Korean | English

pISSN : 1598-317X / eISSN : 2713-8992

2020 KCI Impact Factor : 0.66
Home > Explore Content > All Issues > Article List

2018, Vol., No.107

  • 1.

    The Protestant Activities and Spiritual War Power in an Army during the Korean War : Focused on Chaplains and Protestant Soldiers

    Yun, Enseok | 2018, (107) | pp.1~52 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    The Main theme of the thesis is to reveal that Korean Protestantism contributed to the reinforcement for military spiritual war power of ROK armed forces during the Korean War through the faith activities of chaplains and protestant soldiers. After the outbreak of war, the chaplains appointed by the military supreme HQ under the banner of religious principles had an another purpose that promotes spiritual war power with faith in addition to evangelical work. Their preaching would quite often relate to the strengthening of spiritual war power, they had achieved this purpose through the actions of foundation of church, and worship, baptism on soldiers. It also gave assistance to promote spirit of soldiers that they comforted the soldiers who were fighting at a battle fields and disabled veteran. This study presumes Protestantism might contribute to military spiritual war power from three aspects. One is the commanders’ change into positive attitude about chaplains and Protestantism. Another is a large percentage of solders who chose Protestantism in the war. The other is the behaviors Protestant soldiers showed in the war. Through these examples, this study can estimate that the level of the spiritual war power that Protestantism gave soldiers. The study methodology of this study is literature research. Many articles on war relating to Protestantism is in Protestant newspaper. War veteran’s writing can be the channel through which we understand wartime. With these materials, this study reveals the spiritual war power through Protestantism.
  • 2.

    The Transitional History of the Korean Naval Officer’s Rank Insignia: Focused on Metal Grade Insignia

    신성재 | 2018, (107) | pp.53~82 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Rank insignia means a symbol that, attached to military uniform or cap, and shows soldier’s status and rank. This article examines the transition of metal grade insignia especially. Design features of periodical changes in the insignia are summed as follows. First, the rank insignia in early period was designed Taeguk symbol at the center of the bases of Mugunghwa pattern. This insignia had been used during the period from February 1 1946 to November 30. The insignia borrowed the retaining button of police officer’s cap in the National Security Guard temporarily, which indicated the limits that the navy failed to establish its independent rank insignia. During the transition period, the rank insignia of the Korean navy reflected its original characteristics. Of course, the star-shape rank insignia of flag officers was influenced by that of the US Navy. Unlike this, the rank insignias of officers below flag grade were manufactured following the tortoise shell shape that symbolized the armor protecting the rooftop of the turtle ship. It meant the birth of Korean navy’s original rank insignia with independent and distinctive characteristics since the insignia was granted with the symbolic significance that the navy was the posterity of Admiral Yi Sunshin. In the settlement period, the Korean naval officer’s rank insignia was revised to the triservice common insignia. The Ministry of Defense began to commonize rank insignia in 1953 and adopted diamond(Company grade officer), bamboo leaf(field grade officer), and star(flag officer) designs. These designs represented the gradually escalating ranks in terms of the natural world; they also meant that individual rank insignias of each branch of the armed forces became a triservice common system. The common insignia was in use between May 1954 and August 1975. In September 1975, naval officer’s rank insignia went through a partial revision. It was because the star-shape rank insignia of flag officers was identical to that of foreign armed forces and thus lacked originality. Therefore, Mugunghwa and its leaves were added to the insignia as the flower reflected Korean character. This design was expanded to the entire officer ranks in January 1980. The application of the design that symbolized Korea to the entire officer’s rank insignia meant the complete establishment of naval officer’s rank insignia system as the design demonstrated clearly the national identity. This complete rank insignia system continues today, making itself the core symbol of the identity of officers of the navy and the Korean armed forces.
  • 3.

    The images of Yi Sun-Sin reflected on the writings of a naval officer at the period of Meiji - Focusing on the writings of Ogasawara Naganari

    Kim, Joonbae | 2018, (107) | pp.83~110 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    Among the Japanese Navy officers during the period of Meiji in Japan, Ogasawara Naganari was the first one to announce Yi Sun-sin to the Navy and the public. He published "The History of the Imperial Navy" and "The Lectures on the Sea-Power History of the Japanese Empire," in 1898, 1902 respectively. Both of them described Yi Sun-sin positively and highly praised. "The History of the Imperial Navy" was written for the general public and distributed to middle schools in the whole country. "The Lectures on the Sea-Power History of the Japanese Empire" affected naval officers because this book was a publications of compiling notes that he lectured when Ogasawara was a navy college instructor. Therefore, these two writings played a great role in spreading Yi Sun-sin in Japan. Ogasawara's detailed description of Yi Sun-sin was not simply due to his respect for Yi Sun-sin. In both writings, the Sea-Power was emphasized, and Yi Sun-Sin was ultimately used to achieve the goal of the expansion of navy powers. It was written by the basis of the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, a US war historian, as the theoretical basis and found the case in Japanese history. The defeat of Japanese navy during the Japanese invasion of Korea and the victory of the Korean navy led by Yi Sun-sin were very effective in showing the importance of 'the Sea-Power'. In addition, Yi Sun-sin was a "loyal to the nation" that the Japanese people had to learn at that time, and he was a "ideal admiral" to be learned by naval officers. As a monarchical nation, loyalty to the nation was essential, and Ogasawara was at the forefront of his role during his lifetime. For him, Yi Sun-sin was the most "ideal soldier." So Ogasawara seems to have praised Yi Sun-sin more positively. It is clear that these two writings of Ogasawara have propagated Yi Sun-sin in the positive direction in the Meiji Navy. His writings have formed images of Yi Sun-sin in Japan along with the history books, novels, and biographies already published at this time.
  • 4.

    A Study on the Position of the Marine Corps Headquarters in Jeju Island

    Park, Jong-sang | 2018, (107) | pp.111~145 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Since the establishment of the Marine Corps of Republic of Korea, the locations of the HQ has been changed a lot and many units have created and expanded over the time, and they have been lost due to the adjustment of the organization. And new units were created, and existing units moved to new places. It is not easy to find the positions of the troops that were formed in the early days of the army due to such a large number of changes. It is because many places do not appear at the time of the formation of the unit. It is located on Jeju Island, which is the second station after the foundation, in front of Joil Pharmacy at Gwangdeok-ro. It is equipped with a marker that the Marine Corps HQ. is stationed on. However, the position and the position of the marker should be more thoroughly researched historically. Former Defense Minister Kim Seong-eun, who was Marine Corps Commander's Chief of Staff at the time, arrived at Jeju Island when the Marine Corps arrived at Jeju Island, where he visited the Battalion headquarters of the Army's 1st Independence Battalion, and received orders from Colonel Kim Yong-Ju And that he used the two-story wooden building used by the army. Because Jeju Island was the 1st Army Independent Battalion that was assigned to the 2nd Army Army. Thus, the Marines were taken over from the 1st Army Independent Battalion on December 28, 1949. At that time, the 1st Army Independent Battalion had a commanding post in the Jeju agricultural high school, where the 2nd Army Rgt. hq. was located, and the Marine Corps was stationed after the takeover of this area. There was a Marine Corps HQ. at 283 Samdo-ri (currently located at Jeju International Education Information Center), which was located in the Jeju agricultural High School at that time. Therefore, it should be installed at Jeju International Education Information Center, which is the location of the old Jeju agricultural high school where the Marine Corps HQ. was located since December 28, 1949. After the emergency martial law was declared on July 8, 1950, the Marine Corps HQ. was located in Gwandeokjeong. Also, the contents of marker should be corrected.
  • 5.

    Organizational Limits in Strategic Implementation: Revisiting the Cause of the Chinese Gunfire on Soviet Borderguards in Zhenbao Island

    Sangyeon Parkd | 2018, (107) | pp.147~192 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    On March 2, 1969, the gunfire perpetrated by the Chinese Border Guards killed thirty one Soviet Border Guards. This incident triggered a strategic crisis between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Most analytic work on this topic explaining this incident by way of the ‘unitary actor model’ considered it as an intentional attack by the central government of the PRC (People's Republic of China). However, this view ignores the complexity inherent in a tactical situation in this border area. Moreover, the primary sources quoted by the literature fails to corroborate that the Chinese central government or the military command of the PRC Army literally ordered or commanded the gunfire on March 2nd. This paper tries to reassess the cause of 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflict from the perspective of organization theory. It focuses on how the military organization on the field can implement the crisis management strategy planned by the central government in a mistaken manner. According to the Normal Accident Theory, when the unit (the lower level of the entire organization) deals with a complex and highly sensitive incident, it faces the dilemma of 'decentralization' as it has to cope with 'the interactive complexity' and 'the tightness of coupling' at the same time. As the incident is interactively complex, the system (the upper level of the entire organization) permits the decentralization of the unit (the lower level of the entire organization) in order to ensure a flexible response to a complex situation. On the other hand, if the incident is tightly coupled to the entire organization, the system tries to centralize the unit in order to minimize the risk of the unit's engaging in an unexpected action. If the incident is complex and tightly coupled, however, the system faces problem of determining the right level of decentralization between the system and the unit. The relations between the state and the military organization in a security crisis is emblematic of such an organizational dilemma in 'Normal Accident Theory'. As escalation between nuclear states results in mutual destruction, each state tries to tightly control its military organization in order to use it for the purpose of delivering diplomatic signals to the opposing states. This means that the state needs to be sure that the military fulfill the mission given without deviation, for the fear of sending an unintended wrong diplomatic signal. While this may be so from the state’s level perspective, the military units in the field still face the organizational duty of survival in a complex tactical situation. This, in turn, demands decentralization in military actions and maximization of military readiness at the field. So if the state’s control of the military is not strong enough, the military, given the challenges it faces, will enhance combat readiness, which likely leads to unintended diplomatic signals to its opposing states. The preemptive gunfire by PRC border guards on 2nd of March was the result of the organizational dilemma of the PRC government-military organization relations rather than a well-coordinated action by the Chinese government. The PRC central government tried to implement the 'controlled pressure' strategy which tries to maintain the patrolling operations carried out for years, in facing the USSR's 'limited escalation' strategy which tries to increase the intensity and the frequency of the border patrol operations. However, contrary to the perception of the PRC central government and the local military district, the tactical situation in the border area was unfavorable to PRC border guards. Moreover, the PRC rules of engagement exercised tight control only over the size of double-squads, and gave platoon –level operations significant discretion by commanding by negation. This means that platoons were allowed to act first and report later. As a result, the border patrol squad in the Zhenbao Island tried to enhance the combat readiness by exploiting the loophole of the PRC army's rules of engagement. The border patrol platoon instantly returned fire when they heard the gunfiring sound from the Soviet side, although the PRC government and the military district issued strict limits on gunfire. This research raises questions about the widely-accepted cause of the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict. Moreover, it tries to design a theoretical framework for organizational problems in a state’s implementing crisis management strategies.
  • 6.

    Eyes on the ‘Central Plains’: The Manchus’ Military Strategies and Tactics during the Early 17th Century

    Minsu Park | 2018, (107) | pp.193~235 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    Since the founding of the empire, Nurhaci and his followers suffered from continuous shortage of food, and repeatedly attacked the Ming frontier to secure supplies and other essential materials. Later, in his discussion with the high-ranking Manchu officials, we can see that Hong Taiji considered these frontier raids as the most effective way of raising the morale of the Manchus. In theory, Hong Taiji knew that attacking Beijing via the Shanhai Pass was the most effective way of conquering the Ming, but he also realized that this strategy was unrealistic and risky. Collaborators from the Ming also proposed detailed and systematic plans to achieve this seemingly impossible plan of overtaking Beijing. However, Hong Taiji clearly rejected this optimistic idea of the Ming defectors and Manchu officials, and maintained a more cautious approach of staying to the raiding expeditions against the Ming. The scale and frequency of the raids increased over time, but Hong Taiji still avoided any contact with Shanhai Pass itself and focused the attacks to the frontier area around Beijing. Despite his continuous success in the raids to the Ming territory, as long has he did not secure Shanhai Pass the raids were only raids; they did not evolve into conquest war in a real meaning.
  • 7.

  • 8.