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The Game of Comparative Negligence in Car Accident and Insurance Claim
Journal of Insurance and Finance
2013, 24(4),
pp.109-135
Publisher : Korea Insurance Research Institute
Research Area : Business Management
Publisher : Korea Insurance Research Institute
Research Area : Business Management
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This paper analyzed the economic efficiency of comparative negligence rule for car accident and insurance claims. A similar research(Yang,1997) argued that for the economic efficiency, the liability portion of the more responsible party should be increased. Relative size of an accident amounts, and caution costs have an important role in analysis. However, this paper provides a more generalized game model, which considers the different mix of each party’s caution. In our model, the accident probabilities of one-sided and two-sided caution cases could be different. If the differences are not so significant, we would have the same result as Yang(1997)'s. In the case of significant differences,however, we should not demand just one party’s responsibility. Instead,we should require caution from the both parties by imposing even more responsibilities.
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