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2008, Vol., No.67

  • 1.

    A Study on the Origins of the Cold War in the Northeast Asia

    Youngho Yungho Kim | 2008, (67) | pp.1~28 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The Cold War in the Northeast Asia is regarded as a phenomenon subordinate to that in Europe. This trend remains unchanged in the post-Cold War period. In contrast to the end of the Cold War in Europe with the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European countries, the Cold War still persists in the Northeast Asia. The legacies of Cold War involve the Korean division, the Taiwan Straight issue, and territorial disputes among the countries in the region. The socialist political system does not change in China, Vietnam, and North Korea. The collapse of the Soviet Union does not directly lead to the end of the Cold War in Asia. The failure to understand the differences between Europe and Asia regarding the end of the Cold War derives from the lack of the study in the origins of the Cold War in the Northeast Asia. The study of the origins of the Cold War in the Northeast Asia is the precondition for judging whether the Cold War has ended and helps us to devise specific policies to ameliorate Cold War confrontation. The article is an attempt to trace the origins of the Cold War in the Northeast Asia with specific reference to recently declassified Soviet and Chinese documents. The Cold War in the region started when the regional order was polarized with the development of antagonistic relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is important to understand what events were the watershed in the Cold War development in the region. The events may be imposed by outside powers. They may be ignited by the proactive policies of the region. It is important to explain the interactive process leading the onset of the Cold War in the region. This article seeks to explain the origins of the Cold War in the region with specific reference to the Yalta Agreement. The collapse of the Yalta Accord was one of the most important reasons for the origins of the Cold War in the region. The success of the Chinese communist revolution and the Korean War began to destroy the main pillars of the Yalta Agreement. The San Francisco treaty was only the final legal expression of the collapse of the Yalta system.
  • 2.

    The Role of the United Nations in the Course of the Division and War in Korea

    Gye-Dong kim | 2008, (67) | pp.29~54 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This research focuses on the role of the United Nations during the modern history of the Korean Peninsula. The United Nations contributed to the establishment of the South Korean Government, which means the consolidation of the division of the Korean Peninsula. The United States, in spite of the opposition by the western allied countries including Canada and Australia, passed a resolution at the UN which urged the establishment of a separate government by initiating elections only in the south region of the peninsula. The United Nations which established a separate government in the south intervened in the war initiated by the North Korean People’s Army, in order to save the government set up by the United Nations. In the course of the Korean War, the United Nations which became a belligerent at the beginning of the war opened a new war by crossing the 38th Parallel after the success of returning status quo in the peninsula.
  • 3.

    A Study on the Failure of Prediction to the Chinese Communists Forces’ Intervention in the Korean War- The Intelligence Activities of the FEC -

    이종판 | 코야나기 준이치 | 2008, (67) | pp.55~102 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    This study is to investigate the failure of prediction to the Chinese Communist Forces(CCF)’s intervention in the Korean War in 1950. For this study, I investigated the intelligence operations of the Far East Command(FEC) during the two months from the day of the 15th September 1950, when the Incheon Amphibious Landing Operations were held in Incheon. I have investigated the following two questions. The first question was the reason why the FEC did not understand the possibilities of the intervention even if they received many warning and signals that implicated the intervention. The second question was the reason why the US Government accepted the FEC’s misestimation about the possibilities of the CCF’s intervention without reestimation. As I reviewed these two questions, I could find the cause of failure. The reason why the FEC did not understand the signal of the CCF’s intervention in the Korean War was as follows. Firstly, many complications with respect to the CCF’s intervention in the Korean War have made the uncertainty of intelligence magnified. Second, as the signals about he CCF’s intervention was ambiguous, they were buried in the noise that implicated the possibilities of the CCF’s invasion against the Taiwan. Third, as estimations are activities human beings do not like, there exists possibilities of mistake during information processing. All these factors made the FEC underestimate the possibilities of CCF’s intervention in the Korean war. As centralized information systems did nor work properly, the US Government accepted the FEC’s misestimation about the possibilities of CCF’s intervention without reestimation. As a result of the Japanese Invasion against the Pearl Harbor during the Second World War, CIA were equipped with system to filter many diverse intelligence during the Korean War. But as intelligence about far-east area were preoccupied by the FEC, CIA did not work properly which should reestimate intelligence accurately. As shown, the US intelligence system during the Korean War was operated in distorted way. Misestimation of the FEC about the possibilities of CCF’s intervention which were received by CIA affected the US political decisions about the Korean War greatly. These results from the fact that the US Government during the Korean War depended two much on the intelligence received from the FEC, and the FEC involved US policies. As shown, distortions of intelligence system during the Korean War made failures in intelligence area, misinterpretation of the FEC(intelligence producer) and decision maker(intelligence consumer)’s misinterpretation were mingled. That is the reason why the US Government failed to predict the possibilities of CCF’s intervention in the Korean War. Even if we could say there were some distortions when centralized intelligence system which emerged after the Pacific War settled down, we could also say that these distortions of intelligence system was due to the FEC.
  • 4.

    A Study on Change of the Chinese Communist Forces’ Strategy and Tactics in the Early Korean War

    오정택 | 2008, (67) | pp.103~132 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    The Korean War was a serious crisis to the Chinese Communists Forces (CCF) as the first case of their forces’ intervention in a war abroad at that time when they had just finished a revolutionary war and started to form the strategy for international war. In this study, the key purpose of the CCF in a war was to secure a buffer zone through survival of the North Korea Regime, the key means was a large scale of combat unit which had its kind of military tradition and an experience of winning a series of war against the strong. Furthermore the CCF kept consistently the big purpose of holding the leadership of a war and securing a buffer zone, and also a purpose and means of strategy and tactics level had been changed smoothly by their own condition. The CCF was adaptable to wait for the moment when definitely advantageous situation was developed also in committing troops and strengthening equipments, and it decided fluidly by condition. However, the CCF could not overcome elaborate counterattack by the UN Forces that had been developed since 1951 owing to the absence of their ultimate counter-plan. Strategy and tactics of the CCF was much influenced by the time-honored tradition since Sūnzi expressed clearly the nature of a war, Clausewitz’ On War, and so on, and they pursued a never-losing war by digesting this with the method of shíshì qiúshì. While Mao Tse-tung assumed even the worst situation, he encountered adaptable the result of military operation. The CCF held an advantageous position in the 1st and 2nd Campaigns, they attacked with concentrating on apparent goal, that was they were a national division, based on superiority of speed and sudden attack, and they developed the way how they controled the main forces early on a war by strategical and tactical siege. In the 3rd Campaign, they began to attack for the political purpose first, with considering the 38th Parallel as psychological line of resistance, but they didn’t pursue the improvement of fruits of battle down to the south of the 37th Parallel. In the 4th and 5th Campaigns, they confirmed their limit, and they made an opportunity to confirm position operations as the best plan by considering their own real ability. After considering all factors of the period before the CCF operated in the Korean War, there was no apparent change on tactical side. In this study, it considered change of military strategy and tactics with th following hypothesis, “the CCF pursued the harmony of purpose and means in a war before their operated.” As examined through the period before the whole operation, this hypothesis was harmonized successfully in setting up the purpose and providing sufficient means in the 1st and the 2nd Campaigns, but there was the limit on strategical success because tactical purpose, that was annihilation of the main forces were not complete in the 3rd Campaign. And in the 4th and 5th Campaigns, tactical units didn’t keep the leadership without a hitch in battle situation, so they didn’t accumulate sufficiently tactical victory, also they didn’t collapse the UN Forces’ line of defense even with committing a large scale of new unit, and they failed to harmonize purpose and means by pursuing the purpose beyond means on war, strategy, and tactical side. That is to say, the CCF produced its kind of fruit in the early Korean War with pursuing the purpose meeting means, that is substantial military strength, but they didn’t overcome essential inferiority, blocked to achieve tactical goal, and then a tactical victory failed to contribute as a means to achieve strategical purpose. Then the CCF spreaded position operations that they prescribed with pursuing the purpose of maintaining a buffer zone, and targeted on restoring the original state before the Korean War by the Truce Talks owing to gradual extinction of the UN Forces and military forces.
  • 5.

    MacArthur’s Command Plan of Dropping Atomic Bomb during the Korean War

    Sangho Lee | 2008, (67) | pp.133~166 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    One of the mistakes in the history of the Korean War is MacArthur’s Command’s plan of dropping atomic bomb. Fallacy was known to the people without accurate historical evidence. That is to say, MacArthur was blamed as ‘Warmonger’ whom advocated using the nuclear weapons in the Korean War. This essay would correct such the fallacy, utilizing the documents of MacArthur Archives (MA) and National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). And then we would investigate drafting process, debate course, and final decision of MacArthur’s Command’s plan of dropping atomic bomb during the Korean War. G-2, G-3 and ORO of the FECOM had produced many research papers about that subject, examined feasibility study, and deliberated appropriate. Especially, debate on the Using A-bomb was accelerated after the Task Force Smith had defeated in Osan Battle in July 1950. G-3 Department of Army investigated using the nuclear weapons, but G-2 Department of Army took an opposite. Meanwhile, regular studying about the using the A-bomb was progressed in the MacArthur's Command circle. Typically, ORO, FECOM took charge of that task. But the research of the ORO, FECOM showed reserve using the A-bomb in the Korean battlefield, because of ill preparation for aftereffect. However, consent unanimously about the plan was arisen in the 8th Army and Ⅹ Corps. They estimated that using the A-bomb was in effective. But, in the process of discussion, it was raised several points. The most important local problem is the identification and accurate location of suitable targets for atomic attack. Also, the ORO, FECOM study is largely predicted on the effect of atomic bombs in flat areas whereas the terrain of Korea is almost entirely hilly and mountainous. Moreover, it was raised possible enemy retaliation in kind or against Japan. In conclusion, using the A-bomb in the Korean battlefield was not pertinent. On the one hand MacArthur strongly claimed the atomic bomb on the way of military situation, but on the other he rejected using the nuclear weapons in the battlefield. In other words, he was an advocate of A-bomb toward Washington Administration, and that was reflected by the unit’s request under his direction. MacArthur intention of using of A-bomb requested an all-out war against the China and turning of Truman Administration toward war policy, not ardently consideration about using the nuclear weapons.
  • 6.

    The Korean War Readiness Courses and An Air Power Recognition of the North and South Koreas after the Liberation

    KyeoungLok Kim | 2008, (67) | pp.167~204 | number of Cited : 5
    Abstract PDF
    This research recognize the air power as the key point element of the Korean War, and analyze the war readiness course and the recognition about the Air Forces of North and South Koreas. A subject period of the study distinguishes the Korean War from the rule period of Japan based on the liberation. To strengthen the air power at the rule period of Japan was carried out with the colonization rule and in the method of the war readiness. Japan made many airplane to accomplish the war and made the airport at the Korean Peninsula. Korea was mobilized in this course at an aircraft manufacture and airport construction. Korea had high concern about the air from 1900 and grasped the current situation about the air force of a big power and predicted a future air war. The recognition about the air power of Korea was connected to independent movement. The independence group trained the pilot and applied the air power at independent movement. The air asset and the recognition about the Air Force was utilized for the air force construction which is formed at a rule period of Japan. The Air Force of the Republic of Korea (ROK) after the liberation failed though it tried the receipt of the airplane to be left. But, North Korea took the action such as quick receipt of the airplane and the Sineuiju Air Unit establishment. North Korea began the Korean War from the situation which the air power is superior compared with the ROK finally. The ROK coped with return of the US Forces in Korea and requested the support of active air power in America. The USA emphasized the economy assistance than the soldier assistance of the Air Force about Korea. The USA evaluated the meaning of Korea which is the international politics relatively so that it was low. Especially the USA recognized negatively about the going north unity which the Korean Government insists. The Korean Government propelled an air power increase which is the oneself as soon as an air power enhance requirement about America failed. Syngman Lee propelled a fund-raising campaign to buy the airplane and prepared the Geonkukki. The case of North Korea, Kim Il-sung recognized the air power in the course which he comes into the power due to the problem to be reality so that it was low. The recognition about his air power is low to a guerilla experience and restless political topology. But, He received a soldier weapon support since 1949 from the USSR and emphasized the air power. He emphasized the military strength of the army again as soon as a 38th Parallel force collision happened. The North Korea organized the air unit in spite of short time before the Korean War.
  • 7.

    The USA’s Buildup Policies of the ROK Armed Forces in the Korean War and its Characteristics

    이미숙 | 2008, (67) | pp.205~236 | number of Cited : 5
    Abstract PDF
    This study examines critically the process by which the Republic of Korea (ROK) Armed Forces, which had 100,000 personnel prior to the Korean War, grew to the size of 6000,000 strong at the cease-fire. What should be the appropriate size of the ROK Armed Forces today? This study returns to the years before and following the cease-fire, when the armed forces began to expand, to find the historical background to the propriety of that size. Notable in particular is the aspect of excessive military buildup, which may have happened because Syngman Rhee’s hard line unification policy and the US military policies were not well coordinated but rather as situations arose. The US buildup plans for the ROK Armed Forces of ten divisions, which it maintained until May 1952, was resonable. Worthy of special attention is that the 10-division plan was being maintained one year into the cease-fire negotiation. This backs up Douglas MacArthur and Matthew Ridgway’s view on the correct dimension of the buildup plan. But the USA changed its policies and augmented the Korean military to 20 divisions surrounding the cease-fire, While the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty was signed after the cease-fire, it failed to affect the building plan for the armed forces. The twenty-division plan was already confirmed in February 1953, well before the Mutual Defense Treaty took shape. The buildup achieved despite the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty was the combined result of Rhee’s concerns over the US Forces withdrawal, his northward strategy, and US Forces’s burden-transferring policies. The excessive size of the ROK Armed Forces, achieved in disregard of the US Forces presence and the Mutual Defense Treaty, became a stumbling block in the ROK’s economic development. Had we trusted more the war-preventing capability of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the US Forces, and limited our active strength to 250,000, the national would have been free from considerable economic strains. In mid-1960s the US judged that US aids and ROK's economy were in difficulty maintaining a 600,000 active force, attempting to reduce it to 500,000 men and diverting the free resource to more economic aid. But an army once built up is not easily downsized, and the matter remains to this day to be solved.
  • 8.

    A Study on the Operations Leadership at the Nakdong River Front:Focus on the Battle of the Namji-Yeongsan Area

    장용운 | 2008, (67) | pp.237~262 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    During the Korean War, the situation had worsen after July 20, 1950. After the fall of Daejeon, the core of the Seoul-Busan axis, General Walker decided to concentrate all forces at the Nakdong River and prepare the decisive defense. The Nakdong River literally became the final line of defense with no more ground to fall back on, and the fate of Korea was to be determined here. The UN Forces consisted of five ROK divisions and three EUSA divisions had to cover a total frontline of usual length of 240㎞. Thus division had to cover 30㎞, twice the usual length of 15km for a division. Also the North Korean People’s Army(NKPA) faced difficulties from its stretching supply route and especially from the increasing loses of equipment and men as a result of fierce battles. Meanwhile the ROK and the UN Forces gained the time needed for reinforcements to arrive for an all-out counteroffensive. And General Walker's ‘stand or die' spirit spread among the allies and boosted the morale. The Nakdong perimeter that included Namji-youngsan Area was a fierce boiling pot. It was a critical moment when the Republic of Korea's fate stood at crossroads. Against the NKPA’s fierce attack to end the war by the fall of Busan, the west part of Nakdong River, Namji-youngsan was critical Area to sustain the Nakdong Perimeter. lf this area were to be invaded by the NKPA, Milyang would be threaten directly. Miryang is critical point to the US supply route from Busan to Daegu. For this reason General Walker had to concentrate his intension more than any area. Especially the US 24th Division Commander and his soldiers fought fiercely against the NKPA 4th Division to defend the Namji-yeongsan Area. The NKPA 4th Division was famous and strong division than any other NK Divisions, but the US 24th Division Commander and his soldiers fought well and kept the area even if some dangerous moment were occurred. By their heroic fighting, Nakdong River west front was sustained and Nakdong Perimeter could be kept until to the time of the UN Forces’ Counteroffensive. It was not Rome but Caesar who conquered Goul. It was not Caltago army but Hannibal who made the Romans horrified And it wasn’t Macedonian army but Alexandros who conquered India. From this respects. there’s no doubt that looking into the commander’s leadership or operation guidance is very important when we study a war history. Therefore evaluating the operation guidance of the US 8th Army Commander General Walker and the US 24th Division Commander is essential for studying the Nakdong River frontline combat. General Walker had decided to overcome the difficulties of defense operation near the Nakdong River, and he had always tried to take initiatives of operation. It was a wise and appropriate thinking. When the US 24th Division’s counterattack failed and the situation at Yeongsan area become urgent, he put the US 1st Marine Brigade into the combat so that the NKPA was extracted completely. His aggressive operation bad brought the stabilization of Nakdong River frontline. and made possible to obtain the Busan Perimeter. The US 24th Division Commander General Church moved the civilians within the operation area out of the area. It was appropriate in terms of the civilian control. If the operations carried out without such action, many civilians would have been injured or killed, and it would have given many advantages to the NKPA. It is important to evaluate the overall operational result in studying a war history. However, this study is objecting to analysis and evaluate the process of the combat in detail which was executed along the Nakdong River Defense Operations in the west part of the area, so that we can learn the practice lesson by analyzing each case of the success and the failure of the combat of every level of commanders.
  • 9.

    The Research on the Operational Guidance during the Korean War -Focused on the Battle of Hyeon-ri Area-

    정명복 | 2008, (67) | pp.263~302 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    The main purpose of this article is to research on the UN Forces’ and the Chinese Communist Forces(CCF)’s operational guidance during the CCF’s Second Phase of the 5th Campaign. After the UN Forces’ across the 38th Parallel, the CCF decided to enter the Korean War. There were many purposes behind their participation of the war such as 1) to aid North Korea, 2) eliminating the suspicion of Stalin, 3) giving the CCF the experience of modern warfare, 4) accelerating the modernization of the CCF, 5) reconstruction of the Chinese economy, 6) strengthening of China to prepare for Taiwan’s liberation, 7) joining UN, 8) to trade South Korea with the removal of the US Forces in Taiwan, 9) to lure the Kuomintang Forces to mainland, 10) eliminating the danger of US launching a nuclear attack or retaliatory actions against China, 11) to restore North and South Koreas to how it used to be. But in regards of operational guidance it was essentially to extract the UN Forces from Korea so they can control the Korean Peninsula. The CCF separated their progress into two periods-maneuver warfare period and the period of positional warfare. the Second Phase of the 5th Campaign was the last one used in the maneuver warfare period. During the Second Phase of the 5th Campaign, CCF focused on annihilating four divisions (3rd, 5th, 7th, and 9th Division) of the ROK Armed Forces through the envelopment operations of Hyeon-ri, Chimkyo-Bangneri and envelopment of Soksari area. They also attempted to cut off the ROK Army III Corps’ withdrawal routes by concentrating six divisions in the ROK Army 7th Division Area. During the early period, the UN Forces came against massive loss as the III Corps found their main supply routes cut off, but effective use of delaying tactics and the Eighth Army’s calm response to the crisis enabled their forces to hold off the CCF and launch a successive counterattack and as a result the CCF damaged with a greatest number of casualty since entering the Korean War. During their Second Phase of the 5th Campaign, Peng Teh-huai used maneuver warfare and annihilation tactics learned from the past to make up for their inferiority in artillery compared to the UN Forces. Through the tactical surprise attack by two armies they achieved their early objectives of penetrating at Hyeon-ri area which was the north-east side of the UN Forces’ forward edge. However, some problems such as 1) not spending enough time for the preparement of the war, 2) misjudging the ROK Armed Forces’ withdrawal routes, 3) not anticipating serious logistics problem, 4) unflexible tactics were found during this period. Van Fleet, the Commander of the Eighth Army, at first struggled to deal with the enemy’s surprise attack, but soon recovered himself and counterattacked the enemy through the mobility of the 3rd Division and tremendous use of artillery later named the "Van Fleet way Fire Rate". His counterattack was successive but also from this we can analyze his negatives such as 1) poor decision-making shown when cutting off the ROK Ⅲ Corps’ withdrawal routes, 2) misjudging the information given so that enemy could launch their surprise attack, 3) misplacing the boundary of battle area between the US Ⅹ Corps and the ROK Ⅲ Corps. Second Phase of the 5th Campaign was the turning point for the UN Forces to shift their position to offensive and ultimately became a decisive factor to enforce China to the negotiation table.
  • 10.

    The Gaeseong Incident and the Negotiation of the Military Demarcation Line in the Early Truce Talks during the Korean War

    Boyoung Kim | 2008, (67) | pp.303~334 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    The hot issue in the Truce Talks, the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) insisting by the United Nations Command(UNC) side should be the 38th Parallel insisting by the Communist side and the actual contact line. But the factors of delaying Truce Talks are the issues about Gaeseong Incident and the Movement of Truce Village. During the reopening talks after movement of Truce Village to Gaeseong, the two sides were continuously confronted to secure the Gaeseong area. Finally, the UNC side gave up the Gaeseong area although securing the Gaeseong area after moving Truce Village to Pamunjeom. In the other hand the Communist side secured successfully which was the unveiling issues in the Truce Talks. The principle of continuing combat actions became the exposing issue bringing the worst casualties in the war with extending the talks. The UNC side wanted to do continuously combat actions until signing the Armistice Agreement even after establishing the MDL, the Communist side accepted the proposal withstanding the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA)’s request which was the stopping combat actions, Even though the UNC side could not secure the Gaeseong area, the UNC side appealed and set the establishment of the MDL based on the current contact line. With agreement the principle of continuing combat actions, the UNC side gained the preferential clue which could execute the military pressure to the communist side after the above mentioned agreement. Although the Truce Talks began to stop the Korean War, the continuing combat actions for gaining a domain terrain features during the Truce Talks kept a few confrontations, At the beginning in the talks, the UNC side appealed and strongly insisted the principle, but the Communist side accepted finally the proposed issue. It is meaning that the Communist also have to share the responsibility of the results. In the process of the talks, the role and options of the Republic of Korea and the NKPA were very restricted.