KJC Korea
Journal Central

The purpose of this paper is to find out the factors of Insurance Planner turnover and suggest implications of improvements in the settlement rate empirically based on the study of the questionnaire developed by purposive quota sampling. The results are summarized as follows. The higher the number of policyholders, the higher the turnover intention. On the contrary, the lower the number of new contracts, the higher the turnover intention. This suggests that there is a high degree of turnover among high-performance planners who are currently suffering from the pressure to sell insurance. The relationship between satisfaction and turnover intention shows the high turnover intention of planners with low satisfaction. In particular, all the types of planners showed the negative relationship between the commission satisfaction and turnover intention. Satisfaction of commission structure is low, and in this case, the turnover tendency is especially high. The supervisory authority needs to make an effort to raise the insurance company's settlement rate by ensuring that the sorting is settled in the market because all the planners prefer front-end-loading, which significantly influences turnover intentions. There was a statistically significant difference between the work experience and the turnover intention. In particular, it shows a high turnover of highly experienced TA, and various incentive structures will need to be changed. In addition, reputation(-) for GA, performance(-) for TA, and the number of policyholders(+) for TM influences turnover intentions.

This study investigates the effect of intensive board monitoring, which is measured by the structure of monitoring committees (audit committee, outside director nomination committee, and compensation committee) in the board, on the shareholder wealth in Korea. More importantly, we confirm how this effect can be changed by the various firm characteristics related to the managerial incentives and the efficiency of corporate control mechanisms. Based on this approach, we provide the alternative arguments to the multilateral views to understand the benefits and costs of board monitoring in emerging markets. Empirically, we find that the high proportion of outside directors in monitoring committees has the positive effect on the firm value. However, this effect decreases or disappears as firms’ age, leverage ratio, volatility of cash flow, competitive threats, and the ownership of controlling shareholders increases, while the effect gets stronger as firms’ free cash flow, the opaqueness of assets and the ownership of institutions become greater. These results mean that the value enhancing the effect of board monitoring depends on the firm characteristics which are closely related to the possibility of agency problem and the necessity of growth strategy of the firm. Additionally, confirming the effect on payout policy, we obtain the similar result in the interaction between board monitoring and firms’ age, volatility of cash flow, and ownership of controlling shareholders. Looking beyond this study, our results support the argument of prior literature which suggests that the one size does not fit all: the agency problem will not be solved by one specific control mechanism, therefore we should consider the practical complexity of corporate management and various factors.

There exist lots of difficulties for individual investors to apply the mean-variance framework to their investment decision making, although the framework has been the mainstream of modern investment theory. According to the recent research papers, many of DC participants’ portfolios are carelessly focused on risk-free assets with low expected returns. In this paper, we introduce Goal-Based Investing using stochastic dominance for DC participants. GBI is an investment theory that integrates the advantages of traditional Markowitz theory and Behavioral Portfolio Theory. Hereby, the investment risk is measured as not the standard deviation of return but the probability of failing to reach goals. Also, GBI investors can divide their aggregated assets into the subportfolios which have different investment goals. Through this solution, investors will be able to make the more accurate estimation of their risk attitudes and invest their pension assets to the appropriate financial products. We hope that this paper could contribute to asset allocation strategies for DC participants to achieve investment goals.

The fair value of insurance contract liabilities represents the market consistent value at which the liabilities could be transferred to a willing and rational counterparty in an arm's length transaction under normal business conditions. Where the market values are not available, market consistent techniques should be applied to determine the best estimate liability and risk margin for non-hedgeable risks. Under the Cost of Capital(CoC) approach, proper CoC rate must be estimated to calculate risk margin. In this paper, CoC rate suitable for Korean insurance industry is estimated. Frictional CoC rate was estimated 3.877%, which is made up of double-taxation costs rate(1.487%) and financial distress cost rate(2.39%). In this study, Cost of Equity Capital using CAPM was 6.1% when 10 reference years of Korean market data were used. To the output from two models, both upward and downward adjustments are needed when assessing the proper CoC rate for calculation of risk margin. This study proposes the proper CoC rate for calculation of risk margin is 4.5∼5.5% after adjustments.