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2019, Vol., No.112

  • 1.

    General Kim Hong-il's Experience of National Revolutionary Army of the Republic of China and the Process of Formation on‘WehrStaat’Theory

    KIM JIHOON | 2019, (112) | pp.1~44 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    This article throws light on the military experience and national defense theory of Kim Hong-il by examining the formation of his defense theory during his career in the National Revolutionary Army of the Republic of China. While previous research on national defense has focused either on the Japanese occupation or the Park Chung-hee government era, this paper directs attention to the period around August 1948, when the Republic of Korea Armed Forces were established. This approach is expected to bridge the two separate time periods and facilitate the understanding of Korean military ideology as a continuous theoretical development. The discourse on building national defense, or Wehrstaat, emerged from the lessons of war in the aftermath of World War I. In the era of total war, it meant making preparations for war in peacetime. It required the integration of state-controlled economy with politics for military ends, the process of which involved violence. The theory of Wehrstaat was put forth by German theorists, most notably by Erich Ludendorff. In East Asia, Japan adopted and expanded on it from the 1920s, a change urged on by a group of “total war officers.” From the 1930s, the Nationalist Party of China (KMT) drew from these sources in its attempt to build its own national defense. During his service with the KMT Revolutionary Army, Kim Hong-il took part in the Northern Expedition against regional warlords, Encirclement Campaigns against the Communist Party of China, and the Second Sino-Japanese War against the Imperial Japanese Army. He started out as an officer on the front, gradually rising to the rank of brigadier-general. It is noteworthy that throughout his military career with KMT, his responsibility was in supply and logistics. He served as quartermaster for a subsidiary organization to the Ministry of Defense within the Military Commission. Kim Hong-il mastered national defense theory at Lushan summer training camp, and later at the Military University in Chongqing. The KMT version of national defense he was taught could be traced back to Japanese and German Wehrstaat theory. Kim Hong-il returned to Korea in August 1948, shortly after the establishment of the Republic of Korea and the Armed Forces. He participated in the early organization of the army and was appointed principal of Korea Military Academy. Around this period, he wrote Introduction to National Defense as a textbook for the cadets, but it was also available for purchase to the general public. Kim Hong-il’s national defense theory had been formulated for the newly-created Korean army. He argued for a strong state-controlled economy in order to build national defense. It was his belief that every sector of society should be re-organized around the military. He advocated the installation of a Supreme Commission of National Defense to oversee this process. Unfortunately, Kim Hong-il’s scheme was impractical from the beginning. He wanted to use US assistance via Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to implement his plans. However, ECA aid in East Asia in the 1950s operated on the level of enhancing agricultural productivity in underdeveloped countries. It was unlikely that Kim Hong-il’s proposal could be adopted, since the underlying logic of his scheme would have been unacceptable to US authorities. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the theoretical tradition of national defense was lost in Korea after Kim Hong-il. The national defense ideals of militarization, economic independence and maximum efficiency are some of the most contentious topics in modern Korean history. In general, national defense theory can be understood as the military aspect of revised capitalism after World War I and the Great Depression. It was a radical development strategy deployed by latecomer capitalist countries, as well as an effective shortcut to nation-state building in postcolonial countries like China and Korea.
  • 2.

    Military Crisis, Attempts to Cooperate and Failures Between Syng-man Rhee Government and Kai-shek Chiang Government(1949-1950)

    Hyungah Jung | 2019, (112) | pp.45~82 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    Before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China claimed to be pro-American and tried to address pending issues, counting on aid from the United States. The U.S., however, assumed an indifferent and passive attitude toward military assistance that the two countries wanted to receive. The two governments regarded the similar attitude of the U.S. government as a military crisis in both countries. In particular, at the peak of the sense of crisis in the two countries were the announcements of the “withdrawal of the U.S. troops in Korea” and the “White Paper on the republic of China(Taiwan)-US Relations.” In the Cold War, the U.S. played a role as a leader of the free world, but that did not mean the nation could unconditionally support and assist others in the free world, ignoring its own national interests. The U.S. was not able to give a positive answer to the question about whether the influence of Korea and Taiwan in East Asia on the U.S. interests could be undeniable or not. Moreover, the U.S. government was concerned about a possibility that its military assistance to the two countries could heighten ideological conflicts in East Asia. For this reason, Elpidio Quirino who insisted on forming an anticommunist alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty withdrew his stance by the conciliation of the U.S., and changed into the anticommunist alliance into economic and cultural relations. Back then, Syng-man Rhee and Kai-shek Chiang tried to persuade the U.S. to continue to provide military assistance for the two nations. One of their attempts was the Jinhae Meeting held to carry on discussions on the Pacific Alliance. The two leaders seemed to think that their determined attitude would press Washington. However, as the U.S. did not show a positive change in its stance, the two countries had to have an alternative plan in mind, which was military cooperation between the two nations. Korea attempted to purchase arms from the U.S. with the economic aid that Korea received from Washington, but reached a deadlock several times. Korea planned to purchase war supplies from Taiwan and sent a detailed list to Taiwan. Meanwhile, Taiwan planned to set up a military base in Jeju Island to launch counterattack mainland China. However, the Korean government denied its involvement in Chiang’s plan, saying there was no discussion about it at all between the two nations. Syng-man Rhee and Kai-shek Chiang’s attempt to seek military cooperation was considered as an alternative plan in case aid from the U.S. would be seized, but the bilateral cooperation that the two leaders envisioned was different. Later, Rhee was able to receive arms aid from the U.S., and thus to reject Chiang’s burdensome proposal. Moreover, Rhee made clear that he would follow Quirino’s anticommunist alliance even if the alliance was degenerated and was limited to economic and cultural relations. He came to think that the role of Quirino in its relation with the United States was stronger than that of Chiang. Rhee even said that he could accept the suggestion to exclude Chiang’s Kuomintang of China from the alliance. The anticommunist alliance that they claimed to support was the most commonly observed form during the Cold War. What mattered in forming an alliance was whether each government had a solid and lasting foundation. The relation between the republic of China and Korea in the traditional order was intimately interdependent, and they had to count on each other. Around the time of the Korean War, however, Chiang’s government was weak like a candle flickering in the wind. In addition, the background that both Korea and the republic of China had to prioritize was the U.S., and the two nations’ relation could be affected by the U.S.. For this reason, Korea and the republic of China were allied due to the attitude of the U.S., but the alliance was not inseparable. From the perspective of the U.S. that had to maintain its international relations while having its own interests and security in mind, neither Korea and Taiwan was an undeniable choice like Europe for the U.S. before the outbreak of the Korean War. As people know well, there were significant changes after the outbreak of the Korean War, and both Korea and China were able to maintain their relation as an ally that aids and gives support to each other although they were unable to exchange military assistance.
  • 3.

    A Change of Maritime Strategy in the Maritime dissatisfied great powers by Geographical factors: Focusing on Germany in the World War Ⅰ and Soviet union in the Cold war

    Kim, Dong-eun | 2019, (112) | pp.83~128 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This study began with questions about the maritime strategy changes in the maritime dissatisfied great powers and how there is any correlation between technology (naval arms level) and geography (geopolitical conditions) factors. Therefore, in order to observe the relationship between geographical factors (geopolitical conditions) and maritime strategy, it is necessary to classify maritime strategy into three categories: 'Sea control (offensive)', 'Sea supremacy (complex)' and 'Sea denial'. The numerical change in the technological factor (naval arms level) was also used as a means to observe changes in maritime strategy due to geographical factors. This framework of analysis was applied to two major historical cases of the maritime dissatisfied great powers. The first is the case of the German Imperial Navy, which challenged the United Kingdom during World War I, and the second is the case of the Soviet Navy, which challenged the United States during the Cold War. Although the two cases are similar in some respects, they have pursued different types of maritime strategies due to their different geographical conditions. As a result, the direction of naval arms construction is also affected and the maritime hegemonic challenge against the maritime hegemonic nation has failed. I will apply and verify the framework of the researcher 's analysis on the change of maritime strategy through the case study of the change of the maritime strategy of Germany during the World war I and Soviet during the Cold war above. I would also like to examine how this analysis can be applied to the new maritime hegemonic competition between the United States and China in the 21st century.
  • 4.

    A Historical Review of North Korea's Military Strategy

    Lee, Sang-Taek | 2019, (112) | pp.129~170 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    Military strategy is a sort of military action plan and a way of action for the creation and operation of military means to effectively support the achievement of national interests and national goals. Therefore, the impact on South Korea's security is enormous, depending on the military strategy what the North Korea chooses. This military strategy consists of three elements such as military objectives, military strategic concepts, and military resources. North Korea's consistent military objectives has been to communize the Korean Peninsula since the government was established on the 9th of September in 1948. To achieve this military objectives, the concept of military strategy adopted by North Korea is an offensive strategy. North Korea has continued to develop military resources to realize the concept of military strategy called offensive strategy, and is now believed to be in the final stage of developing nuclear weapons. South Korea should know exactly that the North Korea's military strategy lies in communizing the entire Korean Peninsula. It also calls for an integrated countermeasure to prepare for North Korea's military threats and strengthening South Korea's national security.
  • 5.

    The Dismissal of Private Army(私兵) and the establishment of National Army(公家之兵) in the late Goryo and the early Joseon periods

    JEONG ILTE | 2019, (112) | pp.171~206 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This dissertation analyzes the intents of Confucian scriptures and Chinese ancient system by examining the arguments of the people who had a intention of reforming the military system(兵制) through dismissing Private Army(私兵) in the late period of Goryo and in the early one of Joseon. And this also analyzes how the reformers cognize the problems of the military system at that time, especially how they solved the problems of military power(兵權)‘s whereabouts and methods of function according to the intents. After the Withdrawal from Wihwado, Jo Jun(趙浚)·Jeong Dojeon(鄭道傳) and others reinterpreted that the early Goryo's military system modeled on the Chinese ancient system with reflecting the sprit of the times. And they also made sure of the ideal Army(兵) who protects 'Kingship'(人君之位). Jo Jun(趙浚)·Jeong Dojeon(鄭道傳) and others executed the reformation of military system to realize the ideal Army. But the logics, behind the arguments about Wonsu(元帥)·Jeoljesa(節制使) and their soldiers away from 'Kingship' were changing uder the political circumstances. Finally, the reformers declared to dismiss Private Army and realize National Army(公家之兵) that could not be controlled as anyone and also King(人君) like and would be beneficial to all of the people of the dynasty. However, the declaration didn't mean the completion of the realization of National Army. It stood for the change of the reformers' cognition of Private Army and National Army.
  • 6.

    A Study of the Ideal Images for Military Leadership in the Eastern and Western Humanities Classics - With the Focus on Plato's Republic and Sun Tzu's The Art of War

    Sue, Young-Sik | 2019, (112) | pp.207~237 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    In the long history of the western and eastern philosophy, war has been regarded as one of the most important and famous themes. I would like to clearly explain what is the military leadership theory of Plato(republic) and Sun Tzu(the art of war), and why the study of military leadership through humanities classics is so important to the Republic of Korea in the 21st century, especially the time period of fourth Industrial Revolution featured by convergence and Integration. As well known, Plato's Republic is one of the most important western classics in the political theory. According to Plato, war cannot be regarded as the aim of nation(polis) ruling, but the attack of enemies from the outside should be overcome. In this work we can also find the reason and method of how to prepare and fight against the enemies during the war period. According to Plato war is de facto unavoidable in the human world, because it is rooted in the nature of human being. We should exactly understand that the effective education of guardians is the best way to prepare and overcome the war. In the long history of the ancient china, for example, the period of the spring and autumn and the warring states, war has been regarded as one of the most important and serious subjects through the empire ruling. But war is not a last goal of political acts, but just a quick and safe way to the peace and empire organization. Sun Tzu's world-famous military method work called "the art of war" shows us how to win field fighting and overcome dangerous situations during the war period. He emphasizes that the best way to the victory in the war field is not the number of arms or soldiers, but the authentic power and field leadership of the officer group. So, the long and proper education and hard training of the officer group(the military guardians) have been emphasized.
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