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pISSN : 1598-317X / eISSN : 2713-8992

2020 KCI Impact Factor : 0.66
Aims & Scope
Aims   1. Military history research compilation, which is the original mission of the Institution for Military History   2. A Study on the war and military history from traditional era to Contemporary era   3. Expand the field of research in military history, and improve the level of research Scope   1. Historical contents of domestic and foreign military policies, systems, and war   2. Contents of the political, diplomatic, and military sectors related to the national defense and security which suitable for the characteristics of military history   3. Research papers, book reviews, research trends, data introduction, research paper translation, etc. related to sub-paragraphs 1 and 2  

(Institution for Military History)

Citation Index
  • KCI IF(2yr) : 0.66
  • KCI IF(5yr) : 0.6
  • Centrality Index(3yr) : 0.971
  • Immediacy Index : 0.2917

Current Issue : 2021, Vol., No.120

  • The Process of ‘Biological Warfare’ Allegation and Behind-The-Scenes Accounts during the Korean War

    Jeon, Ye-mok | 2021, (120) | pp.1~41 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This article aims to examine a series of events when North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union raised the allegation of 'biological warfare' against the US and allies, and its inner story by comparing and analyzing documents, letters, memoirs recorded in Korea, China, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the US during the Korean War. This article consists of two parts. The first part examines the process of raising the allegations mainly from 1951 to 1952. The allegations of biological warfare by the US were first raised on May 8, 1951 by Park Heon-young, a foreign minister of North Korea. In 1952, the large-scale propaganda of the 'biological warfare' allegations occurred in cooperation with North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. Three investigation teams were, supported by those three countries, also established. The second one looks into 'evidence' provided by communist countries was highly likely to be fabricated. This fabrication was attested to in the memoir of a head of the Chinese Army's sanitary department, Wu Zhi-ri, as also was reaffirmed in documents of the Soviet Union, implying that the origin of allegations of 1952 was from China. This revelation, however, does not necessarily conclude that the allegations were entirely manipulated. China and the Soviet Union used the allegations of 'biological warfare' for the benefit of their countries. China appeared to use the allegation to gain military and medical supports from the Soviet Union. This study limitedly presents new facts, but it reveals several new facts. First, the origins of the 1951 and 1952 'biological warfare' were different from each other, and those were the Soviet Union and China, respectively. Second, the North Korean leader's position on 'biological warfare' changed between 1952 and 1953. Third, in 1952 the Chinese leaders knew that the biological warfare theory was false but did not inform low-level government officials.
  • The Design of Cold War Initiative for the region of East Asia and the Plan for Composition of Korea-U.S. Relations by the delegation of Van Fleet

    Dongwon Lee | 2021, (120) | pp.43~78 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    After the armistice of the Korean War, Eisenhower sent a special military aid delegation to East Asia in April 1954 headed by former Eighth U.S. Army commander Van Fleet, for the purpose of reviewing East Asian strategy and scale of military aid. Van Fleet delegation visited South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines in turn and wrote a comprehensive report on East Asian policies covering political, economic and military issues as well as military aid and submitted it to President Eisenhower on September 30 at that year. Through the analysis of Van Fleet's report, this article will provide the understanding of the U.S. Cold War initiative in 1954 on East Asia, which was gradually gaining strategic value since the Korean War truce, the signing of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, and the rise of the Indochina Peninsula. Van Fleet served as the head of the special mission with Eisenhower's robust trust even after his discharge from the military. Van Fleet was very close to President Sungman Rhee based on his experience as commander of the Eighth U.S Army during the Korean War. Thus, Van Fleet's appointment as the head of the special military aid mission was due to the need of the U.S. but also at the request of President Rhee. Van Fleet represented the interests of the United States, but similarly expressed an "Asianist" aspect similar to MacArthur's, which led to a compromise between American interests and those of South Korea and other East Asian countries. Therefore, this study will be a historical case study that understands the process of establishing relations between the United States and East Asian countries, especially Korea, and their mutual characteristics. At the same time, it will also be possible to see how General Van Fleet, who was called the "father of the Korean military," influenced the military aid issue and military enhancement in East Asia after his discharge.
  • The Ideal and Reality in Employing and Operating ROKFV's Company Level Tactical Base during the Vietnam War - Focusing on the Battle of Ducco(1966) -

    Hosub Shim | 2021, (120) | pp.79~130 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Based on ROK’s actual conduct during the Vietnam War, employing company level tactical bases was not a strategical feature in itself, rather it was a tactical one that followed ROKFV’s strategic emphasis on its conduct of the pacification(stabilization) operations and the reality of the war. Although this tactical strategy was not always employed following its original ideal, which focused more on a strategic or operational level of the pacification, the company base as ROK’s most important and unique tactical method remained so unabated for as long as ROKFV remained an active participant in the war. ROKFV had to pursue success in both unconventional and conventional war by adopting company tactical bases. However, it was not that easy for the troops to maintain a balance between the company base’s main function of supporting pacification operations while at the same time conducting defensive operations centered on the tactical base. Despite the brilliant victory at Duc Co battle between Tiger Div. and North Vietnamese army, ROKs, internally, realized a limitation and risk of the self-defense of the company base. Considering the ROKFV's internal goal of maximum results with minimum casualties, not causing unnecessary casualties by defending the base well was more realistic and sensitive to the Korean troops than achieving maximum results by successfully pacifying local populations. As a result, a successful defense became a more important and realistic matter than a success in pacification efforts in terms of operating company bases. This tendency became more prevalent as the Vietnam War progressed and bases, indeed, became permanent fortifications in this period.