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2019, Vol., No.110

  • 1.

    The historical reality of the battle of ‘Danghang castle’ during the period of the Three Kingdoms Period

    Yoon, Seong-Hwan | 2019, (110) | pp.1~38 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    In the meantime, it has been extreme confusion in the documentary record and researchers' discussions about the battle of ‘Danghang castle(党項城)’ in the Three Kingdoms period(三國時代). As a result of reviewing the related historical material from the basic point of view, the following history can be depicted. In 643, Backje(百濟)'s King Uija(義慈王) pushed the attack on the Danghang castle to block Silla(新羅)'s lines of communication with Dang-China(唐). In order to overcome Silla's defensive network, which was concentrated on the traffic road around the Danghang castle, Backje's King Uija cooperated with the Goguryeo(高句麗), who was monitoring the military and diplomatic trends of Silla at the Han River(漢江) and the Imjin River(臨津江) estuary toward the West Sea(西海), and prepared for a considerable period of time. Through this, the king Uija tried to raid Danghang castle. However, at the time when the three countries' secret war plans fiercely developed, such preparations had the adverse effect of releasing relevant information to Silla. Although Silla had already dispatched an envoy to Dang-China to ask for salvation, Silla sent another envoy to Dang-China to announce it. The delegation seemed to have delivered relevant information to Dang-China in November 643. And, as Baekje became aware of the information leak, the king Uija, who mobilized troops to attack Danghang castle in November 643, seemed to have stopped the attack, judging that the raid(surprise attack) was no longer possible. In other words, the king's attack discontinuance on Danghang castle was based on his own military strategic judgment, not on Baekje's relationship with Dang-China. Here, a part of Baekje foreign policy is revealed in this period. At that time, Baekje had been pushed foreign policies that pursued both ‘goodwill against China’ and ‘attack on Silla’. In this context, cooperation with Koguryo seems to have been maintained at the level of ‘strategic cooperation’ rather than ‘military alliance’. In the later days, Dang-China criticized Baekje for having had duplicity, but it was Baekje's foreign policy to maximize the security and purpose of self- country at that time. This was the result of inheriting his father's ‘two-way policy(兩端策)’. The reason why Baekje was able to use this foreign policy seems to be that it did not assume that the Dang-China could directly penetrate across the sea, believing different geographical advantages from Goguryeo as King Dang-China Taejong(唐 太宗)'s commentary in 643.
  • 2.

    Anseung(安勝)’s Direction during the period of the Revival Movement of Goguryeo

    Weonjoo Jung | 2019, (110) | pp.39~92 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    After the fall of Goguryeo, the revival movement of former Goguryeo took place in ex-Goguryeo territory, the most well-known is the revival Goguryeo kingdom, which was conducted in Hanseong by Geommozam(검모잠) and Anseung(안승). The Tang Dynasty sent Gogan(고간) as its army commander to punish them. Anseung killed Geomozam and surrendered to Silla, and Silla placed them in Geummajeo(금마저), now Iksan(익산). The period was around June 670, and in July, Anseung was appointed as King of Goguryeo by the King of Silla. Silla fought against Tang Dynasty by force to defeat Unjin Dodokbu(웅진도독부) and was supporting Goguryeo in Hanseong(한성). However, as its influence expanded to the Yalu River(압록강) basin zone, Geomozam was killed in a conflict between the Geomozam factions, which wanted to move to Pyongyang(평양), the capital of former Goguryeo, and the Anseung forces that wanted to move to Silla during the war with Tang Dynasty. This seems to be the first suggestion from Silla to go to Geummajeo, judging that it would be difficult to control the ‘Hanseong Goguryeo’ government located if its base moved to Pyongyang. Silla appointed Anseung, who settled in Geummajeo, as king of Goguryeo, in order to justification for controlling the revivalist forces, which is fighting against the Tang Dynasty in Goguryeo's old territory. Geomozam was killed and Anseung went to Silla, but the revival movement in former Goguryo's Territory was fierce until 673. In particular, there were push-and-pull battles in the area of Hanganghae province(황해도) including Pyongyang, the group of resistance in which was called "'the remnants of Pyongyang" in Chinese historical records, which can be regarded as the forces of Hanseong Goguryeor in terms of their major activity area, size and organizational. Goeyeonmu(고연무), who was known as a general in Goguryeo of Geummajeo, appears to have been the leader of the group. Despite the loss of Liaodong Tu-Hu-Fu(안동도호부) in Pyongyang due to the division of the leadership, they seem to have been able to get over the crisis in haste because of their activities against the Tang Dynasty in Goguryeo. The continuing aid of Silla could have made them continue to fight against Tang Dynasty army. However, after Silla conquered Baekjae's old territory with Unjin Dodokbu, Silla's support for the Goguryeo revival movement group was gradually shifting to a formal and demonstrative manner. Moreover, the Goguryeo revival army gradually retreated to the south as it became more aggressive in its fight against Silla and its crackdown on them after learning that the revival movement was prolonged and connected with Silla in the Tang Dynasty. As they were headed for Silla after losing the Hanganghae Province and defeating the Battle of Horoha(호로하) along the Imjin River(임진강) basin, Goguryeo revival movement group's fighting against the Tang army in Goguryeo's Old Territory came to an end in four years. The Anseung group settled in Geummajeo reshuffled the Goguryeo-style system of lanterns and reorganized it into a five-part system and established its status as a state. They also began diplomatic affairs by sending envoys to Japan. After the revival movement in Goguryeo's former Territory failed in 673, its group was not able to take the lead in Geummajeo due to the power of Anseung, which was already in place. Silla appointed Anseung as the King of Bodeok in 674, which means that his kingdom has been downgraded to Silla's vassal. But the names of the kingdom still seems to have been called Goguryeo, considering the names used externally. Silla brought Anseung to Gyeongju(경주) in 683 and incorporated him as a member of the Jingol nobility, disbanding Geummajeo's Goguryeo Kingdom and absorbing it into the local control system of Silla named Bodeok Fotress(보덕성). There was a revolt in Bodeok Fortress, and the rebellion expanded in conjunction with the Baekje Epitaph. The Goguryeo Epitaph of Bodeok Fortress advanced to Gajam Fortress(가잠성), the region of Anseong at this moment, and resisted Silla, but failed. Baekjae Epitaph's resistant continued event after the breakup of the rebellion in Bodeok Fortress, We can know from the records that the local system for its Old Territory was establish and they were reorganized into the Nine Seodang Guard system after a year or two later. Given the scale of Baekjae Epitaph's resistant, the anti-Silla tendency seems to have been formed for a long time. The Silla government, which grasped the atmosphere of the Baekje Old Territory, rushed to dismantle the Goguryeo of Geummajeo in haste, and the reaction could be seen as the rebellion of Bodeok Fotress' s Goguryeo Epitaph combined with the Baekje Epitaph. As the rebellion of Bodeok Fotress's Goguryeo Epitaph was subdued by Silla, their traces disappeared into history.
  • 3.

    The Unification War of the Later Three Kingdoms and the Battle of Unju

    Shin, Seongjae | 2019, (110) | pp.93~123 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The battle of Unju was a decisive battle that marked a watershed in the unification war of the Later Three Kingdoms. The battle broke out twice in March 927 and September 934. The first battle in 927 was fought by Wang Geon and Geung Jun, lord of Unju, and the second by Wang Geon and Gyeon Hwon. The first battle broke out for Wang Geon to subjugate Unju. The battle also aimed to block Later Baekje's military activities and dominate the unification war by establishing logistics network linking the southern coast of Gyeongsangnam-do and the interior of Gyeongsangbuk-do. It resulted in Wang Geon's victory. Defeated in the battle, Geung Jun defected to Goryeo, while Wang Geon built a fortress at Oksan where he deployed troops. Geung Jun, lord of Unju, is thought to be the same person as Hong Gyu who was the father of Wang Geon's twelfth queen, Madam Heungbok although it it difficult to exclude the possibility that he was a different person. Seven years after the first battle, the second battle brok out in September 934. The second battle was fought for hegemony in the Chungcheong area and the West Sea under the circumstances where the maritime power and the strategic value of Unju were closely related. The second battle ended with one-sided victory of Wang Geon. Goryeo could win the battle because it concentrated on maneuvering strong cavalry that excelled in mobility and penetration. Wang Geon won a perfect victory following Yu Geumpil's offensive strategy that utilized the cavalry whereas Gyeon Hwon was bitterly defeated. The second battle became a watershed for Goryeo to certainly dominate the heated war over the Chungcheong area. Having won the victory, Goryeo became able to lead the unification war by conquering the Chungcheong area and securing maritime power in the West Sea. Meanwhile Later Baekje suffered downsizing of its ruling territory and loss of maritime power thereby its will to win the war being remarkably weakened. In the end Later Baekje began to walk down the road of collapse, having lost its hegemony since this battle
  • 4.

    Achievements and Tasks of the Researches about Goguryeo’s Facilities in the area of South Korea

    윤성호 | 2019, (110) | pp.125~163 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    The number of military facilities left after Goguryeo's entry into the area of South Korea has been 70 places, and 20 ones have been excavated. In this paper, We examined the Goguryeo's Military facilities in the area of South Korea by combining them with the four regions of the Geumgang River- Mihocheon stream basin zone, the Hangang River-Jungnangcheon stream basin zone, the Yangju basin zone, and the Imjingang River-Hantangang River basin zone. The results of major excavation surveys in each region were reviewed, and the present status and prospects of the study of the Goguryeo's Military facilities were described. First of all, we looked at the types of Goguryeo's Military facilities. The first is the type of breeze castle recycled Baekje's Earthen Fortification in the Hangang River -Mihocheon stream basin zone, the second is the type of Fort in the Hangnag River-Jungnangcheon stream basin and the Yangju basin zones, and the third is the isosceles triangle in the isosceles triangle using the natural topography of the Imjingang River-Hantangang River basin zone. We divided the time period by associating these types of military facilities with Goguryeo's southern region. The 1st Period of the three ones was the time when the Imjingang River-Hantangang River basin zone was constructed before the 5th century and constructed Military facilities. In the middle of the 5th century, the 2nd period was a time when Chungju was used as a Gukwon. And the 3rd period was the time when King Jangsu of Goguryeo captured the capital of Hansung Baekje in 475 and Goguryeo built a Forts by fighting against Baekje in the Hangang river basin zone. Next, the operation period of the Goguryeo's Military facilities in the Hangang River basin zone was reviewed. It is common idea to use it from the 6th century to the mid-6th century. However, recent analysis of the Forts confirmed the possibility that Goguryeo had come back south after the middle of the 6th century Finally, we looked at facilities similar to Goguryeo's Military facilities in South Korea. The Forts of Baekje in the 6th to 7th century, similar to the Forts of Goguryeo, have been identified in South Korea. In addition, there is a small Fort in China that shows the characteristics of the small fortress It is not yet investigated, but if these data are secured in the future, I think that it will be an important foundation to restore the genealogy and operation method of the Goguryeo's Military facilities and to fill the vacancy of the ancient military History of Korea.
  • 5.

    The Formative Process and Contents of the military rites, Gyeonjangchuljeugeui(遣將出征儀) and Sahwaneui(師還儀) in the Period of the Goryeo Dynasty

    Jung-Soo Han | 2019, (110) | pp.165~202 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    This study dealt with three research tasks in a broad sense. The first is to examine the meaning of the military rites and the composition of the volume 'military rites' of 「Yeji(예지)」. The second is to examine the establishment, contents and actual case of Gyeonjangchuljeugeui(遣將出征儀) and thereby attempt to understand what ritual procedures and operation occurred. The final task is to examine the contents, cases and operational methods of Sahwaneui(師還儀) paired with the rites of going into battle. As a result, the following findings were obtained: The Goryeo Dynasty organized the military rites ritualizing the military control by administering domestic and foreign affairs by means of courtesy and dignity for the purpose of their assimilation. The military rites in Goryeo Dynasty were composed of Gyeonjangchuljangeui(遣將出征儀), Sahwaneui(師還儀), Guilwolsikeui(救日月食儀) and Gyedongdaenaeui(季冬大儺儀). But it is judged that the actual rites differed from the military rites of 『Goryosa(History of the Goryeo Dynasty』. First of all, Gyeonjangchuljeugeui(遣將出征儀) were equipped with the ancestral rites for a successful war such as Ryu(類), Eui(宜), Jo(造) and so on. The Goryeo Dynasty enhanced the dignity of the holy royal authority by performing the rites for taking and returning battle-axes and halberds(斧鉞) at Gyeongryeongjeon(景靈殿) with the king at the center through Gyeonjangchuljeugeui(遣將出征儀) and Sahwaneui(師還儀) probably organized in the reigning period of kings Yejong and Injong. In particular, Sahwaneui(師還儀) again reinforced subjects' loyalty towards its royal family and kings of the Goryeo Dynasty by symbolizing the facet of sharing virtues with the king at the center by means of dance(舞蹈), Seonggunmanbok(聖躬萬福), Seonji(宣旨), Seonropo(宣露布). Seonsajusik(宣賜酒食) and so on. It mirrored the aspect of sharing the triumphant joy with those making a triumphant return from the battle.
  • 6.

    nternational Situation and War in Northeast Asia during early period of Joseon

    KyeoungLok Kim | 2019, (110) | pp.203~239 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    In a country, war and peace are both contradictory and very closely related concepts as well. Joseon, which inherited political, social, and economic turmoil as a historical heritage at the end of the Goryeo, was established in 1392 and influenced by the international situation of changing Ming from Yuan(元明交替). Under the pluralistic international order, Goryeo had many times of war to influence the national destiny, and while taking full advantage of Goryeo's capabilities, it made strategic diplomatic relations by utilizing the change of international situation. However, after the founding, Joseon focused on the Ming central international order(明 中心 國際秩序) and ignored diplomatic and military alternatives. Of course, this has the advantage of limiting the external forces that invade Joseon from the North. Since Joseon dealt with the ruling class of North, it was punished in terms of border security. In the early days of the founding, Joseon faced internal confusion in the face of changes in international affairs, which were replaced by the Ming from the Yuan, as well as domestic political and military complexity. In addition, Joseon has implemented a fierce defense policy to secure security in the Ming central international order. During the peace period, Joseon could implement long-term and systematic defense policies, but the national policy, which was the national policy for the war, changed due to the initial confusion and the transformation of the international situation. In early Joseon period, the international situation was the decline of Mongolia, a northern nation, and the establishment of Ming Dynasty. In this process, the international situation changed suddenly due to the North Yuan forces of the Liaodong, the Mongol forces in the grassland, the Ruzhen in the northern part of the Korean peninsula. The changes in the international situation have caused frequent military conflicts around Joseon, resulting in massive wars. As a result, the Joseon changes in the defense policy and experience the Campaign against the Jurchen tribesmen(女眞征伐), Tsushima Subjugation(對馬島征伐), Japanese Riots in the Three Ports(三浦倭亂), Nitanggae Invasion(尼湯介亂), Imjin war(壬辰戰爭), Manchu War in 1636(丙子胡亂).
  • 7.

    Response System to Rebellion and Its Operation in Jeolla province -Focusing on the defense against rebel forces in Gyeongsang province during the rebellion in the year of Musin-

    Mun, Gyeong Deuk | 2019, (110) | pp.241~272 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The purpose of this study was to investigate the command system and mobilization patterns of the local forces in Jeolla province with the activities to defend the Gyeongsang rebel forces' advance to Jeolla Province from the historical perspective of military system. For this purpose, I searched the studies about the local systems and military ones to review the response system to rebellion in Jella province. And then, using "the official document file of the Musin Rebellion(『戊申別謄錄』)", which included the reports from local governors during Musin rebellion, I could confirm how the local governors responded to the rebel forces from Gyeongsang under the military system at that time. In the beginning of 18th century, the command system of regional military consisted of provincial governor(監司), provincial military commander(兵使), local divisional commander(營將), and district magistrate(守令) in order. In addition, the troops that could be mobilized in the Jeolla province were the ivory soldiers(牙兵) of headquarters of the provincial governor(監營), the personal troops(親兵) of provincial military commander’s headquarters(兵營) and the regimental troops(束伍軍) in local divisional commander’s garrison(鎭營). But as the cases of exemption of military service were spreaded out at that time, it is impossible to estimate the number of soldiers to have been mobilized from the headquarters of the provincial governor(監營) and the provincial military commander’s headquarter. However, the maximum troops that could be nominally mobilized by the local divisional commander of Unbong(雲峯) included around 5,000 people, 2 companies of horsemen, 34 companies of infantry and so on. The news that the rebellion occurred in Chongju(淸州) on March 15 was delivered to Jeolla province on the evening of 18th. In response to this, Jeolla province mobilized military forces. In the middle of it, the news that the rebellion in Gyeongsang Province occurred on 20th was delivered to Jeolla Province on the 21st. From the moment, Son Myeongdae(孫命大), county magistrate of Ungong and local divisional commander, made a reconnaissance to confirm the rebellion and urgently mobilized the troops to defend the Hill of Pallyang(八良峙), a very important strategic point. However, Kim Yu(金濰), district magistrate of Namwon(南原) refused because there was no official order by royal court, and it was not until he received the order of provincial governor that he supported soldiers. What's worse, it was not easy to gather soldiers quickly, so that only 50% of their troops were gathered on the 27th. The next day, on the 28th, the rebel occupied Hamyang(咸陽), nearby area, and proceeded to the Hill of Pallyang. But the rebels retreated at dawn on the 30th after the provincial troops preoccupied the highlands first. After examining the response system to rebellion and the mobilization of troops, it is certain that there was a problem in the commander's capacity due to the confusion of the command system resulting from the structural defects of the system, and the military command of the non-specialist. Also, the troops couldn't be quickly mobilized, and the mobilized troops were only 2/3 against the nominal number. This shows that the regional response system to the rebellion had already been largely collapsed, and that the institutional and structural problems had to be supplemented by individual capabilities.
  • 8.

    Propagating the Image of Admiral Yi Sun-shin to the Western World: A History of Japan by James Murdoch, Which is the book of playing the Role of connecting link.

    Seok Yeong Dal | 2019, (110) | pp.273~314 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Homer Bezaleel Hulbert and George Alexander Ballard have been noticed as the two main figures in the propagation of the image of Admiral Yi Sun-shin to the West. Hulbert was a ‘Koreaphile’ who introduced Admiral Yi to the Western world. Ballard was a high-ranking Royal Navy officer who favorably compared Admiral Yi to Admiral Nelson and otherwise touted his accomplishments. However, there is a missing link in the propagation of the image of Admiral Yi to the West between the efforts of Hulbert and Ballard. That link is ‘James Murdoch.’ This study examined Murdoch who has long been marginalized in Korean academia even though his book on Japanese history has been an important part of the propagation of the image of Admiral Yi abroad. Murdoch faced many difficulties in his life. After much wandering around the world, he finally settled down in Japan where he wrote A History of Japan, his three-volume masterpiece on Japanese history. The second volume included 16th century Japanese history and so discussed the Imjin War in which Japan invaded Korea and in which the legend of Admiral Yi began. What is particularly interesting about this work is that it also draws the comparison between Admiral Yi and Admiral Nelson. This comparison did not originate with Murdoch, but actually arose from Japanese sources in the 1890s. In the late 19th century, the Japanese wanted the power of the Japanese navy to surpass that of Western navies. They appropriated the legendary history of Admiral Yi in pursuit of this goal. It was in this context that the comparison between Admiral Yi and Admiral Nelson arose. However, this comparison did not last long because of the performance of Tōgō Heihachirō in the Battle of Tsushima (1905). In this battle, Tōgō soundly defeated the Russian navy, causing him to become a source of pride in Japan, so the Japanese had no further need to compare Admiral Yi to Admiral Nelson. However, Murdoch’s history was published in 1903 before the Tōgō had achieved his famous victory, a time when the comparison between Admiral Yi and Admiral Nelson was still prevalent. Murdoch wrote about this comparison because it was so popular at the time and Ballard quoted from Murdoch’s history. It was through this process that the image of Admiral Yi was propagated to the Western world more broadly.
  • 9.

    The Failure Factors of the River-crossing Operations Conducted by North Korean Troops During Initial Phase of the Korean War - Analysing Based on the Battle of the Han-River Crossing -

    정상혁 | 2019, (110) | pp.315~358 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The purpose of this study is analysing failure factors of the Han-River crossing operations conducted by North Korean troops in the early stage of Korean war. Commonly, there are two factors of the failure based on the strategic and operational level. Firstly, they didn't chase Korean Army in Seoul, so they couldn't secure bridges on the Han-River. Secondly, they had not enough river-crossing equipments suitable for Korean terrain. But it is difficult to explain all aspects of unsuccessful operation. So it was necessary to assess tactical level of North Korean troops during conduct of operations. In the initial phase, they weren't prepared well for the reconnaissance, infiltration, deception and fire support of the river-crossing operation, especially in Han-River. After the Han-River battle, the North Korean troops accomplished some improvement in the tactical capability such as Kum-River crossing operation. But, it was too late for achieving objective of the Korean War. Consequently, in order to understand Han-River crossing operation, we have to analyze strategic, operational and tactical level of conduct of river crossing operation together.
  • 10.

    The Implications and Four Plans of ‘Operation Chromite ’, Inchon Amphibious Operation

    Sangho Lee | 2019, (110) | pp.359~388 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This paper reviews the overall ‘Chromite Operation’ plan based on the MacArthur Memorial Collection documents and compares the details of the four operational plans. We will also look into the relevance of the contingency plan SL-17, which was prepared just before the war that some researchers had suggested, to develop in early July, LD-SL-17. In general, when discussing the operation plan of the Inchon Landing Operation, the Chromite Operation Plan, there are three operational plans listed as 100-B, 100-C and 100-D. And these operation plans have been understood as different landing areas - Incheon, Gunsan, and Jumunjin – respectively. However, if you analyze the plan carefully, this is a misinterpretation. In other words, each operation plan is based on the Incheon Landing Operation, and if the US 8th Army does not break the front line of the North Korean Army on the Nakdong River Front, it will undertake an additional landing operation. LD-SL-17(Logistic Study Covering Operations in Korea, LD-SL-17) prepared by the US Army Chief of Staff (G-4), which has been known to be the basis of the Chromite Operation Plan, 17). The plan was revised in July, early in the war. But as we have seen, it is unlikely that this plan is directly linked to the Chromite operation plan. The detailed operational plan does not fit. Therefore, it is unreasonable to claim that the pre-war Far East forces in Korea already predicted and prepared for the outbreak of war. In addition, we can confirm that each project has an organic relation that the meaning of the four chromite operation plans are optional. In other words, 100-A has a meaning as a fake attack plan of the 100-B plan, and it was an operation that could also be used as a real plan in case of emergency. The 100-C plan and the 100-D plan were complementary plans of the 100-B plan. In other words, the Incheon Landing Operation Plan will proceed as planned, assuming the US 8th Army, which can not break the North Korean Front along the Nakdong River, and as a complementary measure, the 100- And the 100-D plan was to annihilate the North Korean forces in South Korea through further landing in the Gangneung- Jumunjin area.
  • 11.

    The Usefulness of Discovering New Resources for the Study of the Naval History in the Korean War - Focused on the British Royal Navy's Operational Records -

    Inseung Kim | 2019, (110) | pp.389~426 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    This thesis examines the usefulness of the Royal Navy's operational records for the study of the naval history in the Korean War. It particularly focuses on the importance of the Korean War studies conducted mainly based on the primary resources produced and collected by the British Royal Navy during their operational period on the West Coast. The purpose of this study is to introduce several remarkable operations carried out by UN forces' in the western sea, which have been largely neglected regardless of their actual value. The last two years of naval operations in the Korean War have been regarded as one of the most unknown parts of the war. The latter part of the naval operation has been defined as a classic example of the static warfare on shore. This unspectacular and dull image of static warfare has led to the UN naval campaign being viewed with relative indifference. In addition, nevertheless of the fact that the responsibility for the west coast naval operation was virtually assigned to the British Royal Navy, this topic has received very little attention from the British. To them, the issues in the Korean Peninsula have been regarded as an area of very little direct interest. This indifference, obviously, has restricted our understanding of a realistic picture of the UN forces’ operation on the west. The problem is that, due to the low interest in that period, several UN forces activities to be noted also have been nearly forgotten by the military historians. This was largely due to the fact that these activities could be only properly explained by the Royal Navy's operational records which have been rarely used. For instance, the rarely told stories about the Anti-Communist guerrilla activities, the process of island warfare, and the detailed information of the final evacuation operation from the northern west islands could be disclosed by the sources. The information in this thesis shows that several comprehensive and objective studies about the Korean War could be conducted if we fully use the British archival resources.
  • 12.

    A Study on the Causes for the Change of the feature in the Iraq War - Focusing on the combination of resistance will and political actors -

    김현식 | 2019, (110) | pp.427~460 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    The Iraq war was the one in which both conventional war, which was a national war, and non-conventional war, which was a war with non-state actors at the same time. The coalition, centered on the United States, conducted a highly effective conventional warfare using weapons systems combined with state-of-the-art science and technology. However, contrary to expectation, the insurgency began to be organized and the warfare changed into a counterinsurgency phase. As can be seen in the Donbass war in 2014, it is hard to imagine that a war between nations will not take place in the modern era where there are 195 nations around the world. However, the characteristics of war can change during the war. In this sense, the war in Iraq, which changed the characteristics of war, has many implications. Therefore, this study focuses on "what causes of warfare have changed in Iraq during the war". To prove this, I have illuminated "resistance will", "political actors" and the "resistance" during the Iraq War using Clausewitz 's "trinity" as a framework of analysis. The will of the Iraqi people to resist and the political actors changed during the war. After the conventional warfare, the Iraqi army was forced to dissolve, but new resistance came to the surface and the war came to a new phase. This study proved through the marvelous trinity that the war pattern changed during the Iraq war. And the cause of the change is that when the resistance will of the people is combined with the political actors, it shows the nature of the war completely. In order to minimize the resistance of the enemy countries, it is important to establish security order after the end of the conventional warfare and to take measures to prevent the emergence of political actors.