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The Hwangsanbeol Battle was one of the decisive battles as well as the Gwansanseong(管山城) and Baekchongang River(白村江) Battles. However, it is unclear where the exact place was, why the Baekje chose it for the last battle field, how the Baekje could win the battle four times although they had only one tenths of soldiers against the Silla soldiers, and why the battle ended in the defeat of the Baekje, finally. Therefore, this study reenacted the Hwangsanbeol Battle from historic records and close considerations of the background. The best military strategy that King Uija(義慈王) of Baekje could establish was the prolonged war obstructing the Silla Dynasty and Tang(唐), China Combined Forces when the Baekje came under attack by the Combined Silla and Tang Forces in July, 660. The loyalists Seongchung(成忠) and Heungsu(興首) suggested that the enemy should not capture the Tanhyeon(炭峴) and Baekgang River(白江) to make this strategy a success. However, the Tang(唐) Forces already occupied the Baekgang River, and the Silla passed already the Tanhyeon while the Baekje was discussing and finding the best solution. This resulted that the Baekje should make a new strategy, so the Hwangsanbeol Battle was brought out. The Hwangsanbeol Field is estimated as the area around the Gaetaesa Temple(開泰寺) in Yeonsan(連山), Nonsan City(論山市), and this area was formed by tectonics valley including Hwangsan Mountain(黃山). The topographical feature of this area could make it possible for the Baekje to keep off the enemy although the Silla soldiers numbered ten times more than the Baekje's. This was the main reason why the General Gyebaek(階伯) of Baekje chose this area for the last battle field. Three units of the Silla Calvary Forces were supposed to attack the Three Military Camps(三營) of the Baekje infantry at one time, and then individual Camps, separately. Four times attacks of the Silla ended in failure. And the Silla infantry finally took the ultimate attack against the Baekje. The last battle resulted the final defeat of the Baekje despite the prior victories of four battles against the Silla.

Capital’s Castle in the Gangdo(江都) was composed of Royal Palace(宮城), Middle Castle(中城; Inner Castle 內城), and Outside Castle(外城). It accepts that Gaegyeong(開京) was composed of Royal Palace, Hwangseong(皇城), and Naseong(羅城). Capital’s Castle in the Gangdo was structured Royal Palace and Outside Castle at first. Because Goryeo Dynasty made war against the Mongol Empire, so that was urgently transferred to Ganghwa Island. But the war was more drawn out, and was structured Middle Castle by Choi Hang(崔沆) at the 37th year of King Gojong(高宗) reign. At last, there finished three castle system. We can know Royal Palace gate name, the others can’t. But it perhaps was built Royal Palace in construction work course of Capital’s Castle. I assert that Middle Castle is equal to Inner Castle in the Gangdo. Because it was records about building of Middle Castle, but it was not records that the building was destroyed by Mongol Empire’ exaction at the 46th year of King Gojong reign. Capital’s Castle in the Gangdo was symbol building of opposition to Mongol empire. Therefore it is impossible that wasn't records about Middle Castle destruction. It prove that Inner Castle, first destruction building is exactly Middle Castle. Royal palace differ with Inner Castle. The Gangdo was not only island but also unimportant spot military, so must construct a line of defense at Gapgot(甲串), the east coast. But the line of defense is not Outside Castle. Outside Castle protected Royal Palace, government office, etc., also was symbol of Capital’s Castle in the Gangdo. As a result, Outside Castle was castle walls constructed around Capital’s Castle. Subject of research in the future must reflect excavation of Capital’s Castle.

Among Korean scholarly circles research on the Japanese Invasion in 1592 has centered on the righteous troops resistance. This is because of the negative understanding that government troops did not react properly during the early stages of the war and also because interest has centered on the righteous troops who voluntarily rose up and defeated the Japanese. The Left Gyeongsang Province, the area this paper covers, was the first area that the Japanese had invaded and the outcome of the war during the early stages could have changed depending on how the government troops confronted the Japanese. Despite this, during the early stages of the war the government troops of Left Gyeongsang Province did not put up much resistance, abandoned their posts and were defeated in battle. It would not be an exaggeration to say that such activity of government troops caused the struggle against the Japanese Army in the Left Gyeongsang Province to be viewed solely through the activities of the righteous troops. But in contrast to other government troop commanders of the Left Gyeongsang Province, Park Ui-jang despite being defeated in battle by the Japanese Second Army of Kato Kiyomasa, did not abandon his post of Gyeongju and reassembled his ranks in Jukjang prefecture. Before recovering Gyeongju Castle, Park Ui-jang distinguished himself by uniting with righteous troop leader Kwon Ung-su and recovering Yeongcheon Castle. In the end, Gyeongju Castle was recaptured and the defence of the Left Gyeongsang Province continued. Even during the peace negotiation period when engagement with the Japanese was forbidden, Park Ui-jang, Pajam in Daegu, distinguished himself by defeating a Japanese Forces of 2,000 with a small, crack unit. This battle of Pajam is significant in that muskets, which became known through exchanges with the surrendered general Kim Chung-seon, were actually utilized in battle. During the second invasion Park Ui-jang distinguished himself also, but his superior officer of the Left Gyeongsang Province Commander Seong Yun-mun represented the news falsely. Thereupon, Park Ui-jang bypassing Seong Yun-mun, reported directly to the Office of Military Merit, actively protesting against Seong Yun-mun's conduct. This paper turns attention to the activities of the government troops of the Left Gyeongsang Province under Park Ui-jang, which has until now been neglected by scholarly circles. What differentiates this paper from previous research is that, firstly, this is the first full-scale examination of the activities of government troops of the Left Gyeongsang Province under Park Ui-jang during the Japanese Invasion in 1592. Secondly, although Park Ui-jang lost the battle of Gyongju Castle, unlike the other commanders of government troops of the Left Gyeongsang Province, Park Ui-jang recaptured his place of appointment, and through continuous warfare brought about a change in the strategy and tactics of the Japanese army. Through the above points it is expected that this could become an occasion to re-examine the activities of government troops of the Left Gyeongsang Province, different from the previous examination of the activities of the righteous troops of the Left Gyongsang Province.

Daejeontongpyeon was at first intended by King Jengjo to become the following installment to Sugyojibrok, yet during the compilation process the nature of the task was changed, and the end result was an elevation from its previously expected status, and to a grand law code such as Gyeonggukdaejeon or Sokdaejeon. This kind of shift in nature led to the most notable characteristic of Daejeontongpyeon, the fact that two separate grand law codes coexisting inside. We can see that all the legal codes & clauses created during King Jeongjo’s reign were granted with the status of the grand law code, and such efforts culminated in the compilation of the Daejeontongpyeon. What's more, King Jeongjo made royal trips frequently and implemented a grand scale military training. Under these circumstances, many officials requested renewed understanding about armaments, and this was led to the publication of Daejeontongpyeon. The key part of this law was the king led reformation of military programs. The systems, in which civil and military servants are selected and re-educated directly by the King through Gwanmujae (martial exam) and Sisa (archery tests), were the evident sign of the maximized sovereign power. This eventually contributed to the compilation of the military code of Daejeontongpyeon.

The United States Information Service in Korea (USIS) initiated the consolidation psychological warfare primarily on the Republic of Korea (ROK) people, since the start of the War until the Armistice was concluded. The reason that made such psychological warfare activities possible was that the USIS was a propaganda institution originally aimed at Koreans. This paper examines propaganda and psychological warfare policies of the USIS by dividing the time line into three. The conclusion can be summarized as follows. To begin with, policies of the USIS can be divided into three phases; launching psychological warfare in the beginning of the Korean War(1950. 6~ 1951. 5), managing both the restoration of ordinary activity and psychological warfare(1951. 6~1952. 12), and preparing for the cease-fire and its aftermath (1953. 1~7). Second, as the War broke out, it initiated psychological warfare in order to elate morale of the ROK Armed Forces and Korean people, and to bring on cooperation by arousing a sense of solidarity in two. Despite of the fact that activities on armies of the USIS were dramatically reduced as the United Nations Command(UNC) and the Eighth United States Army(EUSA) completed arrangements for psychological warfare, the US Government gradually restored its ordinary tasks such as policy propaganda and spread of cultures. Third, in the middle of 1951, as the policy of war in the US changed to a limited war and armistice negotiation took place, the policies and activities of the USIS also greatly changed. The priority of its objective became spreading conviction to Koreans on the ultimate aim of the US policies on Korea, which was that ‘the shared policies of the US and UN on Korea is to create unified, independent, and democratic Korea’. Thus, it quickly restored and strengthened ordinary propaganda activities of normal times. The mission to persuade Koreans that are opposed to the armistice was also important. Military propaganda activities were no more than supporting suppression of guerrillas in Jiri Mountain or providing educational materials for war prisoners. Particularly, it propagated aid and reconstruction projects of the UN institutions such as the UNCACK and provided propaganda materials for them. Fourth, as the armistice negotiation proceeded quickly for reaching an agreement after April, 1953, the policies of the USIS also focused on preparing for aftermath of the cease-fire, restoration of war-torn country, and post-war reconstructions. Moreover, persuading Korean Government and Koreans who were still in opposition to the cease-fire of that this is the only way to bring peace was crucial. Also assuring them of the promise to secure Koreans from the threat of communism and to support Korea with its reunification policy took a big part in the propaganda program. Next, the State Department, which was in charge of overseas propaganda policies, recognized propaganda activities of the USIS were unprecedented in that they were initiated during the War. It struggled for leadership with military officers including the UNC, but could not reach beyond the principle that war theater commander was responsible for operation of psychological warfare. Within the same context, the USIS that stood against an institution under the UNC failed to win the leadership in activities for propagating aid and reconstruction. Eventually, it ended up providing propaganda materials. Furthermore, the State Department and USIS produced and supplied materials not only about the victory of the UN Forces but also about Communist Forces’ acts of destruction with brutality, and delusion of communism. As a result, the Korean War stood out as the first of its kind in which collective security under the command of UN cleared out communists’ invasion. And Korea was widely known as the bastion of anti-communism. Last, among the ordinary activities the USIS gradually resumed, the program of financially supporting and staying in contact closely with representative figures of various fields such as educational and cultural spheres was noteworthy. The program was launched under the intention of reaching out for prominent figures of Korean society to establish the US influence on them let alone propagating the US policies and cultures.

This thesis seeks to predict the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s military intervention and provide a strategic direction for the response against chinese military through the analysis of three examples of war, such as the Silla-Tang Military Alliance, the Joseon-Ming Combined Defense Strategy, and Sino-NK Mutual Defense Treaty. According to the military history of chinese intervention on the Korean Peninsula, China's basic strategy was to prevent Korea from having independent capability to confront China. Also, China attempted to interdict other maritime powers from utilizing Korean Peninsula as a bridgehead to move forward mainland China. It is obvious that China regarded Weonsan-Daedong River Line as a buffer zone to the security of mainland China. Through historic examples of war, the common decisive factors of PRC's military intervention on the Korean Peninsula are applied by three types: military alliance & request for backup, national security & national interest, securing the initiatives among neighboring nations. The PRC military's main task relating to Korean peninsula is to foster a secure environment around the peninsula. The QRF(Quick Reaction Forces) of PRC will be immediately put into military action in case of any emergent situations. The forces will be a significant threat to Korea. Therefore, the directions for military readiness of the Republic of Korea (ROK) military needs to develop various situations and make plans for the threat of new war in the wartime Korean Peninsula defense plan. The ROK military also needs to further develop the ROK-US Combined Operations Plan to implement a ROK-US military response scheme. It is vital for the ROK national security that the ROK military prepares to properly react to chinese strategy on the Korean Peninsula by utilizing Sino-ROK military exchange programs and developing military doctrine in preparation of PRC military's modernization, and sending officers to china for the military education. The ROK military has to become robust forces capable of overcoming any threats in order to support the 'Strategic Companion Relationship' between the ROK and PRC, and uphold the execution of 'Grand Bargain' on the NK's nuclear issue. For this, Our forces have to seize the initiatives in the battlefield by maximizing current strategy for the national defense, possessing flexibility and jointness. They also have to guarantee its national security through the Quick Reaction Strategy if it happens an emergent situation or war breaks out.

This research begins with a question “why the North Korean Leader Kim Il-sung excluded the experience, military doctrine and guideline of Chinese Communist Forces(CCF)) during the reorganization of North Korean People's Army(NKPA), even though the CCF's military intervention contributed to save North Korea from collapse-crisis in the war?". This phenomenon is contrary to the common belief that a military alliance between two nations normally binds and consolidates its relationship strong together, and will have a positive influence on a mutual norm and culture. This paper, focused on the dynamics of Kim Il-sung's “regime security" and “conflicting interaction between two nations", explores a impact of the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command on the Reorganization of NKPA in the era from October 1950 to the end of 1950's. The conclusions of this research are as followings: First, the CCF-NKPA relations at the highest levels during the creation of the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command and the conduct of the Korean War were characterized as a tension and conflict, not as friendship. The CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command, which is created in December 1950 for the purpose of unity of commands for two forces, was perceived by Kim Il-sung not only as a military command defending an alliance's common interest against external threats, but also as an political institution intervening in the North Korean internal affairs. The Establishment of the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command meant to Kim Il-sung a “lost" of his own operational command which can be interpreted as an expansion of chinese influence over the North Korea. The Chinese really attempted to draw towards themselves the commanders of the NKPA, and were not ashamed to interfere in the internal affairs of North Korea. This all made Kim Il-sung anxious about his regime security. Consequently, Kim Il-sung intended to prevent Peng Dehuai (Commander of the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command) from expanding his power over the Yenan-faction by introducing the Soviet in keeping a balance of power between two powers. Kim Il-sung's Mistrust against the chinese leadership was mixed with his personal psychological factor that he had experienced during the Anti-Japanese War in the 1930s and in the winter 1950-1951. He preferred therefore to rely on the soviet side. Second, tensions and conflicts between two nations had a lasting impact on the reorganization of the NKPA in two senses. On the one hand, Kim Il-sung stuffed the core position of NKPA's leadership with a Partisan-faction, so that he could seize the military power as an instrument for making his political power indisputable. The “Military" functioned for him rather an instrument for keeping his own political power internally, than an protecting force ensuring the sovereignty and survival of the national state externally. He succeeded to make the NKPA loyal to protect his own political status. On the other hand, Kim Il-sung was more dependent on the soviet side to keep a balance against the chinese. Under great assistance and support from the soviet he attempted to regain the military capabilities. Kim Il-sung's plan was consistent with a intention of soviet that had a fear of an expansion of the Chinese over North Korean. The Training, military doctrine, tactical guideline during the reorganization of NKPA was accordingly influenced strongly by the soviet military thoughts and systems. The sole alternative that Kim Il-sung could select was leaning to the soviet side, considering an increasing influence of the chinese and their interference in the internal affairs. Last but not least, the subject “the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command and the NKPA" needs studying more carefully with a deeper analysis in twofold respects. The Sino-North Korean military alliance nowadays is a key factor to understand the current security structure of the north east asia that is symbolized by the North Korean nuclear crisis and Cheonan-warship attack. Moreover, this helps us to prepare for the Contingencies in North Korea. In this sense, the subtle analysis on the above mentioned “dynamics of the politico-military relations of the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command" can provide a meaningful implication to the current status of the China-North Korea Alliance. On the other hand, it can also lead to a closer approach to the entity of so-called “Juche-strategy of NKPA" by clarifying the transfer-process of the Chinese traditional military thought to the NKPA through the bridge “the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command" sixty years ago.

The purpose of this article is to evaluate the Syng-man Rhee Administration's defense diplomacy and understand its features and implications, focusing on reinforcement of military ties and acquisition of military assistance based on a defense diplomacy concept. This research has determines that the Syng-man Rhee Administration executed defense diplomacy using all of Korean's resources to pursue the national defense aim while under the existing Korean internal and external security environment. Specially, the Rhee Administration executed the Pacific Pact, the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, and the reinforcement of military ties policy with friendly nation in Asia and worldwide. Also, it executed the acquisition and establishment of arms and defense systems during the pre-Korean War period. After the Korean War broke out, it promoted and advanced the reinforcement of the ROK Armed Forces. And also, this paper presents some actions and their results of the Rhee Administration's defense diplomacy. There are categorized into four areas. First, a look at how the Rhee Administration's efforts brought about policy in the US security and military assistance policy. The main items affected by the changes were the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty and the military assistance provided for the ROK Armed Forces reinforcement. As a result, a new viewpoint is shown on the results formed by the ROK-US's interactions. Second, the Rhee Administration didn't pursue the defense diplomacy promoted by the US. Even though the ROK was dependent on the US, the Rhee Administration made an effort to pursue additional defense diplomacy policies such as the Pacific Pact and the Asian People's Anti-Communist League. Third, we could find that prominent ROK people and organizations of the Rhee Administration's defense diplomacy were concentrated only on the ROK president and the State Department. These people and groups didn't work to unify the organizations and express a specialty under the ROK national power's absence during the Rhee's period. Fourth, this paper examines the context of the Korean internal and external security environments, the ROK national and defense aims, and how they affected the Rhee's defense diplomacy. The Rhee Administration pursued a certain defense diplomacy policy, being very aware of the importance of these factors. In short, the Rhee Administration's aggressive efforts on defense diplomacy resulted in many accomplishments, including the reinforcement of the ROK Armed Forces and the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Even though the Rhee Administration's actions and the US non-intervention and political errors toward the ROK contributed to the causes that started the Korean War, the Administration put an all-out effort to reach its goal of democratic unification. In this paper, we objectively re-evaluate Syng-man Rhee Administration's defense diplomacy policy, revising the historically inaccurate view. Also, this re-evaluation leads us to develop modern defense diplomacy policies, such as creating appropriate agendas, the establishment of new institutions and laws, and the development of human resources.

The purpose of this article is to study the international background of Ax-murder Incident at Panmunjeom in 1976 and the limits of the Republic of Korea (ROK) - the United States (US) responds to the incident, then provides effective measures against the North Korean provocations. The state of international affairs prior to the incident was changing sharply. As the international détente was waning, the ROK-US Alliance was weakened and North Korea increased provocations to sound out the intensity of the US support for the ROK. Ax-murder Incident at Panmunjeom was, I believe, a premeditated incident. I make a judgement that North Korea intended the withdrawal of the US troops from the ROK and the murdering of two US Army officers was a symbolic gesture. Besides, they wanted to weaken the ROK-US Alliance, and to gauge the US willingness to maintain the international détente. The ROK and US reacted with military strength increase at the early stage, but this coercive effect didn't last long because the US was much conscious of détente with the Soviet Union. The constraint of the US action has been a primary factor to give a wrong signal to North Korea that they can continue provocations against the ROK. Even when the Ax-murder incident took place at Panmunjeom, the US coercive diplomacy had only a limited effect. North Korea already knew that the US would not risk a war even though the US made a strong military reaction after the incident. We must reflect over the fact that Kim Il-sung expressed regret to the US Government but didn't punish those who were responsible for the incident and didn't take any action to prevent the US military demonstration couldn't, however big it may be, projected into North Korea soundly. Although Kim Il-sung expressed his regret to the US at that time, he didn't punish those responsible for violation and make efforts to prevent the recurrence of such a brutal behavior. In sum, it was true that Kim Il-sung was frightened by the immediate US military reaction, but the US policy was only a half cock success. The typical US half cock strategy is also reflected in the sinking of the Cheonan, one of the ROK Navy corvette which was occurred in March 2010. The ROK and US Government did not show any decisive countermove against the North Korean attack against the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan. I believe there will be international sanctions against North Korea, but it would not be strong enough to change North Korea. Under this situation, the US must come up with a viable alternative. In view of Ax-murder Incident at Panmunjeom case, the best solution we can think of is the use of military coercion in the early stage at that case. It is to transcend the limitations of sanctions and develop a workable strategy including force of arms to drive North Korea into a critical situation blocking all escapes.

The purpose of this article is to analyze how North Korea has studied about the operations and establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) military defense system on the basis of research data and DB collected at home and abroad. To do it, this paper used a wide range of regular or irregular periodicals and books on research on the ROK made by North Korea, which have held at home and abroad up to now since the North Korean regimes were established in 1948. Subsequently, this research paper abstracted research literature data in which covered only the ROK military affairs out of data on the ROK collected by North Korea. It was 12 out of 37 magazines that were selected as research data. Accordingly, this research paper made the analysis on how North Korea approached the ROK military affairs. First of all, Namjoseonmunje (Issues about the ROK) was mainly covered in regular periodicals, which the North published. Given the research on the ROK military affairs made by the North Korean regimes, it is evidenced that researches on the US military affairs were made more intensively than the ROK counterpart. Also, a majority of critical researches on the US and ROK military alliance have been made. It is so because researches on the the ROK military affairs made by North Korea have put the focal points on the ROK which is militarily subordinate to the US. It was the mid and end of the 1960s that the North Korean Government began to research the ROK military affairs. Most researches on the ROK military affairs conducted by North Korea were of the government regimes of the late Park Jung-hee' military education and military policy critics, during the 1960s and 70s. In the 1980s when the military regimes were still governed in the ROK, issues on the criticisms for the Jun Doo-hwan regime and the ROK military affairs were dealt with. The periods of the 1980s witnessed very active the ROK military researches made in the North. This results from the US and the ROK military alliance operations and training, that took place in 1976, and in more details, from the strong resistance by the North against the Team Spirit and propaganda of it as national solidarity. One of the marked research traits that North has dealt with the ROK military realms is what North Korea sees the the ROK military as military colonized under the US troops, and is what the the ROK military spheres have been at issues in multi-lights. And, the North Korean regimes continues to study the ROK military system to rationalize the North Korean regimes and propagate such regime to North Korean people. Strictly speaking, the research intention of the North to regard the ROK as Military colonized under the US troops differs from what has already been known. In other ways, the North Korean regimes make the research on it merely to propagate North Korean people about North Korea.