Korean | English

pISSN : 1598-317X / eISSN : 2713-8992

2020 KCI Impact Factor : 0.66
Home > Explore Content > All Issues > Article List

2016, Vol., No.98

  • 1.

    Military Geographical Study on Su Dingfang’s Path of Attack on Baekje in AD 660

    이재준 | 2016, (98) | pp.1~36 | number of Cited : 6
    Abstract PDF
    The main purpose of this paper is to study Su Dingfang of Tang Dynasty attack on Baekje, one of three Korean kingdoms in AD 660, and to find out where Su Dingfang’s troops landed and which area Baekje tried to defend. Chinese historical sources suggest Su Dingfang entered Baekje through Ungjin Gang Gu or Ungjin Gu – Ungjin River mouth. On the contrary, Korean historical source, Samguk Sagi or History of the Three Kingdoms, indicates it was Gibulpo or Baek River. In this case of Su Dingfang’s attack on Baekje, Gibulpo or Baek River from Samguk Sagi was area where Baekje forces tried to defend. On the other hand, Ungjin Gang Gu or Ungjin Gu from Chinese sources was Tang forces‘ landing area to attack Baekje. In this context, this paper examines each place from different points of view – the defense and the offense. The defense carries out terrain analysis(war game) to develop strategy to defend against its enemy, which entails identifying key terrains, and deploying combat forces. Baekje must have done the same in its own time. This study concludes that Baekje forces were sent out to an area around Gaechuk-ri and Ugon-ri, where Geum River and Nonsan Stream met – as stated Baek River or Gibulpo in the historical source. The offense also conducts terrain analysis(war game) to formulate attack strategy, which involves selecting avenues of approach, landing and assembly area. This study finds that Tang forces cruised along Geum River to enter Baekje. They landed on area around Bongjeong-ri and Seoksung-ri, where Geum River and Seoksung Stream met – indicated as Ungjin Gang Gu or Ungjin Gu according to the historical source – and struck the opponent from the back. The avenues of approach and landing area were the most efficient path to their assembly point. To conclude, Baek River or Gibulpo in which Baekje formed a defense line, and Ungjin Gang Gu or Ungjin Gu where Su Dingfang touched down are two different locations. These areas are close to each other, but in fact, Su Dingfang passed Baekje’s disposition, landed on Ungjin Gang Gu or Ungjin Gu, and launched an attack from the back. Today, locations of Su Dingfang’s avenues of approach and landing areas differ between researchers because most studies overlook military nature of subject areas, if not adopt improper research methods. Therefore, it is only possible to accurately locate battle fields by conducting military geographical analysis(war game) which takes into account nature of battles.
  • 2.

    Renowned generals of Ancient & Gorea era in old literatures

    Hosoo Jeon | 2016, (98) | pp.37~74 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The following study aims to review the use possibility of old literatures, 『Haedong- myeongsinrok』․『Haedongmyeongjangjeon』․『Daedongjanggo』․ 『Munheonpyeongo』․『Jeongodaebang』 in which renowned generals on the five books are compared each other and will quest for it’s function as objective data for general selection of the day. The editors and editorial time of the five books are as follows : 『Haedon- gmyeongsinrok』(Kim Yuk, 1651)․『Haedongmyeongjangjeon』(Hong Yangho, 1794)․ 『Daedongjanggo』(Hong Gyeongmo, ca.1821)․『Munheonpyeongo』(Lee Janghun, 1923)․『Jeongodaebang』(Kang Hyoseok, 1924), each book contains respectively 29․24․21․19․18 figures and the number of the figures actually is 49, as some are repeatedly mentioned in the books. The people, whom all five books include, are Choe Yundeok․Yi Sunsin․Gwon Yul․Gwak Jaeu․Jeong Chungsin, and Yim Gyeongeop․Jeong Bongsu․Yu Rim can be founded in 4 books, whereas Eo Yuso․Heo Jong․Yi Jongsaeng․Byeon Hyeop․Kim Yeomyul․Yi Jeongam․Kim Deokryeong․kim Eungha are mentioned in 3 books. 18 figures including Yi Jiran can be founded in 2 literatures, while 17 person like Yi Jongmu are to read in just 1 book. It shows that a general, who distinguished himself in the war between Chosun-Japan war(1592∼1598)·Chosun-China war(1627ㆍ1636) and made wide fame, get mentioned more, as the commander, who fought in a small and regional battle, described relatively less. The five books are to divide in two part according to editor’s disposition and composition of figure. 『Haedongmyeongsinrok』․『Munheonpyeongo』․『jeongodaeban- g』 can be categorized as Seoin-Noron group(political faction), while 『Haedongmyeongi- angjeon』․『Daedongjanggo』 as Soron-Namin group(political faction). Two categories as per political coloring is to verify in 4 points : a) 『Munheonpyeongo』․『Jeongodaebang』 handle the almost same figures, as same are 『Haedongmyeongjangjeon』, 『Daedongjanggo』. b)『Jeongodaebang』, which reflect the political position of Seoin-Noron, includes an article about 12 literati purges(sahwa). c)Hong Yangho, Hong Gyeongmo, the editors of 『Haedongmyeongjangjeon』, 『Daedong- gjanggo』 are grandfather and grandson and as high level government officials they were representative ideologue of Soron in Jeongjo·Sunjo periods. d)『Haedongmyeongjangjeon』․『Daedongjanggo』 handle Hyujeong․Ujeong․Yeongkyu, who as buddhist monk fought against japan, while they are not mentioned in 『Haedongmyeongsinrok』·『Munheonpyeongo』· 『Jeongodaebang』 probably reflecting the political group of Noron, which carry for the dogmatic and exclucive nature of Cheng-Zhu school(Neo–Confucianism). It is interesting to find that the books - with the same political faction-like 『Haedongmyeo- ngsinrok』·『Munheonpyeongo』·『Jeongodaebang』are more deviable in figure composition(70% in deviation) than the books with the different political direction(50%). Awareness of times as the criteria of the figure selection plays more decisive role than political and academic tendency. To conclude, it does not make any meaning to study the similarity and objectivity of the figure list in 5 books because of the 50∼70% deviation in person composition. It confirms that the literatures about renowned generals of all time are historical text reflecting the spirit of the times. It is the task of the military historian of the day to select the renowned generals in Chosun era based on systematic and comprehensive discuss.
  • 3.

    Re-exploration on the Meaning of Hongsan Battle in 1376 and its Battlefield

    Lim, Hyung-soo | 2016, (98) | pp.75~104 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Hongsan (鴻山) battle was a combat in which General Choi Young (崔瑩) defeated Japanese pirates (倭寇) at the Hongsan region who invaded Geum River (錦江) basin in July 1376 (2nd year of King Woo, 禑王), which is considered as one of great military victories over the course of 40-year fight against Japanese Pirates worthy of special mention and is assessed as a 'Sweeping Victory (大捷).' This study briefly summarizes the background and development process of Hongsan Battle and reviewes if there is no problem regarding the existing assessment of it as a 'Sweeping Victory' and if the recognition that Taebong Mountain Fortress (胎峰山城) was its battlefield is valid. This study pointed out that Hongsan Battle somewhat falls short to be assessed as a Sweeping Victory (大捷) in that not only the scale of military force mobilized and military accomplishments gained by the battle are unclear but also the battle did not have significant effect on the conditions of the war even after the battle. And yet, study evaluated that Hongsan Battle still holds significant historical meaning of its own in that it lived up to desperate requirements of the time to a certain degree even though it did not make accomplishments enough to satisfy expectations. Study then examined if the recognition that the battlefield of Hongsan was Taebong Mountain Fortress is correct. This recognition was the result of establishment of Hongsan Memorial Stone (鴻山大捷碑) in the process of designating Taebong Mountain Fortress as one of the remains of historical national protection in the late 1970s, which was a hasty outcome without the support of documentary records or excavation survey. Thus, careful comparison of geographical conditions with historical records of Hongsan Battle reveals considerable discrepancies. Although it is very difficult to assert any specific region as the battlefield of Hongsan Battle given the lack of related data available, as the result of assumption based on geographical characteristics which appeared in the historical data, there is high possibility that the battlefield was actually valleys around Hongyang-ri (鴻良里).
  • 4.

    The victory factors for General Lee’s initial battles and combat preparation from combat abilities.

    이경식 | 2016, (98) | pp.105~160 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    This study focuses on how General Lee achieved continuous victory streaks in the beginning of Japanese invasion. Unlike previous studies that focused on the victory factors on the water, this study focuses on analyses of General Lee’s combat preparation and emphasized combat ability during initial battles, which defeated Japanese force. General Lee substantially prepared for possible battles considering Hong-Yang Japanese invasion on Year of Jeong-Hae (1587). By developing the foundation for discipline and commanding system based on the past experience, Lee focused on creative, yet fundamental war-preparation. One of Lee’s creative works is that he collected information of Japanese combat style to create his battle strategies: to avoid hand to hand fights, but to be close enough to target enemy ships with turtle ships, and to inspect the war preparations. For the war preparations, Lee inspected ships, various weapons, and defense system on the field. But most importantly, Lee’s victorious background originated from his nationally scaled propulsion for increasing the number of war-ships, development of cannons specially designed for battles against Japanese forces. When the actual Lim-Gin Japanese invasion occurred, Lee was fully prepared to go to the war against Japan by utilizing the effective reporting system, which reached Right Jeon-Ra provinces, observatory posts, and central government in a very short time. Lee also prepared for all possible routes of Japanese incomings and settled his navy on Gyeong-Sang Sea waiting for the imminent engage command from the government. In order to execute Command & Control system in the battle at Gyeong-Sang Sea, Lee required strict command system, and hierarchy with Won-Gyun and Uk-Gi Lee’s fleet, which allowed well-coordinated strategic system. Also, strategy integrated intelligence, maneuver, fires, and protections against Japanese Force. First, spot the enemy, approach with fleets during earl dawn when security is assured, then charge with turtle ships and full-on assailment of cannons with Pan-Ok ships to defeat Japanese Navy. After such strategy, Lee quickly fled from the battle scene in order to prepare for the possible ambush attacks and buy some maintenance time for his navy. In sum, Lee achieved the victory via analyzing Japanese Navy’s current status, geography, water current, surround and attack strategy, ambush attacks, and effective maneuvers, which integrated with turtle ships and navy’s fire power. He also inspected his forces, fleets, and other weapons to sustain his combat abilities. He distributed trophies from the battles to his soldiers to alleviate their fear and fatigue. The most important victory factor would be Lee’s victory aimed leadership. His leadership highlighted field focused operations, principles, executions, and keen discernment, which contributed to flexible strategies, all with courage, fairness, people and his navy. In order to win the war, combat capability had to be performed at its best, and Lee’s victories at the initial battles exemplify preparation for the war and successful coordination of combat ability with his leadership in the naval battles.
  • 5.

    Regal Power in Joseon and Dochechalsabu(都體察使府) in the Early Reign of Sukjong(肅宗)

    Kim Jong Soo | 2016, (98) | pp.161~202 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    Kings in Joseon Dynasty seized the absolute power. Kings could have that absolute power because they monopolized the military power. Kings’ monopolization of military power in Joseon was the result of making restless efforts to reform sabyeongje(私兵制) and then abolish private relationship between generals and soldiers in the reign of Taejong(太宗). But only with the reformation of sabyeongje, kings could not be sure of their monopoly of military power. Like Taejo(太祖) Lee Seong-gye, someone could command the forces mobilized in wartime and withdraw to topple the current government. Therefore, Joseon government divided the forces into a peace footing and a war footing, and as the commander of a war footing, the mungwan(文官) trusted the most by the king was appointed. The commander of a war footing is called ‘chechalsa(體察使)’. Normally, only one dochechalsa was appointed as a chief military commander, but during Imjinwaeran (壬辰倭亂: Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592), four were appointed all at the same time. The military ruling system during Imjinwaeran was characterized by multi-layered, dispersive, and interregulatory aspects centering around munsin(文臣), and this seems to have been attributed to regal power supremacism that even in wartime, military power should never be taken over to somebody else other than the king. In the early reign of Sukjong(肅宗), Revolt of the Three Feudatories broke out in China, and it altered the political situations in East Asia. Saying that it was the right moment to conduct northern expedition, Yun-hyu(尹鑴) established Dochechalsa-bu and insisted them to put the country into a war footing. After that, Dochechalsabu repeated installment and dismantlement according to the change of political conditions in China. In December, 1675(Sukjong 1), as the envoys reported that Qing was being defeated severely by the forces of Wu Sangui(吳三桂), and Dochechalsabu was installed. And in May, 1677(Sukjong 3), when Qing overcame the forces of Wu Sangui and warned Joseon not to act rashly, they dismantled Dochechalsabu. Later, in December, 1678(Sukjong 4), as the envoys reported that Qing was continuously losing in the war against Wu Sangui, they again installed Dochechalsabu, and in March, 1680(Sukjong 6), Dochechalsabu was again dismantled due to Gyeongsinhwanguk(庚申換局). After that, Dochechalsabu never came to be installed again. Gyeongsinhwanguk was an event that took place after the maternal relatives of seoin(西人) falsely accused that namin(南人) intended to seize the military power through Dochechalsabu. Namin attempted to actualize northern expedition by installing Dochechalsabu within the change of political situations in China but got expelled by Sukjong and the conspiracy of maternal relatives. With this event, however, we can reconfirm the absoluteness of kings in Joseon and it was natural truth that in Joseon, no one other than the king could seize the military power.
  • 6.

    Understanding the Military Supplies of Northern Territory through historical manuscript in the 18th Century

    Kim, Hyo-Kyoung | Hye-Eun Lee | 2016, (98) | pp.203~240 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    This study was conducted to survey the munitions history of the northern territory and to investigate the military preparedness of that time through haeyu documents of North Hamkyoung Province, written in 18th Century. It contains the military supply list of the army in the northwestern region, munitions of bo, separately secured munitions called byeolbi, and rice. The first items of the military supply list of the army in the northwestern region are inshin and byeongbu and they seemed to be recorded first because they are the most important military supplies when mobilizing the army. According to the list of items transferred recorded in the haeyu documents, they possessed three types of bows (heukgakgung, sanggakgung, and gyojagung) and two types of arrows (jangjeon and pyeonjeon). Considering that the amount of pyeongjeon owned by the army of the northwestern region was similar to the amount of jangjeon, the forward unit of North Hamgyoung Province is assumed to use pyeonjeon a lot. As for explosive weapons, they possessed 62 guns of seven types including daeseungja-chongtong. Firearms were widely used in North Hamgyoung Province since the early Joseon Dynasty. It was found that rifles such as seungja-chongtong were made and supplied to the north territory until the era of King Jeongjo. Critical weapons including swords and spears were found to be very small in quantity, compared to bows/arrows and explosive weapons. As for signal equipments used for military signals, the army of the northwestern region was found to have flags of various colors and musical instruments for sound signals such as drums, gongs, and bugles. In case of defensive equipments, they had shields and caltrops (caltraps). According to the haeyu documents, the army of the northwestern region had 4,998 caltrops which account for more than half of the total quantity of 8,000 caltrops owned by giljumok. In addition to weapons, the haeyu documents contain records of clothes, weapon materials, and military books. Approximately 100 items of the haeyu documents of the Joseon Dynasty are still left. Among them, only seven documents of regional officials are left. In this study, the haeyu documents of regional officials, which are very significant materials as the haeyu documents of Hamkyoung Province, were surveyed. This study is significant because the military status, scale, and military preparedness of the northwestern region of the Joseon Dynasty, especially in the 18th century, could be empirically investigated.
  • 7.

    The January 28th Shanghai Incident, Yoon Bong Gil’s patriotic deeds, and Korea and China’s Joint Resistance

    Lee Jaeryoung | 2016, (98) | pp.241~284 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    This paper will uncover the truths behind Korea and China’s joint resistance against the Japanese colonial era through examining the background, objective, characteristic, and significance of the Korean Independence movement’s most representative heroic struggle: Yoon Bong Gil’s patriotic deeds in April 29th, 1932, during the Manchurian Incident. From May, 1931, when Yoon Bong Gil arrived in Shanghai, China, with the resolve to take part in Korea’s independence movements, to April 29, 1932, when he initiated his patriotic deeds at Hongkou Park, Japan’s planned acts of aggression continued. The Wan Bao Shan Incident was manipulated by Japan as an excuse to invade the Manju area. The Japanese aggravated conflict between Koreans and Chinese farmers, and through releasing distorted reports in Korea, induced boycott riots against the Chinese. This incident created emotional rifts between the two nations, and Korean Independence movements within China fell into stagnation. The subsequent exertion of military force by the Japanese during the Manchurian and Shanghai incident awakened China’s national awareness of crisis and aroused resistance against Japan throughout the nation. Especially, the eventual defeat of resistance forces coordinated around the 10throgungreatlyenragedtheChinese. Yoon Bong Gil, who was honing his burning soul for independence movements during this period, chose patriotic deeds as his means of sabotaging Japan’s invasion of China, and ultimately hastening the independence of Korea. Yoon Bong Gil’s patriotic deeds were resistances against Japan to achieve Korea’s independence and freedom, and were planned from beginning stages with Kim Gu with ambitions of Korea and China coordinating their powers to start a Korea-China Joint Anti-Japanese War. With the cooperation of China, his plans were able to be executed. During preparation stages, the Chinese supported the Korea Patriotic Party, and through the help of Kim Hong Il, Yoon was able to receive high explosive bombs from the Chinese. However, Chinese influence on this matter was limited. The preparation, execution, after management, and all other affairs related to Yoon Bong Gil’s patriotic deeds were mainly coordinated by Yoon Bong Gil and Kim Gu. The practical and historical impact Yoon Bong Gil’s patriotic deeds had on Korean independence movements are substantial. His patriotic deeds first heavily damaged the Japanese empire by killing or injuring military and government leaders including expeditionary force lieutenant Yoshinori Shirakawa. The Chinese, who felt a sense of defeat, once more forged their wills for resistance. Furthermore, negative emotions the Chinese held towards Koreans after the Wan Bao San incident rapidly changed to appreciation and cooperation, creating favorable conditions for Korean independence movements in China. Also, the patriotic deeds invigorated the independence movements of the provisional government of the Republic of Korea, which were in stagnation. Inspired compatriots within and out of the country, re-enlightened on the importance of the provisional government of the Republic of Korea and its independence movements, resumed financial and psychological support. Overall, Yoon Bong Gil’s patriotic deeds created an opportunity for Korea’s independence movement’s long cherished wish, a united front with China, to develop, opening Korea/Chinese joint resistance against Japan in the 1930s.
  • 8.

    The Republic of Korea Army Officers’ Military studying-abroad in United States and Its Effects during the 1950s

    Kim, Min-sik | 2016, (98) | pp.285~322 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    Since the end of WWII, in order to prevent the USSR’s expansion, the U.S. government had provided military assistances to Free World countries. With a view to maximizing the effects of the military assistance, the US government intended to ‘Standardize’ the allied countries’ military. Specifically, the military education programs at the U.S. military institutions was considered as an important prerequisite for the success of the military assistance. Meanwhile, in 1951 the Korean War had entered into the phase of a cease-fire agreement. The U.S. government was interested in preventing the Korean War from expanding to WWIII and establishing its dignity in Asia and for this purpose was in need to intervene in the operation of the Korean military. Simultaneously, the Korean government was in dire need to import the advanced U.S. military system in a short period. Likewise the massive dispatch of Korean Army officers to U.S. military institutions was undertaken in furtherance of the mutual interest. The U.S. government arranged the Korean Army officers to participate in the Special Allied Officers Course, an amended education program based on the Officer’s Basic Course. The Special Allied Officers Course included basic studies on military etiquette, commandership, leadership etc. In sum, the U.S. government provided that the young Korean Army officers would learn not only the military knowledge but also the customs and norms of the US officer corps, thereby embodying the ‘American style military concept’. The Korean Army officers who participated in the program aforesaid understood that the teaching methods of the US military education system are ‘reasonable’. And the Korean military appointed those officers to positions in charge of education and training thereby inducing them to propagate the knowledge and techniques. And their technological and administrative knowhow and skills were introduced to the Korean military’s branch education, and subsequently propagated into the Korean society. The massive military education in the United States had resulted in the standardization of the Korean military system based on the U.S. system. As the Korean officers’ expertise grew further in late 1950s, however, they began to perceive that the U.S. military education system may not perfectly capture the requirements of the Korean military education suited to local characteristics. In the Korean military history, this was a time marked with overwhelming American influences and yet the Korean government and military was recognizing their initiative roles as shown in their responses repeating accommodation and struggles vis-à-vis the intellectual and moral hegemony of the United States.
  • 9.

    The Korean Government`s response And Return negotiation of the abduction by North Korea the 1950s

    Hwang Sun-Ik | 2016, (98) | pp.323~360 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    The Korean War killed many people and demolished their living foundation. Moreover, a lot of families was separated by the Korean war. During the war period, many people, who live in the South Korea, was abducted to the North Korea and mobilized for war. After recapture of Seoul in september 1950, the Korean government and the UN forces had come to perceive the importance of the abduction by North Korea. Since then the Korean government went to investigate damage of abductee as doing examination war damage with military and private groups. The Korean government went pushed release of volunteer army prisoners by the North Korea and repatriation of abductees, who interned in the North Korea. Moreover, the Korean government requested cooperation about this issue to the U.S. Eighth Army. About this issue, the U.S. Eighth Army deferred answer,because they claimed that this issue is 'International problem', which is needed to authorize UN headquarters. In the end, the discussions of a release of volunteer army prisoners and repatriation of abductees could be officially started after start of an armistice talks in a July 1951. In the armistice talks, a repatriation of abductees negotiation of between the UN forces and the Red army smashed into principle and realistic aspect. The U.N. Forces claimed principle of 1 on 1 exchange by free will. However, the North Korean government argued compulsory repatriation of all prisoner. Meanwhile The difference in the number of prisoners of war became obstacle in the negotiations. In consequence, negotiation of abductees’s repatriation fell into a baffled. During the process of armistice talks, negotiaion of abductees's return ended in failure. Instead, foundation of returning abductees was laid by 'Armistice Agreement No.59 displaced civilians provision'. However, in the middle of February, North Korean government broken mutual agreement again, with arguing that "There is no person, who apply to return back to South". After all, there are no one abductees, who returned their home officially, during the war and after war. Korean society was enveloped in shock and rage, because of repeated broken mutual agreement by the North Korean government. It come to real and it come to mecharism that worsen relationship between South Korea and North Korea. The issue of abduction by North Korea is sealed a long time, but this issue lifted from the 2000 in the Korean society, And this issue works as an another barometer that can look back the Korean war in Korean society.
  • 10.

    The Red Cavalry and Its Employment in the Russian Civil War

    LEE JEONG-HA | 2016, (98) | pp.361~394 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    This article focuses on the course of creating massive strategic cavalry in the Red Army and on its employment during the Russian Civil War. The inept use of cavalry in the First World War and the development of military technology led to an underestimation of cavalry’s military role in the European armies. Contrary to this perception, it was the Russian Civil War in which both the Red and the White Armies’ cavalries played a leading role because of two primary features: immensity of its battlefield and combatants’ quantitative and qualitative degradation. Long and shallow defense line, an important characters of the Civil War, stemmed from these two factors. Inevitably, the Red Cavalry was the result of those distinctive military circumstances. The formation of the Red Cavalry went against the prevailing theory in other European armies. At the early period of the Civil War, the Bolsheviks also had a negative attitude toward cavalry, and the Red Cavalry could not get institutional and material aids from Moscow. Therefore, the beginning of the Red Cavalry was based on several partisan units organized autonomously in the fronts. Since the White Army took initiative of the Civil War by using maneuver and mobility of its cavalry, however, the Red Army had made every effort to raise the Red Cavalry and its massive strategic cavalry. The fighting methods of the Red Cavalry in the Civil War could be characterized by: 1) the combination of maneuver and firepower; 2) the cooperation with the other branches (particularly with infantry); and 3) the massive strategic cavalry. Eventually, the Red Army won the Russian Civil War by employing the massive strategic cavalry in accordance with a new military condition.
  • 11.

    The American-Spanish War and Political Cartoons in Press Media: Expansionism and Anti-Imperialism

    Seok Huajeong | 2016, (98) | pp.395~432 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The American-Spanish War of 1898, was initiated for the United States to step to rescue Cuba from the oppression, ended just months later with the U.S. acquisition of Spain’s remaining empire, including Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. Patriotic media played a significant role in constructing the war, identifying the key territories to be acquired prior to a deployment of military operations. Even though there were various shades of high-circulation “yellow” journalism, this article mainly focuses on the ‘unexplored’ press media by the including political cartoons, headlines, caption texts from newspapers in both rural and urban settings across the U.S. It elaborates to show how the nation’s patriotic media campaigns mainly by cartoonists and editorialists captured the public’s interest in the Cuban crisis, and to portray the U.S actions for the duration of the conflict, from liberation to conquest, and further to press the U.S acquisition new territories abroad. After the war, growing resistance to American expansionism was found expression in the media, but it was driven the consensus in terms of expansion costs, not by a moral compass as will be identified at the platform of Anti-Imperialist League of 1899.