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2010, Vol., No.77

  • 1.

    Military Development and Growth of the Goguryeo during the Reign of King Gwangato

    나동욱 | 2010, (77) | pp.1~31 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    After King Gwangato's enthronement, Goguryeo had taken initiative in bilateral relationship to Baekje till the end of 5th century reversing the balance that has lasted since 4th century. The main supporting reasons for such a rapid growth of national power are not only the political maturity and stability and the profitable international conditions, but the development of military power. Goguryeo could organize the massive military providing necessary weapons to enlisted citizens from Haho(下戶) by intensified administrative enforcement and power of authority toward public, and the abundant iron from Laodong Area. Furthermore, the advent of stirrups in mid 4th century made Goguryeo commence new arts of combat and strategies in the battlefields. Through these opportune elements King Gwangato could hold a dominant political and military positions to Baekje by employing its strengthen military. That is to say, Goguryeo’s national growth and extension its territory was possible not only because of Goguryeo’s political stability and development by enforcing the law, of the advantageous diplomatic conditions, but of the improvement of military elements through compounding and comprehensive enlargement on armed forces capabilities.
  • 2.

    Tang’s Invasion into the Goguryeo and Cavalry Battles

    Yi Hong Du | 2010, (77) | pp.33~59 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    The Tang Dynasty reinforced the mobility of its force by organizing its main forces, with cavalry instead of chariot units, and invaded Goguryeo twice during the reign of Emperor Taejong and four times during the reign of Emperor Gojong. In the first invasion in May 645 during the reign of Emperor Taejong, there were two cavalry battles outside the Laodong Fortress between 40 thousands infantrymen and cavalrymen of Goguryeo and 4 thousand cavalrymen of Tang. In the first battle, Janggunye was defeated, and in the second one, Dojong won. Janggunye’s defeat was mainly because there was no close support by the infantry, and Dojong’s victory was thanks to the armored cavalry’s attack against the disorganized Goguryeo Forces. In the cavalry battle outside the Ansi Fortress, Tang Forces of 30 thousand defeated Goguryeo Forces of 150 thousand. Tang’s army lured Goguryeo’s force to the place around 3 km to the southeast of the Ansi Fortress, and then it lined up at an advantageous spot and launched an assault with its armored cavalry. In addition, 10 thousand cavalrymen of Tang attacked the Goguryeo Forces from behind. In the second invasion, cavalry battles tool place at the Namso Fortress and the Mokjeo Fortress in March 647. At that time, the Tang Forces deployed cavalry on the front line and enticed the Goguryeo Force’s imprudent attack, and won all the battles. In the cavalry battle at the Bakjak Fortress in September 648, Tang’s force of 30 thousands encountered Goguryeo Forces of 10 thousand in the field 16 km away from the Bakjak Fortress. In the battle, the Goguryeo Forces were defeated as it failed to penetrate into the strong phalanxes of the Tang Forces. Emperor Kojong invaded Goguryeo four times from 655 to 668. The first invasion was in March‐June 655. In the battles at Gwidansu and Jeokbongjin in Yoha, the Tang Forces defeated the Goguryeo Forces by attacking it from behind. In the second invasion in 661, Tang’s Forces of 175 thousand attacked the Pyeongyang Fortress from the land and the sea, but Goguryeo cavalry made sallies outside the fortress and crushed the Tang force. On the other hand, Yeonnamsaeng waged a harsh cavalry battle against Gyepilharyeo Forces in the Yalu River but was defeated. At that time, 30 thousand soldiers were killed while retreating without the cavalry’s covering. In the third invasion in February 662, Yeongaesomun Forces of Goguryeo defeated the Tang Forces in the cavalry battle on the banks of the Sasu River outside the fortress. Tang’s defeat was because of the cavalry’s imprudent sally without the infantry’s support. In the fourth invasion in 668 after the death of Yeongaesomun, Namgeon was defeated in the Pyeongyang Fortress Battle because he failed to take advantage of the infantry’s support and the ambush tactic.
  • 3.

    The Employment of the Crossbow and Military Reforms of Goguryeo between the 6th and 7th Centuries

    이정빈 | 2010, (77) | pp.61~86 | number of Cited : 10
    Abstract PDF
    The purpose of this study is to examine the employment of the crossbow and analyze the consequential reforms of military organization in Goguryeo between the 6th and 7th centuries. Goguryeo had the knowledge of the crossbow even before the 6th century and contemplated how to integrate it into their weapons system. The dissemination of the crossbow only began to occur after the mid-6th century. This was much owed to China, because China initiated the development of the crossbow, which gradually replaced armored cavalry as their primary weapon. Goguryeo adopted the employment of the crossbow, Goguryeo’s military reforms encouraged other neighboring countries, including Silla and Japan, to follow suit. By the 7th century, the crossbow in warfare emerged as their major weapon system. Therefore, the increase in the use of the crossbow spread throughout in the East Asia and brought about significant changes in the military organization. Goguryeo generally employed two types of the crossbow in warfare: the normal crossbow and the giant crossbow. The normal crossbow was the primary weaponry for infantry crossbowmen. The use of the normal crossbow was superior to the use of archer’s bow for attacking an enemy at a distance, but the normal crossbow lacked a mode of fusillades. In order to overcome this deficiency, the normal crossbow was presumably allocated to the standing army because methodical training based on battle formations was an essential component for its effective employment. As for the giant crossbow, its mobility was limited due to its enormous size, weighing as much as a catapult. The giant crossbow was a crew-served weapon and was primarily deployed in siege warfare, since it had substantial advantages of shooting range and destructive power. Unlike the normal crossbow, methodical training was not necessary for the giant crossbow. Therefore, it is thought that the giant crossbow was allocated to the reserve army as well as the standing army. In this sense, the employment of the giant crossbow became an integral component of the infantry. Since the crossbow was the primary weapon for the infantry, Goguryeo’s infantry heavily relied on the employment of the crossbow. The role of the infantry in military organization evolved through the late 3rd century and the early 4th century. The number of infantrymen rapidly increased as enlistment extended to commoners. Furthermore, the deployment of the infantry became the key to successful warfare, while the efficiency of the armored cavalry declined. The enlarged infantry facilitated the emergence of a centralized military system, as it required the control of central government. Therefore, it is understood that Goguryeo’s deployment of the crossbow between the 6th and 7th centuries resulted in Goguryeo’s military orientations to centralism.
  • 4.

    Goryeo's Response to the Invasion by the Qadan Forces in the End of 13th Century

    Jinsoo Kim | 2010, (77) | pp.87~115 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    In Mongolia, which appeared as a great global empire in the 13th century, a fierce political strife took place over the succession of the throne after the death (1259) of the 4th Emperor, Mungke. Kublai Khan who ascended to the imperial throne in 1260 (Wonjong 1) changed the country name to Yuan as he griped with the civil war, and established the centralizing system having Yuan Dynasty in its center. However, as some feudal lords uprose against to Kublai Khan of Yuan Dynasty, Yuan Dynasty came under another civil war. The representative powers were the House of West in the Central Asia, the House of East in North Eastern Manchuria, etc. and they raised rebellions for the purpose of the overthrow of Yuan Dynasty, respectively in 1269 and 1287. Especially, the aftermath of the rebellion by the House of East was carried into Goryeo, a neighbor nation as well as the Yuan Dynasty. As Goreyo invasion by the Qadan Forces, a member for the House of East was imminent, Goryeo was actively implementing the preventative measures as a matter of Centralism and continuously preparing such as strengthening the military joint with Yuan Dynasty in oder to provide for the future. The Qadan Forces, who resisted to Yuan in the first month of 1291, invaded them from the both directions, north east and north west such as Cheolryeong-Wonju-Chungju and the Yalu River-Seokyeong-Gaekyeong. If looking at the military situation of north west area first, Qadan Forces of Naodi won the war against to the Yuan Forces at the Yalu River and reached Seokyeong Area. Duo the Yis situation, Goreyo faced a military emergency that it capital Gaekyeong and Gangdo were threatened. However, as the Goreyo Forces led by Nayoo largely succeeded in defeating the Qadan Forces in Seokyeong, they managed to overcome the crisis. In the war situation of north east area, local crowds of Wonju and Chungju fought back at the battles in the military base under the command of Banghobyeolgam, a military official in Goreyo and repulsed the main forces of Qadan. Goreyo could seize the winning chance in the war thank to the active responses of the Government Forces and the fight backs of the local crowds in the beginning stage of the war. The Goreyo-Yuan Allied Forces formed by Yuan's military aid in April of the same year ended the war by finally repulsing the Qadan Forces in Yeongihyeon. Goreyo's triumph in this war was conclusively possible by Yuan's military aids. However, the active responses of the Goreyo Government Forces and the fight backs of the local crowds centered in the military bases in the beginning stage of the war are also evaluated as the key figures of winning the war. This suggests that Goreyo's wills for the national level of responses to the foreign wars was firm.
  • 5.

    A Study on Organization and System of the Joseon Army in the Battles of Gyeongsangdo Area during Early Imjin War

    Lee Ho Joon | 2010, (77) | pp.117~181 | number of Cited : 19
    Abstract PDF
    Many studies on Imjin War(Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592) have been preceded to the point of forming an greatest part of Korean military history. But the viewpoint on the governmental preparation for war, war guide and operation of military power was very negative. The operation process of Joseon's military system should be objectively analyzed by connecting it to the entire progress of Imjin War based on recognition about it in the 16th century. But It is difficult to avoid evaluation that it was generally weak because it focused on rapid occupation of Hanseong by Japan and aftereffect of the war. It causes the problem that you distort and look at Joseon's military system itself in the 16th century as well as Imjin War. This study tries to recover the existing viewpoint that Joseon could not help losing the war because its military system was disorder and lacked preparation for war by reviewing the war history of early Imjin War critically. Consideration on it will present the objective viewpoint that you can specifically know the joseon's military system because the war showed the process that the military system operated. It tries to review the existing war studies that depend on description historical materials more critically from the military point of view. Joseon's way to execute wars was based on military tradition that the reins were divided and delegated when crisis occurred. Joseon operated local military power to protect the country against external parts. And it divided the reins to control local military power and to prevent rebellions which are the dynasty's biggest threat. The local militaries performed actions in the beginning stage when Joseon executed foreign wars. But if situation was not settled in spite of it, corporals to whom a king delegated the military power were dispatched and led the central militaries consisted of a crack to local areas and finished all the situations. The Local militaries have to arrange the procedures that they got the approvals from the central military when they tried to operate the other local militaries in other districts(道) because they could not operate their duties in other places except their applicable districts(道) without approvals of it. The result that the function of the dispatched corporals was developed and reflected changed the method to divide and distribute the militaries by Jingwan System(鎭管體制) to the one by Jeseungbangryak System(制勝方略). The function of dispatched corporals ranging from Jobangjang(助防將) to Dojechalsa(都體察使) was gradually developed in 16th century. The dispatched corporals moved to the applicable districts(道) with the armed cracks who are in the part of the Central Armies(中央軍) in Hanseong. In this process, they passed post road networks and moved taking soldiers, horses, foods and fighting materials which are waiting for them in each assembly area by Jejinbyeol wunbeop(a kind of moving method, 運法). The method to divide and distribute the militaries of each district(分軍法) was reflected to Jeseungbangryak by district(道) based on the dispatched corporals and changeable national defense situation. As there was Imjin War, Joseon operated military power through the built military system. Military mobilization was began with rapid information spread by each communication system including signal fire network and post road network. Soldiers took action against the enemy in the beginning stage operating the soldiers mobilized from each troop by Jeseungbangryak(制勝方略). Auditors and patrol parties judged situation and gave orders to each district(道). Soldiers in each troop in middle and north parts of Gyeongsangdo(慶尙道) moved to the designated assembly area. The partial troops were formed to the local troops that was taking action in the beginning stage and the partial troops were done to the corporals' troops. The corporals were consequently dispatched to the places ranging from Jobangjang to Dojechalsa by the first action of the government.
  • 6.

    Development of the ROK Conduct of War System: Determinants and Features

    Jeongki Kim | 2010, (77) | pp.183~216 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    Conduct of War System(COWS) is developed with the many types by variable determinants. And that make features. Then, the development of the Republic of Korea (ROK) COWS has been changed along with three types. As a result of this analyses, two main factors of the type's transformation are the security environment and the president's perception of national security in the ROK. For the ROK, her unique security environment was created from the North Korea's threat and the dependence on the United States (US) security assistance. Likewise, the ROK presidents' perception of national security, which has been centered on North Korea and the United States, influenced the fomentation and development of the COWS. From 1948 to 2008, in the ROK history, the type change of COWS has developed from dependent to combined to self-reliant. Therefore, in the features, operational authority was gradually from endorsed to combined to redeemed. And grant aids from the US gradually reduced and terminated. Recently, the strategic thought and action based on those points is getting more important because of the sinking of the ROK Ship Cheonan on March 26, 2010 especially. And in order to deal with victory in war, peace and unification for the Korea Peninsula, these are urgently needed in the transfer process of war-time OPCON and grant aids.
  • 7.

    A Study on the Failure of Military Diplomacy of the Republic of Korea 1948~1950

    Yoon Si-won | 2010, (77) | pp.217~249 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    The purpose of this article is to describe character of military diplomacy of the Republic of Korea(ROK) during 1948∼1950. Previous studies indicate that pre-war defence policy of the ROK failed because of insufficient military assistance of United States(US). Therefore, they couldn't make a critical assessment of the character of military diplomacy of the ROK and role of the president Syngman Rhee. Making of a modernized army for national defence was a most important task of the ROK government. The Korean Constabulary, organized by the US military government, was insufficient for national defence. Therefore, ROK government tried to reorganize constabulary as an army. In December 1948, the ROK government released a plan to create an army of 100,000 soldiers, six infantry divisions consists with 18 infantry regiments and 6 artillery regiments. This was a first detailed national defence plan by Koreans. The main point of this plan was that revise the basic tactical unit of the korean army from brigade to division. The infantry brigade structure, made by americans, insufficient for regular warfare. The US government decided compromise with Korean government because it had a strong need for liquidation of USAFIK. In March 1949, The Position of United States in respect to Korea(NSC 8/2) made it clear that US government would provide military assistance to ROK army of 65,000 men. This was a small victory of the ROK military diplomacy. But Syngman Rhee, President of the ROK, felt disappointment because the US government didn't accept his plan and initiated withdrawal of USAFIK. In May 1949 the ROK government decided to increase strength of army to 100,000 soldiers, 8 infantry divisions without the US support. Equipment, supply and training problems were aggravated because the ROK government unilaterally raised the ROK Army's manpower ceiling to 100,000. After strength of the ROK Army reached 100,000 by August, stocks that were to support an army of 65,000 were quickly dwindling away. And the disruption to the training schedules caused by the continuing expansion of the ROK Army during 1949. The ROK government couldn't gain sufficient military assistance from the US after withdrawal of the USAFIK. The ROK government has increased military assistance demand during later half of 1949. Some of the demands made by ROK government was beyond ability of US government. In example, the ROK government has requested delivery of M-26 medium tanks that wasn't sufficient for the US Army and F-80 jet fighters. The military diplomacy of the ROK government during later half of 1949 failed because of an unreasonable demand. Consequently, irrational increasement of the ROK Army and excessive military assistance demands were a fatal blow for military diplomacy of the ROK. Therefore, President Syngman Rhee, key figure in military diplomacy, has responsibility for this disaster.
  • 8.

    Negotiation Strategy of the Syngman Rhee's Government for signing the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty

    lee,sunghoon | 2010, (77) | pp.251~283 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    The objective of this research analyses regarding Syngman Rhee Government's bargaining strategy for the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The currently critical security issues, such as the ROK Navy Ship Cheonan sinking event, 2015 years scheduled wartime operational control transition, the new vision strategic alliance 2015, demand realignment of the ROK-US alliance role and relationship. To accomplish this, the alliance's origins and the change process since has been formed originally required for the study. In particular, the start of the alliance, a mutual defense treaty, is essential for the analysis. In other words, it is suggestive that bilateral interactions between the ROK-US and the Syngman Rhee Government's bargaining strategy in the process of a conclusion of mutual defense treaty even if the time has much passed. In sum, the conflictual international order represented by the Korea War and vulnerable resource mobilization capability of the ROK in that time reduced the bargaining power of the Syngman Rhee Government in the course of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty negotiation. However, despite the negative impact of these factors, Syngman Rhee Government used for resistance bargaining strategy in response to the United States's indirect pressure, such as brinkmanship and bluffing. The objective of this strategy for the US was trying to obtain maximum yield. In contrast, under direct pressure such as withdrawal of the US troops, the ROK Government used compliance and resistance strategy. Such flexible and cross political strategy was able to made the conclusion of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Hereafter, the ROK will confront simultaneously in the North Korea's direct threat including asymmetrical weapon and nuclear weapons, with potential threat to the surrounding faced at the same time such as escalation of territorial conflict by neighboring, terror by hostile actor etc. In addition, due to defense reform and the wartime control transition conditions, the ROK defense policies will vary considerably. Under these circumstances, there is need to set pre-situation and need to develop appropriate coping strategies for the enlargement of security autonomy. Currently the ROK is the world's top 10 economies and international environment is also considering the vantage point of view compared with that time, it is necessary to appreciate again Syngman Rhee Government's negotiating strategy for achieving the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty.
  • 9.

    East Asia's New Power Game between China and Japan: the Senkaku(Diaoyutai) Islands Proble

    조진구 | 2010, (77) | pp.285~324 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    In 1895 the Japanese Government issued a cabinet resolution claiming the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territory. After UN ECAFE issued a report stating that considerable reserves of oil and natural gas might lie around them in 1969, Chinese government also announced its own claim to the Diaoyutai. It was one of the most hottest issue that may harm the friendly relations between Japan and China since then. This article is organized into three sections. I will open with the historical backgrounds and the origins of this territorial dispute before and after the normalization of China and Japan. The second section of my artice examines the political and economic dimensions of this problem till the middle of the 2000s. And the last section of this article observes the political meaning of the Senkaku dispute not only in the context of the bilateral relations between two countries but also its implications to changing international relations in the East Asia including our nation. The issue of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands emerged in 1971 when Tokyo and Washington signed an agreement on the reversion of Okinawa. Under the accord, the United States returned the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands(including the Senkaku Islands) and the Daito Islands in Okinawa to Japan. The Republic of China(Taiwan), which Japan then recognized as the legitimate Chinese administration, protested the move. It is not part of the Ryukyu Islands, but historically and geographically part of Taiwan. The People's Republic of China, with which Japan had no diplomatic relations at the time, also claimed that the Diaoyutai is part of its territory because it is part of Taiwan. Japan and China signed a joint communiqué establishing full diplomatic relations. In order to expedite the improvement of bilateral relations, both sides agreed to put off to discuss the issue of the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, deferring it to later generation to decide. This left unresolved a potentially explosive bilateral territorial dispute. Especially Japan noted with concern China's adoption of its 1992 Law on Territorial Waters that reasserted its claim to the Senkaku Islands. Japan and China attempted to play down bilateral tensions over the Senkaku Islands, but it has proven to be a sensitive issue. Its importance is generally attributed to underseas oil and gas resources and competition to define exclusive economic zones favorable to either side. Many meetings and consultations have been held between the two countries with regard to the East China Sea issues, and the development of natural resources in the East China Sea. In 2008, as a first step toward realizing understanding between the two countries' leaders of making the East China Sea a Peace, Cooperation and Friendship. Japan and China agreed that the two countries cooperate with each other without prejudice to the legal position of both countries during the transitional period pending agreement on the delimitation. A Japanese patrol boat and a Chinese fishing boat collided on September 7, 2010 in waters off the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. The Japan Coast Guard arrested the captain of a Chinese fishing vessel on suspicion of obstructing public duties in connection with collisions accident. The Government of Japan on September 25 released the captain of a Chinese fishing boat. It seems that the decision to release the captain of a Chinese fishing boat was a political decision made by the Japanese Government. But Japan rejected China's demand that Japan apologize and offer compensation for detaining a Chinese fishing boat captain over collisions near the disputed Senkaku Islands. Even though the Japanese basic position is that Senkaku is an integral part of Japanese territory, and that there is no territorial dispute with China, it is clearly that the Senkaku territorial dispute with China is not resolved. It is of my opinion that the collisions between a Chinese trawler and Japan Coast Guard patrol boats near disputed territories in the East China Sea reflects not only international structural changes but also China-Japan's bilateral structural changes, and that it may also be the prelude to East Asia's new power game between Japan and China.
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