Are Determinables as Fundamental as Determinates?

BAEK SONG EE

doi:10.31310/HUM.074.03

If an object weighs 210g, then it necessarily has mass. Likewise, if an object is red, then it is also necessarily colored. It is said that there are relatively specific properties possessed by objects and each of them belongs to one general property. The former sort of properties are considered to be ‘determinate’, while the latter sort of properties to be ‘determinable’. Some philosophers who are supporting for anti-realism about determinables believe that there are only determinates in a fundamental sense, while determinables are just be supervenient on or reduced to determinates in a derivative sense. But Jessica Wilson argues that there are some reasons for accepting that determinables also exist in a fundamental level or are as fundamental as determinates. She tries to defend realism about determinables, along with two positive arguments and three negative ones. However, most of her objections can be rejected, except for one of negative arguments, the argument from naturalness, which seems to be intricate to handle with. Nevertheless, there would be some viable strategies to solve it. To sum up, this article aims to present that anti-realism about determinables can be sustained by refuting Wilson’s arguments.

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* 2022년 이후 발행 논문의 참고문헌은 현재 구축 중입니다.

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