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2011, Vol., No.79

  • 1.

    North Korea’s Unification Strategy Discussion and War Preparation after the Establishment of Government - From September 1948 to January 1950 -

    김광수 | 2011, (79) | pp.1~40 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    The purpose of this paper is to explore how unification strategies were discussed among chief leaders in North Korea and how preparations for war were made along lines of these discussions during the period between the establishment of the North Korean regime and the outbreak of the Korean War. So far, the main academic debates about the war have been mainly on the origins and causes of the War. Based on the Soviet archive materials partially opened in the 1990s and “the captured North Korean Documents” which had not received much attention, many researchers have focused on the relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union surrounding the war and have made a long debate about who was the leader in determining the War. By contrast, researches on the unification strategy discussions and the mobilization for the War made within North Korea have not been conducted enough. For example, how the North raised the war fund and prepared war resources and materials before the starting of the war has never been studied. Furthermore, the relations between the unification strategy discussion and the actual ideological and material mobilization have not been identified. This paper is an attempt to fill the gap in historical knowledge on these subjects, based on a variety of historical source and personal testimonies. First of all, it should be noted that North Korea’s strategy discussion for unification was made almost simultaneously with the establishment of the regime. The leadership of the Government declared the “complete reconstruction of the country” and “national unification” as their policy priority among the new government’s political principles, right after establishing their government in September1948. In addition, the Labor Party determined the reunification of North and South Koreas and the extension of North Korea’s system to the whole country (both Koreas)to be their top priority. However, opinions of the concrete methods of unification were divided between the leading groups. The Manchurian Partisan faction including Kim Il Sung, Choi Yong-Gun, and Kang Gun insisted the unification through the Army's invasion of the South should be put first and that the South Labor Party’s partisan activities should assist this, while the South Labor Party faction including Park Hun Young claimed the South Korean partisans should over throw the ROK mainly through the people’s uprisings and that North Korea just aid this. During his official visit to Moscow in March 1949, Kim Il Sung suggested the unification by armed force to Stalin, but Stalin refused flatly to approve this by pointing out the unfavorable international situation and the agreement with the United States on keepingthe38th latitude division. He mentioned that if the South attacked first, the North’s counterattack could be allowed but the North should not make a preemptive attack on the South. After this, Kim IL Sung several times urged Stalin to approve his proposal of the unification by armed force but could not get the consent before the end of January 1950. Under these circumstances, Kim Il Sung was establishing the system of mobilization secretly having a war in mind, while supporting the South Labor Party’s partisan activities. Throughout the year 1949, the North leadership was making efforts very secretly to strengthen the mobilization system of the people and also putting time and energy on raising the fund to increase armaments and reserve war materials. The North Korean leadership presumed that the people of North Korea would have aversion on them if the North Korea invaded the South Korea first. Therefore, they were to deceive the people by propagandizing that young people should enlist in the military or be trained in the workplace to prevent the United States and South Korea from invading the North. Also, under the name of ‘the national physical fitness test,’ each department at all levels of the government was in charge of identifying the population to be mobilized to a war and making the military registration card. The Labor party, the Defensive Committee for Fatherland, and all the social organizations such as Democratic Youth’s Union, Women’s Union, and Farmers’ Union gave it their best shot through various meetings and brochures to incite the people to respond to this national policy. Furthermore, the North Korean leadership deceived the people to secretly accumulate funds for the war. In order to raise capital to purchase weapons of war from the Soviet Union, they sold government bonds to residents by making an excuse that the money was necessary for “loans for national economic development.” Also, in order to conceal their armament expansion and war fundraising, they announced only a portion of the actual defense budget as “Defense Fund for the Fatherland (National Defense Budget)”and hid the remaining funds into the other budget items. In 1949, the “Defense Fund for the Fatherland” was announced to be3.1 Billion won, 15% of the total expenditure 19.7 billion 26 million won, but the actual military spending amounted to 7.1 billion won. Besides, the money collected from the people in the name of' donation fund for military equipments, 'the loans of about 850 million won by barter from the Soviet Union, and 2.5 billion won collected for economic development in the name of national bonds were added to this military budget. Therefore, North Korea’s actual military expenditure in 1949 amounted to 10 billion 384 million 600 thousand won. At the same time, through various means, North Korea prepared enough War materials for People’s Army to carry out a war for two months with no difficulty. These were partly from the loans and partly from the people’s contributions in the name of' voluntary fund for military equipment. 'Thus, North Korea was able to stockpile supplies needed to sustain a short term War for duration of 2 months, such as food, fuel, ammunition, clothing, etc. However, it ran short of provisions for a longer term war.
  • 2.

    The Jangsa's Landing Operations during the Korean War

    Yang Yong-Jo | 2011, (79) | pp.41~72 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This study is on the Jangsa's Landing Operations right before the Incheon's Landing Operations during the Korean War. At night on September 12, a Combined Forces of the ROK, US and British troops dared to make a feint amphibious operations in Gunsan, while on the east coast for two consecutive days, on September 14 and 15, UN air craft hit hard on the Samcheok area, another possible landing area, to divert enemy's concern on the west. The student volunteer soldiers of the ROK 1st Independent Anti-Guerrilla Battalion led by Capt. Lee Myeong-hum (Later renamed Lee Chong-hun) even practically landed at the beach in Jangsa, south of Pohang, at dawn on September 15. Unfortunately, however, as their Landing Ship Dock had run a ground because of the typhoon Kezia, they were exposed to enemy troops there. They fought against the enemy on the beach capturing a nearby hill position. But they withdrew suffering heave losses. In brief, the Incheon's Landing Operations had been in progress under a carefully thought-out deception operations. Operational security measures had been so through that the US Far East Command had not transmitted their reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the right moment and the JCS misunderstood the FEC. This Jangsa's Landing Operations is analyzed that it was successful in the view they have achieved the operational purpose inspite of many victims of soldiers.
  • 3.

    The Role as Wartime Leader of President Syngman Rhee during the Korean War

    Jeongok Nam | 2011, (79) | pp.73~109 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    This article aims to explain about the role as wartime leader of President Syngman Rhee during the Korean War(1950~1953). The Korean War was the most difficult and potentially the most disastrous of the early Cold War period, a conflict which directly involved one of super powers in open war with the most populous state in the world. The other super power was only indirectly involved but there was always the possibility that it might intervene; a third world war could erupt. This study has tried answer the following key questions:(1)How did President Syngman Rhee act the initial stage and after of the North Korea's surprise attack against the Republic of Korea (ROK)? (2)What was war policy and objective of President Syngman Rhee? (3)When and Why did President Syngman Rhee try to penetrate 38th parallel? (4) Why did President Syngman Rhee involve the United Statesinto the Korean War? (5)What was role of President Syngman Rhee as a wartime leader during the Korean War? (6)What did President Syngman Rhee obtain from the United States after the Armistice? In seeking answers to the above questions this paper used the State Department Foreign Relations of the United States, Documents and Files of the Korea Government, the Korean War History of Ministry of National Defense of the ROK, and the Memoirs of those officers and generals who played a nactive part in policy-making were consulted. In conclusion, President Syngman Rhee achieved an enforcement of the Korean armed forces and the ROK-US alliance relations through 'Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America'. In this concept, he was agreat patriot, national leader, wartime leader like Winston Churchill or Franklin Roosevelt, and international political scholar and leader.
  • 4.

    The Recognition and Response of the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea about the Korean War

    Dongchan Park | 2011, (79) | pp.111~149 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    The purpose of this paper is to study KMAG's recognition and response about the Korean War. If summarizing what is examined in this manuscript, it is as follows. After the Truman Doctrine was announced in 1947, United States provided a military aid to a region except Europe and dispatched the U.S. Military Advisory Group. The U.S. Army Group was dispatched to Greece·Turkey·Iran, and the Provisional Military Advisory Group was installed in August24,1948in Korea.PMAG wasformally established as KMAG in July1, 1949, since with drawal of U.S.Army Force in Korea was complete. The U.S. Military Advisory Group was organized as a part of American Mission in Korea with the Embassy of United States in Korea and the Economic Cooperation Administration(ECA) and received control of Ambassador of United States in Korea KMAG selected all fields related to the Korean Army such as organization, operation, education and training, and logistics as a domain of activities, and accomplished their plan and decisions to the Korean Army through a “CounterpartSystem". Activities of the U.S. Military Advisory Group has developed while varying its scope and emphasis according to United States' military policy to Korea and changes of the situation of Korea, and continued changes in a command channel and scale by corresponding to it. Before the Korean War, activities of KMAG laid emphasis on training and educational guidance, and anti-guerilla warfare of the Korean Army. Training guidance of the U.S. Military Advisory Group can be summarized as reinforcement of unit's tactical training and training education of commanders. The training plan on the Korean Army that the U.S. Military Advisory Group planned was not properly performed, and training results were also not good, but there was a meaning in that the first systematic American-styletraining on the Korean Army was carried out. In relation with operational support, it had direct influence on support of anti-guerilla warfare and establishment of a defense plan of the Korean Army. The U.S. military Advisory Group evaluated the result of winter subjugation operation against guerrillas during 1949~50 as 'very successful'. The U.S. Military Advisory Group took a defensive position on the 38th parallel's dispute, unlike active intervention in subjugation operation against guerrillas. United States tried to properly controlthe Korean War through KMAG, while opposing assertion of going-north of the Korean Government actively. The defense plan of the Korean Army that KMAG visualized in this stand point was connected to an 'operation order No.38 of the Head quarter of the Army'. Its core content was a defense plan against 'local provocation' of the North Korean Army instead of preparing a full-scale war. Even if KMAG sensed a war symptom such as reinforcement of military strength and forward deployment to the 38th parallel of the North Korean Army before outbreak of the Korean War, it was convinced that it would never be connected to a full-scale war. As soon as the Korean War broke out due to this, organization of KMAG was seriously collapsed, and confusion was generated even in a command system, Councilors dispatched to forward units had withdrawn from the battle line in June 25~26. Withdrawal of councilors accelerated weakening of fighting power by rapidly spreading recognition like "United States gave up Korea" inside the Korean Army. What councilors again returned to the battle line was around July 4, 1950. At this time, the KMAG headquarters completed existing official duties and converted its duties into concentration on operational guidance of the Korean Army. In July 8,1950, an order that makes councilors consider direct command of the Korean Army was delivered to councilors.
  • 5.

    A Study on the Impacts of the Korean War on the Domestic and International Politics

    Youngho Yungho Kim | 2011, (79) | pp.151~181 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The Korea War can be construed as the most important historical event of modern Korean history. The war had great impacts on the development of the Cold War and the international order since the end of World War II. The research on the war has been focused on the war's origins and developments and the issues related to the armistice negotiations. As a result, the studieson the domestic and international impacts of the war has been relatively few. With the 60th anniversary of the war, it is very important to review the extant research on the subject and to present new research agenda. The horrendous experiences of the war tended to put emphasis on the immoral and negative aspects of the Korea War. This tendency resulted in the neglect of the objective and theoretical studies of the war's internal and external influences. The war's 60th anniversary provides us with an opportunity to begin the study on the subjectin earnest. This article will explore the war's impacton the development of the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a modern state. It will analyze how the ROK developed its military and financial capabilities as a modern state with specific reference to Max Weber's definition of the state. The articles will argue that the ROK became a 'rentier state' because of its overdependence on foreign aid for its state budgets. It will analyze the impact of the 'rentier stateness' on the political development. It will also argue that Korean society has become a Tocquevillian democratic society with the end of the war and a strong anti-communistic society. On the international level, the war had great impact on the Cold War development in Europe as well as on the Korean Peninsula. The war contributed to the militarization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)and the consolidation of the Cold War structure in the northeast Asian region. The article also explains why the United States decided to sign a series of mutual defense treaties with Japan,ROK,and Taiwan during and atthe end of the war. It will also discuss the impact of the war on the operations of the United Nations. It will conclude by discussing what kind of lessons the states in the region can draw from the war to keep the region peaceful and prosperous with the rise of China in the 21st century.
  • 6.

    A Study on the Battle Order of the Silla Forces in the Battle of Hwangsanbeol - Committed Troops, Commander, and Number of Troops -

    Yoon ill young | 2011, (79) | pp.183~215 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    The Battle of Hwangsabeol was the battle at Hwangsanwon(黃山原 :Hwangsanbeol) between the Silla Forces and the Baekje Forces on the ninth day of the seventh month in AD 660 by the lunar calendar (August 20 according to the solarcalendar) during the 7th ruling year of King Muyeol. However, inspite of a lot of concerns for this combat from the academic circles, the reality of The Battle of Hwangsabeol has not been restored yet. With the aim of restoring The Battle of Hwangsabeol, this research is going to distinguish the name of the combat unit Silla troops sent in at the Hwangsanbeol battlefield, and the name of a commander, and clarify the number of troops by combat unit, and a total number of troops. In addition, this research analyzed the two examples in which Silla sent in to the counter-Baekje fighting with the aim of inquiring into the name of the combat unit which Silla troops put to the Hwangsanbeol battlefield. The first example is the account that at the time of August in the 46 th ruling year of King Jinpyong(AD 624) when Baekje besieged Sokham Castle(速含城), Bongjam Castle(烽岑城), Aengjam Castle(櫻岑城), and Kihyeon Castle(旗懸城),Silla put 4 combat units such asSangjujeong(上州停) Guidang(貴幢), Hajujeong(下州停), and Seodang(誓幢), etc. The second example is the account that at the time of spring in Februaryin the 8th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 661) when Baekje Revival forces attacked Sabi Castle(泗泌城), Silla reinforced its forces by adding Daedang(大幢), Nangdang(郎幢),and Namcheonjeong(南川停) to the existing Sangjujeong Guidang(貴幢), Hajujeong(下州停), and Seodang(誓幢). As shown in the second example, the fact that Silla additionally sent in three combat units to the battlefield suggests that Silla might need a lot more combatunits in attacking Baekje Sabi Castle than in attacking Sokham Castle, Bongjam Castle, Aengjam Castle, and Kihyeon Castle. Here, it's necessary for us to look atthe above-mentioned case that happened in the spring of February during the 8th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 661). Silla fought a battle against the troops led by general Gyebaek(階伯) of Baekjeat the Hwangsanbeol on July 9 by lunar calendar on their march to attack the Sabi Castle of Baekje in alliance with Tangon July 12 by lunar calendar in the7th year reign of King Muyeol(AD 660). At that time, the size of the Silla combat forces might have been similar to that of the combat units which were put when the Baekje Revival Forces attacked the Sabi Castle in February during the 8th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 661). The reason for such a guess is that the military objective(the occupation of Sabi Castle) of Silla troops on July 9(by the lunar calendar) marking the 7th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 660) and that of Silla troops in the spring of July 9(by lunar calendar)marking the 8th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 661); in short, premising that Silla mobilized their combat units into Baekje territory in order to achieve the same military objective(the occupation of Sabi Castle) on July 9(by thelunarcalendar) marking the 7th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 660) and February by lunar calendar in the 8th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 661), it can be concluded that the size of mobilized troops might be almost the same. The second reason for such a guessis that if Silla tried to attack the Sabi Castle in February in the 8th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 661), Silla might intend to put experienced combat units which had entered the Battle of Hwangsanbeo land the attack on Sabi Castle already in July by lunar calendar in the 7th ruling year of King Muyeol. In other words, Silla might try to put the combat units once again which had entered the Battle of Hwangsanbeolon July 9 by the lunar calendar in the 7th ruling year of King Muyeo land attacked the Sabi Castle on July 12 by the lunar calendar, in February in the 8th ruling year of King Muyeol. Like this, when making inferences based on the military objective and experience in war entry, it is estimated that the Silla mobilized combat units which were put into the attack on Sabi Castle in February in the 8th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 661) and in July in the 7th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 660) might be the same. Accordingly, the Silla-mobilized combat units into the Hwangsanbeol battlefield on July 9 in the 7th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 660)might have been Daedang, Sangjujeong, Guidang, Hajujeong, Seodang, Nangdang, and Namcheonjeong, etc. By the way, here is one more dispatched combat unit we have to consider additionally; that is the mobilization of Saseoldang. Silla entered the Battle of Hwangsanbeolon July 9 by lunar calendar in the 7th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 660) and attacked the Sabi Castleon July 9 by lunar calendarin alliance with Tang. Then, Silla might need a castle attacking unit to attach the Sabi Castle. Due to such necessity, Silla troops might definitely be accompanied by a specialized unit for attacking a castle. Silla, at the time of July by lunar calendar in the 7th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 660), was possessed of the specialized units for attacking a castle such as Saseoldang(四設幢:Nodang弩幢, Wunjedang雲梯幢,Chungdang衝幢, and Seoktudang石投幢). Accordingly, Silla troops might be accompanied by Saseoldang(四設幢) in time of the Battle of Hwangsanbeol and putitinto the combatin time of attack on the Sabi Castle. Thus, the number of combat units Silla put into the Hwangsanbeol battlefield on July 9 by the lunar calendar in the 7th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 660) were 8, including ① Daedang(大幢) ② Sangjujeong(上州停) ③ Guidang(貴幢) ④ Hajujeong(下州停) ⑤ Seodang(誓幢) ⑥ Nangdang(郎幢) ⑦ Namcheonjeong(南川停) ⑧ Saseoldag(四設幢:Nodang弩幢, Wunjedang雲梯幢, Chungdang衝幢, Seoktudang石投幢). Meanwhile, this research made an analysis of the personnel records for generals in Silla based on the Chronicles of the Three States in order to clarify the name of the generals who commanded their combat units dispatched into the Hwangsanbeol battlefield. As the result of analysis, this research identified 18 generals, who commanded the combat units including ① Daedang ② Sangjujeong ③ Guidang ④ Hajujeong ⑤ Seodang ⑥ Nangdang ⑦ Namcheonjeong which were put into the Hwangsanbeol battlefield on July 9 by lunar calendar in the 7th ruling year of King Muyeol(AD 660), as follows: In short, there existed four generals belonging to Daedang including Kim Yu-shin, Munwang, Yangdang, and Munyoung, etc. ; the 4generals belonging to Sangjujeong include Kim Pum-il, Munchung, Jinwang, and Kim Heum-dol; the4 generals belonging to Guidang include Kim Heum-chun, Jin-Heum, Cheonjon, and Juk-Ji, etc; the 2 generals belonging to Hajujeong include Uibok, Junshin etc.;the 2 generals belonging to Seodang include Munpum and Jinbok, etc., and the 2 generals belonging to Nangdang include Uikwang, and Jongjeong. In addition, the number of Dang-grade units(100-soldiergrade) which Silla put into the Hwangsanbeol battlefield was 257. The total number of military troops which were put into the Hwangsanbeol battlefield was 34,658, among which the number of combat support troops was 4,500). For reference, the number of the combat troops Baekje put into the Hwangsanbeol battlefield was 5,000. That the number of military unit troops which general Gyebaek commanded was 5,000 means that this unit was one military unit corresponding to 6-jeong grade unit and Seodang-gradeunit. In addition, total numbers of the troops which Baekje mobilized in time of the Silla-Baekje Waron July by the lunar calendar AD 660 were 60,000.
  • 7.

    A Study on the Eight Guards System of Balhae

    Kang, Sung-Bong | 2011, (79) | pp.217~250 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    Balhae(渤海) corresponds to a stretch of the northern part of the Korean Peninsula, the northeast part of China, and the Maritime Province of Russiain modern times. It took on the socioeconomic character based on farming combined with hunting, and fishing. Also, a majority of ruled class was a multiracial country which was composed of malgal tribes(靺鞨族). Thus, the rulers of Balhae tried to establish the military system based on socia land economic structures to secure stable ruling system. Its Eight Guards System, therefore, can be said to have resulted from the social organization based on the economic life of combining farming with hunting which was projected as it was on the military system. A study on the system has important significance in examining the character of the society closely. Chapter 2 reexamined ten and eight guards theories related to the military system. The result showed that Balhae had organized EightGuards(8衛), the military system, by transforming Tang's(唐) guards system besides the elements such as malgal's eight native camps or parts. Chapter 3 analysed the ambassadors dispatched to Tang who secured military officer position from the country in the period of Muwang(武王). Also, it explored the system improved overall in central political machinery and local system in the period of Munwang(文王). The result revealed that the Eight Guards System, as Balhae's military system, was formed in the period. Chapter 4 first divided Balhae's military officer position broadly into the ones of three periods and made a comparative study with Tang's military officer position ranks. Also, it briefly examined relevant historical materials which enabled me to presume the scale of Balhae's military organization. Regarding the supplement of military force it explained mainly the Fifteen Parts(15府) as Balhae's local system by dividing it into three types of military systems. On the other hand, a comparative study with Tang's military system allowed me to presume the role of the Eight Guards System. There sult showed that in Balhae the Left and Right Fierce and Great Guards(左右猛賁衛) kept the royal palace all night, that the Left and Right Bear Guards(左右熊衛) and the Left and Right Big Bear Guards(左右羆衛) fulfilled the duty of defending the capital, and that the Southern and Northern Left and Right Guards(南北左右衛) played the role as royal guards.
  • 8.

    The expansion to northern region and the dispatch of Jindu during the reigns King Taejo in Goryeo Dynasty.

    이정기 | 2011, (79) | pp.251~275 | number of Cited : 5
    Abstract PDF
    In this article, I studied Jindu(鎭頭) that dispatched for the going-north policy of King Taejo and stable performance of the process. It accessed truth of Jindu through analys is about dispatched time, region, character. After establish the Goryeo Dynasty, King Taejo suggested various policy for set up the foundation of a nation. He built a castle for systematical management at new domain, next he moved the people to the new domain and made an effort for stabile settlement. Also King Taejo decided the capital, after defended the capital Gaekyeong(開京) through base of defense Seokyeong(西京). It built a castle at Seokyeong and Anbukbu(安北府), build a castle and install a campon a fringe of the axis. At the same time, he regarded northern region as the last bastion at the war with Hubaekje(後百濟) so he tried for secure territory and the people. The people became material resources and human resources for the expansion to northern region. Jindu took charge of a series of works for the expansion to northern region, that is defense of the military and stable management of the new domain. We can understand feature of Jindu through dispatched time, region, character. The Jindu was intensively sent to defense at between the King Taejo's own reign year of 9 to18. The Balhae(渤海) was destroyed in 926, the King Taejo's own reign 9 year and the Goryeo Dynasty unified Later Three Kingdoms in 935, the King Taejo's own reign 18 year. It is immediately related to goal of expansion to northern region. In other words the going-north policy of King Taejo advanced by coupling device that 1'st royal tour, 2nd build a castle and install a camp,3rd dispatch Jindu. The dispatched of Jindu was limited to south of the Cheongcheon River, it also was apart of stable management of the new domain. There was an army base, not only connected between Gaekyeong and Seokyeong but also expanded into north of the Cheongcheon River. The Jindu was generally dispatched to Wonyoon(元尹), government official Gwangye(官階). They was a powerful clan or their relative, the King Taejo was conferred on them who surrendered or cooperated to the Goryeo Dynasty. The King Taejo ordered for defense of the military and stable management of the new domain to Jindu. As a result, the Jindu was the beginning of the local government official dispatched to Yanggye(兩界) area.
  • 9.

    Construction of the Goryeo Grand Fortress(長城) in the Northern Realm(Bukgye,北界), and the Establishment of Jujin(州鎭) Units

    KyeongJin Yoon | 2011, (79) | pp.277~312 | number of Cited : 9
    Abstract PDF
    In this article, how the Grand Fortress(長城) was created in the Bukgye region of the Goryeo in its early days, what was the background of such foundation, and what regions the fortress actually passed through, will be examined. Also some parts of the known history of certain Jujin(州鎭) regions related to the Grand Fortress, will be rectified as well. At the end of King Hyeonjong's reign, the Goryeo Government established some new Jujin unitsin a concentrated fashion at the border region, in response to the Khitan threat and certain fluctuations that were happening. Also, existing Jujin units were reinforced, and thus a defense line along theYalu River was established. The Grand Fortress was created based upon this defense line in the early days of King Deokjong's reign. It covered the region between areas like Inju(麟州)at the mouth of theYalu River, and Sakju(朔州). In the early days of King Jeongjong(靖宗)'s reign, additional sections were added to the fortressin its eastern end, and as a result the Jujin units which had been established with a distance from the fortress were connected to it as well. The Fortress' new east end was Cheongsae-jin(淸塞鎭). Later, more Jujin units were established between the Bukgye and Donggye regions(the Northern and Eastern Realms) and the Fortress grew even longer. We can see that the Bukgye Grand Fortress was create throughout three different time periods. Yeongsak-jin(寧朔鎭), which was recorded as a region the Fortress passed through, was only added in later periods(追記),and itis highly possible that the Fortress did not pass through areas like Ansu-jin(安水鎭) and Maengju(孟州). They should have been replaced by Yeonju(延州) and Changju(昌州).
  • 10.

    Ilwahn Hong Beom-sik's Sacrificing Suicide and the Dying Instruction

    박걸순 | 2011, (79) | pp.313~340 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    Hong Beom-sik(1871~1910) is the person who was the highest officer as a governor among the suicided people over country's ruination in 1910, as well as who became the ignition of the anti-Japanese struggle as he killed himself as soon as the Korea-Japan Treaty was proclaimed. Not only for this, his sacrificing suicide is the detailed case of the dying instructions to make many people go to the anti-Japanese struggle, so it can be given the special meaning. He was noble birth ofNoron(老論) and passed the state examination following his father and grandfather to succeed the honor of family. After he passed the exam in 1888, he got an appointmentas a governor of Tae-in, Jeonbuk Province in 1907. At that time, army raised for the justice all over the nation, especially in Jeonbuk area. He persuaded Japanese army to suppress them not to kill thoughtlessly so that he could save so many lives. Furthermore he didn't extorted taxes and exerted himself to save his people from bad crop and to do irrigation works. People in Tae-in published an ad to praise his beneficent government at Hwangseong Daily. With this, there are remembrance like many monuments for him in Tae-in and Geum-san where he governed and they are the historical commemoration and there markable evidence about him. He already had decided to kill himself for country before the ruination of country. The face that the date he wrote his will was August 27th, two days before the ruination confirms it. He left many letter of will for his family and hanged himself on ta pine tree in Jojong mountain behind of the government office. Japanese Imperialism tried to cover and distort Hong's sacrificing suicide, but this news was spread instantly to inside and outside of the country and created big sensation. His suicide became not only the ignition of the anti-Japanese movement for the compatriot inside and outside of country, but also the symbolic existence for remembrance to reaffirm their resolve to achieve independence for abroad compatriot society and independence movement group in every national humiliation day. His sacrificing suicide influenced many people as well as his family to make them go to independence movement. Three generations of his brother Hong Yong-sik and the son Hong Myeong-hee with Hong Seung-he as well as grands on HongKi-mun led the racial movement like 3․1 movement and Singanhoe in Chungbuk Province after his sacrificing. It was not only hisfamily who took a lead after his will. During 3.1movement, the people in Chungbuk Province went to participate the national movement praising Hong Beom-sik who sacrificed in the National Humiliation. Furthermore, Kim Ji-Seop, who had kep this will secretly and carried it to Hong Myeong-hee, exiled himself and participated in Uiyeoldan(義烈團) to drop a bomb at Nijubashi Bridge(二重橋); Song Cheol, who had witnessed directly Hong Beom-sik's suicide, exiled swearing revenge and led the independence movement in America. A same governor Jo Yong-ha also was affected by Hong's suicide and he resigned from office to go to the independence movement. In short, as we can see in Hong Beom-sik's case clearly, sacrificing suicide as a noble fight is not just an old-fashioned or passive struggle. Sacrificing suicide deserves to be valued that encouraged national awakening and triggered public revolt and struggle through individual dramatic sacrifice.