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2021, Vol., No.120

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  • 1.

    The Process of ‘Biological Warfare’ Allegation and Behind-The-Scenes Accounts during the Korean War

    Jeon, Ye-mok | 2021, (120) | pp.1~41 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This article aims to examine a series of events when North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union raised the allegation of 'biological warfare' against the US and allies, and its inner story by comparing and analyzing documents, letters, memoirs recorded in Korea, China, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the US during the Korean War. This article consists of two parts. The first part examines the process of raising the allegations mainly from 1951 to 1952. The allegations of biological warfare by the US. were first raised on May 8, 1951, when Park Heon-young, a foreign minister of North Korea, issued a statement charging the US of using biological weapons but there were no ensuing allegations after that time. In 1952, the large scale propaganda of the ‘biological warfare’ allegations occurred in cooperation with North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. Three investigation teams were, supported by those countries, also established. The second one looks into ‘evidence’ provided by communist countries was highly likely to be fabricated. This fabrication was attested to in the memoir of a head of the Chinese Army's sanitary department, Wu Zhi-ri, as also was reaffirmed in documents of the Soviet Union, implying that the origin of allegations was from China. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the allegations were entirely manipulated. China and the Soviet Union used the allegations of 'biological warfare' for the benefit of their countries. China appeared to use the allegation to gain military and medical supports from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union intended to prolong the Korean War through the allegation in order to learn the information of US military and to lessen the possibility of World War III by draining US military power in Asia.
  • 2.

    The Design of Cold War Initiative for the region of East Asia and the Plan for Composition of Korea-U.S. Relations by the delegation of Van Fleet

    Dongwon Lee | 2021, (120) | pp.43~78 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    After the armistice of the Korean War, Eisenhower sent a special military aid delegation to East Asia in April 1954 headed by former Eighth U.S. Army commander Van Fleet, for the purpose of reviewing East Asian strategy and scale of military aid. Van Fleet delegation visited South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines in turn and wrote a comprehensive report on East Asian policies covering political, economic and military issues as well as military aid and submitted it to President Eisenhower on September 30 at that year. Through the analysis of Van Fleet's report, this article will provide the understanding of the U.S. Cold War initiative in 1954 on East Asia, which was gradually gaining strategic value since the Korean War truce, the signing of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, and the rise of the Indochina Peninsula. Van Fleet served as the head of the special mission with Eisenhower's robust trust even after his discharge from the military. Van Fleet was very close to President Sungman Rhee based on his experience as commander of the Eighth U.S Army during the Korean War. Thus, Van Fleet's appointment as the head of the special military aid mission was due to the need of the U.S. but also at the request of President Rhee. Van Fleet represented the interests of the United States, but similarly expressed an "Asianist" aspect similar to MacArthur's, which led to a compromise between American interests and those of South Korea and other East Asian countries. Therefore, this study will be a historical case study that understands the process of establishing relations between the United States and East Asian countries, especially Korea, and their mutual characteristics. At the same time, it will also be possible to see how General Van Fleet, who was called the "father of the Korean military," influenced the military aid issue and military enhancement in East Asia after his discharge.
  • 3.

    The Ideal and Reality in Employing and Operating ROKFV's Company Level Tactical Base during the Vietnam War - Focusing on the Battle of Ducco(1966) -

    Hosub Shim | 2021, (120) | pp.79~130 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Based on ROK’s actual conduct during the Vietnam War, employing company level tactical bases was not a strategical feature in itself, rather it was a tactical one that followed ROKFV’s strategic emphasis on its conduct of the pacification(stabilization) operations and the reality of the war. Although this tactical strategy was not always employed following its original ideal, which focused more on a strategic or operational level of the pacification, the company base as ROK’s most important and unique tactical method remained so unabated for as long as ROKFV remained an active participant in the war. ROKFV had to pursue success in both unconventional and conventional war by adopting company tactical bases. However, it was not that easy for the troops to maintain a balance between the company base’s main function of supporting pacification operations while at the same time conducting defensive operations centered on the tactical base. Despite the brilliant victory at Duc Co battle between Tiger Div. and North Vietnamese army, ROKs, internally, realized a limitation and risk of the self-defense of the company base. Considering the ROKFV's internal goal of maximum results with minimum casualties, not causing unnecessary casualties by defending the base well was more realistic and sensitive to the Korean troops than achieving maximum results by successfully pacifying local populations. As a result, a successful defense became a more important and realistic matter than a success in pacification efforts in terms of operating company bases. This tendency became more prevalent as the Vietnam War progressed and bases, indeed, became permanent fortifications in this period.
  • 4.

    Russia's Far East defense plan after the Russo-Japanese war and a policy confrontation between minister of Finance and minister of the Army - Focusing on An Jung-geun's patriotic deed at Harbin -

    Deokkyoo Choi | 2021, (120) | pp.131~171 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    The aim of this study is to examine the effects of changes in European international relations after the Russo-Japanese War on the defense plan of the Russian Far East and the Korean independence movements in the Primorsky province. It was characteristic that the Russian Far East's defense reconstruction project after the Russo-Japanese war was linked with a change in the Tsar government's foreign policy that was the first priority of European region. The Tsar government's focus of foreign policy shifted from Far East to Europe caused by offering large loans to the Russia from Britain and France, which tried to keep Germany in check against European imperialistic hegemony. Thus, the Tsar government set the Baltic Fleet in reconstructing the Russian Navy by pursuing European priorities after the Russo-Japanese war, while the Pacific Fleet remained not rebuilt. As a result, The Project for defence enhancement in the Russian Far East remained unfinished till the outbreak of World War I. After the Russo-Japanese War, Tsar government's defense of the Far East had to rely on diplomacy with Japan. This policy not only limited the Korean independence movement in Russia, but also motivated the Japanese intervention of Siberia (1918-1922) after the Bolshevik Revolution. Therefore, the plan (1910) of the Russian minister of Army to cooperate with Korean independent movements troops to defend the Maritime Province led to the history of Korean partisan units cooperating with Soviet army to oust Japanese troops from Siberia.
  • 5.

    Actual Conditions and Characteristics of Special Army Officers of Anheung, Chungcheong-do Province in the Late Joseon Dynasty

    Moon, Kwnang-Kyun | 2021, (120) | pp.173~224 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This study paid attention to special army officer of Anheung, one of naval commanders in Chungcheong-do to examine one aspect of regional political rule done in military territories. For this, the study examined special army officers of Anheung's actual conditions of holding office as preliminary work and a case study for the study on Anheungjin Camp's regional political rule. In this study, Special army officers of Anheung which was analyzed, was targeted at 140 people who had been appointed since King Hyojong. Special army officers of Anheung's term in office was legally 30 months. But the average period that special army officers of Anheung were in office in the reigns of Hyojong of Joseon to Gojong of Korea was about 17 months. Special army officers of Anheung who were termed out of office continued public office in various fields including capital and local officials. About 40% of the total number of officers except the people who dismissed from office belonged to Buhogun to wait for personnel appointments, about 26% was appointed commanders of the senior grade of third rank including commanders of Five Military Commands and commanders of Concurrent Royal Stables. The rate to be promoted to local officials was about 20%. Among them, the rate to be promoted to naval commanders, the high rank of the naval forces was just 6.5% and the case of being promoted to garrison commanders, army inspectors, chiefs of staffs, and county magistrates was 13%. On the other hand, 27.8% of the whole special army officers of Anheung were disgraced as they dismissed from office, were exiled, or were forced into the army. Among them, the people who dismissed from office found from historical records were 36 people. The majority of them dismissed from office because of careless management and transportation of cargo vessels and imperfect management of military food. In addition, the failure of the oyster port of Anheung Port, insufficient reports and management of handover lines, excessive collection of taxation, and matters to repair the mountain fortress led to their dismissal from office. This shows that special army officers of Anheung was conducting Local Magistrates, such as the other regional magistrate.
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