The Chinese Communist Forces(CCF) and North Korean People's Army(NKPA) Combined Forces Command and Its Impact on the Reorganization of NKPA
This research begins with a question “why the North Korean Leader Kim Il-sung excluded the experience, military doctrine and guideline of Chinese Communist Forces(CCF)) during the reorganization of North Korean People's Army(NKPA), even though the CCF's military intervention contributed to save North Korea from collapse-crisis in the war?". This phenomenon is contrary to the common belief that a military alliance between two nations normally binds and consolidates its relationship strong together, and will have a positive influence on a mutual norm and culture. This paper, focused on the dynamics of Kim Il-sung's “regime security" and “conflicting interaction between two nations", explores a impact of the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command on the Reorganization of NKPA in the era from October 1950 to the end of 1950's.
The conclusions of this research are as followings: First, the CCF-NKPA relations at the highest levels during the creation of the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command and the conduct of the Korean War were characterized as a tension and conflict, not as friendship. The CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command, which is created in December 1950 for the purpose of unity of commands for two forces, was perceived by Kim Il-sung not only as a military command defending an alliance's common interest against external threats, but also as an political institution intervening in the North Korean internal affairs. The Establishment of the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command meant to Kim Il-sung a “lost" of his own operational command which can be interpreted as an expansion of chinese influence over the North Korea. The Chinese really attempted to draw towards themselves the commanders of the NKPA, and were not ashamed to interfere in the internal affairs of North Korea. This all made Kim Il-sung anxious about his regime security.
Consequently, Kim Il-sung intended to prevent Peng Dehuai (Commander of the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command) from expanding his power over the Yenan-faction by introducing the Soviet in keeping a balance of power between two powers. Kim Il-sung's Mistrust against the chinese leadership was mixed with his personal psychological factor that he had experienced during the Anti-Japanese War in the 1930s and in the winter 1950-1951. He preferred therefore to rely on the soviet side.
Second, tensions and conflicts between two nations had a lasting impact on the reorganization of the NKPA in two senses. On the one hand, Kim Il-sung stuffed the core position of NKPA's leadership with a Partisan-faction, so that he could seize the military power as an instrument for making his political power indisputable. The “Military" functioned for him rather an instrument for keeping his own political power internally, than an protecting force ensuring the sovereignty and survival of the national state externally. He succeeded to make the NKPA loyal to protect his own political status.
On the other hand, Kim Il-sung was more dependent on the soviet side to keep a balance against the chinese. Under great assistance and support from the soviet he attempted to regain the military capabilities. Kim Il-sung's plan was consistent with a intention of soviet that had a fear of an expansion of the Chinese over North Korean. The Training, military doctrine, tactical guideline during the reorganization of NKPA was accordingly influenced strongly by the soviet military thoughts and systems. The sole alternative that Kim Il-sung could select was leaning to the soviet side, considering an increasing influence of the chinese and their interference in the internal affairs.
Last but not least, the subject “the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command and the NKPA" needs studying more carefully with a deeper analysis in twofold respects. The Sino-North Korean military alliance nowadays is a key factor to understand the current security structure of the north east asia that is symbolized by the North Korean nuclear crisis and Cheonan-warship attack. Moreover, this helps us to prepare for the Contingencies in North Korea. In this sense, the subtle analysis on the above mentioned “dynamics of the politico-military relations of the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command" can provide a meaningful implication to the current status of the China-North Korea Alliance. On the other hand, it can also lead to a closer approach to the entity of so-called “Juche-strategy of NKPA" by clarifying the transfer-process of the Chinese traditional military thought to the NKPA through the bridge “the CCF-NKPA Combined Forces Command" sixty years ago.