Regulatory goals tend to be set as high as possible, and its instruments chosen as strong as possible. This tendency is usually justified on such ground that regulations designed as such must accomplish regulatory goals most effectively. This study casts strong doubt about this naive belief. Paying particular attention to the inherent vagueness and lack of concreteness of policy goals in nature and the typical behavior both on the part of regulators and the regulated at the stage of regulatory enforcement, and also taking cognizance of the utmost strong influence that resources constraints exert at this stage, this study argues, from the perspective of incremental approach, that such a synoptic approach to regulatory goal setting must end up with greater dissatisfaction, for those regulations designed in such a fashion—mostly input standards in sort—would only further increase unreasonableness of regulations. In the spirit of incremental approach, this study suggests an alternative way of setting regulatory goals in such a manner as to make “X% improvement from the status quo”—which can be derived from an expert survey or international comparisons of states achieved under current regulatory structures of advanced countries—a realistic goal to be achieved next year. This method would help increase economic efficiency of allocating limited resources available for regulatory enforcement, set policy priorities right in the midst of unending requests for ever higher regulatory goals from the society, and make it far easier to appraise and compare the levels of achievement of regulatory goals.
Since 1981, Korea has maintained an unique regulatory framework on economic concentration. While most countries manage competition laws to discipline the market concentration and its subsequent problems, Korea rather focuses on restraining the aggregate concentration, esp. the economic power of the big chaebols. Recently the inhospitality tradition against the business groups is being aggravated mostly due to the political rhetoric of economic democratization propagated during the 18th presidential race in 2012. Why has the economic concentration been so much social concern in Korea? What makes the Korea specific regulation persistent and even stricter in the globalization era of open competition? In this paper we evaluate the logics and myths behind the regulation in the contexts of economic theory and history. We also estimate theoretically consistent measures of concentration of the 30 large chaebols and test the corporate hegemony hypothesis, using the data of employments, sales, assets, and diversification indices. The major finding is that various measures used in previous literatures have a feature of ‘quick-and-dirty ones’ in that they lead to significantly upward biases up to 60 percent and a misleading interpretation in the long-term change of economic concentration.
This study aims at analyzing trend of regulatory studies in regulatory theory and regulatory policy in Korea. For this purpose, it conducts a content analysis of 280 articles published in 「the Journal of Regulation Studies」 from 1992 to 2012, focusing on not only subject of researches but also researcher's orientation and perspectives on regulatory reform.
The main results are as follows. First of all, regarding regulation theory, the market-oriented and traditional claims were generally accepted. Second, many studies expressed the negative view on regulation or the government's intervention. Third, the political economic perspectives of regulation such as the capture of regulatory bureaucrats, the private interest in regulation, the demand for regulation and so on were received generally . Fourth, the general trust in regulatory policy in advanced countries and Korea showed a contrasting result. Finally, there were the gap between the background expertise of researchers like public administration and economics of the legitimacy of regulation, the role of government, etc. and the difference of stance on deregulation and the inefficiency of government intervention.
This study analyzes the institutional and structural factors which impact on the technical efficiencies of Oil Companies. In order to identify the variables that induce technical inefficiencies of oil companies, we make use of Stochastic Frontier models using data from “Top 100 Ranking the World Oil Companies" by Energy Intelligence from 2000 to 2008. Our empirical findings suggest that government ownership adversely affects on firm efficiency which is consistent with those of prior researches such as Al-Obaidan and Schully(1991), Hartely and Medlock(2007) and Wolf and Pollitt(2008). However, vertical integration and firm diversification are positively, but weekly, associated with firms efficiencies, depending the dependant variable employed. These results largely imply that oil market liberalization is likely to improve market performance
Regulatory budget aims at achieving rational allocation of resources by putting a cap at regulatory costs and constraining agencies from issuing ineffective regulations. Thus regulatory budget is theoretically considered as a powerful tool for regulatory reform. Nevertheless, there has been no public debate on Regulatory budget theoretically neither practically in Korea. This study aims at searching the applicability of regulatory budget on the basis of a question of why application of regulatory budget has failed despite its merits.
This study examines the applicability of regulatory budget by using five disputed points(exclusion of benefit estimation, problems related to cost estimation, conditional selection of policy instrument, decision of proper size of budget, additional cost) as an analytical framework.
We found that except exclusion of benefit estimation, all disputed points could be regarded as technical problems in implementing the regulatory budget and identified as solvable problems. We also found that exclusion of benefit estimation has been at the center of application of regulatory budget and regarded as a selective problem of regulatory value between efficiency and equality. This results suggest that programs or institutions for regulatory reform be designed to strike a balance between efficiency and equity.
A natural gas industry tends to take a form of monopolized market. Korean gas market has also been governed by government regulation and government enterprise Kogas since its early start. A monopolized industry generally causes an X-inefficiency phenomena, theoretically and practically, The Korean regulatory agency, Ministry of Knowledge Economy, has tried to resolve these kinds of inefficiency and ineffectiveness by instituting some type of competition policy into gas market.
This paper argues that government's recent attempts of instituting a more competitive gas market have a wrong definition of policy problem. This paper also argues that the introduction of competition policy can hardly achieve the intended policy objective of efficient operation of gas industry.
This paper suggests the institutionalization of incentive regulation such as price cap regulation, RPI-X or profit sharing regulation as viable policy options to make the workably competitive or contestable gas market and to raise the industry efficiency.
The court sentenced that it is not the permitted practices for the Korean oriental doctor to use diagnostic imaging devices, such as Ultrasound machine, X-ray generator, CT. Strictly to say, these devises are just a machine that produces image data. Theoretically, these images have no meanings until they are interpreted by doctor or oriental doctor. These images can be interpreted not only by virtue of western medical theory but also by virtue of Korean oriental medical theory. The court, however, did not accept for the Korean oriental doctors to use these machines. The court explained some reasons to justify their decision. The court, however, misunderstood the medical nature of the Korean oriental medicine. The court articulated that the Korean oriental medicine is not anatomical enough to use the image data. This is not a logical decision in that the value of the image data is determined not only by anatomy but also by medical theory. The availability of image data by Oriental medicine can only be determined by the perspectives of Oriental medical theories. The difference between Western medical theory and Oriental medical theory can not be the justifiable ground for the court’s decision. The court also presented institutional reasons to support their decisions. The court says, according to current laws and regulations, there is no ground to permit for the Korean oriental doctors to use imaging devices. These present laws and regulations, however, can’t be the impartial criteria because they are not legislated for the Oriental medicine but for Western medicine.