Conflict and diplomatic competition between North and South Korea targeting the third world of the early 1980s, corresponding to the New Cold War was very serious. North and South Korea had foreign partners throughout the third world, and it was a large part of North and South Koreas’ diplomatic powers. It means that a very large proportion of diplomatic activity took place in the third world. To target the third world, North and South Korea wasted diplomatic resources on slander, with no affect on foreign policy during the Cold War. In the North-South Korea diplomatic confrontation, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to protect the superiority of South Korea, and diplomatic efforts were developed to block the Anti-South Korea maneuvers of North Korea carried out by the International Conference of Non-Aligned Nations and the UN. At that time, by hosting large events, North Korea was trying to exert influence in the leading Non-Aligned Movement. In addition, military weapons exports to countries of the third world, began to expand military diplomacy.
In terms of nationalism in Korea, It is based on Korean people’s emotion and sentiment. In the mean time, we also required complete nationalism as the driving force and foundation for political democracy and economic development in order to build a modernized nation state. In particular, as the modernization process was distorted, delayed and fractured due to foreign pillage and intervention. Korean nationalism added to it the additional characteristics of resistant nationalism and reunification nationalism combined and came to have an even more stable ideological identity. In this 21st century, Korea’s nationalism as the ideological foundation of its international strategies should include political content and reflect Korean nationalism’s features and characteristics in a balanced way. First, Korean nationalism should reflect civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism at the same time and achieve them simultaneously as well. Second, Korean nationalism should reflect and achieve the characteristics of reunification nationalism and resistant nationalism. Therefore, Korea’s international strategies based on nationalism should not be the radical insistence of anti-American autonomy or anti-American reunification but the progressive value of national reconciliation. The equivalent Korean-American relationship should coexist with, be compatible with, and accompanied by the conservative value of North Korean modernization and favorable Korean-American relationship at the same time. This is a very expedient solution to narrowing the gap between policy toward North Korea and policy toward the U.S., stop the vicious cycle of North and South Korean and Korean-American relations, and resolve unnecessary South-South conflict.
The purpose of this research is to seek for an efficient reorganization of government’s resettlement support system for the North Korean defectors residing in South Korea and overseas. The current support system revealed its deficiencies within Korea as well as in foreign soils: domestically, the number of North Korean defectors exceeded 20,000 and issues of North Korean defectors’ re-entrance to North Korea and continuous spy incidents remain unsolved; internationally, 50,000 North Korean defectors’ safety in China as well as problems of illegal refugee applications by North Korean defectors in third countries are on the rise. To resolve both domestic and international matters regarding North Korean defectors, the current support system requires a reorganization in its structure. In this research, I argue for a bicameral system for managing North Korean defector matters: The Ministry of Security and Public Administration (MOSPA) to take charge of domestic matters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to take charge of international matters. Domestically, the Ministry of Unification (MOU) is to transfer its North Korean resettlement support duty to MOSPA, whereas MOFA is to take charge of international matters regarding the defectors according to its competency. Theoretically and practically, this logic well supports the governmental reorganization plan.
When USA, the utmost strongest country in the world enforces anti‐NK policy in early 2000s, North Korea started the security strategy to exchange the existing nuclear weapons with security.
In 2009, the Obama Administration was constituted declaring the improvement of relationship with hostile countries and Kim Jung‐eun succeeding system was established in full, North Korea evolved existing security strategy a step further. North Korea‐US Agreement on February 29 in 2012 was the first accomplishment after North Korea changed their security strategy.
However, USA did not make promised actions when North Korea fired long‐distance rocket in April, claiming that it is the violation of 2·29 agreement, and North Korea‐US relationship became bad to worse with some more incidents. Furthermore, with domestic political situation changes in North Korea with the establishment of the Kim Jung‐eun administration which officially started in April in 2012, the Korean Peninsula in 2013 is facing serious risk of war. In particular, North Korea showed intention to transit the existing strategy to exchange nuclear weapons with security claiming ‘Completion of Denuclearization Negotiation’ in January, 2013.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the determinant factors in North Korea and Libya’s nuclear policy based on the Prospect Theory. I examine what conditions led to North Korea’s nuclear development and Libya’s nuclear renunciation.
The analysis reveals that Kim Jung-il had a strong will to push for nuclear development under strict internal control despite the international sanctions. Qaddafi had the will for nuclear development, but believed it was difficult to protect the regime because the international isolation was intensified while internal crisis was getting out of control. In particular, Seeing the Bush administration attack Iraq on the pretext of the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, He adopt a risk-aversion strategy to escape the collapse of regime as the worst case scenario. On the Other hand, Although Kim Jung-il is in the domain of loss because of ‘terror of war’ strategy in the Bush administration, He play his best cards which alleviate the loss through expanding trade with China and international arms trade.
Therefore, North Korea and Libya have the domain of loss in common, but whether nuclear development is continued or not depends on the effect of international sanctions and the keeping stable internal control.
First, King Kojong took aimed at to safeguard sovereignty safeguard as foreign policy. The advice of the diplomatic mission and foreign adviser affected independent foreign policy of Korea. King Kojong accredited Minister plenipotentiary in U.S. and Europe in 1887.
Second, King Kojong took aim at checking Japan’s invasion as foreign policy about the time of the loss of the sino-Japanese War. King Kojong accredited Min Young Whan as Minister plenipotentiary in U.S. and Europe in 1897.
Third, King Kojong took aim at checking Japan’s invasion as foreign policy. King Kojong planned to tempt Western Powers. King Kojong to check Japan’s invasion. King Kojong accredited Lee Buem Jin as Minister plenipotentiary in Russia.
Fourth, The Boxers entered into Peking in June of 1900 and the allied forces seized Peking. King Kojong tried to safeguard sovereignty safeguard by through the mediation of Western Powers. King Kojong accredited Minister plenipotentiary in Europe in 1901. At the time King Kojong set up resident embassy in Great Britain, France, Germany.
Fifth, the Anglo-Japanese alliance of January 1902 exerted an important impact on the diplomatic policy of King Kojong. The Great Han Empire became a member of the peace Conference of all nations and the Red Cross convention.
Sixth, King Kojong prepared for the outbreak of the Russian-Japanese War. King Kojong ordered to Min Young Chan to negotiate with international organizations for the safety of the Great Han Empire.
The efficiency theory argues that economic globalization limits public welfare spending in order to attract and retain mobile capital since the increase of government social spending undermines economic efficiency and the competitiveness of domestic firms in the globalized markets. On the other hand, compensation approach contends that governments are more likely to increase public expenditures in response to global economic integration, focusing on the social demands for social protection and the political motifs of political leaders to respond to such demands. Welfare spending in Korea has expanded as its economy has been integrated into the global market. The development of the welfare system can be explained by the interaction between political transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system and economic globalization. The democratic and progressive characteristics of the Kim Dae-jung government enabled the state to compensate the economic dislocations caused by economic globalization.
This study attempts to find an answer to the question of whether China during Deng's era can be labeled as a developmental state through an analysis of state autonomy and state capacity. Given that China at the beginning of Deng's era inherited a sufficiently high degree of state autonomy, this study divided state capacity into two different levels, that is, autonomy-sustaining capacity and goal-achieving capacity. As a result of the analysis, it was found that China during Deng's era successfully sustained its autonomy from civil society, but not from domestic enterprises. Moreover, even though the aim of industrial policy during Deng's era was to attain balanced growth among diverse sectors, the Chinese state failed to achieve it since the state did not have sufficient capacity to curb exponentially growing light industry and processing industry. In conclusion, this study found that, Deng Xiaoping's China, not having sufficient autonomy-sustaining capacity and goal-achieving capacity, cannot be labeled as a developmental state.
The most serious issues of the recent Chinese economy are the three great disparity problems-the gap between regions, the gap between urban and rural areas, and the gap between classes. This paper did an analysis on the income convergence of China’s rural residents and of three regions(eastern, central western), employing a panel data of Chinese provinces for the period of 1978～2011. The result shows that the income of rural residents has converged in all the three regions. While, prior to 2001, the level of income convergence was the highest in the central region. But, after 2001, the western region marked higher convergence than the central region. This means that the great western development projects have contributed to increasing the income level of the rural areas in absolute terms and to the improvement of the income distribution of rural residents in western region.