In this article, we tried a theoretical analysis on issues concerned with purchasing of on-line insurance which competing with off-line one in the information asymmetrical insurance market. We verified the following fact and drew interesting implications about on-line's economical significance as a result of the analysis.
1. Where an on-line insurance characterized by the compensation uncertainty and low pricing etc set up low risker a target market, optimal insurance coverage is the full coverage's off-line insurance to high-risker, while the partial coverage's on-line one to low-risker. Such results imply that we can improve adverse selection problems resulted from asymmetry information, if we can design individually a separating contract so that self-selection mechanism does working.
2. In order to survive on that on-line insurance shows the advantage of low price, as is paradoxical, a excessively low pricing strategy should be sublated. Because more price difference than constant level may cause high-risker's adverse selection
3. So that the inexpensive price in on-line amounts factor to become winner, an exquisite underwriting system should be constructed, which requires investment of huge amount of money.
4. It is the fact that on-line' success is influenced by off-line efficiency as well as on-line itself's one, furthermore influenced efficiency of market whole.
5. We can expect role that restrain injustice contract from consumer's misgiving about that quick and correct service is available like off line when accident occurred.