military history 2022 KCI Impact Factor : 0.87

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pISSN : 1598-317X / eISSN : 2713-8992

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2023, Vol., No.127

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    The Warship or Freighter Manufacturing in Goguryo-Tang War(644-648) and Fiscalities : The Analysis of ship building cost and mobilized subject

    Choi Jin Yeoul | 2023, (127) | pp.1~34 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This thesis is the analysis of ship building cost and mobilized subjects in Gogurto-Tang war in 644-648 and fiscalities. Tang built 900 ships in 644, 1,350 ships in 647, and at least 1,100 ships or warships in 648, respectively. The number of ships allocated to the Jiannan province, which is located southwest of Chang'an, the capital of the Tang Dynasty and present Sichuan province in 648 is unknown as it is not recorded in historical records, but Tang Taizong built at least 3,350 ships for the invasion of Goguryeo. Tang Taizong order to built ships on a large scale to transport soldiers and provisions. The cost of building a ship accounted for 17.4% of the estimated total amount of financial revenue under Tang taxation system called zu yong diao in 644, 26.1% in 647, and at least 21.2% in 648, respectively. This is the percentage of shipbuilding costs in the annual budget for the year. In short, the total cost of the 3,350 ships built in 3 years corresponds to 64.7% of the annual budget, calculated by statistical data based on population in 639. it was stated that the state borne the cost of building ships imposed on the Jiannan province in 648. But mobilized subjects for warship or freighter manufacturing in other region probably worked for free the burden of the mobilized people was heavy.
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    A New Window to the Imjin War : Revisiting the Jinglüefuguoyaobian with Case Studies

    Minsu Park , KIM YOUNG JIN | 2023, (127) | pp.35~75 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The Jinglüefuguoyaobian (經略復國要編, literally, Essentials on the Restoration of Joseon, Compiled by Song Yingchang) was written by Song Yingchang, the supreme commander (jinglüe) of the Ming army during the early stage of the Imjin War. The detailed accounts behind the decision to join the war, elaborate depictions of military strategies and tactics, and comprehensive records of the process behind the peace negotiations shown from the Chinese side all make this source a fascinating read. To shed new light on various aspects of the Imjin War as a 16th-century international event involving Korea, Japan, and China, this article examines the process of compilation and transmission of the Jinglüefuguoyaobian and provides overviews of each volume that can be used for future research. In addition, we present two case studies based on the Jinglüefuguoyaobian. Through this examination, we hope to lay the groundwork for a “new” - fresh, inspiring, and necessary - foundation for the academic research in the Korean academia for the Imjin War.
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    A Study on Yi Sun-Sin's Deeds and Military Thought in War

    Bae ilsoo , JEONG HEE TAE | 2023, (127) | pp.77~141 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This study examines the actions of Yi Sun-sin of Chungmugong and the military thought that emerged through war with a modern perspective on military thought theory. The scope of the study is a prior study of military strategies and tactics, national views, and philanthropy that were shown in books such as 『Nanjung Ilgi(亂中日記)』, 『Jingbirok(懲毖錄)』, 『The Sea of Admiral Yi Sun-sin』 and papers published in various academic journals in the process of preparing for war and conducting war. Based on the preceding studies, Yi Sun-sin's military thought was examined by Kim Yu-seok's military thought theory, focusing on the Imjin War, the great Myeongnyang sea war battle, and the Noryang sea war battle. As a result of the study, the military thought of Admiral Yi Sun-sin can be examined in the first, the recognition and understanding of the essence of war in Well-prepared Posture (萬全思想), Short war (速勝思想), and Made-up Win (制勝思想). His belief in war can be seen in Yi Sun-sin's military genius. There was also the idea of an all-out war effort to overcome the national crisis through integrated defense operations. Second, recognizing that qualitative expansion is more important than quantitative expansion and that Intangible fighting power is more important than tangible fighting power, the military power construction has been prepared with confidence. In training, creative methods and Military art were used to put into practice after repeated training. In particular, Admiral Yi Sun-sin had a creative military innovation mind and used new weapons such as the turtle ship. Third, in terms of mercenaries, Yi Sun-sin made a decisive contribution to ending the war with his excellent leadership and military force operation. In terms of the national strategy between the Battle of Myeongnyang, the Japanese forces were destroyed at sea, blocking the maritime supply route and the strategic goal of occupying Jeolla-do. Tactically, the Hakinjinbeop (鶴翼陣法) was changed in various ways according to the situation to change the Uhlinhakik (魚鱗鶴翼) form, or based on this, the Paljingimunbeop (八陣奇文法) with a combination of unity and dispersion was used. Fourth, in terms of supporting national security in peacetime, Yi Sun-sin provided a place for refugees to live and could get the ideology of Ae-min (愛民) Patriotism that guarantees safety. Fifth, in terms of military force operation as a means of supporting national policy, Yi Sun-sin sent the body to his hometown in the event of a dead person and implemented relief measures for widows and their families. Sixth, in terms of effective and efficient military force management and operation during peacetime, Yi Sun-sin was able to use civilian fishing boats and civilians militarily in wartime based on the trust in the army formed during peacetime. did. Yi Sun-sin's military thought, which compressed the core ideas analyzed by category, can be said to be 'a fast and decisive war through military innovation and mission-type command as a national total war'. This study of Yi Sun-sin's military thought will be a useful resource for establishing the theory of modern military thought and establishing national security and military strategies.
  • 4.

    Preparation for the 4th Campaign of the 8th Division of the North Korean Army and the Battle of Surisan-Masan

    Park Huiseong | 2023, (127) | pp.143~178 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Among the various methods of studying the Korean War, the study of the North Korean Army is essential. However, research is also difficult because of the difficulty in obtaining data. In the meantime, official publications have described the North Korean army's operations, but there were many deficiencies. Therefore, examining the details of the North Korean army is the basis of research and is also the direction to move forward. In this paper, the 8th Division of the North Korean Army was identified. The 8th Division was expanded in July 1950, and after that, it was a major division that participated in major battles such as Andong and Sinnyeong. And even after the retreat, delaying battles were held in the Cheongcheongang area. The 8th Division was reorganized in Chosan. Although there was a lack of equipment and firearms, the number of troops was almost completed, and short-term education and training increased combat power. After the reorganization, the 8th Division began marching southward in December 1950 for the second attack, and arrived south of the Han River in early January 1951. During the march, they ought in Pyongyang, Haeju, and Yeonan, and civil actions were also conducted against the residents. And in late January and early February 1951, they fought UN forces together with Chinese forces in Mt. Surisan and Mt. Masan. Such detailed basic research on units below the divisional level of the North Korean Army will help to uncover the way the North Korean Army conducted war one by one at the time, and research on the Korean War will become more substantial.
  • 5.

    A Study on the Statement Diplomacy of North Korea(1964-1972)

    Kim Sangbum | 2023, (127) | pp.179~230 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The goal of this research is to look at how North Korea employed government-level declarations for diplomacy during the Vietnam War, as well as the key contents, characteristics, and meanings of those statements. Foreign affairs-related government-level statements in North Korea can be broadly classified as government statements, foreign ministry statements, and foreign ministry spokesperson statements. The government statement was issued as a top-level strategic statement, whilst the Foreign Ministry and its spokesman issued a tactical statement in support of the government position. There were 113 North Korean government-level comments issued between 1964 and 1972. In particular, once in 1964, nine times in 1965, fourteen times in 1966, fourteen times in 1967, twelve times in 1968, fourteen times in 1969, thirteen times in 1970, twelve times in 1971, and twenty-four times in 1972. The statements focused on the US invasion of Vietnam, North Korea's free aid to Vietnam, the formation and strengthening of an anti-Japanese coalition between Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and support for the Vietnamese government's position in the Paris peace talks. The concept of North Korea's statement diplomacy incorporated the emblem of independence as well as the strategy of national liberation struggle. North Korea sought to share and respond to the crisis through anti-Americanism, to strengthen leaders' legitimacy, to secure internal production and mobilization, to unite socialist rights through a strategy to recall the Korean War, and to recognize the capabilities of the national liberation struggle in the global revolution through statement diplomacy.
  • 6.

    Resistance within the Military Authorities against the Third Reich

    Lee, Byong Chol | 2023, (127) | pp.231~273 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The German military welcomed Hitler gaining control over the regime in 1933. This is because Germany’s military, which was crippled due to the Treaty of Versailles, gained the opportunity to become revived by the Nazi’s rearmament policy. But Hitler wanted to use the military as a tool for expanding based on its foreign policy. The German military that lost in World War I was transforming into a dangerous threat through the reorganization in the Wehrmacht that could once again push Europe into war. And in response, a small group opposing this began to form within the military. Military opposition first began as a struggle to gain power between the organizations reshuffled within the Third Reich, but it soon developed into a movement that opposed the war policies of Hitler. Even prior to the start of World War II, resistance movements were being organized and reinforced among the opposition who believed they could save Germany from a reckless war by overturning the regime within the military. As the first major attempt, the ‘September Conspiracy’ of 1938 within the military authority could not be executed due to the deceptive Munich Agreement that appeared as if Hitler wanted to avoid war. But as the Second World War became a racist war of annihilation, those who had oppositions in the military ranks became morally rearmed and attempted a resistance on July 20, 1944 with the goal of overthrowing the criminal regime and to erect the ‘other Germany’ different from that of the Third Reich. This plot had a tragic as the assassination of Hitler failed, but it served as the mental basis for Germany’s new start following the war, and its historical significance continues even to this day. In particular, the spirit of ‘July 20’ is continuing in terms of military history during the course of the Wehrmacht transforming into the Bundeswehr.
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