban planning was aimed at relocating Hamheung Station without the integration of administrative districts. Separately, however, Heungnam’s urban planning was also based on the connection between Hamheung and Heungnam, and Hamheung’s urban district was transformed into a form of connection along with the Joseon nitrogenous fertilize Plant (朝鮮窒素肥料工場) and the housing complex of Bongung.

After liberation of Korea in 1945, it was imperative for North Korea to maximize the state finance in order to solve the challenges faced in economic area. However, North Korea government had to implement economic reconstruction within the limitations of which were economic collapse brought by Japanese imperial economic policy as well as the absence of fiscal space. During early liberation period of 1945, each local People’s Committee had tried to solve a shortage of financial resource through lottery ticket, contribution, and imposing new taxes. But there were neither unified local policy, nor connections with national fiscal plan. Consequently, in December 1945, financial bureau of 10 administrative bureaus in North Korea sought to fund for state-building through organizing taxation system. The previous 58 tax-types, which included 32 national taxes, 13 provincial taxes, and 13 city and county taxes were simplified into 21 tax-types. Among previous national taxes, land tax and a business tax(a group of profit tax), a liquor tax and drink tax(a group of consumption tax), the individual income tax and a corporate income tax(a group of income tax), registration tax, inheritance tax, and gambling tax were remained. Among other taxes, the taxation for military purpose in the late Japanese imperialism was all abolished. The provincial tax such as surtax and special tax as one of local tax were remained. Ironically, most of national taxes and local taxes which targeted the haves for Japanese wartime financial demand were maintained. Meanwhile, North Korea issued military payment certificate(M.P.C.) to supply lacked currency. To North Korea government, issuing M.P.C. was financing solution designed in the condition of which new currency publication was difficult and there were many moneytary outflow to Japan during early liberation period of 1945. On the other hand, the Soviet Union regarded M.P.C. as a way to arrange finance for their military deployment as well as to avoid inflation in the Soviet Union.

The 1980s was a time when various discourses on women’s employment were formed. In contrast to the discourse on the development of women’s occupations in the 1970s, it was criticized in the 1980s that the development of women’s occupations, which prevented women from entering various occupations and caused job discrimination that only allowed employment in certain occupations. Discourses on the abolition of employment discrimination, such as criticism of double burden theory used by companies as a basis for discrimination against employment and the re-evaluation of the value of housework evoked by double burden theory, have spread. In addition, through the 1980s, a movement was pursued that required legal action to improve employment discrimination and the introduction of laws and systems that prohibit employment discrimination altogether. Discourse and practice effectively contributed to the elimination of discrimination in employment. Discourses on abolition of employment discrimination in the 1980s had several characteristics. First, compared to the 1970s, it was established as a social recognition that discrimination against female employment should be abolished. Second, existing women’s movement groups and newly emerged progressive women’s groups cooperated at least in the practice of abolishing employment discrimination. Third, this discourse against female employment discrimination has spread through the practice of female individuals such as Kim Young-hee and Kyung-sook Lee, as well as women’s movement organizations. As a result of analyzing specific cases of employment discrimination practices both inside and outside the labor market and women’s practice to abolish them, the social recognition that employment discrimination practice under the name of rational discrimination was gender discrimination in workplace has been established. Discrimination in employment is also a historical component. After all, employment discrimination was also a historical component.