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2019, Vol., No.113

  • 1.

    A Study on Changing the Status of North Korea's ‘military elite' from a Historical Perspective

    Lee Heung Seog | 2019, (113) | pp.1~42 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    North Korea considers Kim Il-sung's armed struggle against imperial Japan as a historical context and seeks the root of the Baekdu bloodline, which it claims is the main line of descent of hereditary succession, in the anti-Japanese armed struggle. As these anti-Japanese armed struggles are rooted in the military atmosphere, the People's Army is the historical enemy of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, and the military elite is a key force in the defense of the regime and an important supporter of the third generation. However, since Kim Jong Un took power, the research has put a position on the possibility that a reduction in the value of conventional forces due to the reemergence and upgrading of nuclear missiles could lead to a weakening of the military's status, which could serve as a potential source of tension threatening the stability of the regime. Therefore, this paper starts from this sense of issue and looks at the proportion of military elite in the Party Political Bureau, the Central Committee of the Party, the National Defense Commission and the President's podium, which can be viewed as the nucleus of North Korean power, while paying attention to the characteristics of North Korea's hereditary succession and the regime. The results of the study are as follows. First, the military elite of Kim Il Sung's reign grew from a former member of the North Korean People's Army to a core elite from the main posts of the ruling party, the government and the military after the fourth party congress in 1961, but its position has weakened since it was purged in 1969 due to military adventurism. Second, the military elite advanced as the party's functions were shaped by military-first politics. Third, as the party normalized its function after Kim Jong Un took power, it carried out a forced generational shift to the military and focused on developing nuclear and missile capabilities. On the other hand, the ratio of the military elite to the party's central committee and the party's political and domestic affairs was the highest In conclusion, the status of the military elite has been maintained even after Kim Jong Un took power. Starting in the historical context of "Bbal-chi-san" the military elite has been trained as a privileged class in educational institutions such as Mangyongdae Revolutionary Academy, holding a certain portion of its shares in the main posts of the ruling party, the government and the military.
  • 2.

    A Research on the Process of Making Korean war Escalation Plan in the United States

    Yoon HyunJin | 2019, (113) | pp.43~86 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The purpose of this paper is to analyse the Process of Making Korean war Escalation Plan in the United State. To this end, this paper differentiating the two periods based on when the U.S. administration was replaced from Harry S. Truman administration to the Dight D. Eisenhower administration. The focus of the analysis is on how the United States has coordinated its political and military views as the political goals of the war change. The U.S. has established OPLAN 8-52 and NSC-147. OPLAN 8-52 was drawn up mainly from the military view, while The NSC-147 was designed mainly on the context of coordinated political and military view. This is because the change in the political situation in the United States has changed the goal of war. Thus, the Eisenhower administration established the NSC-147 by coordinating its political and military views. This Paper has three implications. First, political views were not just a unilateral control of military views. and they were not just in conflict. The second is that the politics and the military's perception of war changed in the course of the Korean War. Finally, the case of this paper provides a good example of the relationship between politics and military in war planning.
  • 3.

    Sino-Japanese War and International Law of the Case of the Singking of the S.S. Kowshing(1894-1903)

    Deokkyoo Choi | 2019, (113) | pp.87~132 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    From the perspective of international law, the Sino-Japanese War is characterized by the absence of international consensus on the timing of its outbreak. Leaving aside the version of official declaration date of war(1 Aug. 1894), another influential version of beginning of hostilities(July 25, 1894) was closely related to the sinking of the British steamship Kowshing. In the late 19th century, There were two schools of European scholars of international law, the one saw a declaration of war as the beginning of the war, and the another who regarded the actual outbreak of the war as the opening. It was made at the second Hague Peace Conference (1907), by calling for international consensus for the legislation of the process on the opening of hostilities. From the beginning of the war to the end of Kowshing case, where compensation was completed eight years after the Sino-Japanese war, the progress of the war was manipulated by British Government judging the interpretation of the law of war, This was the British Empire especially who had the hegemonic power of the world which influenced the outcome of the war by the way of interference and control the situation. So it was reasonable to followed Russian led Triple Intervention, soon after the conclusion of Shimonoseki Treaty from the view of the Anglo-Russian Rivalry. In the end, the Western powers, including the United States, Britain, Russia, Germany, and France, condoned or aided Japan's opening of the Sino-Japanese War, rather than focusing on preventing it from opening up. Still, the Powers were satisfied with Japan's bellicosity shown in the Sino-Japanese War, but at the same time they were also keenly aware of the need to regulate Japan's violations of international laws and inhumane acts. It was a natural consequence that the Peace conferences were convened in the Hague right after the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War.
  • 4.

    Seeking the figures playing the role of Karl Clausewitz and Alfred Thayer Mahan in R.A.F : The Military History Education in the R.A.F. Staff College of Great Britain during the Inter-war Period

    이상현 | 2019, (113) | pp.133~167 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    Great Britain established the Royal Air Force as an independent service of armed force like Army and Navy during the first world war the first time in the world history. Since the foundation of new organization was based on the wartime need, it was hardly suppressed by high pressures of reduction in defense budget and manpower during the inter-war period. The Air Force Staff College(Andover) was built in this mood and from the start it maintained the aim not just to develop the administrative skills of officers but also to forster potential leaders. For this purpose, military history was a major tool. Andover’s curriculum covered the variety of military histories even from the ancient one to the First World War in spite of the shortness of newly founded Air Force’s history. The first commandant, Air commodore Brooke-Popham, played a serious role in this process, because he thought the broad approaches on military history was highly important for the future commanders. The American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War, although both were histories without aircraft, were actively handled in the class. Especially to find the potential roles of the Air Force, sometimes the existence of aircraft was conceived in some campaigns with great details. Several ‘Great Men’ in military history were regarded as important figures in the Leadership class. In this as well, the Air Force case was not yet noticeable, so Garibaldi, Napoleon, even Nelson were accepted as role models and studied by officer-students. Also lecturers and students seriously considered military history to find ‘principles of war’, while given the newness of Air Force, they never neglected other forces’ principles. Particularly the Seven Years War was suggested as the best example for ‘Higher Direction War’ studying. Although these subjects were never fully maintained throughout the inter-war period, the newly established armed force was never shamed to refer to the other services’ histories.
  • 5.

    Liao dynasty‘s Military Institution and Tactics

    Joun, Byoung-woo | 2019, (113) | pp.168~200 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Liao dynasty completed the tribal system by going through the Gopbu, dozens of departments, the Daeha and the Ryon Ci leagues before the foundation of the dynasty. The King Taejo of Liao dynasty created the upper part of the North and South to take charge of the civil and military affairs of the tribe of Guran, and was subjugated to Bukmyeonwan during the reign of King Taejong. From King Taejong's time, Bukmyeonwan was in charge of the army of Liao dynasty. Taejo and other emperors assigned themselves to the royal court, and mobilized them to train their own pro-military palace guards. In addition, as the importance of infantry was highlighted, Oh Gyeong-hyang's disease using the Han Chinese was developed and used as the central army of Liao. The Yoga emperors trained the royal court and the central army to reinforce the tribes, which were the main forces of Yoga in the early days of the country's founding. These tribes began as cavalry troops made up of the Giran tribe, and were called Gyu-gun, a unit that was generalized by various tribes. Liao dynasty established a key central force and ran the Royal Guard. There were the royal friends who were created by King Taejo and the royal family, Soksan County, which was built by Empress Eungcheon. There were a variety of special forces in these pro-defense forces, and there were special forces that saved the special abilities of the surrounding tribes. In the early days of Liao dynasty founding, special cavalry was the key force utilizing cavalry with strong tribal characteristics. The special cavalry was a tactic to quickly break into the enemy's center, seize the enemy's capital, and capture the king or the enemy's commander. However, it was difficult for such tactics to build a fortified fortress with deep mountains and valleys and high fortresses. The fortress was favored by infantry rather than cavalry. Liao dynasty operated a Hyangbyeong centered on infantry along with cavalry in the course of attacking agricultural countries such as Goryeo and Song. Hyangbyeong was a unit of the Han people and a unit of the Byeongnug. The infantry was mainly used to take down the castle.
  • 6.

    Construction Method and Characteristics of Goguryeo Forts in the Basin of Han river

    이정범 | 2019, (113) | pp.201~232 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    A group of forts over Mt. Acha area is representative of ruins of Goruryeo in the Basin of Han River basin, and 17 forts of them are designated as Historic Site No. 455 and taken care of. However, due to the relatively short period of occupancy by Goruryeo and geopolitical features that the royal castle of Baekje was located in that area, in the past, it was recognized as defense outpost remains related to Baekje, and the interest for the ruins was considerably low. The earliest record of fortress over Mt. Acha is seen in Daedongjiji, which was published geographical book in the late Joseon Dynasty under the name of Mt. Acha old fortress. Meanwhile the full-scale record had been done during the Japanese occupation period. Although relatively detailed locations of the sites were recorded at that time, it was kept as internal data of the Joseon governor general office and not disclosed to the general. As a result, the data have not been widely used for research after liberation. However, in the 80's, as the existence of Goguryeo earthenware was confirmed in Mongchontoseong and the previously investigated sites of Guui-dong were reconsidered as Goguryeo fortress, the existence of Goguryeo sites was newly recognized in the Han River basin. Since the academic research starting in 1994, the successful results of the extensive excavation on the walls and internal facilities of various forts have been added, and various studies on the structure and characteristics of the Goguryeo forts have been conducted. The most remarkable characteristic of the Goguryeo forts in South Korea is that they were mostly small scale structures with a circumference of more or less 300 meters on the top of mountains, except for the fortress built on some plains, and they had the facilities such as building areas and reservoirs on the flatland surrounded by stone walls along the top of mountains. Most of the walls are divided into soil and stone parts, which is typical of Goguryeo's forts construction as seen in Gooknae fortress and Jnangsoo fortress. Meanwhile, there have been various opinions regarding the construction method so far. In this regard, further excavation and research should be carried out. In addition, it is generally accepted that Goguryeo had occupied Hangang river basin until the mid-sixth century. However, some researchers believe the occupancy period can be extended to the early seventh century. As well as the basic functions as a defense facility, the forts seem to have performed as a 'Government office'. . Although it was thwarted by Silla and Baekje, it seems that Goguryeo intended to dominate the area as a territory.
  • 7.

    Nero’s Armenian War of 54~63CE and the Treaty of Rhandeia

    Kee-Hyun Ban | 2019, (113) | pp.233~264 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This study re-investigates Nero’s Armenian War of 54~63CE and the Treaty of Rhandeia to highlight the geostrategic importance of Armenia in the context of the Roman strategy against Parthia. Firstly, I will summarize the old debate on the question whether there was the grand strategy of the Roman Empire. Secondly, I will explain the processes of forcing the kingdom of Armenia to be situated in the contact zone(or the buffer zone) between the imperial powers of Rome and Parthia, and the crucial phases of Nero’s Armenian War during the first century CE. Thirdly, I discuss the strategic intent to conclude the Treaty of Rhandeia in 63CE, which was followed by the coronation of Tiridates I by Nero at Rome in 66CE. Since E. W. Luttwak’s study on the Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire was published, it has been one of the most controversial topics whether the Romans had their imperial strategy. There was a certain decision-making group in the Roman imperial court, who were able to ‘establish’ and ‘maintain’ a consistent strategy. The primores civitatis(foremost authorities of the state), the consilium principis(council of the princeps) in particular, acted as the closest advisers of the emperor at times of crucial decisions. Ultimately, it is probable that the military disposition, operation and logistics of the greater empires of Rome and Parthia, along with their frontier and foreign policies, were considered to have been relatively ‘strategic’ by people of the neighbouring kingdoms and tribal states. In 66 BC, as the outcome of the Third Mithridatic War, the kingdom of Armenia was driven into the contact zone between the eastern frontier of Rome and the western frontier of Parthia, and therefore it first became to have the geostrategic importance in the Roman strategy facing against Parthia. Rome’s foreign relations with Parthia, which had been unsecured after Crassus’ defeat and fall at the battle of Carrhae in 53BCE, were restored by Augustus’ peace settlement in 20BCE. The Armenian question was resolved with the agreement that the Roman emperor appoints the king of Armenia whom the Parthian king of kings has recommended, but since then in practice the former would appoint the kings out of non-Armenian royal families while the latter often underwent civil wars of the Parthian succession. In 54CE the Parthian king of kings Vologaeses I raided Armenia and crowned his brother Tiridates I king of Armenia to take strategic superiority over the upper Euphrates. Nero decided to begin war against the Arsacid kings and appointed Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo as the dux belli(commander of war). Corbulo conducted military operations based on the Roman strategy against Parthia. He strengthened the defence of the eastern provinces, restored hegemony over Armenia, and tried to evade a full-scale war with Parthia. However, the war became inevitable when Nero had placed Lucius Caesennius Paetus in command to annex Armenia, which was resulted in the serious defeat at Rhandeia in 62CE. Nero after sought advices from the primores civitates replaced Paetus with Corbulo who rectified the urgent situation and managed to draw up the Treaty of Rhandeia with the Arsacid kings in 63CE. The main agreement of the Treaty was that the Roman emperor approves of a Parthian prince as king of Armenia, thereby crowning Tiridates I by Nero at Rome. In 66CE Nero spent a huge budget on holding the clamorous coronation for his propaganda purpose. From a strategic point of view, venturing into a full-scaled war to incorporate the kingdom of Armenia into a province of either Rome or Parthia was not any good solution to the Armenian question. The province of Armenia undoubtedly would have required much more human and material resources to control and defend the extended borderlands. It was strategically better option for both Rome and Parthia to maintain Armenia as a buffer state situated in the contact zone between them. The Treaty of Rhandeia in 63CE was the outcome of considering their strategic interests. Henceforth the peace lasted for fifty years until Trajan’s Parthian campaigns, but the kernel of the Treaty that the Roman emperor approves of an Arsacid royal blood as king of Armenia was maintained by 252CE when Shapur I of the Sassanid Persia annexed the kingdom.
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