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2013, Vol., No.86

  • 1.

    Baekje Intercepted a Japanese Diplomatic Message

    Seo Young Kyo | 2013, (86) | pp.1~40 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    Sui Dynasty centered world order existed asJapanese scholars insisted,but it was incomplete and didn't last long. Japanese king sent a diplomatic message to the emperor of China. Chinese emperor sent a message in reply to the king of Japan, But Baeje seized the message in the presence of the Chinese envoys. In 601 Japan proposed Goguryeo and Baekje to attack Shilla. In March,602, the Japanese army of 25,000 troops assembled in Kyushu(九州) to attack Shilla. Baekje's 40,000 troops were gathering in Namwon(南原). baekje's first military action began in August, 602. Baekje attacked Shilla at Ahmak fort located in Jiri Mt.Silla army counterattacked and defeated Baekje while the Japanese and Koguryo armies were being delayed. Japan did not keep the promise to attack Shilla, because the commander was sick. Att he time, Goguryeo was facing dramatic changes in their area and delayed dispatching its army for a year. Baekje blamed Koguryo and Japan. Baekje had severed diplomatic relations with Japan.In 607 Baekje proposed Sui Dynasty to attack Goguryeo. Sui emperor welcomed Baekje’s proposal. In 608, Baekje had captured the Japanese ship and diplomatic documents were seized. It undermined the authority of the Sui emperor who believed China was at the center of world. The Chinese emperor tolerated the fact that Japan did not keep its promise, because the emperor needed Japanese forces to attack Koguryo. In 610, Shilla sent an envoy to Japan, and Japanese emperor warmly welcomed the envoy because Japan could not maintain hostile relationship with Shilla when Japan's relationship with Baekje was worsening
  • 2.

    A Study on the Hamgyeongdo Battle during the Russo-Japanese War

    CHO Jae-gon | 2013, (86) | pp.41~70 | number of Cited : 6
    Abstract PDF
    The Russo-Japanese War was the global war which took place for the first time in the twentieth century.The war covered the entire parts of the Korean Peninsular,and north and north eastern regions of China and was the Imperial War that began and ended in the Korean Peninsular. The purpose of this research is to make an in-depth study on the Hamgyeongdo Battle focusing on the concept of the military operations and organizations, and the historical significance of the Russo-Japanese War. The main stage of the Russia-Japan War which started on February 6,1904 was moved to Manchuria, after the Japanese troops crossed the Aprokgang River (Yalu) in May the same year. During the war,Hamgyeongdo Province was the only battle area in the Korean Peninsular. But from the historical perspective, the battle which took place in the area was the ‘forgotten war’ and the ‘last war’ which took place at the frontier area in the land. The Hamgyeongdo Battle was characterized as the land and naval warfare which was intricately waged around the border between the Korea and Russia, and the East Sea. Winning or losing the war was significant for both Russia and Japan. But after the Japanese troops consecutive victories at the battles in Manchurian region and the Vladivostok and Baltic Naval Fleets were defeated in arow,the Russian forces lost the irinitiative. Since July 1905,as the Russia troops deployed its Korean detachment unit in Hamgyeongdo areas and the Japan established the command headquarters in the northern part of Korea,the battles resumed between them Hamgyeongdo Battle was waged in large areas. Except for remote mountainous regions in some Northwestern parts, the main cities and roads were devastated by war. Although the Japanese troops continued to win the battles and gained the overwhelming upper hand, the things were in ups and downs. On September 5 1905, Russia and Japan signed 「Treaty of Portsmouth」 and the two nations agreed to sign a ceasefire treaty in Hamgyeongdo areas, in September 16. However, the withdrawal of the Russia troops was completed on November 30. The war lasted for 21 months causing human lives, leaving physical and mental sufferings and damages in the region
  • 3.

    The Approach between the U.S. and NorthKorea surrounding the Pueblo Incident

    UM JUNGSIK | 2013, (86) | pp.71~92 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    This study used the declassified documents and the process-tracing method to analyzed how Johnson administration's initial reaction and perception toward NorthKorea regarding the Pueblo incident had changed. Johnson administration's initial decision-making on the Pueblo incident had been dominated by the Cold War paradigm.The U.S.gave priority to the possibility of a plot between Soviet and North Korea and the diversion of the U.S. attention away from the Vietnam War. However, North Korea played hardball at closed sessions of the military armistice commissions, emphasizing the relation between the two nations,and propagandizing the outcome oft he Juche idea.Most importantly, the fact that the U.S. Department of State was involved directly in the negotiations resulted in the enhancement of North Korea's position as a nation. Moreover, following the visit of South Korea by Mr.Vance, the U.S. Senvoy, Johnson administration started the research on North Korea, which signaled the changes in the U.S. perception toward North Korea. This showed that the mini-detente in the Korean peninsula in 1970s was the result of the changed perception of the U.S. toward North Korea in the late Johnson administration.
  • 4.

    Republic of Korea Army's Advancement and Military Family History

    Changguk Hong | 2013, (86) | pp.93~121 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Professional Soldiers' wives require abilities in variety of areas where their husbands are not available due to the peculiarities of their job requirements. Living in an isolated environment, worse living conditions,frequent moving, poor housing, lack of support in child education and care, and limited medical service and lack of leisure facilities,with their husbands serving 24 hours as commanders, administrators, and instructors,they have to be experts in maintaining households The improvement of the Republic of Korea Army today owes much to the military families. Few people seem to recognize the sacrifices and sufferings of the military families, who contributed greatly to intangible combat power and to Republic of Korea Army’s advancement into internationally recognized strong army through six decades. However, it is undeniable truth that while there are researches on the Korean army, there are not much researches on the military families. Just like women’s study, the researches on military families have been neglected. Finding the data and source materials on the Republic of Korea Army’s military families will provide the basis for the future researches help making the political decisions on the military. Therefore this study on the Republic of Korea Army’s advancementin history will be divided into the followings; establishmen to fthe ROK(1945~1949) and the development of National Defense Position(1991~present).Through these timeline,data and sources on military families will be analyzed to find changes in them. Through this research, hopefully, correct understanding of military families will be possible and this will contribute to the future studies on the military.
  • 5.

    The Military Policy of the Ancient Roman Empire against the Near East from 31 BC to AD 200

    Youngsik Cho | 2013, (86) | pp.123~155 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    The existing researches on the policy of the ancient Roman empire against the near eastargues that the policy was defensive in nature. ButI would rather emphasize the policy was aggressive and offensive. When Roman emperors started the war with hostile countries near them, they mobilized their own forces stationed nearby as well as allied forces from far away country to stage the all-out war.They would not tolerate the failure in the war,but enhanced their pride through maintaining the hegemony by winning in the war. In thisrespect, they were always aggressive and offensive to win the war.Though theJulio-Claudian and Flavian dynasty had sustained intermittently peaceful period with the hostile neighboring countries,it was just at emporary period. The Roman imperial wars with statesin near east were fought in large areas than any othe rwars the Romans fought. Roman emperors tried to keep the strong boundaries tightly controlled by the central government. Since the latter part of the second century,the system of client-kingdom which served as buffer states to stop the Parthian Empire disappeared. the people in those areas were subject to the direct control of Rome. This study shows the general tendency reflected in the individual incidents and war sin the near east during the Julio-Claudian and Flavian dynasty before the third century. As the individual historical incidents occurred under the different situations and backgrounds, the military policy adopted by the Roman emperors were diverse. The diverse historical realities at the times of the succession of each emperor played a key role in the policy making processes of the emperor. Before the third century, with some differences in each emperor,there was consistency in Roman empire's near east policy. Roman empire, per se, maintained expansion of the empire based on keeping hegemony.
  • 6.

    UnitedStatesArmyReform intheearly20thCentury: StalemateandRegressionPeriod(1904-1909)

    In Hyo Seol | 2013, (86) | pp.157~197 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    United States had had unique tradition of supporting local volunteer militia and avoiding large scale standing army.‘The Anti-Military Tradition’had prevailed since colonial time till the early 20th century. After experiencing the record increase in economic power and population, United States had changed in large scale in all aspects, and it finally turned from ‘the isolation of the agricultural republic’ to become‘ an empire true to the name’ especially after the advent of Mckinley administration and Spanish American War. United States Army Reform became possible when the new political groups who recognized the new status of their country cooperated with the reform minded officer corps having been raised after the Civil War. Although the reform between 1899 and 1903 had accomplished a set of institutional changes which had been impossible before for almost 100years, it was the results of a series of heavy compromises with opposing groups, so it had many limits and problems influencing the following implementation period.The period from 1904 to 1909 was recorded as a period of‘stalemate and regression’. First of all the reform had itsown vulnerabilityandlimitation resulting from much compromises.Second,the reform group was not fully formed enough to support the implementation of the reform. Finally and most importantly, the opposition against the reform was consistently high because the long tradition still persisted. Under these circumstances, reform was stagnantand regressed in all areas including there gulararmy and general staffr eform, and the national guard reform. Consequently, the stalemate and regression period of US Army Reform in the early 20th century shows well the difficulties of implementation of reform especially when the strong tradition against reform exists in one society.
  • 7.

    Why Did the Japanese Army Embrace Short-Term Decisive Warfare and Close Combat Assault? : How the Modern Japanese Army Recognized and Coped with the WWⅠ

    Hosub Shim | 2013, (86) | pp.199~220 | number of Cited : 5
    Abstract PDF
    As the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937~1945) and the Pacific War (1941~1945)unexpectedly developed into protracted wars of attrition, Japan was eventually defeated in the Pacific theater of the WWII. Another factor in Japan's downfall was the Japanese Army's warfighting style, which had not changed from the Russo-Japanese War. A typical combat in the Pacific War saw Japanese soldiers charging into the cross fire of the enemy machineguns until their annihilation, and that became an object of awe and caricature at the same time. This paper discusses how the Japanese Army recognized and coped with the aspect of a protracted war of attrition like the WWI and the typical WWI war fighting style that put firepower at its center.This then tries to understand the behavior of the Japanese Army that caused its eventual demise in 1945. The Japanese Army recognized the need to prepare itself for a protracted war of attrition. Several factors including Japan's limited national capacity and the confrontation among the leading members of the army, however, led the Japanese Army to move away from such a preparation and toward short-term decisive warfare. Doing so,Japan would avoid being drawn into aprotracted war of attrition.To that endeavor, the Japanese Army studied siege-and-annihilate operation in order to achieve short-term decisive warfare. Given Japan's strategic environment such as her national strength and her potential enemies,the Japanese Army arguably made a reasonable decision in embracing short-term decisive warfare.The WWI, however, had already shown the difficulty of achieving short-term decisive warfare. A strategy focusing only on short-term decisive warfare was bound to be limited in its effectiveness. After the WWI, the Japanese Army also tried “modernization”.namely by introducing a new weapons system.It also employed Sokaisentou at the level of squad unit in order to minimize the damage from enemy firepower. Because ofthe lack ofthe budget, however, the “modernization” of the army failed. Thea rmy also abandoned Sokaisentou in favor of close combat assault tha temphasized will power over the actual firepower. It seems that the logic reflected the reality facing the army atthe time.As material strength became unattainable, the army had torely on intangible strengths such as will power. From the perspective of the Japanese Army, the WWI was an opportunity to join the Western imperial powers by recognizing and coping with new patterns of warfare and war fighting style.The Japanese Army, however,failed to keep up with the times. Rather, it chose to avoid facing this new situation or to take adetour,thereby failing to participate in the new era.
  • 8.

    Preventive Attack and Offense-Defense Theory: A Study on the Role of Military Strategy and Technology

    Park,Jun-hyuk | 2013, (86) | pp.221~265 | number of Cited : 6
    Abstract PDF
    Most theories of war have paid too much attention to preventive attack cases between major powers, but paid too little attention to ones between major and minor powers and ones between minor powers.Taking this problem into account, the purpose of this paper is to offer a better theory,a complementary theory, than other theories of war, such as power transition theory and the existing version of offense-defense theory, in order to explain not only the probabilities of victory and deterrence related to preventive attack cases between great powers and minor powers but ones between minor powers. This paper argues that offense-defense theory of military strategy and technology is a better theory to explain effectively than the probabilities of victory and deterrence by preventive attack. In particular, this revised version of offense-defense theory suggested in this paper provides military strategy as another important factor because understanding offensive and defensive action and probabilities of victory and deterrence between opponents is not possible by looking only at offensive or defensive military technology, that is, the offensive or defensive character of particular weapons systems; it should be comprehensively analyzed by taking into account the combination of military strategy and military technology. As a new variable supplementing the existing version of offense-defense theory, military strategy is important especially in a weaker target state's defense because an effective defensive strategy can offset the target state's weaker defensive capability, which has inferior military technologies,compared to those of a stronger potential attacking state; it increases the probabilities of deterrence of preventive attack. On the other hand, an effective offensive strategy can increase a potential attacking state's ability to successfully executea preventive attack on a target state, even though it lacks advanced offensive military technologies; it increases the probabilities of preventive attack, including its possibilities of victory.
  • 9.

    The Evolution of Precision Guided Munitions from 1918 to 2010

    Moon Jangnyeol | Moon Kwon | 2013, (86) | pp.267~298 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This paper reviews the history of development of precision guided munitions(PGMs) since the end of the World WarI.We classify the PGMs into four categories; guided bombs,cruisemissiles, ballisticmissiles, and cannon-launched guided projectiles. For each category, the precision, the guidance system, the destruction power,and unit price are reviewed, with the factors of analysis being appropriately quantified. The review primarily focuses on the precision and the guidance mechanism of the PGMs which comprises their essential and defining characteristics.There view covers the time period from 1918 to 2010 and analyzes the PGMs mainly developed by the United States. Precision is estimated by the circular error probable(CEP) and the destructiveness by the weight or the yield of the explosive payload. The unit prices are presented through a conversion into current values. The overall trends are identified as following: First,the PGMs used solely the conventional explosives in the initial development stage but always tended to be combined with the nuclear warhead in the later stages. Second, the improvement in the precision was accelerated by immediately adopting the state-of-the-art technologies in such areas as mechanical,electronic, communication, and optical engineering. Third, the unit prices of the PGMs show a general decrease except for the ballistic missiles. Fourth,the destructive power of PGMs has been reinforced as the precision has improved, which means a great increase of the operational efficiency of the weapons. Fifth, the cruise missiles underwent a stalemate of development in 1960s overweighed by the strategic importance of the ballistic missiles but have been regaining the momentum as the modernization of the new operational concepts and technologies develop,especially in the post-Cold Warer era.