KJC Korea
Journal Central

This study explains the change in Vietnam’s strategy toward China in response to the change of its threat-perceptions to China, from ‘hedging’ to ‘balancing,’ with regard to a continuous policy spectrum. Vietnam, which has historically been highly aware of China’s threats, severed its relationship with China after the war against China in 1979. But Vietnam normalized its diplomatic relations with China in 1991 due to the Sino-Russian rapprochement after the post-Cold War. It adopted a hedging strategy toward China since the normalization with the US. When Vietnam’s threat perceptions to China has deepened, Vietnam adopted a balancing strategy instead of a hedging. In this case, it considered the economic interdependence with China and Sino-Vietnam power asymmetry, and therefore, selected a soft balancing rather than a hard balancing. Vietnam announced a statement in protest against China’s assertive behaviors and violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty. In addition, Vietnam appeals to international institutions such as the United Nations and international community about China’s illegal activities in order to internationalize the South China Sea disputes, to weaken China’s position and to gain support from other countries. However, As China’s revisionist and offensive military activities in the South China Sea have not been suppressed, but rather increased, Vietnam began to change its strategy to military soft balancing strategy. Above all, Vietnam is strengthening its maritime defense capabilities by increasing its defense and security cooperation with the United States, including joint exercises, military training, and transfer of US patrol boats to Vietnam’s coast guards. At the same time, Vietnam is expanding its military security cooperation US security partners(so-called Quad countries) including Australia, India, and Japan. In this respect, this study analyzes that Vietnam is changing its strategy from hedging strategy to soft balancing, and especially strengthening military soft balancing in addition to non-military soft balancing, reflecting changes in the international political environment and Vietnamese perception of threat to China in the South China Sea.

Before the Korean War, the ROK Air Force was nothing but an “air detachment” with twenty-two liaison and trainer aircraft. As soon as the Korean War broke out, the U.S. provided ten F-51 fighters to the Republic of Korea. After that, the Korean government made several requests for further large scale aid for the purpose of creating a tactical air unit to carry out air operations. But U.S. didn't accept that since Korea was not equipped with personnel and economic foundation to manage such a large air unit. However, this matter, which lasted throughout the first half of the war, was resolved as the stalemate and the armistice talks began in 1951 summer. The U.S. agreed that the ROK was needed to possess the potential to ba able to conduct tactical air operations on its own following U.S. leaving Korea after the war. Korea coupled with U.S. established three different phases of flight training system to produce fighter pilots continuously, leading to establish the 1st Fighter Wing. This unit was officially included later in the tactical unit under the United Nations Command (UNC) passing the Operations Readiness Test (ORT) driven by the U.S. 5th Air Force. This study argued that the continuous interaction between Korea and U.S. built the Korean air power during the war.

Dokdo is one of the starting points of the post-war conflict between Korea and Japan in the process of the unreasonable postwar process of World War II. Even though the boundary between the land and the sea exists between Korea and Japan under international law, Japan's claim of territorial sovereignty only with respect to Dokdo continues. As with the “critical date” under international law, the Dokdo issue, which began in earnest in 1947, or Japan's claim to sovereignty over Dokdo continued until the “Treaty of Peace with Japan” entered into force in 1952. In response to this, it is evaluated that the Korean government has responded in a timely manner and defended it in a timely manner, such as dispatching the “Academic Research Troop” from 1947 and the declaration of “Peace Line” in 1952. The Ulleungdo-Dokdo Academic Research Troop, which was dispatched from 1947 immediately after liberation, is the “fact” of the exercise of joint public-private jurisdiction in the transitional period, and this is an example of the interpretation and application of international legal and domestic laws that protect the territory of the Republic of Korea (state practice) to Japan. It can be used as the most basic basis for diplomatic negotiations on Korea. At that time, Korea was under the US military government, but Dokdo was a territory of Joseon, so the effective control of the “Corean Alpine Club” was effective rule for “maintaining the title” and satisfies the “continuation requirement” of effective control. The effective domination of remote uninhabited islands was satisfied by a survey of the Corean Alpine Club. It still has a special meaning of exercising jurisdiction and activities of autographers in the transition period before the establishment of the Korean government. Since Dokdo is located far from the mainland of Korea and is virtually uninhabited, the academic research activities of the Corean Alpine Club met the requirements for effective control over Dokdo. On the basis of these historical “facts”, the Korean authorities and the National Assembly, including the transitional government, at least prove that Dokdo has not “cast it aside” or “abandoned” Dokdo.

Recently, Russia, China, Japan, and Korea are paying attention to the Northern Economy Zone and the East Sea Economy Zone in far east asia. The strategy of Russian new eastern policy and Chinese One Belt Load using ports in the east sea area, Korean new northern policy, Japanese west coast port developments, etc., each country is proposing policies to lead the northern economy. In particular, related local governments such as Gangwon-do, which have geographical advantages, are showing high interest in South and North Korean logistics and tourism. In this study, the direction of port development is proposed for six major ports in the east coast of North Korea in order to find ways to link ports in the South and North Korean east coast area. For the development of North Korean ports, 4 indicators and 6 detailed factors were applied based on the evaluation criteria derived from previous studies. Through the hierarchical structure analysis, four important indicators were analyzed in order: necessity, economic feasibility, realization, and urgency. This paper is a basic study to derive a linkage plan between South and North Korean ports in the future. It derives the priority of port development in the east coast of North Korea and presents the development direction for each port.

North Korean Patriotic Supporter Association(PSA) was established to provide mental and material support to North Korean Army and their families, military training for members, and purchase costs for fighters, tanks, and vessels. The North Korean leadership reviewed the military assistance policy in the past in the past in the USSR and Japan while planning such a military support policy. The PSA was established on the basis of social groups by imitating Japanese military support organizations, and was planning to cultivate air force aviators and paratroopers by imitating Soviet military support organizations. In addition, the PSA supported the military support policies of the Soviet Union and Japan to support the soldiers’ peace of mind. North Korea, like the Soviet Union and Japan, provided condolences to soldiers, but paid national subsidies to military families and greatly reduced direct taxes. In addition, military training promoted by the military support organizations of the Soviet Union was introduced to members as new recruits of the military. Finally, the PSA raised money to purchase fighters, tanks, and vessels by imitating the Soviet and Japanese weapons purchase campaign. Unlike the Soviet Union and Japan, the North Korean leadership did not limit the payment method to cash, but expanded it to labor and grain to diversify the classes involved in the payment movement.

In 2019, Buma democratic uprising has been established as national memorial day. By this decision, this uprising has been built as a legitimate and orthodox democratic movement in Korean democratic history. From now, the State would reveal the political truth about this movement, opening regularly and periodically the national ceremony for this memorial day. We can say that the establishment of Buma democratic uprising as a national memorial day will take a important role for finding its truths. But, we may not say that all of truth about this uprising will completely be revealed. Because Buma democratic uprising and its participants will exist as signification and being beyond the unitary political subject that the national memorial day can define. It is necessary to observe that they are peoples, very complex, often contradictory, sometimes incoherent. So, they can be called the diverse or the particular. It may be possible to open, in this thought, a door of imagination towards the another democracy beyond the democracy defined by the political modernity.

The United Nations developed the concept of humanitarian intervention/R2P (Responsibility to Protect) and deployed PKOs (Peace Keeping Operations) to protect civilians from the dangers of humanitarian crisis like massacre and genocide. Peacekeeping operations are recognized as effective tools to protect human life. However, of the 831 humanitarian crises that occurred in the period 1989-2014, only 237 (28.51%) were subjects of UN PKO deployment. What determinants influence the deployment of UN PKO for protecting human life? I posit three determinants that impact the likelihood of the UN’s humanitarian intervention: the interests of power nations, characteristics of target nations, and objects of humanitarian intervention. In a quantitative empirical analysis of the UN’s deployment of PKOs between 1989-2014, I find that humanitarian crises are selected depending on target nations’ economic/political value. Specifically, the economic interests of power nations, target nations’ characteristics such as military power, GDP, population, and democratic system influence the UN’s humanitarian intervention. The number of deaths in a humanitarian crisis does not influence the UN’s humanitarian intervention. These results show the true face of international governance on humanitarian intervention.