This paper seeks to elucidate the national identity of Koreans living in Japan with a special permanent resident status through in-depth interviews.
In that not only the first and second generations but also the third and fourth generations have maintained the nationality of their ancestral homeland without being naturalized nearly a century after the initial migration to and settlement in Japan, Koreans in Japan with a special permanent resident status are special in an unprecedented manner worldwide. Although it is clear that this group will decrease in number in the distant future, they nevertheless and undoubtedly will remain a very meaningful social entity for a considerable time. Just as ethnic Koreans' living conditions vary, their identities likewise are diverse indeed. Because the question of “Who am I?” is deeply linked to nationality in the case of Koreans in Japan, national identity occupies the greatest share of these people's identities. Unfortunately, however, that national identity is not simply connected to a single nation-state due to the continuing division of Korea. This paper traces the identities of Koreans living in Japan with questions on the meanings of nationality and nation that they seek to preserve.
This article deals with the fate of Japanese colonists in the Korean Peninsula following Japanese defeat in the Second World War. It focuses on perceptions and responses to the protection of colonial assets sort by Keijō-Nihonjin-Sewakai. Having accepted the Potsdam Declaration of August 1945, the Japanese Government-General of Korea adopted a set of measures aimed at helping Japanese settlers to remain in Korea and to protect their assets. Keijō-Nihonjin-Sewakai was an organization set up by colonists to help in this endeavor. The organization cooperated with the US Army Military Government in Korea(USAMGIK), and busied itself with these two aims of settlement and asset protection. However, from December 1945, USAMGIK policy hardened in the direction of asset confiscation and compulsory repatriation. The failure of Keijō-Nihonjin-Sewakai in its mission on the Korean Peninsula led to the rise of the ‘overseas asset compensation problem’ as an issue within Japanese society.
When seen in such a light, the colonial perspective of the Japanese government and Japanese colonists in Korea becomes clear. The fact that US forces made a final decision on matters related to occupation policy only after they had occupied the southern half of the Korean Peninsula led to much confusion in the Japanese colonial administration and amongst would-be Japanese settlers. Above all else, it was ‘USAMGIK Ordinance No. 33’－which vested all Japanese government and privately-held property within the US zone of occupation in the US military government－that would be a major area of contention in future negotiations over diplomatic normalization between South Korea and Japan. The issue of claimed funds that would later prove so contentious in negotiations between South Korea and Japan was inextricably bound up with the problem of Japanese settler property post-defeat in World War Ⅱ. In this sense, the return of settlers and the Keijō-Nihonjin-Sewakai can be said to form part of the burden of history which has so constrained and stymied improvement in relations between South Korea and Japan.
The purpose of this study is to analyze Syngman Rhee administration's perception and policy toward Japan's rearmament in the context of security against Japan. There is critical dispute between ROK and U.S. about security against Japan. Syngman Rhee demanded definite assurance from the U.S. of safeguarding ROK against Japanese aggression. To Syngman Rhee's argument, U.S. convinced ROK to achieve security against Japan through a close and cooperative relationship with Japan. And Syngman Rhee administration predicted that if Japan's rearmament was reaching peak, Japanese nationalism would revive. Based on worst case scenario about Japan's rearmament, ROK suggested ROK-U.S.-Japan tripartite non-aggression pact in order to institutionalize security against Japan. However, for Japan's negotiation tactics, U.S.' passiveness and policy toward Japan, Syngman Rhee became skeptical about non-aggression pact and finally the negotiation was failed.
This paper examines the oral statement in the negotiation process of the issue of cultural properties during the break period of the Korea-Japan talks, and discusses the meaning of the oral statement regarding the issue of cultural properties and the Korea-Japan talks.
In the discussion process, Korea attempted to modify the oral statement in order to dispel the meaning of the unilateral transfer of cultural properties, in addition to persisting with discussions regarding the issue of the cultural properties at the overall talks. Japan accepted most of the Korean revision requests, but strongly opposed the expressions related to the time of delivery.
This oral statement played a decisive role in the process of negotiations surrounding the issue of cultural properties after the break period during the Korea-Japan talks, and the expression “turn over” was the first formal agreement on the solution that allowed the two countries to interpret the agreement signed at the 7th Korea-Japan talks differently
The ‘Local Extinction’ discourse has attracted overwhelming public attention in the Japanese society. Masuda Hiroya and his colleagues in the Japan Policy Council suggested that Japan's localities should provide measures for shrinking their own residents’ moving-out and for encouraging moving-in from Tokyo metropolitan area. In order to realize this plan, Japan's localities should transform their regional planning in a basis of ‘selection and concentration’ principle. This argument of the ‘local extinction’ has provoked intense debates about principle and measures for Japan's local policy. The current Abe Cabinet has incorporated the ‘local extinction’ discourse in its own local policy profile under the slogan of the ‘Chihou Sousei.’ However, the ‘local extinction’ discourse falls short of discussions on local adminstration reform, public-private partnership, and innovation.