The Journal of Northeast Asia Research 2021 KCI Impact Factor : 0.79

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pISSN : 2005-4432
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2013, Vol.28, No.2

  • 1.

    A Review on America’s Rebalancing Strategy and Its Impact on Trilateral Relationship between China, Russia, and North Korea in the 21st Century.

    Kim Jae kwan | 2013, 28(2) | pp.6~42 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    This paper asserts that America’s strategic initiatives, “Rebalancing” towards the Asia-Pacific region and “Pivot to Asia”, has had a great influence on major states in Northeast Asia such as China, Russia, and North Korea. In order to contain China and Russia, the United States has proceeded to carry out two global strategies, namely NATO’s Enlargement in the East and Rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region throughout the 21st Century. In response to the these strategic initiatives, China and Russia have not only built a strong solidarity, built also continuously reinforced overall cooperation in the region. Especially, the Chinese Government undoubtedly regards this rebalancing strategy as a kind of containment policy to block China from emerging in the Asia-Pacific. Under this circumstance, China has consistently attempted not only to avoid conflict between the US and China , but also to establish and manage so called a “New Type of Great Power relations” among them under the Xijinping’s Regime. In addition, on the one hand, it is urgent for the China and Russia to strengthen a bilateral relationship between two nations. On the other hand, China, Russia, and North Korea as Continental power have been demanded to build a trilateral relationship in order to deter tighter trilateral military cooperations between the U.S. Japan, and South Korea as Sea power. However because of America’s intervention on this region using rebalancing strategy, it would be unpromising that China, Russia, and North Korea could establish and consolidate a firm and stable trilateral architecture of security. So as far as I see, these trilateral relations seem to be transient and unstable. They would be no more able to build a regime as a stable institution than an expectation.
  • 2.

    International Politics in the East Asian Seas : Forecast for the East Asian Maritime Security Environment based on the U.S.’ Pivot to Asia

    LIM KYUNG HAN | 2013, 28(2) | pp.43~74 | number of Cited : 6
    Abstract PDF
    The United States’ Asia-focused strategy will bring about competition among East Asian nations according to the realist perspective. As the U.S. tries to engage in a number of territorial disputes in the East Asian Seas, there has emerged a “U.S, vs. China” competition, or, broadly, “maritime power vs. land power.” Due to such competition, the uncertainty in East Asian maritime security has escalated more than ever. The U.S.’ pivot to Asia is likely to bring about significant change in East Asian maritime security environment in that such a stern pose is prone to end up in competition between the U.S. and China to become the maritime hegemon. The stronger the U.S. poses the Asia-focused strategy, the more careful South Korea should be in choosing its strategy. Under such a circumstance, South Korea needs to come up with a maritime strategy that enables its intention to be portrayed.
  • 3.

    Internal Conflict among the Communist States during the Period of the Korean Military Armistice Conference

    Jaehoon Lee | 2013, 28(2) | pp.75~102 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    This article clarifies disagreement and conflict among Stalin, Mao Ze Dong and Kim Il Sung in the period of Korean Military Armistice Conference, using the materials of Russian Archives. Disagreement and conflict had mainly occurred between Mao Ze Dong and Kim Il Sung. In the period of seeking a cease-fire, internal disagreement among the communist side occurred between Mao Ze Dong, who recognized the need for the cease-fire, and Kim Il Sung, who wanted to continue the warfare. On the other hand, In the period of Military Armistice Conference Conflict had occurred again between North Korea and Mao Ze Dong’s China with respect to set the Military Demarcation Line and exchange the prisoners of war. However since Chinese troops committed the war, China had taken over leading role toward the war and North korea had to play the adjuvant role, even though the war was going on in the North Korea’s territory. Furthermore, the Soviet Union also supported the China’s intention. As a result, China’s intention naturally overwhelmed North Korea’s willingness. Therefore from the beginning the Korean Military Armistice Conference forced on the interest of Soviet Union and China, and North Korea’s interest was not the subject of consideration.
  • 4.

    Chinese War Participation Decision Process in the Korean War : From North Korean Support Request to Participation Decision

    Okjoon Kim | 2013, 28(2) | pp.104~145 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    This study examines how Mao and his staff decided to participate in the Korean war after Kim Il Sung asked them to help the war on October 1 by analyzing several important party meetings. First of all, the Chinese leadership had convened five times and discussed issues and concerns during 13 days after the North Korean request. Based upon this analysis, I will resolve the conflicting views among the researchers about two contradictory telegrams sent by Stalin, the Black Sea conference between Stalin and Zou Eun Lai, and the role of Mao with the conference. In conclusion, Mao took an initiative to run the show from October 1 to October 13. This became possible because Mao took a firm control of the domestic politics across the party and military in China at that time.
  • 5.

    The Onset of the Post-Cold War Era and the Change of Korean Politics

    Cho, Jungkwan | 2013, 28(2) | pp.148~183 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This paper discusses how the coming of the Post-Cold War era in the 1990s influenced Korean politics, with particular focus on political parties, electoral politics and political elites. The end of the Cold War provided apt justification for the 1990 ‘three-party-merger’ and facilitated the adaptation of formerly authoritarian regime elites to democratic party politics. It also helped the creation of both Minjungdang(People’s Party) and Tongilgukmindang(Unification Nation’s Party), which were not able to overcome the existing regionalistic party system. Democratic reform by the Kim Young Sam Government was assisted by the post-Cold War setting that minimized the otherwise strong resistance from the formerly authoritarian leaders. The change of governmental power by Kim Dae Jung, which consolidated Korea’s electoral democracy, was possible both by the preceding elite change and by the alteration of the mentality of the elite and the masses, which was caused in part by the post-Cold War setting.
  • 6.

    What is to be done for party reform?

    Ryu, Jaesung | 2013, 28(2) | pp.186~216 | number of Cited : 5
    Abstract PDF
    This article is to present a possible path to reform political parties after analyzing previous studies and arguments on the results of the past reforms for political parties. To reform political parties is necessary for democratic expansion and depth-ness. I start my argument with the evaluations that past reforms are limited in its goals and agreements among diverse political groups. Furthermore, each reform did not fit each other and resulted in weakening political parties. Therefore, party reforms at present should aim at strengthening political parties. This articles shows how and where party reforms should start and argues that starting point for party reform should be organizational reform of political parties.
  • 7.

    The 18th Presidential Election and Negative Campaign

    Lee, Dong-yoon | 2013, 28(2) | pp.218~246 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    In modern political process, civil rights of voter to elect political representative by election is the most important component for democratic politics. Parties and candidates, who were participated in electoral process, made up positive opinion through policy promise and political image, and campaigned for support of voters. However, electoral campaign sometimes used negative method to criticize mistake and fault of other parties and candidates, and to induce emotional decision and support of voter in negative atmosphere. Actually, slander and black propaganda was rampant in the 18th presidential election rather than recent other election, negative campaign was increased. Nevertheless, negative campaign incurred negative result rather than positive effect. Voting rate was increased, and it was occurred concentration effect to increase support rate of rival candidate. In conclusion, parties and candidates need to control to use negative campaign including slander and black propaganda in the electoral process, and all political actor tried to make up campaign atmosphere for policy election.
  • 8.

    Patterns and Causes of Korean Voters’ Candidate Choice in the 2012 Presidential Election

    Park, Chan Wook | 2013, 28(2) | pp.248~290 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    Drawing on the data obtained from the pre- and post-election panel surveys, this paper describes and explains Korean voters’ candidate choice in the December 19 presidential election of 2012. Park Geun-hye defeated Moon Jae-in by receiving 51.6 percent of the vote. Persisting regional cleavage as well as young-old generational cleavage was clearly revealed by a sharp contrast in candidate choice. Analysis suggests that the strong influence of region and age variables are largely intermediated by other independent variables, such as party identification, ideological self-placement, retrospective judgment of past or outgoing President’s job performance, and perception of candidate traits. These attitudinal variables as a whole have a direct impact on candidate choice, and demonstrate outstanding explanatory power. Conceptual frameworks derived from time-honored studies on voting in western democracies have proven their empirical relevance to the candidate choice in Korea’s 2012 presidential election.
  • 9.

    Study on China’s Core Interests

    Kim Heungkyu | 2013, 28(2) | pp.292~323 | number of Cited : 16
    Abstract PDF
    China’s ‘core interests’ was paid attention in 2009 when Dai Bingguo, China’s then-State Councilor, referred it at the first U.S.-China Strategic and Economy Dialogue held in July, 2009. Since then, various debates on ‘China’s core interests’ have been erupted. Chinese government officially defined in 2011 the concept of ‘core interests’ in its white paper titled in ‘China’s Peaceful Rise’ as follows: national sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, national unification, stability of political and social system, and consistent development of economy and society. According to the definition, either North Korea or Korean peninsula doesn’t likely belong to the range of China’s core interests. It is rather strategically important area, affecting China’s core interests. Chinese new leadership headed by Xi Jinping emphasize protection of its core national interests in international relations. However, the concept itself hasn’t yet been well defined. It is vague and evolving. State-centric interpretation of it become more popular and the range of concept extending. The evolution of the concept likely illustrates the nature of Xi’s foreign policy in the next decade and requires special attention.
  • 10.

    The Propaganda of the CCP & Red Culture Craze

    KwangSu Lee | 2013, 28(2) | pp.326~351 | number of Cited : 5
    Abstract PDF
    In Chinese politics the Red Colour, a term that contains a special political significance, and Especially in terms of propaganda, cultural and economic sense in the category is growing increasingly. When Mao’s political propaganda by the Communist Party of China in Principle of Propaganda. one of the strongest principles ‘revolutionary’ with a red color by combining image and to maximize the political effect ‘Red Ideology’ was the implementation of the propaganda. Times as effective propaganda tool and the context ‘political line telephone’ has been used primarily. Since reform and opening up the decline of the political line phone calls along the flow line is made perfume and economic approach, instead of the red color of the new method and the cultural and economic ideology, propaganda, the way this is done is approach.