Korean | English

pISSN : 1598-317X / eISSN : 2713-8992

2020 KCI Impact Factor : 0.66
Home > Explore Content > All Issues > Article List

2006, Vol., No.58

  • 1.

    Kennedy, Johnson, Park Chung-hee and the ROK-US Alliance in the 1960s

    Sangchul Cha | 2006, (58) | pp.1~30 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    The principal purpose of this paper is to examine and evaluate the nature of the Republic of Korea(ROK)-United States(US) alliance in the 1960s. The Vietnam War was the most important issue pending between the ROK and US. The US's containment policy based on “domino theory” led to a massive military involvement in Vietnam and resulted in the “Americanization” of the Vietnam War. The Kennedy administration's early recognition of Park's anti-communist military government in 1961 meant to return to normalcy of the alliance system, which was established in 1953, between Seoul and Washington. To President Park, the Vietnam conflict was a golden opportunity for the ROK to obtain the economic and military benefits from the US. Thus, Park continuously proposed the dispatch of the ROK Armed Forces to Vietnam. In fact, the military expedition in the 1960s not only served as an important basis for the early accomplishment of economic modernization in Korea but also strengthened the ROK-US security alliance. The Johnson administration promised not to reduce US troops stationed in Korea without prior consultation with the ROK government. The Vietnam conflict ultimately became “an economic bonanza” for the Korean people that greatly facilitated the ROK's economic stability and development. In addition, the ROK military involvement in the Vietnam War also contributed to the enhancement of political position of the Park regime. In January 1968, North Korea attempted to assassinate President Park and seized the USS Pueblo. Park urged Washington to launch immediate military reprisals against North Korea, but the US refused. The Johnson administration decided not to escalate the incidents. The growing tension between the two countries in 1968 was an ominous indications of confrontation and discord of the ROK-US alliance in the 1970s.
  • 2.

  • 3.

  • 4.

  • 5.

    Wako[倭寇] and Sacheon at late Goryeo and early Joseon Dynasty

    Jaebum Lee | 2006, (58) | pp.147~176 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    This study is to review the situation and importance of military defense facilities in Sacheon area, Gyeongnam Province, and punitive measures at late Goryeo and early Joseon Dynasty. Other points of this study are to review about the activities of Japanese invaded Sacheon in early Joseon Dynasty and to reassess the Sampo and Eulmyo Japanese Invasions in detail. Having invaded into the Korean peninsula from primitive time, Wako mainly composed of Japanese expanded into a large scale group such as simultaneous attack with a fleet of 500 vessels. A marine stronghold, and main key point, Sacheon has a site position vulnerable to Japanese private raiders' attack. However, there was no case that at late Goryeo and early Joseon Dynasty, Wako's attack was concentrated. The reason was that the neighboring area, Happo(Masan) was a military and administrative center, so subject to preemptive attack, and Sacheon subject to subsidiary attack. Also it was also understood to be due to natural geographic factor that attacking Sacheon needs to conquer Yogjido, Sangdo, Hado and the South sea in advance. Literary records showed that Sacheon was never subject to independent attack, but same attack along with adjacent areas like Geoje, Goseong and Happo. The reason why Sacheon was relatively little damaged by Wako was found to have been derived from military, administrative, natural and geographical factor.
  • 6.

    Dang under Ruling of Empress Wu(武則天), Development and Military Activities of Rebellion of Li Jing-ye(李敬業)

    Yi Sanghun | 2006, (58) | pp.177~204 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    In 683, Dang Dynasty experienced disorder caused by death of Emperor Kao-zong(高宗), dethronement of weak Emperor Zhong-zong(中宗), continuing natural disaster and invasions by the outside. Under these circumstances, Li Jing-ye mobilized relegated former government officials's power and brought about rebellion for cause to restore Emperor Zhong-zong in Yang- zhou(揚州), which was the economic center at that time in 684. The rebel army mobilized as many as 100,000 troops of massive power after 10 days and occupied most of the area, called Jiang-su Sheng(江蘇省) now. However, they intended to hold their own ground not marching north but marching south. If they had marched north, they could have extended their power by finding the just cause to restore Emperor Zhong-zong and connection with Shan-dong(山東) power having anti-Tang sentiment. Their failure to march north is mainly considered the reason to have failed the rebellion. However, their situations where they couldn't march north have not been considered. It is the main object of this study to reveal the reason why they intended to maintain their independence going south instead of going north. For the above-mentioned purpose, difference in fighting strength between repressive military and rebel army at that time was compared and the development of nomadic cavalrymen participating in the war in order to recruit insufficient strength of riot military and rebel army's respond to that were examined. Participation of nomadic cavalrymen who were superior in cavalry strategy caused fighting power to change and rebel army to adopt strategy for defending cavalry. In addition, rebel army penetrated that 300,000 soldiers of repressive military had difficulty in getting impedimenta and intended to perform prolonged war. Considering the above facts, rebel army was absolutely short of cavalry, had difficulty in supplying impedimenta, and couldn't connect with Shan- Dong power. Moreover, the rebellion plan was revealed early and people in the southern side of a river(江南) tended to separately hold their own ground. That's why the rebel army gave up marching north and intended to maintain their independence in the southern side of river. It is regarded as a realistic judgement under the circumstances. Study of the development of rebellion, on the one hand, enables to know that Li Jing-ye's tactics were superior contrary existing cognition and that Empress Wu's respond was very appropriate that she committed another reserved division to the battle while suppressing the rebel army with repressive military of 300,000 troops.
  • 7.

    The Employment of Aircraft & Warship during the Korean War

    강창국 | 2006, (58) | pp.205~252 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This study is to analysis the employment of aircraft and warship of friendly or foe during the Korean War. During the Korean War (1950~1953), friendly forces including the ROK Armed Forces and UN Allied Nations including the USA, and foe forces including the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) and Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), employed the various kinds of weapon system. The Korean War was the International War that executed the massive of weapon, and the Limited War in the employment aspect of weapon system. Major weapon system employed in the war, were the conventional weapons such as tanks, armored vehicles, small arms, machine guns, mortars, and guns as the mobile weapon system though the nuclear, chemical and biological weapon had developed already, And also aircraft such as fighter, bomber, cargo, helicopter in the air, aircraft carrier, cruiser, destroyer, frigate on the sea were employed. Through the analysis of aircraft and warship employed during the Korean War, we can obtain the lessons and effects to the war as the followings: The importance of air and naval superiority is reconfirmed. After employment of MiG-15 Fighters by the Communist, tactical and skill for air combat was greatly changed. Helicopters were appeared newly for transport, search and rescue, evacuation. Close Air Support (CAS) was effective for ground forces, but system and equipment for request and equipment need to be developed. Sweeping Mines in the sea was very hard to operate. The value of Aircraft Carrier is reestimated as a key naval forces. Throughout the Korean War, we can have an opportunity to understand that the weapon suitable to the Korean peninsula need to introduce and employ, the doctrine need to develop, and the performance of weapon system need to modify and develop, too.
  • 8.

  • 9.

    A Study on the Concept and Justification of Preemption

    이석호 | 이준호 | 2006, (58) | pp.287~322 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    From ancient times, many war historians have strongly recommended posterity to make their future better through the understanding of wars. This lesson is valid in the modern age as well. In other words, it means that the ability to prevent wars and even if already occurred, the ability to minimize the damages caused by them derive from understanding accurately them. Thus, in this study, the author attempted to find out how to create the more peaceful world in the manner of analyzing the concept of preemption that has drawn attention recently. To do so, as a result of analyzing a tendency among the previous relevant studies, it was found that the fields where there were lack of studies on preemption until now concerned the pure conception. Accordingly, the author tried to investigate the historical cases and the factors to affect transitions in the recognition of war justification on the basis of such the concept. While ethically, preemption can be justified in the conceptional aspect, in actuality it seems to be degenerated into an aggressive concept addressed at the level of national security strategies among the powers of the world. Therefore, the criteria on ‘imminent threat' should be established so that preemption ensures the nation's right of self-defense and further remains as the concept of using the sword for the sake of justice. If accomplished, the bloody history of mankind will be made more wishful in future.
  • 10.

    A Study on the Origin of German Naval Policy

    조덕현 | 2006, (58) | pp.323~355 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    Historians often describe their art by using the German historie and geschichte. They collect historie or the story of what happened from raw materials such as memoirs, lessons learned, command stories, letters, recollections, oral histories, traditions, legends, and sea stories. Then they ask questions about each source, analyze its significance, and try to discover geschichte, that is, “What actually happened?" “How can we define the meaning of the German naval power in the 20th century?" This is an important question for understanding the German history of pre-World War I. Traditionally, after the unification of Germany, its defense policy was highly defended upon the ‘army power’. Therefore, naval power was the second line of defense in Germany. Since 1890, Germany has been recognized the importance of naval power through some diplomatic crisis at overseas. Under the leadership of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the German defense policy was changed. He defined the policy as ‘New Course'. Wilhelm II, Tirpitz and Hohenrohe were three major people who built up the German Navy in the early 20th century. Chapter Two explores the background of German naval policy. I will describe how Kaiser placed emphasis on the importance of naval power to have more overseas territories for the national interest. Chapter Three examines the process of establishment of German naval policy. In this chapter, I will describe how the naval policy was changed from ‘plan’ to ‘policy’ to secure more national interest as well as naval power. Chapter Four examines the movement of developing the Navy Law after 1898. The Navy League placed an important role to establish the Navy Law in this situation. Chapter Five overviews the influence of German naval policy, not only on Germany but also on the other European countries, especially Great Britain.