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2012, Vol., No.83

  • 1.

    A studyontheprocessofNKPA'sCombatTrainingUsingthe CombatManualfrom theSovietUnionbeforetheKoreanWar

    Sungjin Jang | 2012, (83) | pp.1~33 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    Thepurposeofthispaperistoanalyzehow theSovietFieldManualwas adoptedandreflectedin thecombattrainingmanualofNorth Korean Peoples Army. This combat training was divided into two parts: ‘Military Science'(strategyand operation)and ‘MilitaryTechnique'(tactics).When NKPA wasestablished(1945~1950),‘TheFieldRegulation'wastaken asNKPA'smain manualin theaspectof‘MilitaryScience'which emphasized cooperation and mobility during warfare.Moving on,‘TheInfantry CombatRegulation'which wasincludedinthe‘TheFieldRegulation'waschosenasthestandardmanual forNKPAinfantryintheaspectof‘MilitaryTechnique'.Itispossibletoconfirm thatitwascreatedbasedontheSovietUnion'smanualfrom relateddocuments likeRG242NARA aswell.From this,soldiersofNKPA couldbetrained well and this led to the outbreak ofthe waron the 38th Parallel.As forthe positiveresultsforNorthKorea,Kim IlSunggainedconfidenceonhismilitary powerwhichhadclearsuperiorityoverthatofROK Army.Later,thetraining based on the manualstrengthened NKPA and contributed to success in the earlypartoftheKoreanWar.Then,Kim stressedtheimportanceoffollowing thismanualcontinuouslyandincluded‘TheInfantryCombatRegulation'init. Even though North Korea accepted the truce negotiation later,the process mentionedabovecontinuedtoreflecttheSovietUnion’smanualinthemodern militarytrainingofNPKAtoday.
  • 2.

    A studyontheBackgroundofGPB EstablishmentwithinNKPA -WithaFocusonNK-PRC ConflictduringKoreanWar-

    Lee Sin Jae | 2012, (83) | pp.35~66 | number of Cited : 7
    Abstract PDF
    North Korean People's Army(NKPA) is a party organization installed within the every level of the North Korean military, from Corps to company.North Korea established GeneralPolitics Bureau(GPB),a party organization,within the military on 21stOct,1950.North Korean regime announced thatthe reason forthe establishmentofa party organization within the military was that there was a need to strengthen military principles during the Korean War,when North Korean military was on retreat after entry of the UN forces. However, considering that North Korean leadership atthis time was notable to effectively communicate with otherbranchesofgovernmentandmilitary,whatwasthebackground fortheestablishmentofGPB?Werethereanyotherreason?This study focuses on the background for the establishmentofGPB,with a specialfocuson North Korea-PRC conflictduring thistimeperiod whichhadbeenpreviouslyneglectedinotherstudies. With the establishmentofNorth Korea-China Combined Command and the entry ofChinese People's Volunteer Army(CPVA), Kim IlSung lost operationalcontrolover NKPA as the Supreme Commander.In addition,entryofCPVA weakenedKim'spoliticalinfluenceinNorthKoreanPolitics. The main purpose ofthis study is to providea differentview on the establishmentofGPB: itwasestablishedbyKim IlSungasan effortto check on operational control which was handed over to the CPVA commander. AftertheestablishmentofGPB,themilitaryprinciplesoftheNKPA was strengthened.In addition,Kim continued to emphasize thatNorth Korea mustlead thewarand thatthewarmustbefoughtusing North Korean tactics. Since then, he began to be described as “the Sun" by the pamphlets published by GPB,and his politicalstatus was elevated over higher.Withhiselevatedpoliticalstatus,hewasabletotakeactiononhis politicalenemies,who werethemain supportersofNorth Korea -China Combined Command.He was now able to controlhis relations with the supportersofthecombinedcommand. In sum,Kim was able to check on Chinese influence overthe North Korean military by establishing GPB, a party organization, within the military.In addition,GPB helped Kim gain politicalupper hand within NorthKoreanregime.
  • 3.

    WasItImpossiblefortheKoreanWartoBeCompletedEarlier? -TrialandBreakdownofthePeaceMediation-

    Gye-Dong kim | 2012, (83) | pp.67~104 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    TheKorean Warwhich began on 25June1950continuedformorethan 3years.TheKorean Warbrokeoutrightafterthestartofthecoldwarin theworld,with majorpowersand theUnited Nationsparticipating in the waron theinternationallevel.Theparticipantstateshadvariousviewson thewaraccordingtotheirnationalinterests.Somestatesthoughtthatthey shoulddotheirbesttowin thewarin ordertoshow theirwillandpower totheopponents,whereasotherstatesbelieved thattheyshouldlimitthe warintheKoreanpeninsulanottoexpandtheirinvolvement. Since mostmajorpowers in the world involved in the war,the war becamecruelandcomplicated with thefrontmovingup and down on the peninsula.Before and during the course ofthe war,some statessought the peace mediation.Among others,the British and Indian governments triedtostoptheNorth Korean aggression whilecontactingtheChineseand Sovietgovernments.Althoughthereweresomeprogressinthenegotiations,itfailedbecauseoftheAmericanrejection. Justbefore the Chinese intervention,the British governmentsuggested thebuffer-zoneproposal.TheproposalwastostoptheUN advanceatthe 40th parallel,setting theremainingarea to thefrontierasa buffer-zone. The proposalwas based on the idea that the UN forces would gain favorable position even if the Chinese forces intervened. The US government,however,refusedthisidea.Itwantedtowin thewarwith all the UN forces advancing to the China-Korea border.AtlasttheChinese forcesintervened. Itisdoubtfulwhetherthewarwould end earlierifthepeaceproposa had proceededwithoutdelay.Butin termsofthedelayofthecompletion ofthe warfor3 years and ofthe resultofthe division ofthe Korean peninsula,itwasworthwhiletoreconsiderthepeaceproposaltoend the warearlier.
  • 4.

    A studyontheChangeoftheRoleofU.S.Tactical NuclearWeaponsintheKoreanPeninsulaaccordingto U.S.CognitionofThreatsinNorth-EastAsia

    정경두 | 2012, (83) | pp.105~130 | number of Cited : 9
    Abstract PDF
    Theroleofnuclearweapon in theKorean peninsula had been changed bytheU.Snuclearpolicyfor33yearsfrom 1958to1991.Previousstudies on U.S nuclearpolicy on the Korean peninsula were analysis with U.S hegemony and biased critiqueon theU.S.policy.So they had been not enough the objectivity of purpose of nuclear policy on the Korean peninsula.Thispaperisastudyabouttheroleoftacticalnuclearweapons on the Korean peninsula,focusing on the U.S.cognition ofthreats in North-EastAsiaandsecurityofSouthKorea. We could find the change in the role oftacticalnuclearweapons by analyzingthechangeoftheU.S.nuclearpolicy on theKorean peninsula along with U.S. cognition of threats in North-East Asia. U.S. Tactical nuclearweaponshad served forthemilitary purposewhich supplemented the conventionalforces until1960s,and then therole oftacticalnuclear weaponshad changed totheservepoliticalrolebecauseofthechangeof securitysituationinNorth-EastAsiaafter1970s. In the latterhalfof1950s,U.S.adopted the strategy which focus on nuclearforcesto decreasetheburden ofmilitary budgetin South Korea,and improvethemilitaryforcesand securethesafetyin South-EastAsia. So,relativelytheimportanceofconventionalforceswashalved. This trend had resulted in some changes. While Korea army had decreased two divisions in 1958,U.S.army in Korea was reinforced by pentomic divisions and had deployed tacticalunclearweapons as added militaryforcestoconfronttheNorthKorea-Chinacoalitionforces. Atthattime, tacticalunclear weapons in the Korean peninsula had meaningtowhattohaveeconomicalefficiencybyreplacingtacticalnuclear weaponswithconventionalforces,ratherthanitwascausedbythechange ofthreatsin Korean peninsula.Thisconcepthad been theevidencethat tacticalunclearweaponshad had themilitary roleand could beused in war. In 1970s,U.S.nuclear policy on the Korean peninsula were different from theconceptthattacticalnuclearweaponsreplaceconventionalforces becauseNixon Doctrineand SchlesingerDoctrineallowed nuclearweapon's militaryroletodecrease. Improvementin the relationship between U.S. and China caused the change in Chinese threat.U.S.had promoted nuclearpolicy to decrease tacticalnuclear weapons in South Korea and exclude it's military role,eliminating the threat of China and recognizing the only threat of conventionalforces ofNorth Korea to the Korean peninsula.This led to change oftacticalnuclearweapons'doctrine so thatpossibility ofusing tacticalnuclearweapondecreased. In the middle of1970s,U.S.governmenthad searched forpulling the troopsoutoftheKorean peninsula becausethey had believed thatthere was the equilibrium in military forces between North Korea and South Korea.And then they had recognized thatthey had underestimated the threatofNorth Korea and they had canceled thewithdrawalplan.As a result,U.S.army in South Korea had relocated orstored tacticalnuclear weapons in the rear and decreased the number of war-heads and ground-to-groundmissiles. In a word,theroleofU.S.tacticalnuclearweaponshadbeen changed from militarytopolitical.In thelatterhalfof1950s,U.Shadusedtactical nuclear weapons for military purpose to supplementconventionalforces againstthe coalition forces ofChina and North Korea.After1970s,U.S. had changed itsnuclearpolicyemphasizing“Nofirstuse"forthepolitical role,becausetheyhadexcludedthreatofChinainSouth-EastAsia. Inotherwords,U.Shadbelievedthatonlyoneroundoftacticalnuclea weaponscouldtriggerthegeneralnuclearwarandthisbeliefwasreflected on their nuclear policy.They had controlthreatofaround the Korean peninsulabyimprovingrelationshipbetween U.S.andChinaandeasingof tensionswithSovietUnion.Theyhadusedtacticalnuclearweaponsnotas powerfulweaponsinwarbutasthemethodtocontrolthethreat.
  • 5.

    A ResearchinWarHistoryontheUseofthe AsymmetricForce

    장용운 | 2012, (83) | pp.131~161 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Recently, among the elements of serious threats to Korea such as nuclear,missile,specialforcesetc.,asymmetricforceofNorthKoreamakes seriousthreattothesecurityin korea.In spiteoftheseriousshortagesof food and economic difficulty, North Korea has continued to develope nuclear weapon,missiles and trained strong specialforces.Such North Korea's asymmetricforces have enhanced thecapability oftotalwarand limited militarythreattoSouth Korea.Buttheconceptoftheasymmetric forceswasnotnew.Ithasbeenusedforalongtimeinthewarhistoryof theworld.IfwewanttoprepareforNorth Korea'sasymmetricforces,we shouldmakeeffortsandbepreparedtodealwiththem.Becausethefuture war willbe more multi-sided and more asymmetric, these preparations mustbemadetorespondtothetotalwarandtotheprovocationsinpeace time. In short, these preparations should include military structure,strategyandtactics,weaponsystems.Thus,weshouldbepreparedtodeal withvarioussituations.
  • 6.

    A Review ontheNatureofGoguryo’sThreeFortresses aroundtheImjinRiverBasin

    권순진 | 2012, (83) | pp.163~196 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    Thisisto review thenatureofKoguryo’sthreefortressesin theImjin Riverbasinfrom thetwomilitaryhistoricalperspectives. Firstone was based on the period from the lastquarter ofthe 4th century tomid-6th century when Koguryo engaged in offensiveoperations Horogoroowaslocated alongtheattack routeofBaekje,thusitcontained Baekje’s attack and played a role as an assembly area forthe reserve force.Horogorooand Dangpofortresseswererepaired so thatthefortress becamestrongholdstocontrolsurrounding areasand supply bases.While Eundaerifortresswasdisused. Second one was based on the period from the second halfofthe 6th century to the second halfofthe 7th century when turned to defensive operations and the battles were stalemated. The three fortresses were vulnerabletoattacksbecausetheareastothesouth ofthefortresseswere higherthan thefortresses.Forthisreason,itseemed thatHorogorooand Dang-pofortresseswereused ascommand postsandsupplybasesduring the battles.Itseemed,however,thatEundaerifortress lostits defensive functionandMoodeng-rifortassumedtheroleofdefense.
  • 7.

    A studyontheBenaeFortress(非惱城)Battle – A WarbetweenGungye(弓裔)andYanggil(梁吉)-

    Jeong, seong-kwon | 2012, (83) | pp.197~220 | number of Cited : 9
    Abstract PDF
    Thispaperinvestigatesa warbetween Gungyeand Yanggil.They were powerfulclansattheendoftheUnifiedSillaperiod. When Gungye was born into a royalfamily but due to the power struggle,healmostdied.Hespenthischildhood in theTemple.When he grew up,hewentto Gihwon who wasoneofthepowerfulclansatthe Jukju area.Although Gungye joined with his supporters to Gihwon,he didn’ttreatedthem well.Gungyeletdown andayearlaterheleftGihwon and wenta powerfulYanggilclan in Wonju.From this point,Gungye marched on carrying everything before them. Yanggilbecame a strong supporter. In 895,GungyeenteredMyoungju with 600soldiers.A yearlaterheleft Myoungju with 3,500 soldiers.In Myoungju he called himselfa general. From thistime,GungyeandYanggilgotintotrouble. AfterGungye leftMyoungju,his group became bigger.AtlastYanggil began to attack Gungye from 898.Finally,in 890 Gungye and Yanggil armieswerereadytofightadecisivebattle.Thisbattlewasfoughtatthe Benaefortress. Untilrecently therehavebeen many opinionsaboutthelocation ofthe Benae fortress.Recentresearch shows thatthe Benae fortress is Jukju mountainfortress. Thispaperprovesthespecificlocation oftheBenaefortressbattlefield. Accordingtothehistoricalrecord,theBenaefortressbattlewasfoughtout side ofthe Benae fortress.This paper explains thatthe battelfield is Gisolrithatis8km westoftheBenaefortress This paperalso finds thatthe natives strongly supported the Gungye army.The natives ofJukju had strong relationship with Gungye army. ThispapershowsthatsomeoftheGungyearmyGrandfather’shometown was Jukju.This kind ofblood relationship really worked when Goungye armyfoughtwithYanggilarmy. Notonlythesekindofreason butalsoculturalassetsshow thatGisolri was the Benae fortress battle field.In Gisolrithere is a stone Buddha statue.This stone Buddha statue is related to a folktale aboutGungye. Many scholarsagreethatthefolktalesaboutGungyereflectthehistorical facts. This paper presumes that Gisolristone Buddha statue was built in commemoration ofGungye’svictory in theBenaefortressbattle.Afterthe Benaefortressbattle,GungyecouldcontrolthecentralpartoftheKorean peninsula.
  • 8.

    TheIssueofSoldierRepatriationandtheMilitary DiplomacybetweenJoseonandMingduringtheEarly JoseonPeriod

    KyeoungLok Kim | 2012, (83) | pp.221~258 | number of Cited : 8
    Abstract PDF
    LateGoryeoandearlyJoseon periodwereatimewhen an international tributesystem centered on Yuan wasreplaced by an internationaltribute system centeredon Mingandwith theuncertaintyin thesituation around Lioadung region,therelated parties engaged in fiercemilitary diplomacy. The early Joseon period's military diplomacy was focused on military exchanges and cooperation in order to carry out foreign and military policies by pursuing the diplomatic and military goals of maintaining peacefulrelationship with Ming,military stability in thenorthern frontier andestablishingJoseon'slegitimacyandnationalsecurity. Joseon staged active military diplomacy in order to further national interestand continues tributesystem,which wereinevitableatthetime. Atthattime,Mansan-gun problem,Jurchen problem and othermilitary problemsemergedwiththechangesin internationalsituation.Anextensive Mansan-gunproblemswhichoccurredwhenEmperorYeon’rak. The risk of Joseon-Ming military collision was big, intensifying the captureand ruleofLiaodungbyMing,butin realityitrarelyjeopardized the Joseon-Ming relations.The realmilitary collision in the Joseon-Ming relations was unrealized domestic and foreign situations of the two countries,Byusing diplomacy,thetwocountriessolved theproblem.The military diplomacy between Joseon and Ming was at the heart ofthe disputes.Joseon andMingcooperatemilitarily,repatriaterunawaysoldiers anddriftingsoldiers. Atthattime,theissueofsoldierrepatriation washighly complex and political. In an internationaltribute system centered around Ming, the soldierrepatriations were based upon the premise ofbeomwul(犯越) and wulkyeong(越境).Runaway soldiers were repatriated withoutfail.In this regard Mansan-gun which began during theTaejo period and was atits heightduringtheTaejongperiod,hadtoberepatriatedbutJoseon carried outsuccessfulmilitarydiplomacybymanipulatingthetime,sizeandcause ofthesoldierrepatriations. Keeping an eye on Joseon during the process ofa battle over the ImperialThrone,theMinghadtakenavarietyofmeasurestoeliminatethe diplomatic-military threat. In this process, Joseon made a diplomatic benefit to obtain Gomeong(誥命) from Ming. In legal formality, Ming preventbreakaway from a residentialdistrictand the country,and took firm action againstrunaway soldiers.On this account,Ming recognized thatsoldierrepatriationwasmaindutyofBeongbu(兵部). Joseon dispersed Mansan-gun in allpartsofthecountry and wasnot forthcomingin repatriatingMasan-gun toJoseon madeadiplomaticbenefit to obtain Gomeong(誥命)and theinvestitureofcrown princefrom Ming. Mingdemandpressedfortherepatriation ofJurchen tribes.Respondingto Ming's strong demand, Joseon enforced repatriation. The early Joseon period's concept of soldier repatriation was related to an international tributesystem centered around Ming.Joseon maintained a flexiblesoldier repatriation policy,takingtheinternationalsituation and theJoseon-Ming relationsintoaccount.
  • 9.

    NohsaScholarFaction'sAttemptatMilitaryReforms

    Kim Bong Gon | 2012, (83) | pp.259~286 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    Honam region,uponenteringthe19thcentury,notunliketherestofthe country was faced with serious corruption within the military administration. The degradation of officialdiscipline and the crumbling caste system led to a great number of people gaining immunity from conscription which resultedin increasedburdensupon thepoortopayoff their conscription duties. Pervasive laxity among military administration officialswasconstantlypointedoutbyroyalundercoveragentsofthetime withdemandsforimprovement. With the Imsulinsurrection in 1862,Nohsa scholarfaction proposed a series of military reform measures. They proposed suggest a realistic re-evaluation of the required military force with the household tax regardless ofstatus and bringing up elite troops,lestmilitary strength shouldweaken.Nohsascholarfaction'smilitaryreform measuresledtoKi JeongJin'sinsistenceon across-the-boardmilitaryreformsdirectedagainst theFrench invasion of1866.KiJungJin stressedthatYang-bansaswell ascommonersshouldbeenlistedandarmedwith bow andarrow. Kialso would havetheheadsofhousehold in each villagelead thevillagersand protect their own districts. In order to counter the fast loading short cannonsoftheWest,Kisuggestedcannonsalongwithbowsandarrowsbe producedatthemilitarycampsitein each provinceanddistributedtothe countydepot.Also,Kiwouldhaveeven civilianscarryweaponsandlearn to use them. This would strengthen the military which then would incorporateinterception tacticsusingtopographicknowledgeoftheregion. KiJeong Jin's county scale defense strategy had been the resultofthe close analysis of the volunteer fighters'actions in the Honam regio againsttheJapaneseinvaders. KiJeongJin'sstrategicplansweretolaytheideologicalgroundwork for KiWu Man,whomusteredthemilitaryforcesoftheNaju areatocounter the Japanese in 1896.This tradition would continue through Ko Gwang Sun and KiSam Yeon,during thelastdaysoftheDaehan Empire,who organized volunteerfightersregardlessofclassand status,whilebringing up professionalsoldiers and artillerymen to engage in guerrilla warfare againsttheoccupyingJapaneseforces.