In this paper, I point out that most issues in neuroethics are similar to those raised when a new science was shown up. I emphasize that we have to pay attention to new issues because most of issues may be resolved by broadening current bioethical discourse into neuroethical one. One of important issues beyond current bioethical discourse is how we understand features of the mental. The other is about neural determinism. Dealing with those issues, I argue for minimal physicalism that does not imply reductionism and strong neural determinism. The mental supervenes on its relevant activities of neurons. There are causal laws among activities of neurons. In this perspective, I argue against the view that free will is identified with a pure mental entity as well as brain-centralism that a self is identified with a brain. In addition, I point out that strong neural determinism is not plausible because we have to distinguish causation from determinism. Brain as a part of nature is subject to natural laws. However, what we know about them is mainly about relationships between necessary cause and its effect or correlations among them. Neuroscience, of course, has a task to discover any physical laws among neurons. In addition, it has to identify what mental entities supervene on particular activities of neurons. This research will provide with us a chance to voluntarily intervene causal relationships by improving our knowledge of causation in neural activities, rather than reinforce strong neural determinism.