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2013, Vol., No.87

  • 1.

    President Truman's Direction of the Korean War: Avoiding a Third World War

    Nam Gyun Kim | 2013, (87) | pp.1~24 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    How can we evaluate the presidency of Harry S. Truman during the Korean War? President Truman decided to intervene in the Korean War immediately after receiving reports about the outbreak of war on the peninsula. In his eyes, the invasion launched by North Korea was not an isolated event but a part of the Communists' grand scheme to conquer the world. It was his belief that inability on his part to sever the spread of Communism at its incipient stages on the Korean peninsula would lead to worldwide catastrophe, possibly another world war much akin to the second. Thanks to his prompt decision, not only was the Republic of Korea saved from being absorbed into the Communist block, but a probable war in Europe was aborted. In addition, the United States was able to strengthen its military during the war. The American defense budget grew to 500 billion dollars during the Korean War and has steadily increased since. However, the Korean War did not end as readily as President Truman had hoped. When the United States forces unexpectedly faced massive military forces of the Communist China, General Douglas MacArthur insisted that the United States bomb China's northern territories with conventional weapons and even nuclear bombs, if necessary. Truman was appalled and opposed to MacArthur's suggestion, which eventually led to MacAthur's removal from office. The Korean War dragged on, diminishing Truman's political career with it. He was unable, even, to initiate his plans to run for the top office during the 1952 election. In the short term, Truman seemed an unsuccessful president due to his mismanagement of the Korean War. Conclusively, however, he should be reevaluated on the grounds of two crucial decisions he made during the war; to intervene in the early stages of the war and not to expand the war into the Chinese territories after the Chinese Communists intervened. These two decisions allowed the world to avoid another world war, which was on the verge of breaking out, largely thanks to Truman's prudent decisions.
  • 2.

    Organization and Activities of the Student Volunteer Force at Incheon during the Korean War

    Kyengho Son | 2013, (87) | pp.25~51 | number of Cited : 5
    Abstract PDF
    This paper attempts to explore the reality of Incheon Student Volunteer Force (ISVF) in terms of its organization and activities during the Korean War. The unit was established under the initiative of senior students of Incheon Student Volunteer Force which had been supported by South Korean government until the outbreak of the war. Contrary to common knowledge, the ISVF was the first student volunteer force that was created on June 26, 1950. Unlike other student volunteer forces, the ISVF played a great role in maintaining security at the initial phase of the war. Even, the students asked Korea National Police that had withdrawn from Incheon to defend the city, and they distributed food, and guarded major municipal governmental buildings. Since the recovery of Incheon, the students reorganized their unit and expanded it to include more students around Incheon. Due to their impressive activities at the initial phase of the war, ISVF could gain a lot of memberships. At this time, the ISVF was under the control of a detachment of the Ministry of National Defense following the policy of the South Korean government. The ISVF was suddenly ordered to move to a southern province due to Chinese intervention in late 1950. Nearly 3,000 students made their ways to the south without proper supports from the ROK government. Most students faced ordeals and hardships while they were moving toward the south. Eventually, students began their new lives as marines and army soldiers after taking military training. The ISVF and its students showed “passion” of people that was mentioned by Clausewitz. The students sacrificed themselves to save their country without hesitation. At the same time, they demonstrated strong fraternity by caring each other, which encouraged individuals to survive the war.
  • 3.

    UN Member Nations' Support during the Korean War : Emphasis on Supply Support

    Yang Yong-Jo | 2013, (87) | pp.53~86 | number of Cited : 7
    Abstract PDF
    During and after the Korean war, responding to the UN resolution and request, many countries participated in supporting supplies to Korea. Burma (Myanmar), Venezuela, Israel, Iceland, Ecuador, Japan, Jamaica, China (Taiwan), Cuba, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Pakistan, and Hungary provided supplies through CRIK right after the outbreak of the war until 1951. Thereafter, four countries; Argentina, Iran, Austria, and Uruguay joined in supplying materiel and the number of nations helping CRIK increased to nineteen. Meanwhile, countries participated in supporting through UNKRA increased to 20 from the very beginning of the Korean War up to the last day of 1953. Through CRIK, 13 countries were added: Guatemala, Dominica, Lebanon, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Switzerland, Egypt, Indonesia, Honduras, El Salvador, Chile, and Panama. 21 nations which provided either the ground troops or medical units are not included. In the same manner, four additional countries were confirmed as having participated in rescue efforts. Germany (West), Haiti, and Peru were three nations that offered supports under ERP's authorization excluding nations from the CRIK and UNKRA statistics. The diagram presented above distinguishes the names of supporting countries, organizations, years, supplies and amounts. Brazil for instance promised to transport $2.7 million worth of materials, according to UN's global request. However, it failed to support due to domestic issues. In case of Bolivia, the UN disinclined to acquiesce the dispatching of 30 professional officers, and no supplemental offers were confirmed on either UN almanac or other data. Nicaragua proposed offering raw rice and liquors, yet was not accepted due to transportation problem. Certain countries that demonstrated its intention to aid in accordance with international customs would still be significant. Countries like Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and Iraq additionally verified data related to the United Nations' support plans and also officially confirmed the materials through their embassy's. As a result, all four countries had stated approval of the UN's supporting resolution. Moreover, there was an accusation that these countries were persuaded by the United States, Great Britain, and Canada to provide aid, but that was not verified. As mentioned above, a complete number of countries that participated in the Korean War through United Nations was 60; 16 war-participants, 5 medical backup, and 39 material supporting countries. This number represents that 63 percent of all nations actively responded, since there were 93 independent countries and 60 UN members at that time. In particular, countries such as Hungary, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Switzerland, West Germany, Israel, Japan, Austria, and Vietnam that were not the members of United Nations also joined to give a helping hand to maintain peace and provide relief activities in the rehabilitation efforts in Korea.
  • 4.

    A Study on the Turkish Participation in the Korean War: Focusing on the Motivation behind the Turkish Participation and the Battle of Kunuri

    Kim, Jin-woo | 2013, (87) | pp.87~128 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    Even though Turkey sent a brigade to the Korean War and suffered the third highest number of casualty during the war, the Turkish participation in the Korean War has not received its due recognition so far. The main purpose of this article is to study the Turkish participation with a focus on the motivation behind the Turkish participation and the first battle that the Turkish troop faced- the Battle of Kunuri. This article gives an overview of the Turkish participation in the Korean War and introduces why this topic was chosen, what methodology has been employed for this study, and why this study is significant. The first part of the main article rejects the previous notion that Turkey sent over its troops on ideological and humanitarian grounds. A careful study of the international and domestic circumstance of Turkey at the outset of the Korean War shows that Turkish decision to participate in the Korean War stemmed from the desire to facilitate its bid for a NATO membership. The second part of the article reevaluates the Turkish role at the Battle of Kunuri based on a comparative analysis from Korean, American, and Turkish sources. It argues that their role has been traditionally misconstrued or underemphasized and that we need to rectify this situation by highlighting their contribution to this battle. The conclusion of this article summarizes the main points of this study and then suggests further study on this subject in the future.
  • 5.

    A Study on Korea Military Academy Cadets' Combat Experience during the Early Stage of the Korean War

    Jongnam Na | 2013, (87) | pp.129~169 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Korea Military Academy(KMA), opened in May 1946, was the majorinstitution that educated leaders of the ROK Army in its early days. At thevery first day of the Korean War in June 1950, however, ROK Army Chiefof Staff ordered to send cadets who were studying at KMA to the front linein order to delay North Korean troops advance toward Seoul. With thiscontroversial decision, some 530 cadets were sent to the front line as anindividual soldier. Although they fought hard and were able to delayenemy's attack at several places even including at their own campus atTaerung, KMA cadets had to retreat to the south of the Han River with thecollapse of ROK Army in June 28th. And after one more bloody battleagainst North Korean troops in early July, KMA cadets moved to Daejeonwhere the members of the senior class were commissioned. While fightingagainst the enemy as an individual soldier for more than ten days, some200 cadets were killed and missed in action. This paper also introduces a guerilla force that ran by some cadets. Right after the Taerung Battle in June 28th, thirteen cadets who refused toretreat decided to form aguerilla force around the Bul-am Mountain nearthe KMA, and resisted to the enemy furiously for almost three months untilall members were killed in action. By analogizing KMA cadets' battles during the first ten days of theKorean War, this paper argues that this story should be a symbolicfoundation of KMA's current educational values. This paper tries to findhow this recently known stories has been adopted as apart of the official history of the Korean War. Also this paper suggests to learn some preciouslessons from this unknown case: whether Army Chief of Staff's decision tosend KMA cadets to the front line was inevitable or not; why theSuperintendent of KMA was hesitate to move cadets to a safer place early;and so on. And, finally, this paper argues that this tragic history shouldnot be repeated in the future and we should prepare for that.
  • 6.

    Special Structure of the Ancient Jinbup and the Owiejinbup

    김동경 | 2013, (87) | pp.171~211 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    Jinbup is a military formation, but it reflected the society at that time. The Gugunpaljin showed military aspects for expansions of territory and agricultural systems. The Akgijin was developed to build the special forces from the Gugunpaljin. Later, principles of the Akgijin applied to the Paljin (8 unit formation) and the Yukwhajin (6 unit flower-shaped formation), but they were developed differently with each other as the society required. The five important key principles continued to remain with the developed Jinbups to maintain the structures and systems of the society. Among the important things in the 5 principle were philosophic ideas that influenced all members of society to do their duty to maintain their society. At that time of social disorder, its values didn't work. Therefore, it required each members to follow the king’s authority. So all the philosophers and scholars at the time of the civil wars did their best to unify the whole nation under the unified philosophy. Therefore the 5 fundamental principles from Han Dynasty were adopted as a unified idea at that time. The 5 elements have pragmatic values in military operations. With 5 colors and 5 flags of the 5 elements, soldiers could easily follow the commender’s orders and the commander could command his troops effectively. These were possible by the change of formations. The most important part in the 5 principles of military operations is that it allows each soldier in the formation to do his duty and obey the commander’s order, so the battle could proceed systematically as the commander wished.
  • 7.

    ConfrontationlineandtheBattleoftheThreeKingdoms secondhalfofthe5thcentury

    Kang, Min-Sik | 2013, (87) | pp.213~240 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    Three Kingdoms boundaries in the second half of the 5th century could be confirmed through the analysis of the names of the towns and regions, and the aspects of the war among the three Kingdoms at the end of the 5th century. Goguryeo attacked Silla continuously, but Silla managed to expand its territory in the second half of the 5th century. In 481, Goguryeo attacked Silla to save Baekje. Goguryeo army's axis of attack extended to Chungju, where Goguryeo built a monument. By this, the date of the monument could be traced. The Mosan Fort Battle was fought in 484. The battle site is estimated to be at Gomosung (姑母城) in Mungyeong, not at the Daemosansung (大母山城) in Jincheon. Goguryo army based in Chungju pressed Silla through Gyeripryeong pass (雞立嶺), but It failed because Baekje supported Silla. In 489, Koguryo army again attacked northern boundary of Gwahyun (戈峴) and Hosansug (狐山城) and occupied Sobaeksanmaek (小白山脈) mountain range and hold the territory until the 6th century. Silla advanced to Cheongju area after the victory at Salsu field (薩水之原) in 494. ​​Baekje's boundary reached Cheongju and the west of it. Silla established a fortified base area from which it could immediately advance north in short period of time whenever it wanted to. Baeje fortified its fortresses to prepare against the possible threat by Silla. Through seven battles at the end of the 5th century, the three kingdoms could form their boundaries at Chongju and along the Sobaek mountain range. At Cheongju area, Baekje and Silla formed allies forces, Silla hold Chungju area exclusively. At Usansung (牛山城) battle, Baekje failed to send supporting troops due to the geographic difficulties. After this, there developed schism in the alliance of Silla and Baeje. In the mid-6th century, Silla could maintain the upper hand when the war of the three kingdoms resumed.
  • 8.

    A Study on Admiral Yi Sun-sin's Letter-divination Based on the Analysis of the Nanjung Ilgi (War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun-sin)

    Park, Jong-Pyung | 2013, (87) | pp.241~274 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    We can find something interesting in the Nanjung Ilgi, the war diary, written by Admiral Yi Sun-sin during the Imjin Waeran. Those are related to his divination, which might have made many readers feel embarrassed, as Admiral Yi has long been regarded as a very reasonable war hero, or even a war god. During his time, however, not only the noble class called "Yangban" but also kings engaged in divination. At that time, divination was a usual practice conducted by both the government and the people. The government used divination whenever it had to make a decision on important national affairs while the people tried to predict personal affairs to prepare for the future. Yi Sun-sin, a member of the Yangban class, was not different from other Yangbans of his time. Therefore, it may not be reasonable to see his divination as just a superstitious or queer practice from the angle of the present day. So far, there has been no study on Admiral Yi's letter-divination, the record of which are found in the Nanjung-Ilgi. This is because there are almost no records of letter-divination left in various historical documents while specific texts on that have not been known well. Recently, some scholars have begun to argue that Yi Sun-sin's letter-divination was the same as Yut divination described in the Kyungdo Japji authored by Yoo Deuk-gong. However, there is more than 200 years' difference between letter-divination used during Admiral Yi's time and Yut divination. Furthermore, there was nothing like Yut divination at Admiral Yi's time, and the descriptions of Yut divination in the Kyungdo Japji is very different form those of letter-divination in the Nanjung Ilgi. All in all, we may well conclude that letter-divination preceeded Yut divination and that the former was popularized to changed into the latter in the end. This argument can be proved by the fact that not only Kongmyungchuck divination recently discovered but also Sogang letter-divination and Yuksipsaguesangrye originated directly from letter-divination, independently of Yut divination. The reason of Admiral Yi's conducting letter-divination was somewhat different from that of other Yangbans. Unlike most other Yangbans, he used letter-divination for the purpose of caring for the wellbeing and safety of his nation and people rather than his family. Based on his strong sense of calling and responsibility for guarding the nation, Admiral Yi conducted divination as a sacred ritual for preparing for national difficulties. He used divination as a tool for a Senbi (the classical scholar) training himself, a commander in charge of the lives of his followers, and a soldier defending his home country. As a result, his divination was correct as much as the endowed fortunetellers'.
  • 9.

    The Selection of the Battle Site by Shinlip (申砬) and the Tangeumdae (彈琴臺) Battle

    Yi Sanghun | 2013, (87) | pp.275~302 | number of Cited : 7
    Abstract PDF
    The Japanese Invasion broke out in 1592. General Sinlip prepared the defense formation with the river in the rear at Tangeumdae in Chungju. His force was defeated by the Japanese force and he was recognized as a failed General. Why did Shinlip select Tangeumdae of Chungju as the battle ground? It was selected because of the geographical features and the weather. Tangeumdae allowed only one avenue of approach by the Japanese army (倭軍). And Japanese musket (鳥銃) was inefficient because of the wind. Shinlip chose tangeumdae which cavalry troops could effectively. It is concluded that Sinlip made the best selection of the battle site. Probably, the leadership of Sinlip must be reappraised although he was defeated at the battle.
  • 10.

    U.S. Psychological Warfare against the Japanese Homeland and Their Reactions during the Pacific War of 1941-45

    Jang, Hoi-Sik | 2013, (87) | pp.303~336 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The purpose of this study is to further our understanding the conduct of American psychological warfare against the Japanese homeland and their reactions during the Pacific War in order to induce demoralization among Japanese people and thus hasten Japan's defeat. Two policies, as a 'devide and rule' tactic, were central to American psywar operations: to tell the truth and to refrain from criticizing Japanese emperor Hirohito and ordinary Japanese. The strategy of truth was designed primarily to establish and maintain the credibility of information disseminated by Americans. It enabled propagandists to establish trust between themselves and the Japanese people they hoped to influence. It dictated that psywarriors induce despair within the enemy's ranks by distributing accurate information. The decision not to criticize the Japanese emperor was astute. Rather than blaming the emperor for the devastating results of the war, which would have alienated the target audience, American propaganda portrayed Hirohito and ordinary Japanese as an unwitting victim of the militarists who controlled Japan and were always criticized by American psywarriors. Japanese authorities made a considerable effort to prevent the effectiveness of American psychological warfare. The Japanese reactions to American propaganda were that the early leaflet efforts were unsuccessful, partly because they were poorly adapted to the target. As the war situation worsened and quality of leaflets improved, however, they met acceptance, especially from the early summer 1945 on. What has to be noted is that the leaflet disseminated on the homeland saying that the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Declaration for surrender, influenced Hirohito's decision to issue an Imperial Rescript ending the war.