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2014, Vol., No.92

  • 1.

    The Peace Movement in Britain and Norman Angell’s Ideas on Peace, 1900-1920

    Nae-Joo Lee | 2014, (92) | pp.1~29 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    In the years before the First World War, Norman Angell(1872-1967) published a book, The Great Illusion, which analyzed the increasing interdependence of industrial states, the ills of armed conflict, and the disutility of war. It was widely acclaimed and promoted with fervor by proponents of the peace movement and even by the general public. It had been sold over two million copies from 1910 to 1913, and had been translated into twenty-five languages. Angell’s main theme was the futility of war. According to him, the notion that one nation could gain interests by armed confrontation was a ‘great illusion’. Large industrial powers had become so economically interdependent with one another that the war was profitable neither for victor nor for loser. Angell’s ideas on peace cannot be lightly dismissed, for in the years immediately preceding the Great War they inspired the ‘New Pacifism’ and also exercised a pervasive influence upon the minds of peace movement activists and politicians, deluding them with an optimistic view of world peace. Key Words : The First World War, Norman Angell, The Great Illusion, Peace Movement, Interdependence, Futility of War, Richard Cobden, New Pacifism, Liberal Internationalism, Union of Democratic ControlIn this context, this article will analyze his ideas on peace from the historical viewpoint. Angell’s doctrine, coming as it did at a moment of crisis in European affairs, contributed to rejuvenate the old faith in the peace movement and to reinforce the tradition of liberal internationalism in Britain. By doing this it refurbished and perpetuated the ‘pacifist illusion’. And his discussion on industrial states’ interdependence and the underlying irrationality of war is significant and useful even today, especially in examining international peace movement and international relations.
  • 2.

    The July Crisis and the Causes of the First World War Revisited: civil-Military Threat Perceptions of Germany and russia

    오인환 | 2014, (92) | pp.31~63 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    This study aims to research the decision-making process of Germany and Russia during the July Crisis in 1914, focusing on the threat perceptions analysis from the political and military leader's standpoint of both Great Powers. Specifically, it argues that Russian decisions during the July Crisis-including preparatory mobilization measures as well as the general mobilization-became a major causes for escalating the July Crisis into the outbreak of the First World War. The study also tries to help resolve the controversial issue which was brought up with no clarification of the two parties views on the German and Russian decisions by making sure the difference of the threat perceptions of statesmen and the military, especially those of military intelligence operations,The Germany's proclamation of support to Austria, so-called the “Blank Check” was based on the assumptions that Austria would defeat Serbia shortly and the crisis would be over. Furthermore, German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, was concerned that he might lose the only factual Germany’s ally, Austria surrounded by Trifle Entete's countries. This threat perception led the Chancellor to pursue the local fight during the July Crisis, and persuade Russia not to intervene. However, Russia’s preparatory mobilization measures near German borders, was detected and reported by German intelligent Agency, which strengthened the threat perception of the German military leaders towards Russia, especially the more aggressive position of Erich von Falkenhayn and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. Sang-Soo Jung has asserted that Sergey Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, pursued the European War after the Austrian ultimatum against Serbia. Jung emphasizes that Sazonov’s remark that Russian mobilization was only aimed at Austria, not at Germany, was a kind of deterrence measure. However, this argument is somewhat simplistic and little bit exaggerated, because his study did not take into account that Russia just attempted to deter Austria and Germany through mobilization in the beginning. As Samuel Williamson and Ronald Bobroff have argued, Sazonov tried to deter both Austria and Germany with preparatory measures and partial mobilization, without knowing that preparatory measures were actually parts of a general mobilization program. Having realized that deterrence had failed, Sazonov soon persuaded Nicholas Ⅱ to decide to order a general mobilization with the help of the military leaders who thought that partial mobilization was meaningless. In short, the Russian mobilization, including preparatory measures and the general mobilization, prompted Germany to mobilize its troops, finally escalating the July Crisis into the continental war and ultimately the First World War. Though Jack Levy contends that the British rejection of the German request on the 29th and the 30th the July was a more direct factor in the shift of German decision, the Russian mobilization still had a significant influence in terms of the German military leader's threat perception. The gap between political-military leaders' threat perceptions helps to elucidate and analysis the decision-making process during the July Crisis. It also contributes to challenging the German Paradigm, refocusing on the roles of countries other than Germany in the outbreak of the First World War.
  • 3.

    A Study on the Korea Force Vietnam Network(KFVN)'s Installation and Operation during the Vietnam War

    Lee Sin Jae | 2014, (92) | pp.65~101 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    Headquarters of Republic of Korea Forces in Vietnam(ROKFV) established on its own radio station in 1965 and operated it during the Vietnam War. The name of radio station was "Korea Force Vietnam Network(KFVN). KFVN had been operated for more seven years from December, 1965 to February, 1973. KFVN had a significant meaning in terms of that KFVN was the first overseas Korean broadcasting system in the Korean broadcasting history. However, despite of those highly evaluation for the KFVN, the study of that topic had not been for a long time. This paper is the study of the RFVN during the Vietnam War. The purpose of this research is to examine RFVN's main focus and process, and analyze of outcome of operations. RFVN had transmitted broadcasting of various programs of news, entertainment, music, and educational programs for the Republic of Korea Forces in Vietnam. And also it enhanced the morale of the soldiers, and performed psychological warfare toward ROK soldiers, South Vietnam's peoples and the North Vietnam as well. During the operation time period of KFVN, it had three major achievements. Firstly, KFVN had contributed to ROK military soldiers's morale during the Vietnam war. Secondly, KFVN played a important role in psychological warfare. KFVN also had improved Korean broadcasting technic and skills.
  • 4.

    The Great Wall of Goguryeo in Liao-River Area

    우석훈 | 2014, (92) | pp.103~138 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    This study focuses on the Great Wall of Goguryeo that had been estimately constructed during the reigns of King Yeongryu to King Bojang for 16 years(631∼646). Due to the lack of related historical records, there have been three assumable theories about the Great Wall of Gogureyo, namely Sanseong-yeonbangseol(山城聯防線說) which assumption is the connected wall with the established wall in the past, Sanseong-bangeojogool(山城防禦組群說), and Byeongang(邊崗說). Reviewing the old documentary records and the archaeological data to examine the existing studies, it came to the conclusion that the two former theories are not valid. Although the remains of the Great Wall of Goguryeo haven't been found, there are several reasons to prove the reliability of Byeongang theory. Firstly, the position of Byeongang was easy to prevent enemies crossing the Liao-River. Secondly, the position of Goguryeo's Great Wall was not overlapped in Liao-Dong, in which the great walls of other dynasties were built. Thirdly, The Direction and length of the Great Wall is consistent with the relevant records. Based on the result of the research, in this study, I compared the invasion route of Sui and Tang dynasties before and after the Great Wall of Goguryeo was built. The reason why I compared these two dynasties's invasion route is that there found in the historical records the fact that Goguryo built the Great wall after its successive defence from Sui's attack. After the comparison, I found that Tang's invasion pathways to Goguryo became diversified and Tang's army changed their tactics after building the Great wall. Next, this study also analyzed Chinese archaeological data and documentary records about Byeongang. The result confirmed that the construction technique of Byeongang site stretching a thousand li from the northeast to the southwest, was the same one so called, "Pancheck" which piled up the several earthen panel one by one, from Killim province to Yonyeong province. Finally, I confirmed the fact that Byeongang site was mentioned in 『Bongcheontongji』 called as ‘Goguryeo Castle’, ‘Goguryeo Tae’, ‘beacon’., small the site of an ancient castle after analysing of the related old records. Thus, it is certain that the Great Wall played the role of an auxiliary line in the existing defense system of Goguryeo. The purpose of building the Great Wall is presumed to guarantee the time for the rear's preparation and to inform the position as well as the condition of enemy troops to the existing defense system, the fortress.
  • 5.

    A Study on the Combat Power Index of Warship during Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592

    정완희 | SEUNGSIK MIN | 2014, (92) | pp.139~165 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    This paper was studied on the combat power index(CPI) of two nation's warship during japanese invasion of Korea in 1592(So called "Imjin Waeran" in that the War broke out the year of Imjin). Combat power index calculation model was utilized in the Ranchester's law. In order to gain the proper data, historical records were classified and the controversial data which contains some sea-battles related to abnormal operations and sequence attack were excluded, After the refinery process, 7 kinds of battle selected. These are the sea-battel of "Okpo, Happo, Jucjinpo, Sachun, Dangpo, Danghangpo, Hansando". The output data of the 7 sea-battle were inputted into the Lanchester's model.(warship numbers committed to combat, remaining warship numbers). The result is that Japan warships' (Three types of warship according to the size : large, middle, small) CPI is "16.1:15.0:11.3". This means that 1 korea's warship(Called as Panoksun) CPI is similar to 16.1 japan's large warship CPI. Because the korea's warship CPI was stronger than japan's warship, korea navy could overwhelmed the Japanese navy in a lot of sea-battles at that time.
  • 6.

    Training methods and military discipline of Chousun musketeer around the 17th century

    김영준 | 2014, (92) | pp.167~197 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    This study is analysis on the training methods and military discipline of musketeer responsible for a key figure in Chousun army around the 17th century. Since it was founded, Chousun dynasty faced the most complicated crisis around the 17th century when it had been invaded by Japan in 1592 (임진왜란 壬辰倭亂) and Chung Dynasty in 1636 (병자호란 丙子胡亂 ) . The military system of Chousun at that time was almost collapsed by the Japanese army's early offensive and it was very necessary for it to design a new one for substituting the old system. According to its need, Chouson dynasty published the Training Book (훈련도감 訓鍊都監 ) in which Musketeer appeared as its key change. Actually, the weapon called Musket was not at all new to Chousun because it had already used gunpowder. However, Chousun's army hadn't yet developed proper military tactics to utilize Musket systematically and organizationally. On the contrary, the Japanese army had developed strong and effective heating tactics on the basis of the Musket imported in Europe, which affected one of causes that Chousun army was beaten in early stage of war. However, we should notice that the Musket used in East-Asia then was different from that was used in Europe. And these differences were not only distinct from kinds of just a weapon, but had an strong impact on military tactics and the way of war execution adapted by both countries. Thus, this study, by noticing these differences, analyzed the reason why Chouson dynasty had chose the Musket of other kind from the West as its major individual weapon system. As a result, it found out that cultural concept affecting those who conducted the war had a great influence on the difference between military tactics. For the reason, this study sought to find a cultural notion made ​​up of such a military environment as well as the military history is not limited just to Military weapon systems, a combat or the military institution.
  • 7.

    The Russo-Japanese Secret Agreement and Russia’s Policy toward Mongolia

    Seok Huajeong | 2014, (92) | pp.199~232 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    The third secret treaty which Russia and Japan signed on July 8, 1912, maximized the imperial interests in two countries compared to the previous Treaty of 1907. After the secret agreement with Japan, Russian government considered the consolidation of Mongolia and northern Manchuria as a buffer area against China through Russo-Mongolian Treaty in 1912 and the Declaration and Exchange of Notes by Russia and China in 1913. ‘Automous Mongolia’ under the suzerainty of China was ratified in 1915 at the Tripartite Treaty of Kiakhta by Mongolia, Russia, and China. In reality, Russia had assumed that China would played a role in acting as the guarantor of Outer Mongolian autonomy. Inner Mongolia, however, lost its local autonomy forever. Mongolia might think that it cleverly was making use of China and Russia to advance its own interests, but it was evident that these two big powers in the early twentieth century had their own agendas for holding their private negotiations on Mongolia’s sovereignty. In short, the Russo-Japanese Secret Treaty and the Russo-Chinese cooperation as their outcome, served to deny Mongolian independence and sovereignty. As the pawn of imperialistic geopolitics, Mongolia had to bear the result of the Russian-Japanese-Chinese conspiracy and cooperation over its independence and sovereignty and try to barely survived on the edge of the balance of power.
  • 8.

    A Study of US Policy on the Recognition of the Government of the Republic of Korea: Centered on the US Recognition Policy during the Period of the Military Occupation in Korea

    Youngho Yungho Kim | 2014, (92) | pp.233~263 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    After the protectorate treaty was signed by Japan forcibly with Korean Imperial in 1905, the United States withdrew the American legation from the capital, Hanyang. It resulted in the severance of US-Korean diplomatic relations. And it also meant that the US did not recognize Korea as an independent sovereign entity. The independent movement of the 1st of March in 1919 was a watershed event because it resulted in the establishment of the Korean Provisional Government. The Provisional Government objected to the restoration of the Chousun dynasty and declared the establishment of a Republic system based on the principle of popular sovereignty in Korean peninsular. The establishment of the Provisional Government meant that there emerged a Korean national political entity with the ability to pursue the diplomatic recognition of Korea in the international society. The Provisional Government made great diplomatic efforts to achieve diplomatic recognition of Korea from the United States, Great Britain, France at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 which held after the end of the First World War. But these diplomatic efforts failed. Since the Peace Conference, the diplomatic efforts of the Provisional Government concentrated on the United States because the leaders of the Provisional Government believed that the United States was very sympathetic to the independence movement after President Woodrow Wilson’s proclamation of the principle of self-determination. The American policy of state and government recognition began to change with the development of international environment and according to its foreign policies. Specifically, the US recognition policy of Korean Government incrementally changed from non-recognition to de facto recognition and finally de jure recognition. After the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule, the American military government in Korea did not recognize any political groups in Korea and declared itself as the sole sovereign entity and assumed the responsibility even for the properties reverted to the Japanese colonial authority. This situation was unprecedented in the history of international law. The American policy of diplomatic non-recognition of Korea went against the hope of the Korean people who wanted an immediate restoration of sovereignty and diplomatic recognition. The policies of the US on diplomatic recognition on Korea during the wartime and post-World War II periods were closely related to its general policies on diplomatic recognition. This article is designed to explore the US policies on diplomatic recognition of Korea during wartime and after the foundation of the Republic of Korea. It begins by analyzing the development of American diplomatic recognition policies after its foundation. Next, the article analyzes US recognition policies of the Korean Provisional Government from the period of the establishment of the provisional government to the period of Japanese colonial rule. This article will also explain the reason why the American military government in Korea declared itself a sovereign entity without diplomatic recognition of the Korean Provisional Government. This article will also research the process of US recognition policy of the Republic of Korea which proceeded from de facto recognition to de jure recognition after the free elections in South Korea under the supervision of the United Nations in May 1948. This article will conclude by the impact of US recognition policy of the Republic of Korea with the help of the United Nations.
  • 9.

    ROK's PKO and Governance Change in Countries experienced civil war

    Kim, In-Soo | 2014, (92) | pp.265~298 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The achievements of ROK's Peace-keeping activities international society has been evaluated just by humanitarian performance or its contribution to promoting South Korea's international status. The goal of this study is to replace this perspective with new approach for two reasons. Firstly, PKO is supposed to help establish sustainable peace in the countries in the middle of civil war. Secondly, it is widely accepted that good governance is a requirement for sustainable peace. Therefore, this study examines the extent to which South Korean PKO improved governance in six countries to which South Korea sent troop to participate in UN PKOs (East Timor, Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, and Lebanon). The analysis on Worldwide Governance Indicator demonstrates that governance was improved in East Timor(rules of law), Afghanistan(rules of law), and Haiti(political stability), even though a specific area of governance that experienced improvement varied across countries. In Iraq and Lebanon(political stability) and in Somalia(social accountability), however, governance was deteriorated in spite of international intervention. In order to explain this variation, this study used Mason and Fett's expected utility model to suggest two hypotheses. Major findings go as follows. Firstly, governance was improved where international society successively decreased possibility that civil war parties win military victory and increased utility that is expected to get from international society by ending the use of violence. Secondly, military engagement by international forces was helpless unless it can prevent civil war party from using violence to win military victory. Thirdly, South Korean PKOs have not necessarily been integrated into international effort to establish sustainable peace. However, this was not decisive factor to improve governance in civil war countries. Finally, we suggest policy alternatives regarding an improvement direction for South Korean PKO on the basis of these findings.
  • 10.

    The Iraq War and the Future of War: The Implication of Iraq War on Future International Relations

    In Hyo Seol | 2014, (92) | pp.299~330 | number of Cited : 5
    Abstract PDF
    This study analyzes the lessons and implications of Iraq War by the framework which divides the concept of 'the war of the future' meaning the mode of war conditioned by surrounding future political situations, and the concept of 'the future warfare' implying the simple aspect of warfare, aspects of fighting itself which reflects on the innovation of measure of warfare. Moreover the paper anticipates 'the future warfare and future war' by using the same framework and related international relations theories. The failure of U.S. intervention in Iraq War originated in preparing for war based on the wrong future war image. The U.S. RMA, 'Revolution of Military Affairs', which is a defense reform project after the demise of Cold War, successfully anticipated the future warfare, but it failed to prepare the country for the war of the future. Under the unipolarity formed during the post Cold War era, U.S. should be prepared for both the asymmetric warfare and guerrilla warfare because there has been a huge gap of national power between U.S. and other states, which lead into that the mode of war became a typical asymmetric warfare and guerrilla warfare. The war of the future after the Iraq War should be anticipated based on the fact that the relative decline of U.S. power and rise of China was happened as the result of Iraq War, so the bipolarity has been come again. Under this bipolar circumstances, first virtual military conflict, which means there will be no real war with the existence of mutual nuclear deterrence and competition of military buildups between U.S. and China, will be central issue, and the limited war between two super powers and regional small powers will be possible in terms of future war scenarios. Especially the competition between U.S. and China will be shaped by the result of the second stage of RMA, the result of diffusion of RMA which was first started by U.S.