Based on the analysis of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP)’s policy on the private sector during the Xi Jinping era, the article asserts the following arguments. During the Xi Jinping era, the CCP proposed a series of policies to foster and improve the status of the private sector while endeavoring to expand its influence in the private sector through the Party building and United Front work. In addition, the CCP intended to change the way of interaction between the state and private entrepreneurs by suggesting the New Type of Government-Business Relationship. In this context, the CCP achieved the quantitative growth of the private sector, expansion of Party organizations in the private sector, political consensus with young private entrepreneurs, and new ways of mutual interaction between government officials and private entrepreneurs. However, government officials’ complacency after the proposal of the New Type of Government-Business, securing a loan for the private sector, and the issues over the US-China trade conflict and COVID-19 are the tasks that require further consideration in the policies for the private sector.
The current China–Venezuela relationship adheres to the South-South cooperation (SSC) model wherein the two countries have established an integrated cooperative approach with “loan-for-oil” deals at its core; however, in contrast with its recent softening stance on interventions, China has taken a cautious approach to the crisis in Venezuela since 2014. Nevertheless, not many studies highlight the reasons for China’s cautiousness. This paper tries to mitigate the gap by examining China’s strategic overdraft as exposed by this response and exploring the challenges in SSC model. It is herein argued that dual overdrafts of material power and credibility constitute the reason for China’s nonintervention in Venezuela. Meanwhile, as the country hoped to continue its presence in Venezuela and is concerned over the overdraft credibility risk by withdrawing, it chose adopt hedging as a form of flexible involvement. To avoid a similar situation in the future, China should neither rely on economic complementarity nor rigidly stick to nonintervention. With national economic and political interests and cooperative sustainability as a guide, China should clarify and redefine its nonintervention principle and adopt preventive measures for risk assessment and cooperation practices to innovate a more sustainable SSC model.
This paper investigates consumption function using auto-regressive distributed lag(ADL) model using quarterly data from 1990 to 2020. Elasticities of age-specific disposable income, inflation rate, interest rate, and population aging index were estimated and the effects of population aging on aggregate consumption were analyzed.
Income elasticities household on average were 0.75, the biggest value of 0.97 the upper sixties, 0.73 in the lower thirties, 0.68 in the forties and the smallest one of 0.60 in fifties.
Inflation elasticities were found to be the most responsive value of -0.03 the upper sixties and the other households shown to be around –0.01.
Interest rate elasticity, household on average, showed -0.11 which means interest rate affects consumption as an opposite direction. Age-specific elasticities were the biggest value of –0.11 in lower thirties, -0.09 in the forties, -0.08 in the fifties and the positive value of 0.05 in the upper sixties. Currently low interest rate policy will function as a positive factor for aggregate consumption expenditure.
Population aging elasticity was estimated be –0.06 which indicates 1% increment in population index will lead to 0.06% decrease in consumption. This result implies deepening in population aging will affect consumption negatively.
As seasonal impacts, winter shows the largest while spring does the smallest in consumption. Facing with accelerating population aging, this paper could be a reference analysis in designing economic policy.