In the current situation focusing largely on the regulatory reforms of national government in Korea, this study examines the present state of regulatory reforms in local government in Korea. It intends to contribute to making the current regulatory reform systems in local level more efficient and workable by analyzing and improving the present local systems for regulatory management and reform. For this purpose, it particularly reviews and analyzes the registration system of regulations to find some problems which can be categorized into two types: ‘ones in registration system of registration' and ‘ones in contents in regulation.' In addition, it suggests more practical and specific guidelines for registration of regulations by category, supplemented and supported by cases (in laws) for each guideline. These guidelines are expected to help the local regulatory officials sort out, judge and register regulations more efficiently and correctly. Finally, from the broader perspective, it makes several policy suggestions for improvement of the regulatory reforms in Korea.
This paper critically reviews the rationale of the “Restrictions on Equity Investment” (REI), provided in Lim (2003), and also the proposal by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) to base regulation using the “Indices of Ownership-Control Disparity” (IOCD). We find that Lim (2003) analyzes firms' equity investments only in a static one-period model, and much of the analysis tends to lack supportive explanation for critical assumptions made, while different equity investments are unrealistically treated homogeneously. On the other hand, we find critical possible problems in the event that the KFTC restricts firms' voting rights based on the levels of IOCD calculated. Also, IOCD is problematic if it is used as a criterion for exempting firms from REI.
In this paper, we first of all tried to evaluate the deadweight loss induced by the monopoly of Korea Electric Power Corporation using econometrics method. Second, we also pursued to calculate the monopolist price as well as perfectly competitive price to derive the economic loss from monopolist in Korean electric market. The third issue is that the price of oligopolistic competitive market is derived under the condition that the power sector as well as distribution sector in the electricity industry are all successively restructured.
According to the empirical results, we found that the regulation price controled by the government was much higher than that of hypothetical competitive electric market. Next, the welfare loss out of total revenue amount to 7.61% in 1982 year, which was dramatically reduced to 1.15% in 2000 year. If the distribution sector of electric market were restructured successfully up to the third stage, we can derived the remarkable result that welfare loss under the oligopolistic competitive market is much less 1/1000 than that of a monopoly market.
Korea experiences the most rapid aging trend in the world and currently transits into an advanced aging society. Aging trend decreases working population and increases aged dependency ratio that have negative impacts on supply of labor force and social security expenditure such as national pension.
In this context, increases of retirement age as well as pension benefit age are alternative measures that can compensate decreasing labor force and insecure pension financing.
Nevertheless, without improving employment condition and working environment for the aged people, simple increase of retirement age may result in the limited employment opportunity and unemployment of the aged people and the increase of workload for the aged people who are physically weak. In addition to the increase of retirement age, the increase of pension benefit age may expand no income period.
This study suggests flexible pension benefit system and gradual retirement system as for buffering measures absorbing the problems arising from the increase of retirement age and pension benefit age against aging society.
The major advantages of these systems are to let the aged people to choose work type and retirement model according to individual socio-physical conditions or their preferences and to provide institutional base for prolonging employment period and to solve income reduction by developing pension benefit system.
This paper investigates policy difference between a market-based environmental policy such as emission trading and a command and control policy such as fuel quality standard. For this, we construct a CGE model allowing various vehicles, fuels, and transportation service options. Especially, choices that consumers face in the model consist of ① new vehicle & existing fuel ② new vehicle & low sulphur fuel ③ existing vehicle & existing fuel ④ existing vehicle & low sulphur fuel. Also, we divide the vehicles into three types(passenger car, bus and truck), two sizes(small and big) and two vintages(new and existing), and classify the fuels into three types(gasoline, diesel and LPG). This classification allows us to analyze not only the substitution effect across the existing vehicles but also the substitution effect between the new and the existing vehicles. We use the CGE model to compare the economic impacts on GDP between command-and-control (CAC) and market-based policy. It shows that the market-based policy is superior to the CAC to minimize GDP loss in achieving a environmental target. Also, it shows that tax recycling mechanism is preferable to mitigate GDP loss in the presence of the existing tax distortion. Moreover, it is found that, under the market-based policy such as emission trading, the high quality standard fuel can be penetrated through markets without introducing any other regulation.