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2013, Vol., No.89

  • 1.

    Establishment and Political Changes of Reconstructed Baekje: Focused on Boksin‘s Leading a Political Situation and King Pung's Responding to Him

    Kim Byung Nam | 2013, (89) | pp.1~32 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    The reconstruction forces of Baekje asked Pung-Jang to return to the homeland as the pivot for securing Baekje dynasty’s legitimacy. Pung-Jang left Wae (Japan) in September 661, and arrived in Baekje in December. During that time, however, there was some political changes within the reconstruction forces--Boksin eliminated Dochim. Thus, he return seemed in vain. His succession to the throne was threatened because of the political upheaval. He managed to compromise with Boksin, and succeeded the throne in May 662, but he remained as a nominal king without real power. However, Boksin, though he seized the power, was embroiled in the political chaos. Baekje lost most key military bases by Shilla-Tang Combined Forces such as Jira-fortress, Yun-fortress, Deasan-stockade, Sajeong-stockade, and Jinhyeong-fortress in July 662 and Neasaji-fortress as well in August. At this, Boksin sought to settle the political disturbance by the capital to Pi-fortress (Gimje) in December 662. In February 663, however, he lost the key bases in the south such as Geoyeol-fortress, Geomul-fortress, Sapyeong, and also Deokan-fortress, one of the Five-Bangs. He was forced to retreat to Juryu-fortress(Buan) as the new capital was threatened. As the political maneuver to move the capital city to Pi Fortress failed, Boksin power was weakened. Taking the opportunity, King Pung began involving in the military affairs and strengthened his political power to the extent to raise a formal issue of ‘Boksin’s sin’. Finally, he could remove Boksin in June 663. In the end, the discord between King Pung and Boksin come to an end by a political revolt. But it was not a peaceful period to be engaged in the internecine struggles. King Pung managed to restore his legitimacy as king, but he didn't have enough time to fight against the Shilla-Tang Combined Forces.
  • 2.

    The Southern regions' Resettlements on the Islands(海島入保) in Resistance of the Mongol Invasion forces

    KyeongJin Yoon | 2013, (89) | pp.33~74 | number of Cited : 8
    Abstract PDF
    Examined in this article are the resettlements on several Islands in the South sea, which were necessitated by the invading Mongol forces. The local governing and military operations during the Goryeo dynasty were traditionally overseen by the local commanders (界首官), and so were the 'resident resettlements.' Some units of the primary army were positioned on the islands so that they could preserve their operational capabilities, When it was necessary, they landed on the main land and fought the Mongol forces. Some of the forces occupied mountain fortresses in order to defend crucial inland bases. Nam-gyeong(南京) and the Gwangju-mok(廣州牧) units of the Yang'gwang-do(楊廣道) province moved to the Gang'hwa-do island, and the Chungju-mok(忠州牧) unit entered the Daebu-do(大府島) island which was under the jurisdiction of A-ju(牙州). In case of Chungju-mok(淸州牧), the units in several areas entered adjacent islands, and some of them entered Chungju Sanseong fortress (忠州山城) and Gongsan-seong(公山城) fortresses as well. In the Jeolla-do(全羅道) province, the Jeonju-mok(全州牧) unit entered both Jo-do(槽島, Ji-do[智島]) and Ab'hae-do (押海島) islands and engaged in maritime defense, while the Naju-mok(羅州牧) unit entered Jin-do(珍島) island to form a defense base. Areas in the Jeolla-do province also entered Ib'am Sanseong fortress (笠巖山城) and Geumseong Sanseong fortress(錦城山城). In Gyeongsang-do(慶尙道) province the Jinju-mok(晉州牧) unit entered the Nam'hae-do(南海島) island, but was not able to enter Dong-gyeong(東京) because of the officials there would not let them into the island.
  • 3.

    Operation Status of Samgunmun(三軍門) in the first half of the 19th Century

    Yi Gwang woo | 2013, (89) | pp.75~113 | number of Cited : 5
    Abstract PDF
    This study examined the operation status of Samgunmun in the first half of the 19th century. It is to explore the background of the operation status of Hunryeondogam, Keumwiyoung and Yeoyoungcheong that formed the foundation of central military base since 18th century, to understand the inability of the Joseon government to defend against the foreign invasions. The 1st half of 19th century was the period when the country was in turmoil studded with the financial and political problems. Several public offices were severely incapable of managing the national finance due to corruption of the officials and inefficiency of tax collection system, and were barely limping along. It was also same with Samgunmun that had independent finance and budget. First of all, Hunryeondogam was the core military base of the central military system, and the wage payment had emerged as a major problem particularly at Hunryeondogam during this period. While by borrowing budget from other public offices and exchanged it with grains or by coinage, they tried to manage the finance, but they couldn't solve the fundamental problems. In the end, the wage had been left as a chronic problem throughout the 19th century. The organization of the foot soldiers, which formed the foundation of Hunryeondogam forces, was also a problem. Since actions should be taken to increase the military fund when the public services and various sundry services by the soldiers had increased in the first half of the 19th century, the foot soldiers organized in the rank were inevitably diverted to public areas due to poor financial status. Since routine missions for the defense of the capital city and palace could be served by a small number of foot soldiers, many of them were diverted to other areas of service. Such diversion had continued throughout the 1st half of the 19th century. While it wasn't a big problem during the peace time, it became a critical issue when those soldiers joined and integrated into a regular force in the event of emergency. In the mean time, the officials in charge had conducted a series of policies, recognizing that they are essential forces to keep the main function of Hunryeondogam. Such policy actions include the increase in military forces in small scale, financial support from other public offices and enforcement of examination system for the military officers. While they were not groundbreaking measures, they were noticeable compared to the other public military offices that did not take any measures even when the military preparedness was disoriented. We can see clearly that the responsible officials at that time recognized Hunryeondogam as the minimal institution for maintaining their military force. On the other hand, Hyanggun(veterans), serving in turns, formed Keumwiyoung and Yeoyoungcheong, different from Hunryeondogam. Foot soldiers were allocated to these veterans. If serving in turns stopped, calico paid by foot soldiers and that paid by veterans could be utilized as surplus finance. Accordingly, persons in authority tried to fill up the financial deficit with textiles which was paid as a kind of tax instead of military service, which became a routine while financial aggravation continued. As such, surplus finance generated by this system had been used for various purposes, it was used as a means of finance of Hojo in particular. Due to this, Keumwiyoung and Yeoyoungcheong actually served as financial public office that supplemented the finance of Hojo while leaving standing army during normal times at the minimum level. That is, the deterioration of national economy resulted in the lack of budget at Hojo and persons in authority made Keumwiyoung and Yeoyoungcheong military bases into financial public offices to supplement this. Military mission of the two weakened military bases was handed over to Hunryeondogam, which caused the closure of Hunryeondogam which didn't have enough finance. These served as a vicious circle in many areas, accumulating several problems in the first half of the 19th century, so that the central military institution remained unavoidably helpless in the defense of the nation when the foreign powers invaded Korea in the second half of 19th century.
  • 4.

    Reformation of the military judical system after the Gabo Reform : The Disciplinary Provisions for the Army and the Legal Code for the Army

    Kim, Hye-young | 2013, (89) | pp.115~160 | number of Cited : 6
    Abstract PDF
    Military reforms during the Gabo Reform were continued even after the founding of the Korean Empire in 1897, with a goal of realizing the slogan “Rich Country, Strong Military (puguk kangbyŏng)” and strengthening the imperial power. The reorganized military consisted of the palace guards (ch’inwidae) and the imperial guards (siwidae) in the capital as well as the regional forces (chinwidae) and the local forces (chibangdae) in the provinces. The military was reorganized and expanded in this manner, and the Chosŏn government sought to manage and regulate it by modifying military laws and regulations. As a result, the government proclaimed the Disciplinary Provisions for the Army (Yukkun jingbŏllyŏng) on January 24th, 1896 (Edict No. 11) and the Legal Code for the Army (Yukkun pŏmnyul) on September 14th, 1900 (Ordinance No. 4). The Disciplinary Provisions was proclaimed in the following context of the dissolution of local military organizations following the reforms in local administration as well as the nationwide military reorganization. Through the Disciplinary Provisions, the Chosŏn government sought to prevent the dissolved local forces from joining the Resistance (ŭibyŏng) and to encourage them into joining the newly organized military organization. The Disciplinary Provisions was actively modeled after its counterpart in Japan (1881), but it aimed for a tighter control over the armed forces as one can see in a wider discretionary power of the disciplinary authority and the existence of physical punishments. After the founding of the Korean Empire, the military came to be directly controlled by the emperor, and it was reorganized and expanded further to reflect this new status. These changes were accompanied by an increasing number of soldiers committing crimes, and it became hard to control such crimes by the Disciplinary Provisions alone. Therefore, the imperial government proclaimed the Legal Code for the Army, which was basically a military criminal law. The Legal Code was legislated after two years of preparation under the slogan of “New Things Supplementing the Principle of Tradition (kubon sinch’am).” It consists of four parts and three hundred seventeen articles. When we compare it to existing legal codes such as Japan’s Army Criminal Code (1881), the Ming Code (Da Ming lü), and the Collection of Laws (Taejŏn hoet’ong), a few articles in the Legal Code stand out. For example, there is an article that deals with soldiers collaborating with political factions or foreign nations, and this reflected the reality of military involvement in past coups led by the Enlightenment Faction (kaehwap’a). There is also an article on how to punish an officer who acts as a legal authority in provinces. This reflected the reality of military officers still accepting and dealing with civil lawsuits and some local soldiers even forging military papers in order to embezzle some money. The Disciplinary Provisions was used as a “disciplinary regulation” that dealt with soldiers’ misdeeds not covered by criminal law, while the Legal Code was used as a “military criminal law” that dealt with soldiers’ crimes that went beyond the scope of the Disciplinary Provisions. In short, they complemented each other in actual operation. We need to analyze them within the bigger context of the Gabo Reform and the founding of the Korean Empire in order to appreciate fully the historical meaning and significance of them.
  • 5.

    A study on Actual power of the Air Force of North Korea before the Korean War -Focused on the force and weapon status of the Flight Division-

    Kim, Seon-Ho | 2013, (89) | pp.161~195 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    The Air Force of North Korea was established in December, 1949. There had been 4,135 soldiers in the flight division right before the Korean War. Among all troops in the flight division, the technical battalion had the greatest number of soldiers and the training regiment was the next. Then the fighter-bombers and the fighter Regiment were in sequence. Under the direct command of the Flight Division, the repair section had the most. 60% of officers in the flight division were intensively deployed in the combat unit and the training unit. 91.8% of sergeants were deployed in the combat unit, the training unit, and the technical unit. 75.7% of soldiers were heavily deployed in the technical unit and the training unit. In 1950 at the beginning of the Korean War the number of airplanes in the Flight Division was 226. The flight division produced 180 pilots by February 22, 1950. However 83% of the pilots only had 6 or 7 months of flight training. Therefore, the level of skill of the pilots was low and they had no alternative pilots. Moreover, 21 of 113 fighter-bombers and 33 of 84 fighter-planes of the Flight Division were second hand planes. Until the time of the Korean War the flight division didn't solve problems such as the malfunction of the decrepit planes and lack of spare parts. Fighting power of the flight division had been builded up through weapons from the Soviet Union since 1950. Nevertheless, the flight division still had a lot of problems in terms of actual power. The flight division couldn't prepare supporting elements of force integration such as planes, pilots and spare parts. And only 63% of a full strength were recruited to the flight division by January 28, 1950. Especially, the fact that only 28.3% of staff officers were recruited to the flight division was a serious problem. And at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War, 29% of soldiers in the flight division were new recruits who had been deployed 4 months before. The flight division had 9.7 times more planes than the Air Force of South Korea at the beginning of the war, but much less than the Air Force of U.S.A. Finally the Flight Division was engaged in warfare with no prepared regular power. And it was an internal cause of the Air Force of North Korea's failure in the earlier part of the Korean War.
  • 6.

    A Study on the Growth of North Korean Air Force during the Korean War

    Lee Sin Jae | 2013, (89) | pp.197~232 | number of Cited : 6
    Abstract PDF
    South and North Korea's military buildup during Korean war made the foundation of reinforcement of the military buildup after war. And so we can evaluate the period of Korea war by starting point about military buildup. But, the study on the North Korean military buildup during Korean war is not enough. Particularly the study of North Korean Air Force(NKAF) nearly could not find. In this paper, we study NKAF during Korean war. Especially, Reconstruction process of NKAF is main study point. For this study check the status of the beginning of the war power of the Air Force look at North Korea, Kim Il Sung, in the circumstances of the initial devastating air power will rebuild, the Soviet 64th Army combat flight status and support of the war, North Korea's air force pilot training in the reconstruction information, aircraft acquisition, airfield repair and new, and in a situation that could not be equipped with air power air defense activities, such as PO-2 aircraft using lightweight operations discussed NKAF. Through this process, troops increase about 3.7 times, 2 times the pilot, and 2 times the aircraft than at the beginning of the war. The growth of NKAF continue after the cease-fire process. In conclusion, this study point out the growth of NKAF during Korean war make the start point of military buildup in Korea peninsula.
  • 7.

    Historians on the Frontline: The Activity of US Army Military History Detachment during the Korean War

    CHUNG, Yong Wook | 2013, (89) | pp.233~265 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    This research introduces the newly discovered organization and projects of Military History Detachment(MHD), which had been to the fore of compilation of History of the Korean war of the US army. Through this research, we can comprehend not only the formation and the completion of MHD's mission but also the transition and overall projects, which could not be clarified up to this date. Moreover the research explains one of the important links of the Korean War history project. Eight MHDs were formed in the United States between October and November of 1950, which would be dispatched to Korean front. The MHDs arrived in South Korea between March and July 1951 via Tokyo, Japan. In early months of the war, the eight MHDs concentrated on writing After Action Interviews and After Action Reports and later turned them into historical records on the basis of battle experiences. By December 1951, small unit activities, combat narratives, and monographs became another crucial task. These eight MHDs amalgamated into one in January 1953 and was named the 8086 army unit. By that time, the most important task for the 8086 unit was the writing research papers later to be part of history of the Korean War of the US Army. ‘History of the Korean War’ of the US Army had five parts; war history, history of operations, special tasks, combat narratives, small unit activities and operations of service units. Among those parts, military historians took part in the writing of monographs concerning special subjects of part three and research of part four and five. But the importance of MHD activities in regard to compilation of history of the Korean War is not that military historians wrote thesis on special task or studied small unit but that they provided the foundation of compilation of history of the Korean War by producing, collecting and arranging various data. From all sorts of policy document and statements to reports done by FEC/UNC, Eighth Army, corps, and divisions, finally after action interviews and after action reports are the most important data of compilation of history of the Korean War of the US Army. Among those, after action interviews and after action reports were wholly produced and collected through MHD activities.
  • 8.

    A Study of Napoleon’s Cavalry Tactics

    Joo, Jung Youl | 2013, (89) | pp.267~296 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    The advent of Napoleon was a turning point in the war history. Tactics and war principle he established became the basis of the current military theory. However, one military achievement that has not been noticed for a long time is the return of the cavalry as a leading force in the battlefield, which had been in decline after the development of gunpower weapons. The main object of this paper is to see the application and the effect of the cavalry used by Napoleon, focusing on the art of his cavalry operations. Before the French Revolution, the French cavalry relatively lacked both quality and quantity compared to the other cavalries in Europe. Nevertheless, thanks to Napoleon, the French cavalry was able to hold its leading position in Europe. Napoleon especially focused on the intrinsic advantages that cavalry holds, and by reflecting from his concerns and experiences, he developed his own cavalry operation methods. Based on these new methods he was able to win the battle of Eylau, the battle of Somosierra and battle of Borodino. However in the battle of Waterloo, his decision not to follow the principle rules in his cavalry management methods had lead to defeat. Through this article, I hope that more attention could be paid on cavalry operation, and wish that more studies will be conducted on modern cavalry operation.
  • 9.

    A Study on Total War Plan and ‘Economic General Staff' of Japan in the 1920s

    Park, Sung-jin | 2013, (89) | pp.297~330 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    This paper is to investigate the total war plan emerged in Japan in the 1920s and the formation process of such system through the formation of economic general staff including the 'Munitions Bureau'(軍需局, 1918-1920), the 'National Strength Evaluation Board'(國勢院, 1920-1922) and the 'Resources Bureau'(資源局, 1927-1937) and its history of change. The entire Japan was severely concerned about how to cope with the First World War symbolizing the total war in the 1920s. The military authorities had shown the most sensitive response and the political circle couldn't be excluded from such trend. In particular, the army sincerely examined the aspects of the total war and clarified how to cope with the war. However, such an approach was inevitably led to a total war plan due to the limit of industrial capability at that time and insufficient resources. Nevertheless, some middle-level officers in the army gathered momentum and formed a group of ‘the total war officers’ and presented a longer-term and more in-depth plan. The military authorities and the political circles agreed on the necessity to strengthen the national power for the total war. To this end, the Economic General Staff including the Munitions Bureau, the National Strength Evaluation Board and the Resources Bureau were established on the institutional level. However, the differences in opinions among the military authorities insisting to quicken the planning and implementation of short-term war plan and the political circle asserting to strengthen the national power in the longer term restricted the activities of the Economic General Staff. The military authorities which were politically restricted in the 1920s couldn't help withdrawing their insistence due to the political barrier. In this aspect, the 1920s could be the only period which could curb the military authorities. Meanwhile, the total war officers emerging since the late 1920s provided the theory enabling to overcome such barriers and their theory was earnestly implemented in the 1930s.
  • 10.

    Changes in Korean-US Relationship during the Vietnam War

    Park, TaeGyun | 2013, (89) | pp.331~361 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    There are few works on the Korean-US relationship in 1964-1973 when the ROK combat troops participated in the Vietnam War (1964-1975). Since it was a very critical turning point in the US foreign policy, a new approach to the whole period is needed in order to examine the relationship precisely. The participation of the ROK troops in the Vietnam was a very crucial moment to improve the relationship between the ROK and the US, because the ROK government accepted American government's request for the first time, which was a key to the US foreign policy in general, and not directly related to the Korean issue at that time. In fact, the Johnson administration provided special economic and military assistance to Korea through the Brown Memorandum in return. However, a serious gap between the two countries was emerging due to the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula since 1966. As North Korean regime started to have a very aggressive strategy against South Korea in order to help North Vietnam, the ROK government considered a very active retaliation in order to boost ROK soldiers' morale, while American government had a different position on this. The Johnson administration did not want escalation of the crisis into another general war in Asia and wanted to concentrate on the frontline in Vietnam. The Nixon Doctrine played a role as the final break of a honeymoon relationship between the ROK and the US, in the end. President Park himself as well as the ROK government officials were shocked at the downsize of the US forces in South Korea without prior consultation with the ROK government, which has been conducted by President Johnson in 1966. Even though the conflict was weakened during the Ford Administration, the relationship had been worsening during the Carter Administration. The relationship between the ROK and the US had a serious transition during the Vietnam War and the legacy was continued until the end of the 1970s.
  • 11.

    The Soviet Maritime Strategy in the Cold War and The U.S. Response

    정광호 | 2013, (89) | pp.363~387 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    Although the Soviet’s military strategy was continent oriented in the 1920~1930, the Soviet Union had two maritime strategies. The first was ‘the old school’ that pursed the traditional maritime strategy, contending that it had to strengthen nuclear powered battleships and cruises to command the sea despite the limitations of the geopolitics and sufficient forces and this is in the same vein as the classical theory of maritime strategy by Colomb and Mahan. The second was ‘the young school’ that pursued small navy with patrol killers, destroyers, submarines and land based naval aircraft, contending that it could deny enemy’s command of the sea, which is better than to defeat the enemy and command the sea. Following the two schools, the soviet school emerged which emphasized the limited sea power, focusing on the equal force strategy and current aggressive fleet in 1949. On the other hand, the Soviet Union in 1956 had made use of a naval power as a means of national policy with the advent of Gorshkov. Since 1970, sea denial strategy was adopted by the Soviet’s maritime strategy of the Soviet Union and started to expand the Soviet Union’s interest in the Asia-Pacific region. As the Soviet navy increased his power in the Pacific region, the U.S. Navy changed to active maritime strategy. in the past the U. S. navy was forced to play a passive role with a ground oriented forces in the Atlantic region after World War-Ⅱ. The concept of ‘aggressive maritime strategy,’ ‘Sea Plan 2000,’ and ‘600 Navy Ships’ had strengthened U. S. navy’s doctrine and these became the specific and clear maritime strategy of the U. S. Therefore, this article will find out the changes in maritime strategy of the U. S. in response to the Soviet maritime strategy during the Cold War.
  • 12.

    The Active Plan for the ROK-US Combined Coordination Organization after the Transfer of the War time Operation Control Authority

    CHO, Sung Ju | 2013, (89) | pp.389~413 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    In 2015 the wartime OPCON authority will be turned over to ROKA. After the turnover, the command arrangement and the chain of command between ROKA & USFK will be based on equal status. The combined chain of command is similar to that of the multinational forces in the Gulf War. In Gulf war, American CENTCOM was equal to Arab JOINTCOM in the command arrangement. Under the dual chain of command, the assessment on the application of Coordination organizations for unifying efforts between CENTCOM and Arab JOINTCOM was remarkably effective. CENTCOM and JOINTCOM used the Combined Coordination, Communication, Intergration Center(C3IC) and the Liaison Parties as a coordination organization. C3IC played the great role in the accomplishment of unity of efforts in the multinational operations through coordinations and adjustments. Also CENTCOM employed the large scale Liaison Parties at the adjacent and subordinate units, so that they could understand the situation of operations in real time. The lessons of the multinational operation of coordination organization in during the Gulf War are as follows:First, examine the documentation of the final decision authority on the combined operation between ROK-US;Second, the cooperation organization should be established permanently, and controled by the responsible deputy commanders;Third, the officers who speak English fluently and possess the military expertise should be assigned to the cooperation organization;Fourth, MC Liaison Party should be established permanently to complement the current MC to prepare for the war;Fifth, the cooperation organizations should be located in the ROKA command building or at an adjacent location and have enough space;Sixth, a thorough preparation and operation of the Liaison Party are requested in peace time and during the war.