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pISSN : 1598-317X / eISSN : 2713-8992

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2020, Vol., No.117

  • 1.

    Music of ‘Geoje’ POW Camp during the Korean War - Focused on the songs of prisoners -

    Kyungboon Lee | 2020, (117) | pp.1~46 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    There is no war without any POWs and then POW camps are needed. If there is a camp for POWs, there must be always their routines with sports, theater and music etc.. The Geoje POW camp during the Korean War was no exception. However, so far, the music of prisoners in Geoje POW camp has not been researched, though the Geoje POW camp was such a noisy singing camp that it was hardly to see in any other POW camps of previous wars. The Geoje POW camp was noisy with demonstrations, riots and slogans, but the prisoners sang whenever they had the chances to sing. For prisoners, songs can always be easily mobilized anytime, anywhere, making them the simplest and most convenient instruments of expressing their demands, joys, grievances and resistance. Especially for pro-communist prisoners, singing was important as a means of struggle against anti-communist ideology and against the policies of the camp authorities. In this context, it is highly likely that the second volume of "The Songs for the Soldiers" published in November 1951 reflects the intention of the General Political Bureau in Pyeongyang to support the song struggle of pro-communist prisoners at the Geoje POW camp. This paper explored the songs of the prisoners of Geoje POW camp which have not been studied so far. In conclusion, the diverse value of the song in the Geoje POW camp was hard to imagine in other POW camps of previous wars, which can also be seen as a characteristic of the Geoje POW camp, which was born as the first result of the Cold War period.
  • 2.

    A Study on the Fire employment of the 9th ROK Infantry Division in the Battle of White Horse Hill - Focused on artillery employment of the 9th ROK Infantry Division-

    Cho, Nam-joon | 2020, (117) | pp.47~92 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The study attempts to research the Fire employment of the Battle of White Horse Hill, in which the 9th ROK Infantry Division won against the 38th Corps of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army in October 1952. Although many studies have been conducted officially and academically on the battle, however most of them are the study of analyzing the battle centered on maneuvers, whereas the role of firepower had been accepted less interests, in some cases, to extent of the just amount of ammunition that used during the battle. Even the numbers of artillery units participating are different based on studies. In this regard, this study analyzes the strength of firepower mobilized, operational plans, command and control systems, and actual performance of those units, based on primary historical records, like combat situation reports(sitreps) from the 9th ID, special reports from the Ⅸ U.S. Army Corps, reports from the U.S. Military Advisory Group, and testimonies from veterans. According to the study, the 9th ID put more firepower assets into the battle than previously known. even though the 9th ID operated the division-level fire support control center for the first time in the ROK Army, it smoothly commanded and controlled huge amount of firepower assets through flexible measures and pre-preparation. Although there were also negative incidents such as misfires during the battle, they carried out the battle in a variety of ways in the joint operation with the U.S. military. The effectiveness and efficiency of these fire employment was well illustrated by the 9th ID's success to dispel incoming Chinese troops through the front lines by rapid fire employment. In conclusion, by using firepower effectively and efficiently, the 9th ID was able to win the Chinese troops three times more than themselves.
  • 3.

    Analysis for the strategy of Cestius Gallus in the year of AD 66

    Bae Eun Suk | 2020, (117) | pp.93~127 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This study is to understand the military capabilities of Cestius Gallus who led the Jewish War in 66. Josephus found the cause for the defeat of the Romans in Cestius' strategic error and military incompetence. But I think that the judgment of Cestius, who retreated troops after giving them accurate recognition of the situation, was reasonable. The Roman cavalry was used to protect the flanks of the military formation, and a convoy of military supplies was placed in the rear of the convoy to increase the mobility and safety of other troops. The defeat of Cestius was due to the lack of consideration for the terrain features of the ties of guerrilla warfare in mountainous areas. In response to the withdrawal after the battle of Beth Horon, Josephus claimed that he had missed the chance to take control of Jerusalem. All conditions, such as troop, munitions, armed conditions, topography, and weather, were inappropriate for attacking Jerusalem. In this situation, a strategic withdrawal could have been better than an unreasonable challenge. It was a good judgment that Cestius to give up his attack on Jerusalem and withdraw most of his troops overnight. Of the Cestius, Vespasianus, Titus and Silva who exercised command in the Jewish War, it is Cestius whose military role has been underestimated. Cestius' careful judgment and strategic withdrawal provided a foundation for subsequent commanders to take control of Judaea. The supply and demand of troops, the securing of supply lines, and the establishment of siege equipment became important to the Roman army. In addition, the guerrilla tactics of the Judaea and the tactics of utilizing the mountainous terrain became a reference to the Roman army's strategy. In the Jewish War, Cestius was not the cause of the prolonged war, but the foundation for victory.
  • 4.

    The Motivation and Arguments of the Research in the History of Military System of Tang Dynasty in Japanese Academia

    Lee, Kichon | 2020, (117) | pp.129~172 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    The research in the history of Tang dynasty’s military system in Japanese academia has been conducted by ‘the experience of war’ as the time axis and ‘schools of thought’ as the space axis. The early scholars who experienced the war were cognizant of the fact that military system was not the matter of right and wrong but the experience of survival. It originated from the experience of war why scholars of the war generation, such as Hino Kaisaburo who suffered from a spine fracture produced by torpedo attacks, Kurihara Masuo who lost all but one comrade in the war, and Tanigawa Michio who was conscripted into the army as he matriculated at university on the verge of defeat in the war, and scholars of the post-war generation had different perspectives on the military system. Hamaguchi Shigekuni focused on the matter of the biggest anguish of people, namely military service, and Kurihara Masuo compared military provinces in the late Tang to Japan’s warlords in the 1930s by a common denominator ‘mutiny’, and sought an inevitable principle in history which is ‘Restrain Military provinces, Encourage the Cabinet.’ The motive behind their researches also came from the experience of war. Scholars of the war generation were divided into two camps, Tokyo university and Kyoto university. They heavily debated the utility of the conscription system and the burden of military service. On the contrary, scholars of the post-war generation did not have scholarly debates between schools, but rather had a tendency to conduct individual research focusing on specific cases. They tended to focus on excavation of new historical sources and individual research, but have not yet presented ‘the zeitgeist of Tang dynasty.’
  • 5.

    The Characters for the Implements of Island Protection Tactics(海島入保策) in Seohaedo(西海道)·Bukkye(北界) of Goryo dynasty in the Period of the War against Mongol from the Military Point of View

    Jaegwang Kang | 2020, (117) | pp.173~213 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Island Protection Tactics(海島入保策) during the Period of the War against Mongol was carried out for the first time in Seohaedo(西海道) and Bukkye(北界) of Goryo dynasty in 1231. The strategic experience of Haedoibbo(海島入保) that had been executed in these provinces had an considerable effect on the governments’ escape led by King into the Kanghwa island(江華遷都) in 1232. Island Protection Tactics that was propelled in Seohaedo and Bukkye in the Period of the War against Mongol, have several military characters distinguished with southern provinces of Yanggwangdo(楊廣道). The first, Haedoibbo in Seohaedo and Bukkye had come true throughout intensive military control of Choi Woo’s political power, from the start. The second, Juhyunmin(州縣民) who had entered to strategic islands of Bukkye, could come back to the homeland in 1261. They defended strategic islands from Mongol invasion, staying to designated islands for a long time. The third, Byeolchogun(別抄軍) that had stationed to strategic islands of Seohaedo, won to all naval battles against Mongol navy. As a result, Juhyunmin and defensive forces of strategic islands, prevented from Mongol navy’s coastal infiltration toward Kanghwa island. The fourth, Gyungbyeolcho(京別抄) dispatched to main strategic islands of Bukkye. Forward stationing of this unit strengthened defensive power of strategic islands of Bukkye. The fifth, Bukkyebyungmasayeong(北界兵馬使營) had been moved to strategic islands of Seohaedo and Bukkye in the end of the War against Mongol.
  • 6.

    Reconsideration of the Factors in Deploying Tactical Nuclear Weapons on the Korean Peninsula in 1958 - Focusing on the Change of U.S. Policy toward Japan -

    Kim, Min-sik | 2020, (117) | pp.215~257 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The ‘Japan’ factors were behind the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula in 1958. Previous studies about the process of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea analyzed this issue mainly in terms of U.S-R.O.K. relations. However, U.S. political and military leaders in the 1950s focused on the relations between the U.S-R.O.K-Japan in the establish of security policies in the Far East. The U.S. has decided to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to the U.S. Forces in Korea as a result of political considerations about Japan. In the mid-1950s, the U.S. government faced stubborn resistance from the Japanese government and public opinion against the U.S. nuclear strategy and rearmament policy of Japan. At the same time, however, the U.S. foreign security policy was being formulated in a direction that emphasized the role of nuclear weapons and the local forces of allies. Given its political ripple effect, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the U.S. Forces in Korea was a much more reasonable and safer alternative than the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the U.S. forces in Japan. In doing so, the U.S. also put strong pressure on the Japanese government, which demanded a revision of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. It also included expectations that the modernization of U.S. Forces in Korea and Republic of Korea Armed Forces could stimulate rearmament of Japan Self-Defense Forces. As such, the U.S. decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula reflected consideration of ‘Japan’ factors in various aspects.
  • 7.

    Reviewing the Status of United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea from the Perspective of International Law with Emphasis on the UN Charter

    Song, Seongjong | 2020, (117) | pp.259~304 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The underlying dilemma among the general public in South Korea is a gross mismatch between the economic superiority and security concern, especially military arena, in the context of inter-Korea relations. One the one hand, the South Korea’s economy is more than 50 times as large as that of the North, while majority of South Korean have a disproportionately serious security concern from the North Korea’s military threat. In its relentless quest for the occupation of Korean peninsula on its own terms, Pyongyang regards the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea as an intermediate barrier in the path of the eventual elimination of the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) along with the ROK-U.S. alliance from the peninsula. In essence, from North Korea’s viewpoint, the UNC is the weakest link in the triangle framework, which is consisted of UNC, USFK and the ROK-U.S. alliance, and that as such, its demise is just a matter of time when the declaration of the end of (Korean) war, peace treaty and/or the transfer of Operational Control (OPCON) are to be realized in the not so distant future. Against this backdrop, the crucial question to be raised is whether the UNC is a lawful subsidiary organization of the United Nation. The implication and repercussion of the answer goes far beyond the level of binary “Yes, or No” reply. Rather, it will be directly related to the heart of such issues as the UNC’s legal foundation and raison d’être, the lawfulness of its establishment, its international status and prominence, as well as its termination or existence in the future times to come. The subject-matter of this study is exploring a substantive answer to the afore-mentioned question: “Is the UNC is a lawful subsidiary element of the United Nation?” To attain the research purpose, the Chapter II followed by the Introduction will focus on the nature of relations between the UN primary elements and subsidiary ones, including the delegation of powers to UN subsidiary organs in the context of the UN Charter. The Chapter III will undertake a case study of the UNC in Korea, with particular emphasis on the legally verified organs of Security Council in establishing the subsidiary organ, the delegation of its powers to UNC as well as to member states. Lastly, Chapter IV will include the major findings of this study, along with policy implications to be taken into account in strengthening functions, roles and prominences of the UNC in the future.
  • 8.

    A Study for the Decision Making Process on Dispatch Policy of the ROK's PKO Forces to Angola

    Jeongki Kim | 2020, (117) | pp.305~341 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Republic of Korea(ROK) sent the first group of Engineer forces on October, 1995 as a contingent of the United Nation Angola Verification Mission III(UNAVEM III) for Peacekeeping Operation(PKO) to Angola. Which was initiated by requesting of the UN on February, 1995. Dispatching to Angola is a unique case because it was decided during the period of aftereffect from dispatch to Somalia. And it was not the same engineer unit as others, which was to repair bridges and reconstruct in the area Angola. These facts stimulate this paper to be begun. What made the dispatch to Angola possible? To answer that questions is the goal of this study. The Win-sets conception of two-levels game theory was used to study the decision making process of the unit's deployment and to investigate solution of discords between ROK and UN. The result of this study is that the security issue was the main factor of win-sets for ROK to negotiate, whereas, the mandates for UN was the main one. With the win-sets, the process of decision to send a Engineer PKO unit had to follow two-levels game including the possible agreement between ROK and UN, and the final ratification of ROK's National Assembly. And the discords about for mission area and the post was also solved on the base of the win-sets of them as well.
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