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2016, Vol., No.99

  • 1.

    Revival Movement of Koguryo in Liaodong Region and Kommojam

    Kim, Kang-hun | 2016, (99) | pp.1~38 | number of Cited : 13
    Abstract PDF
    Koguryo(高句麗) was fell by Tang(唐) in september, 668 and the Andong Dohufu(安東都護府) was set up in the territory of Koguryo. The people of Koguryo took up arms against the rule of Tang. The Mihang castle(未降城) in Amnok river(鴨綠水) north of status data of Samkooksaki(三國史記) jiliji(地理志) and route of force immigration tell us resistance was strong in the Region of Liaodong. Nearly 13 million of force immigration on a large scale prompted the resistance of people of Koguryo. Kommojam(劍牟岑) was the key person of the resistance against Tang. He commanded the local military forces as local governor of Kungmo castle(窮牟城) before fall of Koguryo. Kommojam and people in Kungmo castle had been experienced in that combined through a military command system. This became the base that organized the movement of revival military forces of the former Koguryo. Kommojam invaded the fringeland of Tang. It means that Kommojam who took up arms in Liaodong Region and the displaced peoples of Koguryo to Liaoxi(遼西) Region combined. They had affinity in the way that came from Liaodong Region and had planned resistance movement through route of communication of Liaodong to Liaoxi. In response to this, Tang started to suppress Go Gan(高偘) and Lee Kun haeng(李謹行). Go Gan was dispatched to Liaodong, Lee Kun haeng was sent out to Liaoxi. Nevertheless, military activity of Koguryo people had continued to 672 in Liaodong and Liaoxi Region. Although Kommojam proceeded towards Pyongyang area, there were numbers of Koguryo revival army in Liaodong Region. Therefore the military activities against Tang had held in Liaodong Region and resistance movement in Liaoxi which were concerned with that was not subdued without difficulty.
  • 2.

    A study on the frontline guard post[Soo, 戍] in Eastern frontier province[Donggye, 東界], Goryeo Dynasty

    youngho hong | 2016, (99) | pp.39~76 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    Eastern Seaside of Gangwon province is organized as Eastern frontier province[東界] as military zones in the Goryeo Dynasty. Therefore many military sites exist, and the frontline guard post, called Soo[戍] are distributed. But the location and function of these sites are not clear. This article is revealing location and function of these sites. I conducted a extensive literature search in order to achieve this purpose, verified by field survey. As a result, these sites are defined as a frontline guard post and played a role of function in monitoring and preventing the enemy[東女眞, Jurchen pirates] invading through the sea in early Goryeo Dynasty. Therefore, these site is located on the promontory and mountain of the beach. Some of these sites became reused as a signal fire station to protect its area from the invasion of Japanese Pirates[倭寇] from late Goryeo Dynasty to early Joseon Dynasty.
  • 3.

    he territorial disputes in the late of Goryeo Dynasty(918~1392) - focusing on Ssanseongchonggwanbu and Dongnyeongbu-

    AnSik Shin | 2016, (99) | pp.77~112 | number of Cited : 10
    Abstract PDF
    As the territory of the Goryeo Dynasty, the 'Jikhalryeong' (which means the territory of direct control of a country and union) of Yuan Dynasty were Ssanseongchonggwanbu and Dongnyeongbu. These were important areas to defend the Gaegyeong as the region of Northeast Yanggae. And having been made them to the Jikhalryeong of Yuan Dynasty could weaken mainland grip of the Goryeo Dynasty. Since the Goryeo Dynasty was persistent, it demands the return of these areas. As a result, while Dongnyeongbu that were returned in 20 years, Ssanseongchonggwanbu was maintained until 1356 when it was recaptured directly. The installation of Ssanseongchonggwanbu was done when Johwi and TakCheong was surrendered to the Mongol in the December 1258. During this period, the Military Rule was destroyed by removing Choiui of Yoogyeong and Kiminjun, and this situation has been the opportunity of a large-scale invasion of the Mongol. Mongolia pressures put a weight on the Gangdo government. Because of this reason, King and the Military Rule had no choice to accept the demands of Mongolia. It was more pressure this situation that was the surrender of Johwi and Takcheong. Dongnyeongbu was established when it was surrendered to the Mongol by Choitan and Hanshin in October 1269. During this period, Imyeon deposed king Wonjong, which was heightened the tension with Mongol. So it was applying that the resistance of Choitan etc in Bukgye was a great blow to the regime of Imyeon, king Wonjong and Mongol have been a good opportunity to pressure the Military Rule. However, in Mongol it did not make this region as soon as Dongnyeongbu, at first it was managed by Haengjungseoseong of Mongol. Installation of Ssanseongchonggwanbu and Dongnyeongbu was quite as crisis situations to the king Wonjong and the Military Rule. In particular, there was direct mention of Mongolia on the border in Dongnyeongbu installation process, it was compared with Ssanseongchonggwanbu installation process. In addition, it can be seen that was much more effort for the return of Dongnyeongbu than Ssanseongchonggwanbu first installed in the Goryeo Dynasty. This issue of the return process can be said that would be appreciated the territory consciousness of the Goryeo Dynasty. Eventually, Ssanseongchonggwanbu and Dongnyeongbu were the loss of territory to be done from the failure of struggle with Mongolia, after returning problem of these two regions was directly related to the phase of the Goryeo Dynasty in the Yuan Dynasty. The return of Dongnyeongbu has been made when more close of the Goryeo Dynasty and Yuan Dynasty happened. The recapture of Ssanseongchonggwanbu was a result of anti-Mongolia. Since these two regions was also an important issue connected with northern border.
  • 4.

    The Import of Manchurian Horses and the Installation of Manchurian Horse Ranches in the Joseon Dynasty

    Yi Hong Du | 2016, (99) | pp.113~144 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    Horses in the Joseon Dynasty are largely divided into native Jeju horses and northern Manchurian horses. Since Jeju horses were not able to bear the weight of the horse armor and heavily armed cavalryman, large‐sized Manchurian horses were used for the the cavalry. Manchurian horses were classified by Central Asian horses, Daldan‐ma horses(韃靼馬‐highland wild horses), and Mongolian horses. Central Asian horses were imported in the Period of the Korean Three Kingdoms, and Daldan‐ma horses were imported from Jurchen through tribute trade in the early Koryo Dynasty. The number of tributes through which Jurchen paid horses during the period from King Jeongjong (945~949) to Yejong (1105~1122) was 127, and the number of tributary horses was approximately 4~5,000 heads. In the late Koryo Dynasty, the Yuan Dynasty brought Daldan‐ma horses to Tamra‐do Island and installed Mongolian‐style ranches there. In addition, it brought 150 Daldan‐ma horses and distributed them to ranches throughout the country, and this increased the number of Manchurian horses in the country. As the diplomatic relationship with Jurchen was broken in the Joseon Dynasty, Manchurian horses could not be imported directly from Jurchen and only a small number of Manchurian horses were available through private trade. Even the private trading of Manchurian horses was prohibited from the reign of King Seongjong, and this accelerated the miniaturization of Manchurian horses. Under the rule of King Sejong, a male Manchurian horse was traded with two female Jeju horses. In the Joseon Dynasty, horse ranches were installed as one of King Taejong’s efforts to secure war horses because the trade of Manchurian horses with Jurchen was stopped and Ming confiscated the Jeju ranch. Taejong moved 1,800 male and female Manchurian horses from the Jeju ranch to Jin‐do Island in Jeolla‐do, and 100 heads to Mt. Gilsang in Ganghwa‐do Island. In addition, King Sejong installed Sindo and Boeumdo Ranches in islands affiliated to Ganghwa‐do Island, and pastured Manchurian horses, and prohibited the colts from being carried out of the islands for preserving the breed. King Sejo expanded the Jangbong‐do Ranch in Ganghwa‐do Island exclusively for Manchurian horses, and distributed colts from the ranch as breeding horses to other major ranches throughout the country. From King Seongjong, however, ranches were closed and instead government fields were installed, and this reduced the number of Manchurian horses gradually. The closure of horse ranches undermined the military power, and as a result, the country could not avoid Japanese invasion of 1592‐1599 and Qing’s invasions. In the late Joseon Dynasty, Kings Sukjong and Jeongjo promoted the northern expedition policy, and installed the cavalry to content with Qing’s Eight Banners and this increased the number of Manchurian horses temporarily. As horse ranches had to be closed for arable lands, however, the production of Manchurian horses had to decrease gradually.
  • 5.

    Hongwu emperor's military recognition and military policy in the early Ming Dynasty

    KyeoungLok Kim | 2016, (99) | pp.145~188 | number of Cited : 10
    Abstract PDF
    In this paper, I researched Hongwu Emperor(洪武帝)’s plans of country governance, his military recognition and military policy which was the general source of military policy in the Early Ming Empire. First, I will focus on state of a Hongwu period and the process of military system, and let's look at linking Hongwu's rule plan and military policy. Hongwu period was meaningful in established of the new Military Command System(軍事指揮體系) and instituting the Military System(軍制) besides common change of era. The representative military system of Ming Dynasty, and it is influenced not only China history but also Korea history, Japan history the neighboring countries. Ming dynasty established, but also it marks the reconstruction of a large number of Han Chinese regime's military system and institutions. In terms of construction of the military system, as the founding emperor of the Ming dynasty, Hongwu emperor considered it very seriously. In the early period of establishment of the Ming Dynasty, Hongwu emperor ordered to to formulate the military system with his military experience. In the Ming Dynasty emperors reign, politics was influenced by the former. Military organization was not only a classic military command system but also reflects Hongwu emperor's military recognition, it contains rich ethical thoughts. Hongwu emperor’s military thought stems from domination history of China and has been influenced a lot by traditional military system in china’s history. The political trend to strengthen imperial power continued in Ming dynasty. As we saw before, Hongwu emperor abolished prime ministership by reason of the uprising of Hu, Wei-Yong(胡惟庸), and put 6 Ministry directly under jurisdiction of emperor. Besides that, in order to control military power more tightly, Hongwu emperor divided the office for Joint chief of staff, called Great chief of staff(大都督部), into five office for chief of staff(五軍都督部). Not long after the Ming dynasty established, the military situation was unstable, and the economy also suffered severe damage. In order to strengthen the centralization of authority and consolidate the new power, Hongwu Emperor drew lessons from the failure of Yuan(元) dynasty, summarized the successful experience on the management of past ages after repeated thinking. Due to a profound historical background and his military experience in his early years, he attached great hatred towards the military official embezzlement. This thoughts ran through the whole process when formulated "the Great Ming Code", "Da Gao"(大誥) and other messages as well as regulations. Despite the limitations of these measures, the effect of military system did not achieve the desired results.
  • 6.

    The meaning of construction efforts of Korean Air power during the period of independence(1945∼1948)

    Ki-doong Kim | 2016, (99) | pp.189~222 | number of Cited : 5
    Abstract PDF
    This study focuses on the efforts of airmen to build air power since the Liberation of Korea until the establishment of government and intends to reveal the significance of such endeavor. As a result, it was possible to see the activities of the Korean National Preparatory Air Force(KNPAF) and conflicts between the airmen in a new light. The gist of this study is as follows. After liberation, air facilities and equipments implemented by the Japanese Empire were left behind on the Korean Peninsula. Trained during the colonial era, the airmen rallied around the Korea Aviation Association(KAA) and the KNPAF and attempted to build air power by using the air heritage from the Japanese. In order to achieve this goal, cooperation with the U.S military government was indispensable. The U.S military authorities, however, ramped up its control over aviation and dismissed the two organizations as it referred to incidents, such as flying without notice and corruption. Although Korea's dream of building air power appeared fallen to pieces due to U.S intervention, the airmen strived to find ways to stand back up again by forming small organizations in their own specialized fields. Other Air Force figures, such as General Choi Yongduk, returning home from overseas became a cause for the remaining personnel in the nation to gather once again, and this led to the foundation of the Korea Aviataion Establishment Assocation(KAEA). The KAEA was not only an organization that combined the two associations aforementioned, but it also included airmen overseas. Accordingly, the KAEA could carry out activities in various fields to build air power. One area that produced noteworthy achievements was the military field, in which an air unit was created and the basis for aviation training was established. On the other hand, the transportation sector in civil aviation under performed. Considering that Korea Int'l Airline approved to fly by colluding with the U.S military government ended up not operating, such limitation is more likely due to the influence of U.S military policies than the lack of the KAEA's capabilities. In order to make a result immediately in case the U.S military government showed any sign of shifting its control policies, the airmen continuously put much effort in building air power. Again, the establishment of an air unit and of the basis for aviation training is just one representative instance in line with such exertion. Likewise, the steadily developing air power Korea could maintain before and after the foundation of government can be said to have derived from the effort inside rather than outside. These efforts were not fruitless, for they became the driving force for further development of air power.
  • 7.

    General Kim Hong-il and Han river defensive operation in early Korean war

    Dongwon Lee | 2016, (99) | pp.223~256 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    The Han river defensive operation that Siheung theater commander, Kim Hong-il led, have a historical significance because it was the first battle that recover the early failures of Korean war under the clear notion of ‘delaying tactics.’This tactics had became the fundamental concept of the ROK army operations in Korean war until Nak-dong river defensive operations. The Han river defensive operation also contributed to the U.S. ground troops deployment as it gave the opportunity of General Macarthur's inspection for the front line. Moreover, it secured the time and space to engage the U.S. ground troops in warfare. Hereby a big turning point, the formation of ROK-US combined operations, was created. For such a reason, the role of Siheung theater commander, Kim Hong-il who successfully led the 6 days’ Han river defensive operation has a important meaning in Korean war history. Since then, Kim Hong-il came into conflict with the U.S. commanders and the military advisory group, and he was discharged as a lieutenant general in March 1951 as a means of president Rhee’s controlling the military. But he should be reviewed again as a representative of ROK army in Korean war history.
  • 8.

    The humanitarian relief activities of the Korean Forces during the period of the South Vietnam’s collapse

    Lee Sin Jae | 2016, (99) | pp.257~288 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    This study is a research on the humanitarian relief activities of the Korean government around the South Vietnam's collapse period. At that time, The government of ROK was received request by the South Vietnam government. And Korean government decided to support the policy for South Vietnam. But Korea government policy was limited to purely humanitarian level. These are as follows. First, transferring to South Vietnam of aid goods, second, transport support for the refugees, third, support for withdraw of the Korean residents abroad and embassy. The Korean government's support policy was performed by the Navy. The Navy had organized squad which was consisted of two landing ship(LST), and the Squad was dispatched for South Vietnam. It was called with a “75 Sipjasung plan” or “Sipjasung operation”. The result of operations, aid goods were delivered safely to South Vietnam, and it arrived 1335 persons including the Korean residents abroad and Vietnamese refugees at Busan port safely. This Non-combatant evacuation operation(NEO) was the first case of Korean Government and Korean Forces in Korean history. But related study is not proceed until recent. "Sipjasung operation" have a significance as the first overseas NEO case. In the future it seems to need further study.
  • 9.

    An Analysis on the Current Preparedness and Necessary Tasks of the Republic of Korea to Address the North Korean Nuclear Threat based on Total War Theories

    Park Hwee Rhak | 2016, (99) | pp.289~322 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    This paper is written to analyse the unique nature of a nuclear threat compared to a conventional one and recommend right approaches based on the analysis. It concludes that nuclear weapons targets the people directly, which is quite different from the conventional warfare. It also concludes that the nuclear threat cannot be defended by the military alone and needs the systematic division of labors among the people, the government and the military based on Clausewitz's “Trinity” theory. As recommendations, South Korean government, the military and the people of the country should achieve the trinity regarding their preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat. The South Korean government should engage in various diplomatic efforts to compel North Korea to return to the negotiation table for the denuclearization and make the comprehensive deterrence and defense strategy to protect its people from the worst case scenario. The South Korean military needs to change its organizations, priorities among various tasks and budget demands in order to guarantee the effective response to the North Korean nuclear threat. It should expedite the construction of its capabilities for the Kill Chain and KAMD against the North Korean nuclear weapons. It needs to ensure the reliable combined nuclear defense posture as soon as possible by using the division of labor concept with the U.S. military. The South Korean military should focus on building up the capabilities that the U.S. military may not be able to provide, while depending on the U.S.'s extended deterrence. South Korean people should understand the serious nature of current North Korean nuclear threat and demand the government and the military to provide necessary defense measures for them. Furthermore, they should try to implement necessary civil defense measures to survive even the nuclear attack.
  • 10.

    The meaning of ‘Military Genius’ in Clausewitz's On War

    Lim Ik-soon | 2016, (99) | pp.323~370 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The purpose of this paper is research that how to Clausewitz figure out the concept of ‘Military Genius’ in On War through analyzing for the nature of war and developing the war theory, and that what is the ‘Military Genius’, and that which meaning and implication is for today. Clausewitz’s perspective in developing for war and ‘Military Genius’ was searching for nature factors in variety and complicated phenomena of war by Montesquieu’s analysis - synthesis method for searching of type of a political structure in The Spirit of Laws. In the flow of history, Clausewitz spread out the logic that borrowing the thought and format from Kant and Hegel through core value of Enlightenment - reason, empiricism, science, universalism, freedom, simplicity of human nature. The concept of ‘Military Genius’ is the outcome that Clausewitz developed the logic about correlation between the appeared genius in war phenomena and unique traits of genius and artist in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Clausewitz accepted the thought of Kant’s Theory of Genius and Theory of Art and A. Gerard’s opinion. But, Clausewitz explained the mental capacity in his own ward re-interpreting unique trait for Military Genius in war phenomenon that distinguish Kant’s genius in the Theory of Art. The Meaning of Military Genius in On War is that he is the existence of playing a main part for maintaining maximum freedom and balance to element of trinity as the arbitrating exist. And that he play a center part for developing the victorious strategy thinking over all physical and mental elements, passing through the total phenomenon world in war. And he has to dominate the uncertainty through the courage as private mental capacity and a piercing eye(coup d’ oeil), determination, equanimity, the power of self-control, sense of topography as supreme commander. And he has to play a center part for victory and implementing the strategy through fostered the total force’s team spirits and demonstrating the fearlessness. Given the implicature for us today by Clausewitz’s On War and ‘Military Genius’ is that we can control and overcome the uncertainty because the uncertainty can’t be eliminated forever. And to the soldier, in commanding war, private mental capacity is the highest value in any war. Furthermore, it’s also very important for military’s team spirit and commander’s fearlessness in war. In addition, it’s very important value today that we have to right understand trinity as the harmony of nature element in war.
  • 11.

    The Caucasus war and the emigration problem of the Circassian nation in the 19th century

    Shin, Dong-Hyug | 2016, (99) | pp.371~404 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    The “Circassian question” is an important element defining the characteristic of the Caucasus war in the 19th century and contains the tragic history of an ethnic group. This article examines the “Circassian question” as a result of the Caucasus war of the 19th century, that is, studies the cause and process of large-scale Circassian migration into the Ottoman Empire from the Northwest Caucasus to 1864 after the Crimean War. The interpretation and assessment about the 19th century the Caucasian war(the Circassian question) shows a clear different position between the central(mainly russkie scholars) and local scholars(mainly from the Caucasus regions). Russkie scholars recognize an inevitability, a harsh conquest policy in war process and Circassian’s big victim as it’s result. Also they assert that Tsar’s government had no goal of eliminating Circassians, there were important assignments of Tsar’s government policy that to keep Black Sea coast and to strengthen the new frontier of the empire in the Caucasus. Russkie scholars, emphasizing that as the most sensitive issue the cause and characteristic of Circassian migration are an outcome of Russia-Turkey-Britain interests surrounding the Northwest Caucasus, using sometimes ‘forced-muhajirun’ expressions they insist that Circassian’s migration was ‘muhajirun’. This stance doesn’t differ much from interpretation of Russian Empire period. On the other hand, the first source cited in the text and like the Caucasus region researchers did prove in their studies, after defeat in the Crimean War Tsar’s colonial policy in the Northwest Caucasus was not differentㄴ from that of other Caucasus(Chechnya and Dagestan). There is a need to give an eye to that Circassian migration policy was implemented, in the situation that Russia already seized the chance to victory in Caucasus war. And there was not the case of driving out 90% inhabitant of the conquest of areas outside Caucasus like Circassians anywhere. Deportation has occurred frequently in history of Russia, but it is difficult to find a case of driving an ethnic group out of country. But Tsar’s government regarded Circassians as the potential risks of the northwest Caucasus region, it decided to get rid of them permanently rather than to manage the risk element. And the result was the large-scale Circassian migration into the Ottoman Empire. Therefore in spite that the Circassian migration has elements such as ‘muhajirun’, ‘forced-muhajirun’ and ‘deportation’ in fact, there are more distinctive things like ‘the deportation of an ethnic unit’ or ‘an ethnic cleansing.’