KJC Korea
Journal Central

Between 460 and 480, the focus was on analyzing the battles in the Yeongseo and East Coast regions of Gangwon Province for Goguryeo and Silla. While various research results have emerged about the wars of that time, there were issues such as the lack of clarity regarding the positioning of the Jeongseon-Samcheok connection or the locations of Gwahyeon and Hosanseong, which appeared in the war of 489. Examining the areas of Jeongseon, Samcheok, and Gangneung, it was argued based on geographical and historical analysis of the Goryeo and Joseon eras that movement from Gangneung to Jeongseon was smoother than from Samcheok to Jeongseon. It was found that the movement from Gangneung to Jeongseon was smoother than from Samcheok to Jeongseon. Silla attempted to expand along the Namhangang River towards Jeongseon and Yeongwol. The route taken by Goguryeo in the 481 attack on Silla was along the coast. Goguryeo's defeat weakened its control in Gangwon Province. Based on historical and archaeological evidence, Hongcheon was estimated to be the location of Hosanseong attacked by Goguryeo in 489. Considering the the discovery of late 5th-century Silla pottery in Hyeongseong and the possibility of Moroseong being identified as Pyeongchang Morohyeon, it was argued. As Goguryeo's influence in the Gangwon Province region weakened due to the war of 481, Silla attempted to expand towards the Daegwallyeong Iseo area. Goguryeo attacked and occupied Gwahyeon and Hosanseong to address potential control issues along the Chuncheon-Hongcheon-Wonju route due to Silla's expansion. However, the challenging terrain and transportation hindered Silla's long-term expansion. Silla's attempts to expand into the Yeongseo region from the northeastern region of the Namhangang River indicate changes in control and the political situation in Gangwon Province from the late 5th century. These findings raise considerations for Silla's future expansion in the region.

This study investigated the military phase and utilization form of Joseon spearmanship. It also summarizes various Chinese spearmanship techniques that were newly popularized by the Joseon army after the Imjin War. In particular, I specifically looked at the usage characteristics of six spearmanship techniques such as Jangchang(長槍)·Jugjangchang(竹長槍)·Gichang(旗槍)·Dangpa(鎲鈀)·Gichang(騎槍)·Nangseon(狼筅) in 『Muyedobotongji』. Through this, we investigated the historical significance of the Joseon Dynasty spear. And I grasped the value as a military martial arts diachronically. It's take a look at some of them. First, the soldiers who guarded the fortresses of Joseon were basically composed of 50 spearmen and 50 archers each. In the case of the central army, the number of spear soldiers was the largest in conjunction with the number of shields for the king's close guard. Secondly, it was difficult to expect the development of Spear technic, because all Sword and spear for infantrymen was excluded from the exam subjects of military service. Only the cavalry spear was maintained among the military service examination subjects, the basic content was still maintained. Thirdly, with the outbreak of the Imjin War, Joseon tactics and weapon systems underwent many changes. They had to overcome the attack method of the Japanese army, which was a mixture of guns and close proximity tactics. Therefore, it was decided to compile 『Muyejebo』􋺸 by compiling the spear sword method contained in 『Gihyosinseo』 compiled by Cheoggyegwang(戚繼光) in the Joseon style. Fourthly, in the 14th year of King Jeongjo (1790), 『Muyedobotongji』 was published. The six spear techniques newly organized here could be used for tactics by coexisting with each other with spears of various lengths.

Having experienced numerous attacks by Japanese pirates from the early years of the dynasty, Joseon viewed that 'Japanese pirates troops were strong on water, but weak on land'. However, when the Imjin War, Japanese invasions of Korea (1952~8), took place, the Joseon Navy managed to win battles continuously from the beginning of the war, while the Joseon Army was defeated on land. Accordingly, there have been many researches examining why its navy could continue to win battles. However, as those researches have tended to focus on specific aspects of the battles, they have some limits in comprehensively understanding it. Accordingly, this study comprehensively analyzed direct impacts of the attacks of Japanese pirates troops on the Joseon Navy. That is, using principles of maritime strategy of Julian S. Corbett, this study proved that the experiences of fighting with Japanese pirates troops in the early years of the Joseon dynasty helped the Joseon Navy win the maritime battles during the massive invasions of Japan Japanese invasions in the late 16th century called Imjin War. To achieve the research purposes, this study applied the historical social science methodology of Max Weber. This study did not aim to discover new facts, but to prove that the excellency of the Joseon Navy in the Imjin War was the results of experiences of fighting Japanese pirates and troops in previous years. To achieve the research aim, this study comprehensively analyzed research findings which had been done in different areas. This study found out that fighting experiences with Japanese pirates troops in the early years of the dynasty helped Joseon to strengthen its naval power to secure the command of the sea. Of course, Joseon did not consistently pursue such a maritime strategy in the early years of the dynasty. But, dealing with Japanese forces in Sampo Waeran, Saryangjin Waebyeon, Eulmyo Waebyeon, and Sonjukdo Waebyeon, etc., Joseon could clearly figure out shortages and defects of its maritime war capacities, and improve its naval structure, warships and weapons over time. As a result, the Joseon Navy could show its strong aspects during the Imjin War. It is expected that this study will contribute to understanding of the causal relationship between Japanese attacks in the early years of Joseon and supremacy of the Joseon Navy during the Imjin War and understanding of history from the consilient perspective.

This article focused on weather observation on the Korean Peninsula and the development of war. During the Russo-Japanese War, the temporary observatory set up by the Central Meteorological Observatory of Japan's Interior Ministry was in charge of all parts except maritime observation. The watchtower installed by the Japanese Navy was in charge of maritime weather observation. The Japanese Army also organizes a temporary organization, but there was little actual activity, and information was received through the Central Meteorological Observatory. Accordingly, this article first identified the purpose of establishing a temporary observation station supervised by the Japanese Ministry of Interior. Next, it was revealed that the Japanese Navy built a watchtower to conduct maritime weather observation and form an observation system. Finally, we looked at how Japan operated weather information militarily through the establishment of communication networks and the operation of military communication handling stations. The above study attempted to re-examine Japan's invasion of the Korean Peninsula. And I tried to discuss the Russo-Japanese War from various perspectives. In addition, the study was expanded from the perspective of military history by informing the importance of weather in the history of war.

Bezobrazov formed shareholders of Yalu River Forestry Company centered on people who served in the Guards Corps or related to the imperial family to defend the interests of the imperial family, and he promoted Russia's Far East policy through the imperial family with the patronage of Nicholas II. while gaining political influence. Tsar Nicholas II also actively supported Bezobrazov to strengthen the autocracy. Bezobrazov supported the tyranny of the emperor and the governorship of the borders as the basic political system. Bezobrazov thought that an emperor-centered autocracy was the most suitable political system for Russia. Ultimately, Bezobrazov supported the long-term plan for Russia to occupy Manchuria and make Korea a protectorate. Bezobrazov believed that Russia should build up its military presence in the Far East and then protect individual Russian companies with foreign participation. By the way, Bezobrazov argued that no company could actively operate in the Far East if the management system of the Ministry of Finance remained as it is today. Bezobrazov criticized Russia's bureaucracy and tried to carry out the Far East policy of the imperial family by directly negotiating with the finance minister, the military minister, and the foreign minister. As a result, Bezobrazov directly intervened in the establishment of the Far East Government-General, drafted the Special Committee for the Far East organizational structure and the Far East's economic plan, and even prepared a plan for the formation of a plenipotentiary committee in Manchuria. However, at the last minute of the Russo-Japanese negotiations, Bezovzazov proposed a plan to maintain Korea's independence without Russia militarily occupying Manchuria in order to realize the 'Russian-Japanese alliance'. This was different from the basic policy of Bezovzazov's Far East policy, which was 'the occupation of Manchuria and the protectorate of Korea'. He intended to realize their own interests by establishing a 'stock company' while Russia occupied an economic advantage in Manchuria and Japan in Korea. In late December 1903 and early January 1904, Bezobrazov conveyed his idea to Kurino, the Japanese minister to Russia, to promote the actual 'Russian-Japanese alliance', and he suggested Russia's adherence to Manchurian interests and concessions on the Korean issue. Bezobrazov accurately grasped the intentions of the political opposition in order to seize political leadership in Russia, but he failed to grasp the decision-making process of Japan's most important enemy, Korea and Manchuria policy, especially the Japanese military's preparations for the Russo-Japanese War. He was preoccupied with internal enemies and neglected to grasp information about external enemies. As a result, Russia suffered a series of defeats against Japan in the early days of the Russo-Japanese War.

The history of the Pusan Logistical Command provides a clue to understanding the background of the Battle of the Nakdong River Defense Line, which determined the nature of the early Korean War, and the Operation Chromite that followed. In other words, the transition from the Pusan Base Command to the Pusan Logistical Command is a structural change of the command following a change in operations. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to analyze the operation and role of the Pusan Logistical Command and its overall history. On July 13, 1950, the unexpectedly rapid advance of the North Korean army and the crushing defeat in the Daejeon area of the US 24th Division led MacArthur to change tactics. In other words, MacArthur's initial plan of the war, the Operation Blue-hearts, to block the invasion of the South by the North Korean army landing at Inchon using the US 1st Cavalry Division was frustrated. This changed the role of the small Pusan Base Command, which supported the USFK Command, which was mainly composed of the US 24th Division. The Base Command, which had been in charge of command and support until then, was reorganized into the Logistical Command, and the Pusan Base Command was changed to the Pusan Logistical Command. The Pusan Logistical Command was organized as a B-type Logistical Command. The Pusan Logistical Command was also responsible for handling mass refugees, receiving and supplying prisoners of war, and operating auxiliary ports such as Masan, Ulsan, Pohang, and Gunsan ports. It was assigned an additional supply mission to the US 10th Corps in Wonsan, on the east coast of Korea. On September 19, 1950, the Pusan Logistical Command was renamed the 2nd Logistical Command, a C-type logistical unit, as the responsibility for logistics support increased with the increase in combat units.

This study analyzes the importance of the Meeting of Staff Officers from November 1951 to April 1952 during the Armistice Conference. This study analyzed the role of the Staff Officers Meeting and the achievements of the Staff Officers Meeting in the process of the Armistice Conference focusing on the third agenda. Existing research has only shown fragmentary results that the meeting of staff officers has helped conclude the armistice agreement. In addition, Existing research focus only on the decision process of the leadership in which the armistice agreement is concluded, or on the establishment of the second agenda military demarcation line and consultation on the fourth agenda prisoner. Discussions on the maritime area that were not resolved in the second agenda were also held in the third agenda. Moreover, when the issue of prisoners, the fourth agenda, was not solved, it was discussed in conjunction with the issue related to the third agenda. Discussions on the third agenda are important but have not been noticed. Especially, the Staff Officers Meeting played an important role in resolving the issues arising from the Third Agenda, but it did not draw attention. Of course, Stalin's death was the biggest reason for the resolution, but without the role of the Staff Officers Meeting, it would have taken longer for the armistice to be concluded even after Stalin's death or the completeness of the agreement would have been reduced. Therefore, in order to solve these problems, this study focuses on what the issues of the third agenda, what each other claimed, what they wanted, and how they solved the problem, focusing on the minutes of the armistice talks. As a result, the items that were at issue in the third agenda discussion were classified and the consensus area for each item was derived. And through constant meetings of UN and Communist delegations, it was found that the meeting of staff officers played an important role in the conclusion of the armistice agreement.

This study examines the impact of the Korean War on the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the process of NATO expansion, especially in Greece and Turkey. NATO was founded on April 4, 1949 to stop Soviet expansion. When the Korean War broke out, NATO felt a real threat to the Soviet Union and needed to strengthen its alliance accordingly. Among the existing studies, there were rare studies directly raised the relationship between the Korean War and NATO. It was mentioned as part of the relationship, but only mentioned as the background of the recognition change. Therefore, this study analyzes the process from the creation of NATO to the perception and change of NATO's threats after the Korean War, and the expansion of NATO after Greece and Turkey's participation in the Korean War. To this end, NATO's strategic documents at the time and secondary sources analyzed later are mainly used. In the wake of the Korean War, NATO recognized the importance of the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea as it considered the expansion of the alliance, and considered the membership of Greece and Turkey for further eastward expansion. Greece and Turkey participated in the Korean War with political intentions to join NATO, and in conclusion, NATO members, including the United States, agreed to join in 1952, resulting in the first expansion of the alliance. It is hoped that studying NATO's expansion due to the Korean War will help us understand the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war and thereby study the expansion of the NATO alliance, which remains strong even about 70 years later.

The purpose of this paper is to identify how the major defense policy agendas of previous governments are set, spread, and entered, and analyze the types and characteristics based on this. The results of the study are summarized as follows. First of all, Korea's major defense policy agenda was analyzed as a more diverse and democratic model in which problems were raised by citizens or private groups outside the government and turned into policy agendas actively resolved by the government. When deciding on a policy to postpone the Transfer Wartime Operational Control, it was analyzed as a mobilization model to secure public support after the government's agenda, and an inside access model that omitted the process of Transfer Wartime Operational Control, THAAD deployment on the Korean Peninsula, and signing a Korea-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement. The characteristics of Korea's defense policy agenda setting process can be presented as follows. First, South Korea's defense policy decision was made within the framework of North Korea's provocations and threats and the U.S. defense policy. Second, the government's opinions were reflected in the initiative, and most of the agenda setting process was led by the government. Third, the government tended to decide on the policy contents they prepared or spread the contents to groups essential for implementation and set policy agendas. Fourth, there was a lack of public understanding and persuasion efforts for defense policy decisions from the process of setting policy agendas. Finally, logical consistency and continuity were not maintained in the process of setting policy agendas. Based on this, the policy implications that can be presented can be presented as follows. First, efforts should be made to enhance the negotiating ability with the U.S. from setting the defense policy agenda. Second, in the process of setting a policy agenda, it is necessary to review the bottom-up agenda rather than top-down. Third, the process of setting the defense policy agenda needs to be carried out with various policy actors, and clear guide-lines for how to set the content and scope should be set in consideration of the national interests. Fourth, consistency and continuity must be maintained from the stage of setting the defense policy agenda. Fifth, active use of think tanks is required. Finally, unlike in the past, various efforts should be accompanied to gain public support from the stage of establishing the defense policy agenda so that public consensus and support can be formed.

The main aim of this paper is to assess how the Israeli Air Force is strategically utilizing and developing its military capabilities in response to potential military threats from neighboring countries. In order to achieve national objectives, it is crucial to establish effective strategic concepts and construct appropriate military means to support those concepts. Israel has demonstrated a strong ability to accurately identify key targets in interstate conflicts and has successfully utilized its air power in offensive operations. However, there are limitations when it comes to countering sub-state actors, specifically in dealing with rocket artillery employed by groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Therefore, considering the prevailing threat landscape, it is evident that defense against missiles or rocket artillery that cannot be intercepted before launch is also of utmost importance, in addition to offensive capabilities. Currently, South Korea is faced with the challenge of addressing military threats posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons, missiles, and long-range artillery, while also developing its capacity to respond to neighboring countries. Taking inspiration from the operational concepts and construction strategies employed by the Israeli Air Force, it is imperative for South Korea to enhance its air defense capabilities in a timely manner, in alignment with its strategic concept. This entails securing assets such as surveillance and reconnaissance systems, as well as combat mission capabilities, and augmenting air defense capabilities to effectively address the evolving threat landscape.