In traditional international relations, the logic of 'Enemy of my enemy is my friend' or 'Enemy of my ally is my enemy' is established. According to the above logic, Iran is clearly an enemy of the United States, and ROK, which is an alliance with the United States, surely becomes an enemy of Iran. Conversely, for DPRK, Iran is an enemy of the United States, so they should be friends in theory, but in reality, it is not as close as in the above logic. In other words, the relationship of 'Enemy of my ally is not my enemy' is established.
As such, although the relationships among ROK, DPRK and Iran are difficult to form and maintain, the reality is not. There are common interests, and as a result, the relationship continues beyond theoretical prediction. If so, what variables are the determinants of the triangle relations? Why is the ROK-DPRK-Iran triangle relations maintained differently from theoretical predictions? What is the theoretical alternative to explain the relations? This study argues that Iran's policy on the Korean Peninsula is similar to the ‘hedging strategy’. Iran has gained economic and military benefits by appropriately using the conflict and rivalry between the two Koreas, and used it for the Iran-Iraq war and anti-US diplomacy. In conclusion, there are sources that can seek mutual benefits between the ROK-DPRK-Iran, and contrary to theoretical predictions, a paradoxical relationship is maintained.