KJC Korea
Journal Central

The alliances of the Three Kingdoms period were closely related to the internal and external situation of each country in the process of dominating the territory of Han River basin after the 5th century. They include the Alliance of Baekje and Silla dynasty in the 5th century, the Goguryeo and Silla Alliance in the 6th century, and the Baekje and Goguryeo Alliance in the 7th century. In addition, not only did each alliance have different purposes and natures, but the consequences and impacts were also different. The characteristics of the alliances of the Three Kingdoms era were that there was never an alliance in which the all three countries participated jointly, and two different nations formed relationship against a particular country. And the alliances were not just only one country participated unilaterally but the each three kingdom participated twice during the period of three kingdoms. And Baekje and Goguryeo were collapsed by the allied forces led by Silla and Tang dynasty. Silla actually achieved the greatest profit in the process of alliance during that period. The alliance of the Three Kingdoms period influenced many changes in the internal and external affairs of the Three Kingdoms after the 5th century. It also gave Silla a meaningful results and eventually Silla was able to achieve the Unification of the Three Kingdoms.

At the end of the 14th century, Goryeo dynasty acquired the overall and general techniques for manufacturing gunpowder based weapons systems through the research of Choi Mu-seon(崔茂宣), and used it in the battle against the Waegu(Wokou) which was the Japanese pirates. It is supposed that gunpowder weapons in maritime battles at that time destroyed enemy ships mainly through incineration by flames. However the research on the gunpowder weapon system at the late period of Goryeo dynasty was insufficient due to lack of data. And for that reason, it is somewhat ambiguous as to what was the main gunpowder weapons that executed role of the incineration. In this study the actual situation and operation pattern their were traced by referring to existing studies and related historical records. And in particular, was paid attention to hwatong(火㷁) and hwapo(火砲) that developed by Choi Mu-seon. First, some supposing that hwatong was a firing device for projectiles and supposing that it was a thrown weapons and the main weapon for incinerating enemy ships at the same time. This study reviewed several historical sources and concluded that it was a firing device made by metal. And among the gunpowder weapons developed by Choi Mu-seon, hwapo was thought to the main weapon of incineration of enemy ships. And referring to the historical records of China, it was highly likely that this was a flame-throwing gunpowder weapon. The hwapo that developed by Choi Mu-seon was able to effectively incinerate enemy ships in connection with the tactics using Geo-chul(拒鐵, large iron pushing rod) and Goo-Chul(拘鐵, large iron hook), and was usefully used effectively in battlefields such as Jinpo(鎭浦) and Gwaneumpo(觀音浦), contributing to the suppression of Waegu(Wokou). However, it is supposed that the flame-throwing gunpowder weapons were rapidly eliminated due to the problem of high too much gunpowder consumption and some other reasons. And from King Sejong's era, Joseon reorganized its gunpowder weapon system with a focus on firing device made by metal. This study is meaningful in that it find out the actual reality of hwatong and hwapo in the late period of Goryeo dynasty through analysis and review of historical records, and enhances the understanding of gunpowder weapons at the same period.

The Noryang(노량) Maritime Battle has a very important historical significance whole throughout the Imjin War. It is of great significance in that it was the battle of the Joseon-Ming Combined Fleet fighting together and also the final battle of the seven years of Imjin war against Japanese invasive forces. However the general level of historical understanding for this sea battle is not very high compared to its importance. It was simply recognized as a battle in which Yi Sun-shin(이순신) died, and the Japanese troops returned back to their country and finally the Imjin War was over. In fact, not enough individual studies dealing with the background of the Noryang(노량) Sea Battle, the combat power of friend or foe's participation in the battle, the course of the battle, and its historical importance. Many researchers still have slightly different views on the size of the Joseon and the Ming naval forces that participated in the sea battle of Noryang. Although it can be said that the size of the Joseon naval forces has been grasped to some extent however the size that of the Ming naval forces remains controversial. ​The size of the Joseon-Ming Combined Fleet at the Noryang(노량) Sea Battle is an important topic to understand the strategies and tactics of Joseon and Ming naval forces at that time. The more accurately we can grasp the size, the better we can understand the strategies and tactics of Joseon and Ming naval forces, and the better we can read the course of the Noryang(노량) Sea Battle and the war status and process of Imjin War. To this end, this study examined the size of the Joseon and the Ming naval forces that participated in the Noryang(노량) Sea Battle in detail by reviewing some historical literature and various research data dealing with the Noryang(노량) Sea Battle. In particular, by researching newly introduced or excavated historical materials in detail, this study tried to clarify what existing researchers missed about the size of the Joseon-Ming Combined Fleet at the Noryang(노량) Sea Battle. The size of Joseon naval forces was estimated in more detail than previous studies by comparing and examining changes in the size of the front line battleships after the Myeongnyang(명량) Sea Battle, the loss of the front line battleships during the SaroByeongjin Operation(Four Way Breakthrough Operation 사로병진 작전) and the number of remaining front line battleships after the Noryang(노량) Sea Battle. To this end, this study referred to various historical sources such as 󰡔Annals of King Seonjo(선조실록)󰡕, Yi Sun-shin(이순신)'s war diary 󰡔Nanjung Ilgi(난중일기)󰡕, Cho Kyung-nam(조경남)'s 󰡔Nanjung Japrok(난중잡록)󰡕, Lee Won-ik(이원익)'s 󰡔Orijip(오리집)󰡕, Lee Hang-bok(이항복)'s 󰡔Baeksajip(백사집)󰡕, Jin Kyung-moon(진경문)'s 󰡔Seomhojip(섬호집)󰡕, a Japanese record 󰡔Jeonghanrok(정한록)󰡕. ​The size of Ming naval forces was referred to records of Ming dynasty such as 󰡔Gyungryagoejui(경략어왜주의)󰡕, 󰡔Yangjopyongyangrok(양조평양록)󰡕, 󰡔Gyungryagbokgukyopyon(경략복국요편)󰡕 and also the records of Joseon dynasty such as 󰡔Annals of King Seonjo(선조실록)󰡕, Yi Sun-shin(이순신)'s 󰡔Nanjung Ilgi(난중일기)󰡕, Sin Heum(신흠)'s 󰡔Sangchonjip(상촌집)󰡕, Shin Gyung(신경)'s 󰡔Jaejobunbangji(재조번방지)󰡕 were cross-verified.

This paper studies the nature of the “active defense” army doctrine through the process of writing the doctrine reflected on the FM 100-5 in the 1970s, the center of violent doctrinal change, when interest and doctrine changed from the Vietnam War to a large scale all-out war. General William E. Depuy, the first commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, founded in 1973, began developing conventional and total war doctrine that strongly reflected his own tactical idea. With full support of the Army Chief of Staff, General Abrams, Depuy began the development of an “active defense” doctrine in collaboration with his strong advocates on that military theory, General Paul F. Gorman and General Donn A. Starry, but faced a lot of opposition from existing infantry branch and field units. Depuy hosted OCTOFEST conference in collaboration with FORSCOM to gain authority to proposed doctrine, and collaborated with the German Army and U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command to produce a doctrinal agreement in political perspective. The FM 100-5 was written with Depuy’s strong will but he had gone through a painful process when the 1976 version of “FM 100-5 Operations” was finally ready to publish. After the FM 100-5 was published and distributed, they clashed with traditional offensive supporters inside and outside the army because the U.S. Army's military ideology valued initiatives and traditional infantry doctrine. The “active defense” doctrine, which is the center of controversy, was eventually replaced by the 'Airland-battle' doctrine five years later.

The awareness on MIP(Military involvement in politics) is quite different in every country. In some cases, like the Republic of Korea and other countries, MIP is considered very negatively while others, like Egypt and Israel in the Middle East, are viewed favorably. However, there is clear distinction between the cases of the Egypt and Israel. Although military involvement occurs in a moderate manner within Israel's formal political system, while it does so in a radical manner in Egypt. To explain these variations, this study used the ‘Internal Stability-Divided Military’ analysis framework. As a result, Egypt of 'internal instability- divided military' showed a radical manner due to dualized military, although the military gained credibility and intervened in politics as an institution that could replace civilian power. On the contrary, in Israel, which is an ‘internal stability-integrated military’, the military have influenced in the diplomatic and security policy-making process in peacetime due to constant security threats and unique civil-military relations. It suggests there was no need to radically intervene in politics in a circumstance where the organization's interests are institutionally safeguarded. In conclusion, Israel, which has a developed civil-military relations and a enhanced democratic government systems, is the example I believe we should follow. There, the military engages in very moderate manner political engagement. Therefore, rather than having a blanket rejection of military involvement in politics, we also propose that it is vital to create a suitable system and culture that would allow the professionalized military to contribute to the development of national security strategy and policy.